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PREFACE
The late Professor J.W. Davidson wrote that the 
preponderant concern of historians of the Pacific was the study 
of multi-cultural situations. Davidson believed that such 
studies could not be satisfactorily undertaken 'from the 
western point of view alone', and that the focus of inquiry 
should be directed at the islands themselves. It was on this 
basis that this study was conceived: it is an examination of 
the nature and consequences of the interraction between an. 
island society and the culture of the European. The centre 
of interest is the behaviour of Melanesians and Europeans in 
the islands of the New 'Georgia Group.
The New Georgia Group has not received much attention 
from historians. Most who have touched upon it have done so 
as part of a broader field or subject. In this category is the 
work of Jack-Hinton, Scarr and Hilliard. The work of the 
first is an invaluable guide to the discovery and exploration 
of the Solomon Islands» To Scarr's study of the Western 
Pacific High Commission I owe much of my understanding of the 
operations of that organisation, and of the background to the 
creation of the protectorate administration. Hilliard's thesis 
covers in detail the development of Protestant missions in the 
Solomons, and I have not attempted to duplicate his work with 
regard to the Methodist and Seventh Day Adventist Missions in 
the New Georgia Group. Rather, this thesis deals with the 
missions when their activities come into view as part of the 
interrelations of the various groups of Europeans and 
islanders. Of more recent date is McKinnon's work on the
vii
Mbilua region of Vella Lavella. I have taken issue with his 
interpretation of nineteenth century developments in the 
Group, but on the whole our work is complementary. McKinnon's 
approach is that of a microcosmic sbudy of an island culture 
experiencing social change, and his work deals largely with 
rural change and development in a period outside the purview 
of this thesis.
The source material on which this study is based is 
extensive rather than comprehensive. While pieces of inform­
ation can be gleaned from a wide range of sources, there is a 
sad lack of any consistent and intensive records. For the 
first hundred years of European contact - a period of momentous 
development - only fragmentary and sporadic evidence is 
available. The sources improve for the concluding forty or 
so years of the period under study, with reasonably detailed 
material available from the archives of the Royal Navy, the 
various missions, and the colonial government. Unfortunately, 
these sources all too often limit themselves to the affairs 
and interests of their European authors, paying scant attention 
to the islanders; this imbalance has been reflected, to an 
extent, in this work.
The first two chapters deal with island society and 
early European contact. They argue that the New Georgian 
islanders were able to exploit and control the circumstances 
created by the coming of the European, and that head-hunting, 
a practice of great religious, political and economic importance, 
was the major vehicle of this exploitation. Chapter Three 
examines the second phase of European contact - the years of 
the copra traders and the intervention of the Royal Navy in the
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affairs of the islands, and argues that the islanders* ability 
to exploit the European connection on their own terms remained 
undiminished.
The fourth chapter investigates the early years of 
the Protectorate, during which the forcible pacification of the 
islands was accompanied by an acceleration of economic 
exploitation, with a corresponding loss of the islanders' 
capacity to dictate the terms of their relationship with the 
white man. The chief avenues of exploitation were the alien­
ation of large amounts of land and adoption of extortionate 
trading methods. The colonial administration, in dealing with 
these matters and their consequences, was both irresponsible 
and inept.
Chapter Five examines the world of the European 
settlers in the Group - their lives, attitudes and political 
and economic ambitions, and their relationship with the 
administration which supported many of their demands without 
thought for the welfare or future of the islanders. The sixth 
and seventh chapters investigate the acceleration of land 
problems and the intensification of conflict between the various 
European interests in the islands, both culminating in the 
Land Commission, which is the subject of the eighth chapter.
This chapter argues that the Commission was almost submerged 
in the struggle amongst Europeans for power, prestige and 
wealth. The final chapter looks at the state of the islands 
in the mid 1920s, and concludes that this period marked a 
turning point, with the subsidence of inter-European squabbling
ix
and the adoption of a more responsible attitude towards the 
islanders by the administration.
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XNOTE ON GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES
Unless otherwise stated, all Solomon Island 
place names have been spelt in accordance 
with the Solomon Islands Gazetteer (Honiara, 
1969). However, the names of European 
stations and plantations (usually the same 
as the area in which they were located) have 
been spelt as they were originally.
Note that Ghizo refers to the island of that 
name, whereas Gizo is the name of the 
station/town on that island.
The term 'New Georgia Group', or simply 'Group', 
has been used throughout to distinguish it 
from New Georgia Island, which as been referred 
to as 'New Georgia'. However, the word 'New 
Georgian' refers to the Group as a whole, 
not New Georgia Island.
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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a study of the behaviour of Melanesians 
and Europeans in the New Georgia Group, Solomon Islands, from 
the beginning of European contact to the mid 1920s.
For the first century of contact the islanders of 
the Group were able to exploit the opportunities created by 
European intrusion within the framework of their own culture, 
and to dictate largely the terms of their relationship with 
the white man.
The imposition of colonial rule radically altered 
the situation. The forcible pacification of the islands 
destroyed the Melanesians' capacity to constrain the conduct 
of the Europeans in the Group and in consequence the European 
exploitation of the islands rapidly accelerated, particularly 
with regard to the alienation of land, which the colonial 
administration did much to encourage.
The first two decades of colonial rule saw the 
interests and welfare of the islanders neglected as European 
commercial, missionary and official factions struggled amongst 
themselves for status and authority. These conflicts, and the 
mounting land problems, culminated in the Land Commission of 
the early 1920s.
The Commission, although it too was almost submerged 
in inter-European rivalries, marked the adoption by the 
administration of a more responsible attitude towards the 
islanders. Other administrative reforms followed, and by 
the mid 1920s the turbulence and disorder that had accompanied 
colonial rule began to subside.
y\
INTRODUCTION
Rive hundred miles to the east of Papua New Guinea
lie the 'Islands of Solomon', as they were called after the
Spanish expedition of Mendana in the sixteenth century. In
pre-colonial times the name referred to an archipelago some
five hundred and fifty miles in length, composed of thousands
of islets, rocks and reefs, and dominated by six major islands
2and one large island cluster, the New Georgia Group.
The New Georgia Group stretches some one hundred 
and fifty miles in length, and in parts is about fifty miles 
wide. Yet it is quite compact: the most isolated island 
within it is but six miles from its nearest neighbour. In 
comparison, the channels which separate the Group from the 
other Solomon Islands vary in width from thirty to sixty-five 
miles. The Group is comprised of about one thousand islands 
which together encompass a land area of two thousand square 
miles. The bulk of this figure is contributed by the five 
largest islands: New Georgia, Vella Lavella, Kolombangara, 
Vangunu and Rendova. These islands are of volcanic origin and 
all have mountains rising in height to at least three thousand 
feet. The tallest is Kolombangara, an extinct volcano whose
For a detailed account of the origin of the name see 
C. Jack-Hinton, The Search for the Islands of Solomon 
1567-1858 (Oxford, 1%9), pp. 12-84.
The six islands are Bougainville, Choiseul, Santa Isabel, 
Malaita, Guadalcanal and San Cristobal. They vary in size 
from Choiseul (981 square miles) to Bougainville (3,500 
square miles). The features of the Solomon Islands are 
described on Map I; those of the New Georgia Group are 
given on Map II.
2name appropriately means 'King of the Waters': its peak is 
5,4-50 feet above sea level.
Apart from the areas that have been cleared for 
village and garden sites, all the islands are completely 
covered with dense tropical forest. The vegetation, combined 
with the rugged terrain of many of the islands, made overland 
travel exhausting and difficult. This was particularly the 
case for Europeans who were unfamiliar with the forest and 
were more likely to be ignorant of the few paths and tracks 
that did exist. A preferable means of travel was the sea, 
although this too had its difficulties. Most of the larger 
islands are bordered by coral reefs, the major exception being 
the 'weather' coasts of the more westerly islands such as 
Ranongga and Rendova. In the latter cases, breakers from the 
Solomon Sea crash directly on to the steep open beaches, with 
little or no protection offered for landing or mooring. In the 
other coastal areas the numerous lagoons formed by the barrier 
reefs and islets facilitated travel in canoes and other shallow- 
draughted boats but were a nightmare to Europeans navigating 
larger vessels.
The New Georgia Group has a typically equatorial 
maritime climate with consistent high temperatures and high 
humidity at sea level. These conditions are moderated somewhat 
by the southeast trade winds which blow almost continuously 
between April and November. Rainfall is heavy, averaging 
between 100 and 200 inches a year, the wettest months usually 
being January, February and March. As well as the pervasive
 ^British Solomon Islands Report for the year 1972 (Honiara, 
1^9737, pp. 112-15, 160.
3malaria, this environment also encouraged such diseases as
4hookworm, dysentry and tropical ulcers or yaws. The latter 
could develop from a tiny scratch or blister into a gaping 
sore exposing the bone. The islanders bore these complaints 
as a necessary part of their lives, though their suffering was 
in no way diminished by the fact. For Europeans fresh from a 
friendlier climate, and unfamiliar with such illnesses, the 
transition from health to debility could have psychological as 
well as physical effects. Hope and happiness could deteriorate 
into disillusionment and melancholy. To the European, the 
islands were often a hostile environment: his ships were blown 
on to reefs and grounded on the intricate shoals; he sweated and 
stumbled through the bush; his cumbrous clothing became wet, 
uncomfortable and unhealthy; his goods and possessions rotted 
and rusted.
The history of the New Georgia Group from the arrival 
of Europeans in the late eighteenth century to the 1920s falls 
broadly into two periods: the pre-colonial era, and the
A survey taken in the early 1920s indicated that between 60 
and 80% of the indigenous population was infected with 
hookworm, and that yaws was practically universal. H.B. 
Hetherington & K.R. Steenson, ’A Year’s Hookworm and Yaws 
Work in the Solomon Islands', The Medical Journal of Australia 
(June, 1929), p. 856.
 ^For example, see J. London, The Cruise of the Snark, twelth 
ed. (London, 1926), p. 2A5, and E. Muspratt, My South Sea 
Island (London, 1931;? passim.
4years of the Protectorate administration. In the former 
period the Melanesians of the Group largely dictated the terms 
of their relationship with the white man. The Europeans had 
no ’fatal impact' upon island society: the opportunities created 
by the coming of the European were exploited by islanders to 
enhance their status and prestige in indigenous terms. While 
the role of Europeans as suppliers of goods and services was 
crucial to developments in island society, the white man remained, 
in a sense, peripheral to the basic concerns and aspirations 
of the islanders which continued to be firmly rooted in the 
traditional faith and values of their culture. The practice 
of head-hunting, which was the most basic expression of the 
religious, political and economic values of island society, 
was the most important vehicle for the islanders' exploitation 
of their connections with the European.
Some historians have tended to see so-called 
'primitive' societies as particularly susceptible to collapse 
in the face of European intrusion. D.K. Fieldhouse has 
argued that:
In many parts of Africa and the Pacific, where 
political units were small and religions 
primitive, the presence of small numbers of 
European traders, planters, missionaries and 
beachcombers could erode indigenous instit­
utions and social cohesion. Matters were 
made worse by rivalry between Europeans and 
by intermittent intervention by European 
military or naval forces. In the end such 
places, particularly in the Pacific, frequently 
reached a state of domestic disintegration 
which can be described as a 'crack-up
6 D.K. Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire 1 8 3 0 -1 9 1 4  (London, 1 9 7 3 )  ^
p .  8 3 .
5This study of the New Georgia Group offers an alternative view. 
The coming of Europeans to the Group did not result in 
'disintegration1. For over a century the New Georgians 
retained control of both their own society and their relation­
ship with the white man.
The source material for the pre-colonial period is 
sketchy and irregular. The only consistent and detailed 
records are those of the Royal Navy, and these are limited 
to the last three decades of the nineteenth century. Despite 
their limited range, the sources contain a reasonable amount 
of information on the islanders, their society, and their 
role in the contact process. This is because the interests of 
the Europeans who visited and resided in the Group in the pre­
colonial years revolved principally around the behaviour and 
attitudes of the islanders. The traders were dependent upon 
the islanders for their livelihoods (and often their lives), 
and the object of the Navy's visits to the Group was primarily 
the investigation of the conduct of the islanders.
The establishment of a Protectorate in 1896
marked the beginning of the end of the islanders' capacity
to determine the nature of their relationship with the European,
and to act in accordance with their traditional beliefs and
customs. According to Fieldhouse, the extension of 'formal
European protection' was the only remedy for the disorder that
7had been created by European intrusion. In the New Georgia 
Group, the imposition of colonial rule was, in many ways, a
7 ibid., p. 83, 239, ^37.
6prelude to disorder. The forcible pacification of the 
islands removed the constraints on the behaviour of Europeans. 
The retaliatory capacity of the islanders, which had restricted 
abuses by Europeans in previous years, was destroyed. Exploit­
ation quickly followed: traders adopted extortionate methods, 
and large amounts of land were alienated without consultation 
with the islanders. The Protectorate administration offered 
little protection from these abuses; indeed, in the matter of 
land alienation it was the architect of much of the injustice 
that occurred.
In the years after 1900 the interests and welfare of 
the islanders were increasingly submerged in the fierce compet­
ition between European missionaries, settlers and officials 
for power and prestige. In the same period, the difficulties 
and problems resulting from the irresponsible alienation of 
land continued to grow. The land question culminated in the 
Land Commission of the 1920s. The Commission was also the 
climax of much of the inter-European conflicts in the Group; 
conflicts which at one stage threatened seriously to impair 
its operation. The Commission, despite its shortcomings, was 
at least a belated recognition of the rights of the islanders, 
and the first of a number of reforms and changes that were to 
improve the situation in the Group. By the latter half of 
the_1920s peace and, to a lesser extent, justice, at last came 
to the islands.
The sources for the colonial period are much more 
profuse than those for the earlier years. However, they are 
in many ways more disappointing. The records of the administ­
ration, the missions and the settlers tend to concentrate on
7the affairs of the Europeans in the Group. There is 
surprisingly little detailed information concerning the 
islanders. This is a consequence of the changed status of 
the Europeans in the islands: the settlers were no longer 
dependent upon the islanders for their livings; their security 
was assured, and in their aspirations and vision of the future 
there was little room for the indigenous population. The 
missions and administration, whose activities were supposedly 
directed towards the betterment of the islanders, were largely 
pre-occupied with the squabbling amongst themselves, and this 
is reflected in their records. In consequence, that part 
of this study concerned with the colonial period has a greater 
concentration on the affairs of Europeans than that dealing 
with the earlier years of contact.
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8CHAPTER ONE
ISLAND SOCIETY BEFORE THE COMING OF THE EUROPEAN
From 1787 to the 1860s Europeans regularly visited 
and resided in the New Georgia Group, yet very little remains 
as a record of their observations and experiences. As a result, 
an account of pre-European island society must be based on 
later anthropological and ethnological studies and the oral 
traditions of the islanders, with some small assistance from 
the few morsels of information that survive from the early days 
of contact. Consequently, assumption and hypothesis loom 
rather large in the following discussion which first briefly 
surveys the little that is known of the prehistory of the Group, 
and then looks in more detail at the people of the islands, 
their relations with each other and the structure of their 
society. The roles of religion and leadership in island society 
are examined, and it is argued that both found common expression 
in the practice of head-hunting.
There is a tendency amongst European observers of 
so-called 'primitive' societies to assume that they were some­
how locked in time, or 'timeless', until the arrival of the 
white man triggered a fundamental transition. The coming of 
the European may have quickened the pace of change, but it did 
not-originate it. Although the pre-history of the New Georgia 
Group is largely unknown, the scattered evidence that has been 
uncovered does indicate that the societies of the islands had 
experienced considerable upheaval and development.
It is possible that as early as 25000 BC 'Old 
Melanesians' from Sahulland, the late Pleistocene land mass
9comprising both Australia and New Guinea, migrated along the
island chain stretching eastward of what is now New Guinea and
reached the Solomon Islands. Whatever the time of their
arrival, it seems certain that these people were Non-Austron-
esian speakers. A number of languages of this type survive
today in the Solomons: Mbilua and Mbaniata in the New Georgia
Group, Savosavo and Lavukaleve on Savo and Pavuvu respectively.
These four languages share very little common vocabulary but
are remarkably homogenous in their phonemic and phonetic
patterns. Such indications of unity are possible evidence that
they originated in one early general migration with subsequent
millenia of geographical isolation within the Solomons resulting
"Iin the divergencies that now exist. A similar pattern can be
detected for the other linguistic group found in the New Georgia
Group - the Austronesian speakers.
Between 4-000 BC (possibly earlier) and 1500 BC
Austronesian speakers from Indonesia spread to parts of New
pGuinea and island Melanesia. The eleven Austronesian vern­
aculars found in the New Georgia Group are closely related; 
united not only by the high proportions of their shared 
vocabularies, but also by their common 'idiosyncratic'
W. Howells, The Pacific Islanders (London, 1973), pp. 186-9»
J.H. Greenberg, *The Indo-Pacific Hypothesis', in T.A. Sebeok 
(ed.) Current Trends in Linguistics, Vol.8 (The Hague, 1971), 
pp. 816-7, 85H.
A. Capell, 'Non-Austronesian Languages of the British Solomons', 
Pacific Linguistics Series A - Occasional Papers No,21, pp. 1-3« 
S.A. Wurm, 'The Papuan Linguistic Situation', in Sebeok, 
op.cit. , p. 64-7.
Howells, op.cit., pp. 207-11.
M.E. & R. Shutler, 'Origins of the Melanesians', Archeology 
and Physical Anthropology in Oceania, II (1967), pp. 91-9-
10
3character when compared with 'typical' Austronesian. Again, 
this is possible evidence of an original common migration, with 
following local isolation resulting in the development of 
further linguistic sub-families and dialects.
It may have been that the Non-Austronesian communit­
ies which existed at the time of the Austronesian migrations 
were mostly small and dispersed, and that some did not survive 
the intrusion of numerically stronger Austronesian speakers. 
Those that did survive may have done so because of their 
isolation: Lavukaleve, Savosavo and Mbilua are all found on 
single islands which they do not share with any other linguistic 
group. The other remaining Non-Austronesian language, Mbaniata, 
is located on the southwest end of Rendova, a region shielded 
by a rugged mountain range and the open sea. It is known that 
one Non-Austronesian speaking group, the Kazakuru, were 
absorbed by their more powerful and numerous neighbours, the 
Roviana people. It would appear that the Kazakuru were 
relatively few in numbers and were afflicted with disease, 
possibly due to inbreeding. Without the protection of any
3v I. Dyen, 'A lexicostatistical classification of the Austron­
esian languages', Indiana University Publications in Anthrop­
ology and Linguistics Memoir 19 (Baltimore, T965TJ pp. 36-41. 
G. W. Grace, ‘Languages of the New Hebrides and Solomon 
Islands', in Sebeok, op.cit., pp. 3^8-9. The distribution of 
the languages of the Group is given on Map III.
u A.H. Hall, 'Customs and Culture from Kazakuru Folklore 
Obtained After the Discovery of the Shrine at Bao', Oceania, 
XXXV (1964), pp. 129-35. J.H.L. Waterhouse & S.H. Ray,
'The Kazakuru Language of New Georgia', Man, XXXI (1931)? 
pp. 123-6. P.A. Lanyon-Orgill, 'The Papuan Languages of the 
New Georgian Archipelago, Solomon Islands', Journal of Austro­
nesian Studies, I (1953), pp. 122-37 identifies two other 
extinct Non-Austronesian vernaculars, Guliguli and Doriri, 
which appear to have suffered the same fate as Kazukuru, to 
which they were closely related.
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natural barriers, they seem to have been drawn into the con­
flicts of the inhabitants of the Roviana Lagoon, and were 
unable to prevent the expansion of these people into the Munda 
region. The absorption of the Kazukuru by the various Roviana 
clans is well documented in the genealogies preserved by their 
descendants, which seem to indicate that those that survived 
the ravages of sickness and warfare were mostly female, who 
became the wives of men of Nusa Roviana and Munda.
While the course of island society in the pre-contact 
era remains largely unknown, it is apparent that it underwent 
considerable upheaval. On the island of Kolombangara and in 
the Mase River basin on New Georgia there are indications that 
an established culture of significant difference to that 
observed in historic times existed many years ago. At these 
places are the remains of extensive terraces, once used for the 
cultivation of the Colocasia esculenta, or true taro. The Mase
site has been described as ’well established farmland with an
6irrigation system for a settled agriculture', and another 
observer has estimated that there are approximately four square 
miles of terracing in the area.r It is not knownwhether this 
intensive system of cultivation was introduced with the
5 MS. collection of genealogies compiled by J. Roni, entitled 
'Buka tututi pa Kazakuru, Roviana, Vuragare, Koloi'. In the 
possession of J. Roni, Nusa Roviana. Interview with J. Roni, 
B. Gina and J. Zinihite, 14-/9/74- Munda.
6 T. Takeda, Progress Report Vina Roni S.P.h. (Mase Basin Side) 
New Georgia B.S.I.P. (Solomons Explorations Pty. Ltd., Feb. , 
1973), p. 4-.
 ^Interview with B. Barrus, 29/9/197^, Munda.
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Austronesian migrations, or whether it evolved independently 
in the islands. It is equally difficult to draw any conclusions 
about the forces operating in a society which employed, and 
then abandoned, this agricultural system. One possible factor 
in the adoption of intensive methods of cultivation is populat­
ion pressure. However, this appears unlikely in the New 
Georgia Group, where the terraced areas are minute when compared 
with the total land available for cultivation. A more tenable 
hypothesis is that intensive agricultural methods were 
introduced by settlers who had come from an area where they were 
necessary because of the high population density (perhaps this 
pressure was a cause of their migration). The system could 
then have been abandoned as it became apparent that in their 
new environment the construction of irrigated terracing was not 
essential for the production of an adequate food supply, and 
that less strenuous methods would suffice. H.C. Brookfield 
has pointed out that intensive systems are more 'brittle1 
in the face of major disruptions: a large-scale conflict, 
epidemic or blight might equally have been responsible for the 
transition to the swidden or 'shifting' type of cultivation
opractised in more recent times. Whatever its cause, this 
development was fundamental to island society, as it involved 
the basic question of subsistence. In the absence of any 
archeological investigations, little else can be concluded about 
the prehistory of the Group. Fortunately, there is more
H.C. Brookfield & D. Hart, Melanesia A Geographical Interpret­
ation of an Island World (London, 197^)? pp. 80-124. I owe 
much to Brookfield's discussion of intensity in Melanesian 
agriculture.
13
information on which to base a description of pre-European
island society, although the source material must be treated
with caution, as most of it dates from a period many years
after initial European contact with the islands.
In general, the basis of social and political
organisation was the clan: the clan in this case being a
cognatic group tracing their descent from a common ancestral
figure. Each clan was associated with certain tracts of land
on which they lived and cultivated. The nature of this
association, and the form of the clan, varied throughout the
Group. The speakers of a particular language generally had a
common understanding of kinship structure and land tenure,
although the linguistic group itself had limited political
significance. There are thirteen languages spoken in the New
Georgia Group today, though in the late eighteenth century there 
9were more. Eleven of the thirteen languages are of Austron-
esian origin and are closely related, sharing a high proportion
10of their vocabularies. The kinship systems of their speakers
9 The extinct language Kazakuru, with its dialects Guliguli and 
Doriri, has already been mentioned. In addition, there is a 
reference to a language that was possibly once spoken on 
Nggatokae; this was called Chipuru, but no vocabulary of it 
has survived. A. Capell, 'Notes on the Islands of Choiseul 
and New Georgia, Solomon Islands', Oceania, XIV (194-3), p. 26.
^ The term 'language' has been used rather loosely above, as 
some of the eleven are in fact dialects. Dyen divides the 
New Georgian Austronesian languages into three subfamilies: 
Rovianic, Marovan, and Lunggic. Rovianic is comprised of 
two languages: Roviana and Kusaghean. The Kusaghean
language has as dialects Kusaghe and Hoava. The Marovan sub­
family is comprised of two languages: Lunggan and Nduke. 
Lunggan consists of three dialects: Lungga, Ghanongga (or 
Kumbokota), and Simbo (or Mandeghughusu). Dyen overlooks 
Ughele, which would appear to belong to the Rovianic sub­
family. See Dyen, 'A lexicostatistical classification of 
the Austronesian languages', pp. 36-4-1.
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also appear to have been similar, whereas those of the speakers 
of the two Non-Austronesian languages, Mbilua and Mbaniata, 
were more idiosyncratic.
The Mbilua language was spoken on the island of 
Vella Lavella; each Vella Lavellan was a member of a toutou - 
an exogamous matrilineal descent group that traced its origin 
to an apical female ancestor. The size of the toutou varied, 
but it is stated by modern informants that in the past there 
were fewer, but much larger, toutou. These primary toutou 
appear to have lost their cohesion because of their size, and 
to have fragmented into smaller toutou. The members of a 
toutou lived together in a village or cluster of hamlets in 
the bush, although they kept canoes and huts on the coast for 
temporary use. A toutou claimed the land on which it lived 
and cultivated as its own, but it seems that such claims could 
lapse if the land was deserted or unused. A toutou could allow 
another toutou the use of its land after the payment of gifts 
and ceremonial feasts, but it appears that once permission of 
this sort was given reclamation of the land was difficult.
This may have accounted for the break-up of the large primary 
toutou estates: as sub-groups within the original large clan 
began to assert their autonomy, the primary toutou1s integrity 
weakened. A toutou was presided over by a lekasa who had to be 
a cognatic member of the toutou with enough wealth and spirit­
ual prestige to assist his kinsmen, propitiate
15
11the ancestors and enforce the sanctions of the toutou.
The traditions of the people of Vella Lavella give
the impression that the occupation of land, and the status of
the toutou, were by no means static. The disappearance and
emergence of toutou, conflict amongst them, and their migration
about the island, do not appear to have been unusual. However,
it is possible to make some general comments on the nature
of the relationship between the various groups that inhabited
the island. The islanders distinguish between two forms of the
Mbilua language - Mbilua and Ndovele. The former is found on
the southeastern half of the island, and the latter on the 
12northwestern. This division has a geographical basis: a 
broad valley running across the island separates the rugged 
hilly regions of the northwest and southeast. This valley 
does not seem to have been much occupied in the past, possibly 
due to the lack of naturally defensive sites in the area. In 
the northwestern half of the island there are three regions - 
Ndovele, Iringgila and Njorio; in the southeastern half there 
are five - Njava, Siruinbai, Mbilua, Supato and Varese. While 
the toutou that occupied each of these regions did not 
constitute political units, it would appear that there was some 
significance in this regional division. The toutou of each 
individual region were unlikely to indulge in serious conflict
J.M. McKinnon, Bilua Report A study of Rural Change and 
Development in Vella Lavella, Western District. British 
Solomon Islands Protectorate (Wellington, 1975;, PP. 4-8. 
DC I. Reports, Notes of Proceedings and Other Papers 
Relating to Land Claims. Claim No.52.
Report of the Land Commissioner, 9 June 1925. Notes of 
Proceedings.
12 Interview with D. Rariqeto, 5/1171974» Mbilua.
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amongst themselves. The impracticality of being at war with 
close neighbours and relations, as well as the need to preserve 
some unity in the face of possible attacks from outside groups, 
would have acted as pressures against the escalation of 
domestic squabbling into large scale warfare. The same con­
straints would probably operate, though with less force, between 
the toutou of neighbouring regions. However, between the 
northwest and southeast ends of the island there may have been
a long-term emnity. Modern informants state that there was
16regular raiding between Mbilua and Ndovele. A possible factor 
in this situation was the origin of some of the Ndovele toutou,
1ZLwhich had migrated to Vella Lavella from Choiseul. The 
tension between Mbilua and Ndovele was exacerbated in the 
twentieth century with the establishment of rival missions in 
the two regions, and it is difficult to know exactly when the 
conflict began; it may not have existed in pre-European times.
The other Non-Austronesian speaking people in the 
New Georgia Group were the Mbaniata of southern Rendova. Like 
the Mbilua speakers, the clan system of the Mbaniata was 
matrilineal, but there the similarity ends. The Mbaniata 
people have seven named, matrilineal, non-local, non-exogamous 
clans or rana. Each rana is associated with one or more tracts 
of land, however, these tracts have long been divided into 
lesser estates allocated to branches of the clan. While
15 ibid.
LC I. Claim No.48, 'A statement made at Dobeli by the tribe 
whose antecedents came from Choiseul’, dated 20 June 1919-
14
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children of male clan members have rights of usufruct over
clan or branch land, the right to ’look after’ the land passed
through the mother. The rana do not seem to have ever been
local groups or to have had much political or economic 
15significance. The basic political unit was residential: a
branch of a clan living together on a particular piece of clan
land. One level above this was their regional loyalty: the
Mbaniata speakers divide themselves into two regions - Mbaniata
and Lokuru. The two areas are on different sides of the
island and are separated by a steep range. There would appear
to have been occasional conflict between these two regions,
although intermarriage between the clans of the two areas would
16probably have helped to avoid the intensification of fighting.
Apart from the Mbilua and Mbaniata speakers, island 
society throughout the New Georgia Group was reasonably homo­
genous. The commonest term for the clan was mbutu mbutu: how­
ever, the word ’mbutu mbutu' was used to refer to both a
cognatic descent group, and to a residential group that was
17part of the former. ' In some cases the residential mbutu 
mbutu could in fact comprise all or nearly all members of the
^  H.W. Scheffler, 'Baniata Kin Classification: the Case for
Extensions’, Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 28 (1972), 
p. 352.
^  Interview with Boaz Bero, 23/9/1971-5 Lokuru.
Interview with Ali Pitu, 23/9/197^5 Lokuru.
Interview with Jepe, 19/9/197^5 Mbaniata.
^  H.W. Scheffler, 'Kindred and Kin Groups in Simbo Island Social 
Structure', Ethnology, I (1962), p. 139-
The word mbutu mbutu is found in the languages of Roviana, 
Simbo, Ranongga, Nduke and Ughele (mbu' mbutu in the latter).
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descent group mbutu mbutu. Today, membership of a descent
group is not determined exclusively through the father nor the
mother, but rather a combination of both, or what has been
18called a ’more general principle of filiative kin right’.
This descent system has been subject to investigation by two
19land commissions this century. Both concluded that bilateral 
descent was a relatively recent development from what was 
originally a matrilineal system. This conclusion was based on 
the continuing existence of matrilineages in some parts of the 
Group, and on the statements of some older witnesses before 
the commissions which asserted that in earlier times the 
female 'line' had been stronger than the male. The commission­
ers also pointed out that if followed logically over a number 
of generations, the bilateral system would lead to an enormously 
confusing multiplicity of lineage connections. They discerned 
a number of factors responsible for the supposed breakdown 
of the matrilineal system: that big-men were able to have 
their sons recognised as landholders in their own line; that 
the usufruct of trees could be passed from the father to the
son; that men did the negotiating in land matters; and the
20influence of the colonial government and the missions.
Quoted in Scheffler, ibid.
^  The B.S.I.P. Land Commission 1920-1929-, and the Special
Lands Commission whose report was published in 1957? as C.H. 
Allan, Customary Land Tenure in the British Solomon Islands 
Protectorate (Honiara, 1957)•
LC I. Land Commissioner's Report on Claim Nos. 30-57? 55 
(21 April 1925)? pp. 9-5-61 (hereafter referred to as 'Lever 
Report '.)■••
Allan, Customary Land Tenure, pp. 89-91.
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The land commissions were of course concerned with 
the relation of descent systems to land tenure, and their 
conclusions were based on conditions that were not necessarily 
applicable to pre-European society. Without the existence of 
a market in land, the need to justify ’ownership' as a basis 
for selling would not have arisen. Occupation could possibly 
have been as great a determinant as lineage, and the need to 
precisely define lineage connections with regard to land would 
not have been pressing. In fact, the system may well have 
worked the other way round, with interest in land determining 
lineage. A man who married and then resided in the village 
of his parents would consider his children to be of that 
mbutu mbutu. If he moved to the village of his wife's 
parents, his children might then take the mbutu mbutu of the 
mother. Thus descent could be both matrilineal and patrilineal 
in turn, depending on the circumstances. The land commissioners 
were confronted with a situation where individuals, anxious to 
establish extensive land interests, were claiming rights 
through both parents simultaneously. Anticipating the confusion 
that would arise if such rights were granted over more than one 
generation, thecommissioners concluded that matrilineal/patril- 
ineal descent was an 'unnatural' introduction. In pre- 
European society, if residence was the primary determinant of 
lineage and the value of land lay in its use and not on a 
cash market, such simultaneous claims would not necessarily 
arise. An individual's major concern would be land on which he 
lived and cultivated.
20
The evidence for this hypothesis lies in the
genealogies of the people of the Roviana Lagoon. These
consistently show that the descent lines of the various
inbutu rributu pass indiscriminately through both male and female.
For example, the mbutu mbutu Sosolo of Lodumaho, Munda is of
Kazakuru origin and begins with the apical female, Vakoriqe.
It then progresses through one female, three males, two
females, and three males to the present day. This pattern is
quite typical: clan membership could apparently be taken from
the father or mother, and this situation seems to have existed
21for many generations. On this basis it would seem that the 
bilateral descent system observed by the land commissions was 
not so much a corruption of an original matrilineal system, 
but rather a modern development of what could be called an 
ambilateral form of descent. It is of course possible that 
this ambilateralism was itself a development from a matrilineal 
form which was eventually diluted through convenience. As the 
land commissioners noted, there is some evidence of the
j
islanders belief that the female line was 'stronger' than the 
22male; however, in practice it would seem that in many cases 
the convenience of taking the line of the father triumphed over
21 The author collected the genealogies of many of the mbutu 
mbutu existing in the Roviana Lagoon■area in 1974-. There are 
also a considerable number of Roviana, Simbo and Nduke 
genealogies in the A.M. Hocart Papers, MS. Papers 60, 
Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. Item 
No.A3.
The line of the mbutu mbutu Sosolo was given by B. Gina,
30 August 1974-* Munda.
LC I., ibid.22
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this belief.
The relations between the various Austronesian 
speaking groups, and between the clans that comprised those 
groups, seem to have been of a similar type to those already 
described on Vella Lavella and Mbaniata. Namely, neighbouring 
clans inhabiting a certain area would be unlikely to engage 
in long-term, large scale warfare. Quarrelling over such matters 
as petty crime, adultery and sorcery would be unlikely to 
develop into serious conflict, as all parties would realise 
the impracticality of being in a state of war with their 
immediate neighbours. Peace keeping was ensured through the 
exchange of traditional wealth objects such as the bakiha, 
which were ornaments fashioned from clam shell. Intermarriage 
between neighbouring clans would also act as a deterrent to the 
assumption of hostilities before an attempt was made to seek 
an alternative solution. It seems probable that in areas of 
high population density the likelihood of internal conflict was 
even further diminished, with extensive intermarriage between 
clans settled in close proximity to each other. The strength 
of numbers and internal unity of such areas would make them 
more powerful than the more dispersed and fragmented settlements 
of other areas.
The prime examples of such a situation would appear 
to be the people of the islands of Simbo and Nusa Roviana.
Both of these island had strong natural defences: Simbo
Interview with Leunga, Hite, Bamu, Navoko, Beti, Jonga and 
Mulasai, 29-/9/1979- at Ughele.
Interview with Doni, Bambara, Elana and Mamupio, 17/10/1979- 
at Nusa Simbo.
25
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was isolated from its nearest neighbour by five miles of ocean
and its steep rugged hills were natural bastions. Nusa Roviana,
one of the barrier islands of the Roviana Lagoon, was less
isolated but it too had the elevation to enable its inhabitants
to look over its surroundings and withstand attack. According
to Roviana traditions, it was settled for precisely this reasofn!"
Both islands appear to have been well populated: a number of
early European visitors to Simbo commented that it was populous,
and Nusa Roviana had the numbers to enable it to serve as a
focus of emigration to other parts of the Roviana Lagoon over
a number of generations, apparently without adversely affecting
25its own powerful position. The strength of Simbo and Nusa
Roviana was reflected in the nature of their settlements: the
two seem to have been the only areas in the New Georgia Group
with unfortified villages adjacent to the sea. Elsewhere
villages were sited inland, concealed in the bush, or else
26heavily fortified, such as those of Marovo island.
Interview with J. Roni, J. Zinihite and B. Gina, 14/9/1974 
at Munda.
25^ People from Nusa Roviana settled on the mainland opposite 
(Munda) and on the other islands in the Lagoon. Some of 
these migrations are dated back to six generations.
Interview with N. Kera, 9/10/1974 at Munda. Nusa Roviana 
also acted as a refuge, with people from Parara, Kazakuru 
and Kalikonggu settling there. Interview with J. Roni etc., 
14/9/1974.
26 J.L.O. Tedder, 'Notes on Old Village Sites on Marovo Island 
- New Georgia', The Journal of the Solomon Islands Museum 
Association, 2 (1974), pp. 12-21.
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The strong position of Simbo and Nusa Roviana was
further reinforced by their good relations with each other.
The people of the two islands intermarried frequently and
regularly traded with each other: Simbo would provide ngali
nuts and megapode eggs in exchange for taro and clamshell 
27ornaments. 1
The one other area which may have been in a
position to challenge the power of Simbo and Nusa Roviana
could have been Mbilua, the southeastern corner of Vella
Lavella. Roviana traditions tell of massive attacks on Nusa
Roviana by Mbilua men, and the emnity between the two regions
28continued throughout the nineteenth century. There are some
indications that Mbilua was also a centre of concentrated and
substantial population. The Roviana traditions emphasise the
numerical strength of the Mbilua attackers, and in the nine-
29teenth century the area seems to have been heavily settled. y 
The position of other communities throughout the
27 Interview with Doni, Bambara, Elana, and Mamupio, 17/10/1974-.
^  Interview with J. Roni, 11/9/4 974- at Munda.
LC I. Lever Report, pp. 112-22 describes the Mbilua men 
as the ’ancient foes' of Roviana.
Interview with J. Roni, 11/9/1974-- One tradition tells of 
1000 attackers from Mbilua.
L. Foanaota, 'Burial Sites on Vella Lavella Island', The 
Journal of the Solomon Islands Museum Association, 2 (1974-), 
pp. 22-33.
There are many burial sites in Mbilua; some contained the 
remains of up to 160 men - and these were said to have been 
from a single clan.
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Group seems to have been less secure. On Ranongga the people
lived amongst the steep hills of the range that runs down the
spine of the island. On the northern half of the island were
settled the Kumbokota people (eastern side) and the Ghanongga
people (western side) who both spoke the Kumbokota dialect.
The southern half of the island was the region of the Lungga
people, whose dialect was closely related to Kumbokota.
Despite these linguistic affinities, the three regions appear
50to have been in conflict with each other on many occasions.
To the east, a small community lived on the island of Ghizo. 
These people seem to have had good relations with Mbilua, 
but this connection did not compensate them for the weakness of 
their position. Ghizo is small and flat, offering little prot­
ection, and its inhabitants were decimated by raids in the mid 
nineteenth century. The few survivors eventually deserted the 
island.J The people of Kolombangara (or Nduke) were more 
fortunate. Kolombangara, a large extinct volcano, appears to 
have had few inhabitants. Only the southwestern sector of the 
island was populated; this is the one area where the smooth 
slopes of the volcanic cone give way to broken ranges, provid­
ing some natural defences against attackers. Disputes amongst 
the clans inhabiting this region were not uncommon, though
their scale was probably small. They appear to have been able
52to adopt a common front against hostile outsiders. A
^  Interviews with Torebule 16/10/1974 and Panakera, 17/10/1974 
at Kumbokota.
51 J.M. McKinnon, 'Tomahawks, Turtles and Traders A Reconst­
ruction in the Circular Causation of Warfare in the New 
Georgia Group', Oceania, XLV (1975), P- 502.
52 LG I. Lever Report, pp. 95-112.
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similar situation existed in Ughele (northern Rendova),
which was inhabited by a small number of clans. The Ughele
people seem to have been regularly at war with the two other
groups on Rendova, Lokuru and Mbaniata, but amongst the
55Ughele clans themselves conflict was limited. ^
The remainder of the New Georgia Group - New Georgia
Island, the Marovo Lagoon, Vangunu and Nggatokae - was
inhabited by scattered and warring groups living deep in the
mountainous bush or in fortified coastal settlements. The
nature of these groups is largely unknown: writing in the 1940s,
Capell and Russell described between twelve and fourteen 'clans'
5 4that were found in the area. By that time, the material 
and social life of the islanders had been radically altered 
from that of the nineteenth century, let alone pre-European 
times. Moreover, their use of the term 'clan' was somewhat 
confusing, as no attempt was made to define what was meant. It 
would appear that the term was used to mean a broad cognatic 
group with not necessarily direct lineal connections between 
its members. Rather, it was a group which may have generally 
accepted a common origin and ancestry but had since long sub­
divided into smaller and more explicit 'lines'. For example, 
the Kazakuru people all traced their origin to one apical
^  Interview with Leunga etc., 24/9/197^-
^  T. Russell, 'The Culture of the Marovo, British Solomon 
Islands', Journal of the Polynesian Society, 57 (1948), 
pp. 507-8 and A. Capell, 'Notes on the Islands', pp. 26-7 
both list these clans (with some differences).
26
female, but were nevertheless sub-divided into a number of
separate mbutu mbutu. The evidence given before the first
Land Commission makes it apparent that the people of the
Marovo Lagoon saw the basic social organisation to be a 'line'
of descent of which the living representatives generally
occupied the one village or hamlet and cultivated specific
56tracts of land. The 'clans’ described by Capell and Russell
were not well-defined descent groups, but agglomerations of
related 'lines' occupying particular regions, and generally
having the same name as those regions. Nevertheless, it is
quite apparent these 'clans' could function effectively as
units, particularly under an able leader and in reaction to
external threats, and that such regional groups could be
spoken of as operating with a cohesive 'foreign policy' in
57relation to the other groups. (
While there were around a dozen regional groups 
inhabiting New Georgia Island and the islands to the east in 
the twentieth century, in earlier years there were more. The 
one group known to have lost their independent identity were 
the Kazakuru, who dwelt in the Tiriokiamba area of southwestern 
New Georgia. The Kazakuru were eventually absorbed by the
^  Interview with P. Siga, 17/9/1974- at Munda.
P. Siga, MS. notes entitled 'Buka tututi pa Kazakuru'. This 
contains the genealogies of the various mbutu mbutu Kazakuru.
^  LC I. Claim No.26, 'Notes of Proceedings'.
57 Witnesses before the first Land Commission frequently spoke 
of the attitudes or relations of the 'Kusaghe' people etc. 
as a single entity.
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Roviana clans which expanded from Nusa Roviana into the
Munda region five generations ago. The Kazakuru may have been
forced to seek the protection of the Roviana people, for
apparently they were at emnity with the Nduke clans on
Kolombangara and the Kusaghe people to their north. One
traditional account describes a fierce battle between Kusaghe
38and Kazakuru in which the latter lost eight hundred men. The
The absorption of the Kazakuru would seem to have been completed
during the second half of the nineteenth century, when Nusa
Roviana and Munda became a focus for refugees from head-hunting 
39raids.
The Kusaghe people appear to have inhabited the region 
between the Hanggorana and Mase Rivers. To their northeast, 
between the Mase and Lever Harbour, was the territory of the 
Lupa people. Both of these groups lived deep in the hills 
but maintained contact with the coast, having groves of coco­
nuts on the foreshore and keeping canoes for fishing and raid­
ing. The Kusaghe and Lupa were not on good terms with each 
other and apparently feuded until the late 1800s when the 
statesmenlike policy of the big-man Vilingi brought them togeth­
er. Both Kusaghe and Lupa were also in conflict with other
40groups to the south.
The Marovo Lagoon extends from Lever Harbour to the 
island of Nggatokae, running adjacent to the northern coasts of
^  LC I. Lever Report, pp. 129-37- 
^  ibid., pp. 112-22.
40 ibid., pp. 137-54.
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New Georgia and Vangunu. The Lagoon is dotted with hundreds
of islets, though it would appear that only a few were occupied,
probably because of the lack of protection they offered. Those
that were settled, namely Ramata and Marovo Islands, had stock-
41ades for defence. The Ramata and Marovo people, together with 
a number of groups that lived close to the coast on the major 
islands, regarded themselves as 'beach' or 'salt-water' people, 
in opposition to the 'bush' people who dwelt deeper inland on 
New Georgia and Vangunu. The salt-water groups included the 
Pondokana people of north Vangunu, the inhabitants of Nggatokae, 
and the people of Nggerasi, Nono, Ramata and Marovo. Amongst 
the bush groups were Vangunu people (southern half of the 
island), the Kalivarana and Limbo people (southern side of New 
Georgia), and the Mbareke people (central eastern Vangunu).
The conflict between the bush and salt-water people seems to 
have been long-standing and bitter, with the former the weaker 
of the two. ^
While the people of the various islands and regions 
of the New Georgia Group differed in language and circumstances, 
they had at least one powerful common interest - the practice 
of head-hunting. The term 'head-hunting' has been used some­
what indiscriminately in the past to refer to the decapitation 
of those killed in warfare* In this thesis it is used more 
narrowly to describe the regular organisation of expeditions 
whose principal purpose was the acquisition of heads. Although
ibid., pp. 155-63. 
Tedder, op.cit.
42 LC I. Claim No.26 'Notes of Proceedings'.
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the decapitation of deceased kinfolk and slain enemies was 
common in the Solomon Islands, the systematic mounting of large 
expeditions to ’hunt' for heads was restricted to the western 
islands: principally Santa Isabel, Choiseul and the New Georgia 
Group. Of these, the inhabitants of the New Georgia Group 
were by far the most active in their head-hunting operations, 
which were of a greater intensity, scale and effect than those 
of the other islands.
When the trader Andrew Cheyne was on Simbo in 184-4 he
was horrified to see the walls of a large canoe house strung
with human heads. He was informed that a few days prior to his
arrival an expedition had returned to the island with ninety
three heads, and that it was the 'universal custom' throughout
44the Group to display these trophies in canoe houses. This
was the first of many European observations on the practice of
head-hunting in the Group. Such nineteenth century observers
seldom inquired too deeply into the function of head-hunting
within island society, often being content to assume that it
was yet another manifestation of the inherently brutal and
treacherous character of the islanders. Modern historians,
however, have tended to see head-hunting and 'slave raiding'
48as crucial to an understanding of island society.  ^ In the 
words of Peter Corris, they were 'the foundations of the
45 R.H. Godrington, The Melanesians Studies in Their 
Anthropology and Folklore (Oxford, 1891), p. 345-
^ D. Shineberg (ed.), The Trading Voyages of Andrew Cheyne 
1841-44 (Canberra, 1971)? pp. 303-4.
For example, see A.R. Tippett, Solomon Islands Christianity 
A Study in Growth and Obstruction (London, 19^7) ,  pp. 147-51•
45
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vigorous military, economic and ceremonial life enjoyed by the
46people of the western islands'.
In the late 1880s an anonymous reviewer in The West­
minster Review wrote of head-hunting in the Solomon Islands:
It seems, however, as if the desire for skulls 
has become hereditary, and that, quite irres­
pective of their special value to their 
possessor, they are hunted for owing to the 
force of a blind, instinctive impulse, the 
origin of which the hunter himself does not 
understand.^
This explanation of head-hunting adroitly transferred the
Europeans' lack of understanding of the phenomenon to the
islanders themselves. More recently, head-hunting has been
seen to have developed from the practice of acquiring skulls
for ritual purposes into a 'mania', in which the only object
48was to enhance the prestige of the slayer. ■ Such an explan­
ation rests too much on what Peter Lawrence has called 'the 
general anthropological prejudice against accepting belief as 
sociological fact, and predeliction to examine religious
phenomena almost exclusively as indices of human social relat- 
40ionships'. y Head-hunting was a practical expression of the 
religious beliefs of the islanders; or, to paraphrase Lawrence,
P. Corris, Passage, Port and Plantation A Study of Solomon 
Islands Labour Migration 1870-1911- (Melbourne. 1973). p. 30.
47 Anon., 'The Natives of the Solomon Islands', The Westminster 
Review, GXXIX (1888), p. 363.
48 C.H. Wedgwood, 'Some aspects of warfare in Melanesia', 
Oceania, I (1930), p. 13-
49
P. Lawrence, 'Daughter of Time', in T.G. Harding & B.J. 
Wallace (eds.), Cultures of the Pacific Selected Readings 
(New York, 1970), pp. 271-2.
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their behaviour was intellectually directed: they held certain 
religious beliefs and acted on them to achieve their ends.
There has been little investigation into the 
religious beliefs of the islanders of the New Georgia Group in 
the period before the introduction of Christianity. The most 
extensive work was undertaken by A.M. Hocart and W.H.R. Rivers 
on the Percy Sladen Trust Expedition to the Solomon Islands in 
1908, which concentrated on the island of Simbo. The ensuing 
discussion relies mainly on this material.
The Simboese believed in the existence of 'ghosts' 
(tomate) and 'spirits' or 'gods' (tamasa). Generally, tornate 
referred to a dead man, his skull or corpse, and his ghost or 
spirit, though there were a number of tomate not connected with 
any deceased human being. The tamasa were distinguished from 
tomate: they were gods or sacred being unconnected with any 
recently living man, though they may have sprung from some 
long dead ancestral figure. There were two main classes of 
tamasa: the 'gods of crops' (tamasa vuvua) and the 'weather 
gods' (tamasa vambule). The tomate and tamasa, while super­
natural beings in the European sense, were a matter-of-fact 
part of all facets of the islanders' lives. They could be 
responsible for accidents, sickness and death; the state of 
the weather and the condition of the crops depended upon them.^
30 A.M. Hocart, 'The Cult of the Dead in Eddystone of the 
Solomons', JRAI, 32 (1922), pp.80, 259, 271- 
W.H.R. Rivers, 'Solomon Islands', in J. Hastings (ed.), 
Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (Edinburgh, 1920),
Vo1.11, pp. 680-5.
W.H.R. Rivers, Medicine, Magic, and Religion (London, 1924), 
PP- 35-7-
The power of the tornate and tamasa could be employed for one's
benefit and to harm others by performing various ceremonies or
rites. The site for these ceremonies was usually a tambuna or
sacred place (called hope in Roviana and Marovo). The tambuna
were small structures containing skulls, 'charms' (potana iama)
51and valued ornaments.
When a man died his head was removed and left to
bleach. After a period of time which involved the performing
of a number of ceremonies it was placed in a tambuna. The
tambuna and the skull were material representatives of the
tomate. Food and valuables were placed in the tambuna, and
prayers offered to the tomate so that it would assist the
islanders in their earthly activities. The gods or tamasa
were also represented by tambuna in which skulls were kept.
These were also offered prayers, food and valuables. The power
of a tomate and the scale of ceremonies attached to it were a
reflection of the status of the man when he had lived. For a
big-man (mbangara) pigs would be killed, food and goods
distributed, and feasts organised. The dead mbangara would
also be honoured with the sacrifice of a captured enemy or the
52organisation of an expedition to obtain heads.
The power and influence of a tomate which was the 
object of propitiation has been called mana by some writers.
It has also been stated that in taking heads the slayer increased 
his mana, and that the offering of heads on inaugural occasions
^  Hocart, 'Cult of the Dead', pp. 103-11. 
52 ibid., pp. 80-98.
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added to the mana of a new canoe or building. Similarly, the 
mana of a tornate of a deceased big-man, already strong, would 
be increased and propitiated by the presentation of heads at 
its tambuna.
The popularity of the word mana dates back to R.H.
Codrington, who wrote that ’The Melanesian mind is entirely
possessed by the belief in a supernatural power or influence
. 54called almost universally mana13 Other anthropologists have 
developed on this, and there has been much controversy over the 
nature and meaning of mana. It has been defined as a non­
physical force that shows itself in any power or excellence a 
man or object has. Melanesian religion has been seen as
consisting mainly of getting mana for oneself or used for one's 
55benefit.  ^ With increasing use, the word mana has become, in
Raymond Firth's phrase, 'something of a technical term' which
may have little in common with the same term as used by the
56natives of the societies under investigation. J.H.L. Water­
house's Roviana dictionary defines mana as 'potent, effectual', 
and Hocart's notes on its use on Simbo indicate similar meaning. 
Mana was used in connection with ghosts and spirits (tornate)
^  Tippett, op.cit. p. 7-
E.A. Salisbury, 'A Napolean of the Solomons', Asia, XXII
(1922), p. 710.
^  Codrington, op.cit., pp. 118-20.
^  H.I. Hogbin, 'Mana', Oceania, VI (1936), pp. 266-7- 
56 R. Firth, 'The Analysis of Mana: An Empirical Approach', in 
Harding & Wallace, op.cit., pp. 316-9-
and had the meaning 'you speak true'. Used in prayers and
invocations it could be translated as 'put forth your power1
57or 'be effective'. 1 Hocart gives a number of examples of the 
invocations made to tornate after the return of a head-hunting 
expedition. Heads, and pieces of the bodies of the slain, 
were offered to tornate with the the words, 'This is the share 
of the killed for you the spirits, be efficacious (mana tu)'.
More specifically, 'Be efficacious and club men. Depart here­
after and kill men. Be efficacious; anoint the war canoe. Be 
efficacious; let this village strike down the m e n ' I n  this 
sense, the use of the word mana reflects the essential prag­
matism of the Simboese' religion. The power of the tornate 
and tamasa were seen as being directly related to human interests 
and could be supplicated for specific ends. Mana expressed 
the efficacy of the power and influence of the 'spirits' when 
applied to earthly objectives. To get and keep this force on 
one's side were necessary considerations for the islanders. 
Head-hunting was a practical expression of that necessity.
Heads were required for specific occasions: to 
inaugurate new war canoes (ngeto in Simbo, tomako in Roviana), 
new canoe and communal houses (paele), and new tarnbuna or hope 
and on the death of a big-man. The inaugurations were called
vapenja, which according to Hocart means '"to moisten, to wet'1,
59presumably with blood'. y These occasions and the preparation 
57r J.H.L. Waterhouse, A Roviana and English Dictionary (Sydney,
1949), p. 71.
A.M. Hocart, 'Mana', Man, 26 (1914), pp. 97-8.
C O
 ^ A.M. Hocart,'Warfare in Eddystone of the Solomon Islands', 
JRAI, LXI (1931), pp. 314-5.
ibid., p. 303.
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of the head-hunting expedition itself involved many ceremonial 
and religious obligations. Before their departure, the head­
hunters would visit various tambuna to make offerings and
invocations to ensure that the 'spirit' would mana tu on their 
60behalf. On Nusa Roviana there was a series of hope to be
visited before an expedition got underway. Each hope offered
some form of practical assistance to the head-hunters: the
tiola to guide and protect them; mama helo, to lighten their
burdens and increase their speed; doma, to mesmerise their
enemies; tutulotana, to increase the deadliness of their 
0 61weapons.
On the day of departure a further ceremony took
place in which the vovoso was placed in the war canoe. The
vovoso was an object made of clam shells and wood; it guided
and added strength to the fighters. After an invocation to
the vovoso and tornate to be 'efficacious' (mana) on the behalf
62of the head-hunters, the men set out in their tomako. The 
tomako, or war canoes, were extremely specialised and revered 
craft. Beautifully constructed and ornamented, they appear to 
have been used solely for head-hunting expeditions. These 
vessels could be up to fifty feet in length, with a depth of 
about two and a half feet and a beam of five feet. Their
^  ibid., pp. 308-12. Hocart gives the Simbo text and English 
translations of these invocations. All call on the spirits 
to be 'efficacious' (mana tu).
^  Interview with J. Roni, 13/9/7^- 
62 Hocart, op.cit., pp. 309-11. I have used the Roviana 
tomako in preference to the Simboese ngeto throughout, as it 
is the term most commonly found in the literature.
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curved bows and sterns, decorated with carvings, ornaments
and inlaid pearl, could reach a height of ten feet. A tomako
could carry thirty to forty men with their weapons, and could
reach a speed of approximately seven knots. The tomako were
planked vessels: their construction involved the binding and
cementing of numerous pieces of wood cut perfectly to size, and
63could take two years to complete. Each tomako had its own 
name, personality, and spiritual value. To ensure the latter, 
heads were taken for the inauguration of a new canoe, and 
various ceremonies observed before a voyage was undertaken.
The tomako were kept in paele, large canoe houses which also 
served as communal club houses where men and older boys would 
sleep and eat. Heads wore required for a new paele, and the 
skulls of the victims of successful expeditions were kept in 
them.k'1’
On the return of an expedition there were further 
ceremonies. The vovoso was removed and placed in its tainbuna. 
Hair fromthe head of one of the victims would be burnt as an 
offering to the tornate so that they would mana tu, and the heads 
would be placed in the paele■ In addition there were feasts and 
festivals in honour of a successful man-slayer (the tundu) 
and successful expeditions (the vavolo).^
^  CoM. Woodford, 'The Canoes of the British Solomon Islands', 
JRAI, XXXIX (1909), pp. 510-13.
A. Mahaffy, 'The Solomon Islands', The Empire Review, IV 
(1902), p. 192.
G. Hendy-Pooley, 'Among the Solomon Islands', The Australian 
Magazine, 8 (1908), p. 739-
6A Hocart, op.cit., pp. 308, 310-11, 317-8.
W. Ivens, 'Religions and Customs of the Melanesians', in 
S.W. Artless (ed.), The Church in Melanesia (London, n.d.), 
pp. 22-3.
^  Hocart, op.cit. , pp. 311-, 316-20.
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Modern Europeans, accepting a dichotomy of faith and
66reason, have described head-hunting as a 'mania'. The 
islanders did not subscribe to such dualism: their lives were 
constantly subject to the interraction of the physical and 
the spiritual. Head-hunting and its associated ceremonialism 
were the logical outcome of this perception. Rooted in the 
religious beliefs of the islanders, the practice of head­
hunting had broad ramifications - particularly in relation 
to the nature of leadership and authority.
When Hocart was on Simbo, he noted that the activities 
of the 'chiefs' had mostly ceased with the ending of head­
hunting. He was told by an islander:
No one is mighty now: they are all alike, they 
have no money; they cannot go head-hunting; 
they all 'stop nothing'.^
This statement effectively condenses the basis of leadership 
in the New Georgia Group: the use of wealth in conjunction with 
the practice of head-hunting. The construction of the tomako 
and paele, the preparation and celebration of expeditions, with 
their attendant ceremonies and feasts, required men with 
entrepreneurial skills and a high level of organisational or 
managerial ability. The men who were successful in this work 
were the 'chiefs' and 'Kings' so often mentioned by visiting 
Europeans. The use of these terms was unfortunate, for it 
implied a degree of authority which did not necessarily exist. 
As Godrington noted, European visitors carried with them 'the
Wedgwood, op.cit., p. 13.
^  Hocart, 'Cult of the Dead', p. 79-
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persuasion that savage people are always ruled by chiefs'.
The desire to find and utilise such 'chiefs' could often result 
in enhancing the importance of an individual above the level of 
his status within island society. An illustration of this 
comes from a midshipman in the Royal Navy, who visited Savo in 
the 1870s:
We had two chiefs on board, who although they 
did not seem to have much authority over their 
own subjects, who jostled them about indiscrim­
inately, appeared to presume on their rank with 
their dealings with us; but as we had inform­
ation to gain from them, of course they had to 
be humoured.^
This foible of the white man was soon exploited, and men such 
as Bera of Isabel, Taki of San Cristobal, Kwaisulia of Malaita, 
and Ingava of New Georgia increased their political and social 
influence through adroit manipulation of their European contacts. 
Of course, the prominence of such men only served to reinforce 
European assumptions with regard to 'chiefs' and 'Kings'.
In recent years, the term 'big-man' has been used 
to describe Melanesian leaders. In his analysis of 'political 
types' in Oceania, M.D. Sahlins has described the modern 
Melanesian big-man as 'thoroughly bourgeois', combining 'an 
ostensible interest in the general welfare' with 'a more pro­
found measure of self-interested cunning and economic calculat­
ion'. The attainment of big-man status, according to Sahlins, 
is the outcome of a series of acts which elevate him above the
68 Codrington, op,cit., p. 46.
6Q 'A Young Middy' (psuedonym for C.E. Baxter), My Start in 
Life, (London, 1881), p. 230.
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common herd and attract a following of lesser men. Thus 
big-man leadership is a 'creation of followership'. The 
prospective big-man can build up renown and prestige through 
oratory, gardening ability, bravery in war, and especially the 
accumulation of wealth. This wealth is distributed through 
bride prices, feasts, his club house, and the payment of sub­
sidies and indemnities. The big-man must establish personal 
relations of loyalty and obligation so that he can mobilise 
production to accumulate wealth, and must maintain these rel­
ationships by ensuring that distribution does not fall too short 
70of production. Although big-man status is open to all who
have the necessary ability, in practice the son of a big-man,
or of a rich matrilineage, could aspire more easily to such
a position. In this sense it could be called 'hereditary',
71but not formally so.
Most of the detailed anthropological work on Melanes­
ian leadership has been done in an age of relative peace and 
Christian missions. This may account for the emphasis on the 
'bourgeois' and materialistic aspects of big-man leadership.
It would appear that in less peaceful, pagan times there were 
other equally important factors. In the New Georgia Group 
it would seem that wealth and influence were expressed largely 
through the practice of head-hunting and its attendant ceremon- 
ies-and rituals. The big-man would mobilise his followers
^  M.D. Sahlins, 'Poor Man, Rich Man, Big-Man, Chief: Political 
Types in Melanesia and Polynesia', Comparitive Studies in 
Society and History, V (1962-3), pp. 287-92.
For. discussions of big-man leadership see D.L. Oliver,
A Soloman Island Society Kinship and Leadership Among the 
Siuai of Bougainville (Boston, 1967), PP- 335-W8 and 
H.W. Scheffler, Choiseul Island Social Structure (Los Angeles, 
vl%5), pp. 179-81.
71
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for the construction of paele which they would then use as their
club house; he would pay specialists to build the tomako;
organise head-hunting expeditions, and distribute wealth
through festivals and feasts such as the tundu and vavolo. The
more successful he was in these activities, the greater his
prestige and following. His worldly status had its spiritual
parallel: for like those Christian capitalists who believed
that their prosperity was proof that God looked upon them
favourably, the big-man*s success was an indication that his
propitiations of the tornate had had their desired result, and
72that they had been 'efficacious* on his behalf. Wealth and 
prowess in warfare were seen as evidence of a man's good 
relations with the spirit world and this in turn enhanced a 
big-man's status and authority. This religious aspect of 
leadership may have been one reason why the power of nineteenth 
century big-men was greater than those of modern times: 
affronting a big-man who had the tornate on his side could bring 
calamity and sickness upon the offender. v Of course, the 
efficacy of this type of authority was limited to those who 
believed that the big-man's influence with the spirit world was 
great. The exercise of power was also curbed by the need to 
preserve popularity: unduly tyrannical actions could alienate 
a big-man from his followers, and eventually destroy the basis 
of his status. Leadership and authority were ultimately 
dependent upon the initiative of the individual. While a man
^  Hocart, 'Cult of the Dead', pp. 77-80.
Hocart, 'Warfare in Eddystone', p. 308.
Codrington, op.cit., p. 32.73
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might inherit wealth and respect from his father; parsimony, 
stupidity and indolence could erode this position.
The followers of a New Georgian big-man were largely 
his relatives - members of his clan living in the same neighbour­
hood. However, it does not seem that a big-man's following was 
necessarily restricted to those with whom he had close cognatic 
connections. Material and spiritual status could attract 
the support of others who may have been more distant relatives, 
or who established a connection with the clan of the big-man 
through marriage. The authority of a big-man was not static 
or defined, it could develop or decline in accordance with his 
actions and abilities. Thus the status of various big-men could 
vary greatly, with some achieving considerable authority and 
attracting the support not only of their immediate followers 
but also of lesser big-men and their followers. Island leaders, 
usually men who owed their position to their own initiative 
and ability, were to be particularly responsive to the arrival 
of the European: here was another avenue for the talented and 
ambitious to exploit.
The society encountered by Europeans in the late 
eighteenth century was not 'timeless' or static. The scattered 
evidence of its pre-European history indicates that it had 
experienced considerable upheaval and development. The coming 
of the white man was to result in further change. The nature 
of this change, and the extent to which it was moulded by the 
response and initiative of the islanders, is the subject of 
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO
EUROPEAN CONTACT AND HEAP-HUNTING, 1787-1860
The first seventy years of European contact are very 
poorly documented, yet it is possible to obtain some insight 
into the methods employed by the islanders in confronting this 
new situation. From the start it is apparent that the islanders 
were eager to make the most of the benefits of European goods.
The Simboese, who were to be the main beneficiaries of early 
European contact, became noted for their willingness to 
cooperate with Europeans for their mutual benefit. At the same 
time they attempted to ensure that this advantage was not 
extended to other islanders in the Group. They endeavoured, 
quite successfully, to monopolise relations with visiting 
Europeans, and to act as middlemen for the rest of the Group.
In this manner they cemented their power within the Group 
and established a basis of authority that was to last until 
the end of the century. This authority was to be expressed in 
traditionally indigenous terms - its medium was head-hunting. 
Head-hunting was the most powerful dynamic operating in island 
society, uniting the forces of leadership and religion under 
the banner of warfare. Head-hunting has already been described 
as a practical expression of the religious beliefs of the 
islanders, providing a vehicle for the ambitions and aspirations 
of big-men and their followers. The coming of the European 
did not alter this, but it did provide an opportunity for the 
islanders to pursue their interests more intensely.
The first Europeans to enter the Solomons were the 
men of Alvaro de Mendana’s expedition, who landed on Santa 
Isabel in February 1568. Although they did not visit the New
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'IGeorgia Group, they observed it from a distance. Two hundred
years later, the French navigators Bougainville and Surville
also glimpsed the islands, but it was not until November 1787
2that a European vessel came in close proximity to the Group.
This ship was the Alliance, out of Philadelphia and bound for 
Canton to trade for tea. On the 12 November it passed between 
Simbo and Ranongga: two hundred and fifty islanders in canoes 
approached the ship, and were described by the logkeeper, Richard 
Dale, as friendly in appearance. This impression was to remain 
unconfirmed, as squally weather and the onset of night prevented 
any meeting. The Alliance* 1s route was something in the nature
4of an experimental short-cut, but with the establishment of the 
penal colony at Port Jackson it was to be used with increasing 
frequency. Ships under charter to the East India Company,
Lord Amherst & B. Thomson, The Discovery of the Solomon 
Islands by Alvaro de Mendana in 1368 (2 vols., London, 1901),
I, pp. 33-4.
2 M.M. de Bougainville, Voyage Autour du Monde par le fregate 
du Roi La Boudeuse, et la flüte l'Etoile; en 1766, 17677 1768 
& 1769 (Paris, 1771), PP- 263-4.
C. Jack-Hinton, op.cit., pp. 258, 262.
Bougainville sighted Vella Lavella on 28 June 1768. Surville 
sighted Kolombangara, New Georgia and Vangunu on 9 October 
1769.
 ^Logbook of the Alliance, 21/6/1787-15/9/^788. Logkeeper, 
Richard Dale. Original MS. in possession of E.C. Dale,
Bryn Mawr, Penn., U.S.A. MFP. Entry for 12 November 1787»
C. Jack-Hinton, 'The Voyage of the Alliance American 
Contribution to the Rediscovery and Exploration of the 
Solomon Islands', The American Neptune.» XXV (1965), pp. 248-61.
The frontispiece of the Log of the Alliance, op.cit., states 
'Bound for China Round New Holland and New Guinea, to save 
the passage to China'.
4
having landed their cargoes of convicts and goods at Sydney, 
would then sail north to China to pick up tea for the English 
market. Before the use of Torres Straits became common, 
vessels bound for India from New South Wales could also travel 
by a route which took them north of New Guinea. In making 
such journeys, navigators had the choice of a number of 
passages. They could take the 1 Outer Passage' to the east of 
the Santa Cruz Islands; the 'Great Eastern Passage' between 
Santa Cruz and San Cristobal; or, the 'Inner Passage' which 
could take them through or just to the west of the Solomon 
Islands. A vessel taking the 'Inner Passage' could use any 
of a number of channels through the islands: Indispensible
Strait, Manning Strait, Bougainville Strait, St. George's 
Channel, or the strait between Buka and New Ireland. The 
latter three passages would bring a ship immediately to the 
west of the New Georgia Group, with a good chance of sighting 
the distinctively shaped island of Simbo. This was to have 
profound consequences for the subsequent history of the Group.
It was not long after their brief glimpse of the 
Alliance that the islanders of Simbo first came in contact 
with the European: on the 6 August 1788 the Alexander appeared 
off their shores. This ship had been part of the First Fleet 
taking convicts to New South Wales and was now returning to
Jack-Hinton, Search for the Islands of Solomon, p. 332.
J. Horsburgh, Directions for Sailing to and from the East 
Indies Part Second, (London, 1Ö11) , pp. 471-5- 
The Oriental Navigator; or, New Directions for Sailing to and 
from the East Indies, China, New Holland etc, etc., 2nd ed. 
(London, 1801), p. blO.
See also H.E. Maude, 'East Indiamen in the Pacific, 1788-1825 
JPH, IV (1969), pp- 158-9-
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England by way of Batavia under the command of Lieutenant
John Shortland. The ship was several miles off Simbo when it
was approached by four canoes; the islanders were unwilling to
come on board but they consented to be towed along by the
Alexander and were willing to exchange their shell armlets and
other ornaments for nails, beads and other 'trifles', although
they displayed a distinct preference for any object made of
iron. The islanders also expressed their desire for the ship
to stop at Simbo by indicating that they had fruit and meat
available. Shortland regretfully declined this invitation
because 'the length and uncertainty of his passage seemed to
forbid the least delay'. Like the logkeeper of the Alliance
before him, Shortland was impressed by the friendliness of
the islanders, and also noted that they traded very fairly with
6no attempt to defraud. A similar experience was recorded 
by George Bowen, captain of the Albemarle, which passed by the 
coasts of 'New Georgia' in December 1791 when on a voyage from 
Port Jackson to Bombay. Bowen states that he was off Gape 
Deception which, if correct, would place him off the southwest 
coast of Rendova. The islanders that came on board the 
Albemarle were familiar with the use of iron and curious to 
know more about it. Bowen also claimed that they had English 
fishing nets in their possession: this was by no means impossible 
as the islanders indicated by signs that they had seen several 
other ships and that one had actually been wrecked upon the 
coast, the remains of which Bowen himself later observed. Bowen 
reported that there were many huts along the coast and that the
The Voyage of Governor Phillip to Botany Bay (London, 1789), 
pp. 196-9-
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7people were of a 'mild disposition'.
For the next ten to fifteen years East Indiamen 
from Port Jackson to China continued to pass through the 
Solomons. In 1792 Captain Manning took the Pitt between 
Mborukua and the Russell Islands, then north through the 
strait that now bears his name. On the way he sighted
o
Nggatokae, which he named Cape Traverse. In the following 
year the Bellona, under the command of Matthew Boyd, took the 
same route as Shortland: south of the New Georgia Group then 
turning north through Bougainville Strait. On the 8 and 9 
March islanders came on board the ship and Boyd was impressed 
by their friendly manner. It would seem that these people
9were from either Simbo, Ranongga or northern Vella Lavella.
In June 1793 the official French expedition of D'Entrecasteaux 
passed south of the Group, however their investigation was 
confined to charting the southern coasts of Nggatokae, Vangunu, 
Tetipari and Rendova. They had no contact with the local people!9 
The amicable on-board trading which had characterised 
relations between the islanders and the passing Europeans was 
interrupted in 1795 when the Young William, another East
7 J.F.G. de La Perouse, A Voyage Round the World in the years 
1785s 1786 , 1787 and 1 7 8 8 , C5 vols., London, 1 7 9 8 ), I , 
pp. 5 1 -4 . Bowen's record comes from 'Extracts from the 
minutes of the justice of peace of the town and commune of 
Morlaix'. Bowen was giving information as to the possible 
whereabouts of La Perouse.
^ Jack-Hinton, op.cit., pp. 3N7—9-
^ MS. Log of the Bellona, 24/7/1792-29/9/179^-. Commander M. 
Boyd.
IOL. MFP. Entries for 7-9 March, 1793- 
Jack-Hinton, op.cit., pp. 320-1.
M. de Rossell, Voyage de Dentrecasteaux, Envoy6 a la 
Recherche de la Perouse (2 vols., Paris, 180S j , I , pp. 398- 
402.
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Indiaman, was off Simbo and Ranongga. On the 14th November 
a number of canoes came off one of these islands with the 
intention of coming on board. As a number of ’war* canoes 
were amongst them the captain, James Mortlock, prevented the
11islanders from approaching by firing a shot over their heads.
With the increasing shipping passing through the Solomon
Islands, more acts of violence occurred. In March 1802 while
the Minorca, Nile and Canada were sailing in convoy through
the islands, a ship's boat from the Nile was attacked and
several men were wounded. The log of the Canada states that
the ships were near New Georgia or 'Cape Bennet', but the
descriptions of the land and the positions given make it clear
that they were in fact in Indispensable Strait, between Malaita
12and Guadalcanal. In August of the same year the Coromandel
passed to the south of Simbo and Ranongga; about fifty canoes
1 3were sighted but no contact with the islanders was made.
In the early years of the twentieth century, the 
anthropologist A.M. Hocart transcribed the stories of the 
people of Simbo dealing with the coming of the white man to 
their island:
(the white men) gave tobacco in exchange, 
but they did not like the smell; they gave 
them tins of beef, but they did not want 
them; gave biscuits, but they would not have 
them; they offered iron used to bind cases of 
meat, & they took it.^
MS. Log of the Young William, 11/9/1794-4/8/1796. Commander 
J. Mortlock. IOL. MFP. Entries for 12-14 November 1795*
^  MS. Log of the Canada, 16/5/1801-29/3/1803. Commander W. 
Wilkinson. IOL. MFP. Entries for 3-7 March, 1802.
^  MS. Log of the Coromandel, 3/11/1801-4/7/1803. Commander A. 
Sterling. IOL. MFP. Entry for 4 August, 1802.
A h Hocart Papers. Item 18, 'Notes on White Men, Mandegusu', p.1.
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The Simboese* demand for iron soon became more refined, as did 
their methods of fulfilling it, both in trading and in less 
legitimate forms. The islanders' respect for European goods 
did not necessarily extend to the white man himself, whom they 
were quick to exploit whenever possible. At the same time, the 
Simboese considered that they had a special relationship with 
the European:
The white men came to Mandegusu (Simbo) first, 
then to Lungga, Vella Lavella & Ysabel; Simbo 
men went with them to pilot them round.
This island...cannot kill white men because a 
ship came here first, so that this is, as it 
were, a white man's land. In Mbilua they can 
kill white m e n . ^
While this declaration of amity may have been exaggerated, it 
is nevertheless true that the people of Simbo did have a 
pre-eminent role in dealing with the early European visitors to 
the New Georgia Group. Their sophistication in such matters, 
when compared with the islanders from other parts of the Group, 
is apparent from a number of more detailed records of Europeans 
in the islands in 1803 and after.
On the 28 June 1803 H.M.S. Buffalo anchored a quarter 
of a mile off Simbo. A canoe carrying three men came out to the 
ship with breadfruit, coconuts, tortoiseshell and pearl orna­
ments to trade for hatchets and hammers. The Buffalo had none 
of these on board, but the islanders were willing to accept 
nails, knives and old iron. Soon the ship was surrounded by 
canoes containing about one hundred men and two women. The 
men distinguished themselves by their amazing dexderity in
15 ibid., p. 2.
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stealing some bayonets. The next day the Buffalo was again 
surrounded; this time by sixty canoes and several hundred men. 
Thieves broke into the officers' cabins stealing glasses, bells 
and dirks. Iron works were wrenched off the boats, and an 
attempt was made to abduct a ten year old boy. The captain, 
William Kent, seems to have been a patient man for, unlike 
many others after him, he decided not to act against the 
islanders.
According to Mrs Kent, who kept a journal of the
voyage, the island of Simbo looked like a garden in high
cultivation, covered with coconuts, breadfruit and banana
trees with the people's houses just discernible in the midst
of them. The inhabitants were obviously populous, intensely
active and well-organised. She observed what must have been a
tomako, or head-hunting canoe: it carried fifty men, had high
curving prows decorated with pearl, shell and carvings of fish,
birds and heads. In the centre of this canoe was an elevated
seat for a 'Chief'. Unless Mrs Kent failed to mention it, the
ubiquitous trade hatchet had not yet become common, for the'
weapons of the men were spears, bows and arrows. The Buffalo
left Simbo on the 29 June and sailed past Ranongga and Vella
Lavella. Canoes also came off these islands, but the people
16seemed of a milder disposition to those of Simbo.
It is obvious that the Simboese had lost any shyness 
or wariness in dealing with Europeans, and perhaps it was
Kent Family Papers, Vol. IV. Mrs William Kent's Journal, 
May 13-0ctober 13, 1803. Written in the form of letters to 
her mother, during part of a voyage of HMS Buffalo. MS. 
ML.A3968. Entries for 28-29 June, 1803-
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because the people of Vella Lavella and Ranongga had less exper­
ience with passing ships that they seemed 'milder* in their 
behaviour. It is equally evident that the Simbo people were 
well experienced in trading with Europeans, knowing that they 
would prefer pearl and tortoiseshell ornaments to what the
Simboese would regard as their most valuable possessions -
17the clam shell armlets, bakiha and poata. ' Throughout Mrs 
Kent's narrative there is no hint of any possibility of violent 
confrontation, despite the audacity of the islanders. This 
may have been due to a feeling of security prompted by the fact 
that the ship was a man-o-war, but another account from the 
same year gives a similar impression.
The Patterson under Captain Jonathon Aborn, on a 
voyage from Port Jackson to Canton, stopped off Simbo in 
December 1805. The ship was soon surrounded by several 
hundred unarmed men who were 'quite sharp in trading' as well 
as being a 'very thieving set', to the extent of stealing the 
hats off the heads of the sailors. On the following day the 
islanders' behaviour was 'much better' and Crawford Carter, 
the keeper of the ship's journal, 'could not but consider them 
as quite a hospitable ingenious people'. Once again the island­
ers displayed a great eagerness for iron, though more particul­
arly for cutting instruments. The Patterson sailed on past the 
northern end of Ranongga where it encountered more islanders in 
canoes. These people were much more timorous than the Simboese:
' These ornaments took a great deal of time and effort to
make, and were thus highly prized. See C.M. Woodford, 'Life 
in the Solomon Islands', Popular Science Monthly XXXV (1889), 
p. T84 and Burns, Philp & Co. Ltd., Handbook of Information 
for Western Pacific Islands (Sydney, 1899), p. 5^ 7
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they would not come alongside until satisfied that the
strangers were of a peaceful disposition, and then refused to
come on board. They traded from one canoe at a time and made
18no attempt to steal anything.
It appears that the Simboese’ familiarity with 
Europeans had, to some degree, bred contempt and that their 
irreverent attitude towards the possessions of the white man 
would sooner or later result in conflict. Equally responsible, 
however, for the creation of situations of confrontation was 
the increasing apprehension of the crews cf European vessels.
In April 1811 the Union, bound for Penang under Captain John 
Nichols, was becalmed off Simbo. The first officer, James Hobbs, 
took a boat to the island thinking it would be uninhabited.
The boat was soon surrounded by canoes, and the apparently 
friendly islanders invited them to land. Hobbs would have done 
so except his crew of four ’lascars' was terrified, believing 
they would be killed and eaten. The boat rowed back to the 
Union which was by now crowded with islanders, which led Hobbs 
to believe that the ship’s destruction was inevitable. How­
ever, most of the men were unarmed and were devoting themselves 
to the theft of any iron objects which could be obtained.
Hobbs cleared the decks with some violence, cutting the arms 
of one thief.^
MS. Journal of the Patterson, 1803-180A. Captain J. Aborn, 
kept by C. Carter. Original with Rhode Is. Historical 
Society, Providence, U.S.A. MFP. Entries for 15-19 December, 
1805.
y M.G.L. Domery de Rienzi, Oceanie ou Cinquibme Partie du 
Monde (3 vols., Paris, 1836-?)» III, pp. 400-1.
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Hobbs also claimed that he saw the remains of a
wrecked European vessel at Simbo: what would have happened to
the crew of such a ship? To seafarers at that time this
question would have appeared ridiculous; they would have
assumed that the sailors would have been massacred and, in all
probability, eaten. This need not have been the case:
Europeans were soon to be living quite happily on Simbo, despite
the reputation of the people of the New Georgia Group as the
most bloodthirsty and treacherous savages in the South Seas.
The traditions of the Simboese also include a number of instances
20of white men settling amongst them without difficulty, yet 
the contemporary European records constantly reiterate the 
extreme dangers of the area. This change in reputation, from 
friendly thieves to murderous cannibals and the anomalous 
position of Simbo in this transfiguration, can be explained 
in the transition that occurred in the nature of contact between 
Europeans and islanders in the years shortly after Hobbs' 
visit to the islands.
On 15 May 1812 Simbo and Ranongga were visited by
21Captain Abraham Bristow in the Thames. This episode adds 
nothing new to our knowledge of Simbo and its environs, but 
it does mark a turning point in the relationship between 
European and islander. Unlike the previous ships that had
Hocart Papers, op.cit., pp. 1-2.
The Oriental Navigator 3rd ed. (London, 1816), 'Tables and 
Positions*, pp. 103-10.
J. Horsburgh, India Directory, 3rd ed. (2 vols., London, 
1826-7), II, pV 590.
21
53
passed, by the New Georgia Group on voyages to China or the 
East Indies, the Thames had cruised for some months in the 
waters northeast of New Guinea. Captain Bristow was one of 
the first whalers to exploit these grounds.
From the 1820s through to the 1860s whalers were to 
be found in the vicinity of the Solomon Islands. The most 
popular grounds were first the waters to the east of Isabel and 
Malaita, and then later in the neighbourhood of Buka and 
north Bougainville. The arrival of the whalers meant a basic 
change in the islanders' relationship with Europeans. Whalers 
were in the area for protracted periods, frequently trading 
for provisions and occasionally coming ashore for water, 
careening and copulation. In this way many European tools, 
weapons and goods were introduced to the island society, 
increasing both the demand of the islanders and their expect­
ation of a regular supply. This was particularly true of 
tobacco, which became an article of currency for the next 
century. With increasing contact also came increasing conflict 
islanders might resort to drastic action to obtain the goods 
they wanted, or might seek retributive justice for some action 
of the whalers, who were not renowned for genteel diplomacy.
In some areas a relatively stable situation existed: trade 
was organised and peacefully conducted, with both sides 
realising that it was to their mutual benefit that harmonious 
relations be preserved. Simbo, Treasury Island and Makira Bay 
on San Cristobal were such places; but even in these localities 
confrontation could easily flare into violence. On Treasury 
Island in 181-2 seventeen of the crew of the whaler Offley 
were killed by the islanders after the captain of the ship shot
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22a local big-man. Simbo seems to have been recognised as the
'safe' port in the New Georgia Group, for Europeans regularly
resided there and ships often used it as a stop-over point.
For the rest of the Group, and other islands in the Solomons,
relations were not so pleasant.
By the late 1820s large numbers of whalers from
Sydney, Hobart and England were using the grounds off Malaita
and Isabel. The nature of relations between these men and the
islanders is sensationally described by T.W. Smith, who claimed
that at one stage the whaler Hibernian was surrounded by two
or three thousand islanders and then attacked. In the ensuing
fight fifteen large canoes were destroyed and some two hundred
2^5islanders killed. v A more reliable source on the period is
Edward Cattlin who whaled regularly in these waters between
1828 and 1855« Cattlin seems to have been able to trade
peaceably on a number of occasions but adopted the practice of
’scaring off* any canoes that looked hostile by firing over 
24their heads. Both Smith and Cattlin heard that Europeans 
from wrecked ships were or had been living on the islands. In 
the 1850s whalers from New England entered the area. In 1850 
Morrell was off Bougainville and Buka and recommended the grounds
Sydney Morning Herald, 5 January 1845.
28 T.W. Smith, A Narrative of the Life, Travels and Sufferings 
of Thomas W. Smith (Boston, 184-4) , pp. 195-201.
2Ur E. Cattlin, Journals 1827-1836. ML. MSS. 1800.
Journal of the John Bull, entries for 8/1/1828-4/5/1828. 
Journal of the Alfred, entries for 12/10/1828-25/1/1829- 
Journal of the Australian, entries for 14/10/1850-5/12/1850, 
4/10/1851-6/1/1532.
Journal of the Genii, entries for 21/10/1855-7/4/1856.
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in his book published in 1832.^
In 1836 the Marshall Bennett, Captain R.L. Hunter, was 
off New Georgia and Treasury Island. Hunter advised the 
readers of the Nautical Magazine that they should be on guard 
when dealing with the natives of this area. Although it was 
safe to trade alongside, going ashore was particularly hazard­
ous. Crews landing on islands that appeared to be uninhabited 
could be rushed by 'hundreds' of men concealed in the bush. 
Hunter states that this had happened to one or two vessels at
'New Georgia', and that the crews had with difficulty regained
26the boats with some killed and wounded. Despite these acts
of violence, numbers of Europeans were voluntarily living in
the New Georgia Group, particularly on Simbo. The Duke of York
27left three men there at their own request in July 1837«
In February 1839 when HMS Larne was at Ponape her commander was
28informed that there were Europeans on 'New Georgia'. In 
November of the same year the whaler William Hamilton took a 
white man off Simbo. This man had deserted a ship at Sikaiana 
and had later been taken from there to Simbo by the Carnavon 
of London. The William Hamilton had been whaling in the
^  B. Morrell, A Narrative of Four Voyages (New York, 1832), 
p. 452. See also T. Beale, The Natural History of the Sperm 
Whale (London, 1839), pp. 315-X18.
^  Nautical Magazine and Naval Chronicle, 9 (1840), pp. 465-7-
^  MS. Logbook of the Duke of York, 1836-1838. Captain R.C. 
Morgan.ML. Entry for 13 July 1837-
^  Despatches to the Governor of N.S.W. January-June 1840. ML. 
MSS. A1282. Despatch No.79 Russell to Gipps, 19 June 1840. 
Enel. Blake to Maitland, 5 February 1839, PP- 827-8.
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northern Solomons since October 1839 and had bartered for
tortoiseshell off New Georgia in that month. On 22 November,
when off Simbo, they had been chased by canoes. After
initially attempting to elude them the whaler allowed the
canoes to come alongside. In one was a European who asked to
29be taken on board. y From this it is apparent that the Simbo 
people were hospitable to the point of going to lengths to ob­
lige an uninvited guest. The contradiction between this 
behaviour, and the increasingly evil reputation that the Group 
was acquiring, is more understandable in the light of the first 
detailed description of the area; this is provided by Andrew 
Cheyne, who spent almost two months there in 1844.
Andrew Cheyne, captain of the Naiad, was out from 
China on a beche de mer collecting expedition. His intention 
was to establish curing points at a number of islands through­
out the Western Pacific, manned by an officer and a party of 
men, which would collect and process the sea slug. Cheyne would 
then call back at each place on his return to China. Cheyne 
arrived at Simbo on 1 February 1844; he was met by three 
Europeans living on the island and the 'two principal chiefs', 
Meno and Lobie. He asked for permission to establish a station 
on the island; this request was granted with an assurance that 
the establishment would be under the chiefs' protection.
Cheyne remained in the New Georgia Group until 21 March, spend-
31ing most of that period on Simbo. His description of this 
29y Log of the William Hamilton, 1839-1842. Captain Swain. 
Original MS. in Whaling Museum, Nantucket, Mass., U.S.A.
MFN. Entries for 28 October 1839 and 22 November 1839.
^  Shineberg, op.cit., p. 224. 
^  ibid., pp. 303-14.
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visit throws much light on two important questions: the role 
of Simbo within the Group, and the deterioration of islander- 
European relations.
By the 1840s Simbo was easily the most sophisticated
island within the New Georgia Group, having had fifty years
of regular contact with Europeans. This was partly the result
of its geographical position: the island is well clear of the
rest of the Group, with its approach unencumbered by shoals and
reefs. It has, in Cheyne's words, 'a snug little harbour’
and was an obvious stop-over point for any ship passing to the
southwest of the New Georgia Group in an attempt to avoid the
unknown waters of the New Georgia Sound or the extremely
dangerous reefs and lagoons within the Group. Moreover, it is
completely distinctive in appearance: it would be difficult,
almost impossible, to confuse it with any other island.y As
well as these factors, the island had received favourable
publicity in the account of Shortland’s voyage, and its position
8 l lhad been given m  the 1816 edition of the Oriental Navigator.
With a steady parade of visiting ships in their 
waters the Simbo people gained both wealth and strength. They 
could trade foodstuffs, tortoiseshell and sexual favours for
32 ibid., p. 303.
88 ■■ ^ From a distance Simbo appears as two, almost identical
blocks rising from the sea. For this reason Shortland named 
it 'Two Brothers'. Another aid to identification was 
Eddystone Rock, off the southwest tip of the island - 
a pinnacle that remarkably resembles a ship under sail.
3 A Voyage of Governor Phillip to Botany Bay, pp. 191-9«
Oriental Navigator, 'Tables and Positions', p. 100.
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European goods, particularly iron axeheads. The latter were
highly valued by islanders throughout the Group, who on
occasion would withhold trade from a ship if they were not
available in the hope of obtaining them elsewhere. By the
1840s the Simboese had acquired a surplus of axeheads and were
able to trade this surplus with islanders from elsewhere in the
86Group for tortoiseshell and traditional objects of wealth.
As well as being middlemen traders, the Simboese also acted as
a channel of communication between traders and other islanders.
They guided Cheyne to their allies on the larger islands, and
showed him watering places and safe passages for his ship. The
Simboese actively sought to monopolise this role, warning
87traders that other islanders were not to be trusted. r 
The Simbo people were also able to enlist the 
support of Europeans in their conflicts with other communities 
in the Group. Cheyne had difficulty in restraining them from 
using his men and guns in attacking their enemies, and the 
traditions of Simbo tell of Europeans accompanying them on 
raids to Rendova and the Marovo. By Cheyne’s time the
Simboese had certainly learnt the use of firearms, though to
88 Shineberg, op.cit., p. 505- The islanders fitted their own 
handles to the axeheads, which would fetch between V/i - 
3 lbs. of shell in Cheyne1s time.
56 Ibid., p. 309.
^  ibid., pp. 304-5-
See also G.F. Angas, Polynesia The Islands of the Pacific 
(London, 1866?), p. 365.
Shineberg, op.cit., pp. 307-8.
Hocart Papers, op.cit.
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what degree they possessed them is not known. While it is
easy to overestimate the importance of European assistance and
firepower, it does seem that in areas where firearms had not
been widely distributed the psychological, if not the physical,
advantage could be considerable. Cheyne's description of a
59fight that occurred while he was there supports this view.
The position of Simbo was reinforced by the actions 
and reputations of the people from other parts of New Georgia, 
which the Simboese were not reluctant to emphasise to their 
European partners. The big-man Lobie told Cheyne that he 
considered it unsafe for any European to land on any part of 
the Group, as the people were totally untrustworthy and 
treacherous. He pointed out to Cheyne several places where 
whale boats had been cut out and the crews massacred. Lobie 
stated that they were so 'covetous and rapacious' in their 
desire for European axes and other goods that they had turned 
on one Simbo trading party and murdered forty of them for the 
goods they carried. The location of this incident, and of the
domurder of the whalers, appears to have been Ughele on Rendova. 
This area was to become notorious for its attacks on Europeans. 
For such islanders, frustrated by the Simboese monopoly, direct 
action was probably the best method of obtaining European 
goods.
Cheyne left the Solomons with the impression that 
they were the 'most treacherous and bloodthirsty race in the
59
dO
Shineberg,
ibid.
op.cit.
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4-iWestern Pacific', and this was to remain their reputation
throughout the century. It was common amongst Europeans to
assume that treachery and savagery were inherent characteristics
of the islanders, and that the earlier descriptions of the
people as amiable were the result of attempts to lure sailors
ashore where they could be easily massacred. This frequently
did happen, but the available evidence for the first twenty
or so years of contact with the New Georgia Group indicates
that relations were quite good and it was not until the whaling
boom that the situation deteriorated seriously. Considering
the behavior of some Europeans this was not surprising. Not
all captains had the discretion of Cheyne who realised that
good relations were essential for successful trading, and in
one instance had to restrain his crew from firing a carronade
at point blank range into a number of canoes that were said to
ll pcontain men who had murdered Europeans.
Cheyne left Simbo on 21 March 1844, leaving four
Europeans on the island to run his beche de mer and trading
station until he returned, which he does not seem to have 
4 3done. From Cheyne's record of his stay it is quite apparent 
that the Simboese had fully converted their society to an 
iron technology, as they had sufficient supplies of iron goods 
to export to other parts ofthe Group. It is also obvious that 
the-people of Simbo had established themselves as formidable
A. Cheyne, Sailing Directions from New South Wales, to China 
& Japan (London, P* 77-
42 Shineberg, op.cit., p. 307.
45 ibid. , pp. 311-14-.
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head-hunters: in one raid alone they were able to net ninety 
three heads. These two things were not unconnected.
It has been generally accepted that the introduction
of iron tools to the New Georgia Group was responsible for an
intensification of head-hunting: that as steel axes reduced the
time necessary for such essential tasks as clearing gardens,
the men 'found time hanging heavy and employed it in head 
44taking'. In a recent article J.M. McKinnon has enlarged this 
hypothesis and produced a detailed analysis of the development 
of head-hunting in the nineteenth century. McKinnon's thesis 
is that prior to European contact 'raiding was based on small- 
scale inter-family disputes' which resulted in few deaths.^ 
With the introduction of iron and the advent of trade this 
situation changed. The increased leisure time made available 
by the introduction of iron tools was employed in the organis­
ation of large-scale raiding, altering the scale of social 
organisation and leadership and destroying the balance of 
conflict that had existed in the past. However, McKinnon 
expresses his dissatisfaction with the argument that 'any 
people would risk intensifying the level of violence to satisfy 
some transient desire to demonstrate their superiority', and 
so concludes that there must have been other reasons why this 
escalation occurred. McKinnon finds the answer in the
Howells, op.cit., p. 17- 
45 McKinnon, 'Tomahawks, Turtles and Traders', p. 301. 
^  ibid»? P» 295-
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relationship between trading turtle shell and raiding:
taken together trading and raiding formed 
part of a single interlocking system that 
built up its own momentum and led to an ever 
increasing level of violence....Just as 
trader and big man were linked in a type of 
symbiotic relationship, so it appears that 
indigenous trading and large scale raiding 
were also mutually dependent. The relation­
ship of the two is so close that they can 
be viewed as interlocking parts in a 
system of circular causation. ^
He concludes that ’raiding was basically dependent on trade
48in shell controlled by big men'. McKinnon's arguments are 
attractive, but they overstep the evidence. What begins as a 
'qualitative speculation' finishes as an assertion of fact. 
While much of McKinnon's thesis is perceptive, in particular 
his comments with regard to the monopolising role of big-men 
in trade with Europeans, his basic proposition concerning the 
relationship of the trade in turtle shell and head-hunting 
is speculative - and must remain so while equally tenable 
hypotheses can be drawn from the available evidence. The 
following pages present an alternative view, dealing where 
necessary with McKinnon's points as they arise.
When Europeans first came to the New Georgia Group 
in the late eighteenth century, it would appear that large 
scale raiding was already being undertaken by the islanders of 
Simbo. There are a number of reasons for believing that head­
hunting pre-dated European contact, rather than developing 
from 'small-scale inter-family disputes' as a result of that 
contact. As has been seen, head-hunting and its associated
47 ibid., p. 296, $00.
48 ibid., p. $04
63
ritual and ceremony were a fundamental aspect of the religious
lives of the islanders; it would seem unlikely that such an
intricate pattern of belief and behaviour would evolve in a
few years as a result of the introduction of iron. Moreover,
it seems that the Simboese quite clearly distinguished between
external raiding or head-hunting and internal disputes as
forms of conflict. Fighting within Simbo could be forestalled
and ended by the exchange of custom money; it is also said by
modern informants that when such fighting did occur, traditional
stone axes rather than iron hatchets were used. The 'ghosts'
of men murdered by their fellow Simboese were classified as
50separate from others, and their heads were not kept. The
positive evidence for the existence of pre-European large
scale raiding is to be found in a description of a tomako at 
51Simbo in 1803- These vessels would have no relevance in small 
scale internal conflict: they were expressely designed and 
constructed for long distance mass raiding. What distances 
these large war canoes travelled at that time is unknown, though 
it is interesting to note that contact between New Georgia and 
Isabel appears to have existed from at least the mid sixteenth 
century.
49 Interview with Doni, Bambara, Elana and Mamupio, 17/10/1974.
^  Hocart, 'Cult of the Dead', p. 263.
51 Kent Family Papers, loc.cit. Eliza Kent describes a canoe 
carrying fifty men, with high prows and decorated with inlaid 
pearl and 'devices' of fish, birds and human faces. This was 
unmistakeably a tomako. See Woodford,'Canoes of the British 
Solomon Islands', pp. 510-13-
52 Amherst & Thomson, op.cit., I, pp. 33-4.
64-
If head-hunting existed prior to the coming of the 
white man, what then was the effect of the introduction of 
iron? Much has been made of Salisbury’s research amongst the 
Siane of the eastern Highlands of New Guinea in which he estim­
ated that a man's time spent on subsistence activities was 
reduced by about half through the replacement of stone tools 
with iron. Although Salisbury's conclusions have been applied 
widely, it would be dangerous to use them in relation to the 
New Georgia Group. For example, fencing of gardens does not 
seem to have occurred in the Group as it did amongst the Siane; 
fishing and its associated activities were also variable factor^ 
However, it would seem logical to conclude that the time spent 
in clearing gardens, and shaping posts for houses was reduced, 
thus increasing leisure time to be spent in other activities. 
More importantly, iron tools would have accelerated the prod­
uction of tomako and paele. The large war canoes were constru­
cted from numerous pieces of precisely shaped wood, and could 
take up to two years to build using iron tools. The labour 
spent on them using a stone technology must have been enormous. 
Where before only the most affluent of big men could afford the 
mobilisation of resources and labour necessary to build a 
tomako, now lesser big-men could also aspire to their ownership
56 R.F. Salisbury, From Stone to Steel Economic Consequences 
of a Technological Change in New Guinea (Melbourne, 4962), 
pp. 107-9- Salisbury estimated that in a stone technology 
'clan' and 'lineage' work (mainly clearing and fencing 
gardens) took 79% of a man's time. In a steel technology 
this was reduced to 38%.
Brookfield, op.cit., pp. 120-1 makes some pertinent remarks 
regarding the application of Salisbury's conclusions.
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and the resulting prestige it would bring them and their
followers. While it is not possible to prove that this did
occur, there are some indications that the numbers of tomako
increased, though the evidence is tenuous. Eliza Kent in 1805
noted one tomako amongst about sixty canoes and 'some hundreds
of men'. In 1908 Hocart was told that formerly each of the
four districts on Simbo had several war canoes, and was able
to enumerate eighteen individual tomakt^ The entire population
of the island at that time was estimated by Hocart to be about
four hundred, though it would seem to have declined in the
years prior to 1908. However, it is unlikely that the popul-
86ation of the island ever exceeded one thousand. If Kent's 
observation was an accurate reflection of the proportion of 
tomako to adult men, then it would seem that their numbers 
increased considerably. The more detailed records that are 
available for the later decades of the nineteenth century 
indicate that large numbers of tomako were used by the island­
ers. Ingava, a big man from Sisieta at Munda, owned five
himself and once organised an expedition involving twenty
57tomako and five hundred men. ' In 1881 the Royal Navy destroyed
55 Kent Family Papers, loc.cit.
Hocart, 'Warfare in Eddystone', p. 308.
 ^ Scheffler, 'Kindred and Kin Groups', p. 137-
W.H.R. Rivers (ed.), Essays on the Depopulation of Melanesia 
(Cambridge, 1922), pp. 97-101 deals with the decline in the 
population of Simbo. Scheffler states that Simbo supported 
a population of about 800 'with difficulty', and this in an 
age when the diet is partly comprised of imported foodstuffs. 
It is also worth noting that in the nineteenth century Simbo 
was exporting food to visiting Europeans.
B.T. Somerville, 'Ethnographic Notes in New Georgia,
Solomon Islands', JRAI, XXVI (1897), p. 399.
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ten tomako in one village on Vella Lavella. If one village 
possessed ten tomako, the number of war canoes on all of
ro
Vella Lavella must have been considerable.
As numbers of tomako increased, so would the level 
of raiding escalate. New war canoes and club houses would re­
quire heads for their inauguration; big-men with newly acquired 
tomako would seek to inflate their religious and social prest­
ige; more men could now hope to aspire to the tundu, or festival 
in honour of the man-slayers. Opportunities for the propitiat­
ion of the tornate, so important in the lives of the islanders, 
had now been multiplied, and men would not be slow to take 
advantage of them. In short, it is not necessary to posit some 
introduced socio-economic factor (in McKinnon's case, the trade 
in turtle shell) to explain an increase in raiding: it is 
entirely understandable within the context of indigenous belief 
and custom. This is not to say that head-hunting and turtle 
catching did not occur in conjunction with each other: quite 
clearly they did, but it is a quantum leap from the evidence 
to assert that raiding was dependent on the trade in turtle 
shell. There is no hard evidence for this. McKinnon states 
that the incidence and extent of head-hunting observed by 
Cheyne on Simbo in 1844, coupled with the presence of large 
quantities of turtle shell on the island, is 'sufficient
evidence that large scale raiding occurred in close association
59with turtle hunting'. y However Cheyne's records also indicate
^  RNAS 16. 'Proceedings of HMS Miranda, 1881', p. 7.
In 1930 there were 25 villages on Vella Lavella; in the 
1880s there were more, as after the introduction of 
Christianity the people congregated in larger villages 
adjacent to mission stations.
McKinnon, 'Tomahawks, Turtles and Traders', p. 302.59
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that the people of Simbo at that time were obtaining shell from
60other islanders by trading iron goods; that, is, they were 
acting as middlemen between the Europeans and the less experi­
enced islanders. In these circumstances, it is not surprising 
that there was a large quantity of shell on Simbo. The other 
evidence for McKinnon’s hypothesis come from the last few 
decades of the nineteenth century, when it was observed that 
the head-hunting expeditions from the New Georgia Group would 
stop over at the islands of the Manning Straits to collect 
shell on their way to raid the people of Isabel and Choiseul.
The fact that this did occur is insufficient evidence to
justify the assertion that the two were ’interlocking parts in
61a system of circular causation'. Rather, it simply indicates 
that in some circumstances, head-hunting and turtle shell 
collecting were undertaken on the same expedition.
McKinnon describes another fundamental development 
in island society that can be ascribed to the coming of the 
European. He discerns a change in the direction and scope of 
raiding during the nineteenth century. He hypothesises that 
raiding in association with turtle shell collecting was 
initially concentrated within the New Georgia Group, and that 
as the local turtle grounds became depleted, expeditions were 
organised to seek shell further afield - principally, the 
islands of the Manning Straits. Thus raiding (and shell collect­
ing) were redirected outside the Group: conflict within the
Shineberg, Trading Voyages, p. 309. 
McKinnon, op.cit., p. 300.
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Group subsided and inter-island cooperation for the purpose
62of forming larger, more effective expeditions replaced it.
This reconstruction cannot be reconciled with the available
evidence, which indicates that head-hunting within the Group
continued throughout the entire century. While it does appear
that New Georgian head-hunters did intensify their raids on
Choiseul and Isabel during and after the 1860s, this does not
seem to have been accompanied by the cessation of conflict
within the Group. It seems probable that raiding continued to
be directed on the pattern of traditional emnities and
alliances, and that this pattern underwent no radical change
during the century. For example, Simbo and Roviana continued
to exchange raids with their 'ancient foes' on Vella Lavella
68till late in the 1800s;  ^ they also continued raiding the
scattered communities of northern New Georgia and the Marovo
64Lagoon, who persisted in fighting amongst themselves. The
people of Rendova, Ranongga and Kolombangara likewise continued
66to raid and be raided for heads. In fact, as late as 1900
ibid., pp. 301-3.
68y LC I. Lever Report, pp. 112-22. Roviana witnesses before 
the Land Commission stated that certain areas were unoccup­
ied because they were considered too vulnerable in the face 
of raids from Vella Lavella. In the late 1880s Mbilua head­
hunters raided Roviana, killing fourteen people. See RNAS 
23, 'New Guinea and Solomon Islands, 1889', p. 20.
6k LC I. Lever Report, pp. 133-63- 
Somerville, op.cit,, pp. 391, 398-9*
Hocart, 'Warfare in Eddystone', p. 305-
Sydney Daily Telegraph, 20 June 1898. 'From the Islands News 
from the Steamer Titus Interview with Mr Mitchell'.
6 6 Interview with A. Torebule, 16/10/1974.
Interview with Leunga etc. , 24/9/1974.
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people in the New Georgia Group were still living concealed 
in the mountainous bush, or in fortified settlements - their 
fear of being attacked by fellow New Georgians in no way 
diminished.^
In summary, it would seem that the coming of Europeans 
to the New Georgia Group, the commencement of trade and the 
introduction of ironware, did not radically alter the islanders' 
conception of themselves and their society. The opportunities 
provided by European contact were exploited by the Simboese 
to enhance their status in indigenous terms. The value of the 
new iron technology lay in its utilisation for specific 
objectives within the traditional framework of individual and 
social relations. This pattern was to continue during the next 
forty years of European contact with the Group, with big-men 
throughout the Group utilising their contacts with Europeans 
to further their power and prestige, not through the acceptance 
of the spiritual and material values of the tie vaka, but 
through the exploitation of those values in the satisfaction 
of the objectives and aspirations of the tie hokara.
Somerville, op.cit., p. 358. 
LC I. Lever Report, passim.
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CHAPTER THREE
ISLANDERS AND EUROPEANS, 1860-1896
In the second half of the nineteenth century the 
European presence in the islands began to take on a different 
form. The scattered population of beachcombers and castaways 
gave way to a more permanent contingent of traders who lived 
and worked in the islands for most of the year. Missionaries 
began to enter the Solomons, although they were not to become 
entrenched in the New Georgia Group until the turn of the 
century. Labour recruiters from Fiji and Queensland also came 
increasingly to the Solomon Islands, although they too were to 
have little to do with the Group. The newcomers had an 
economic or moral stake in the islands, and soon they were to 
seek protection for these interests and to call for European 
law and order to be imposed. Thus the Royal Navy entered the 
islands in the unenviable role of policeman. This function of 
the Royal Navy reflected the changing nature of relations 
between white and black: it mirrored the European's increasing 
dependence on the islander for his economic and physical well­
being. This was a state of affairs in which few Europeans felt 
comfortable, and many believed that the big guns of Her Majesty's 
ships would somehow reinforce their rather precarious position. 
This hope was largely unfulfilled, for it was not until the 
1890s that the activities of the senior service began to be 
effective.
By the late 1860s the number of whalers working in 
the vicinity of the Solomons had declined to a trickle. Unlike 
the later Europeans who came to the islands, the whalers did
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not depend on the islanders for their livelihood and although 
collectively the whalers represented a regular source of 
goods to the islanders, individually they were dispensable. 
There was little in the way of constraints on the behaviour 
of both sides. As noted in the previous chapter, violence 
was not uncommon, and this state of affairs continued through 
to the 1860s. In November 1858 the James Arnold traded off 
Simbo, and reported that the islanders were frightened to come 
on board because a month earlier an English cutter had killed
-Iseveral of their countrymen on Simbo. In approximately June
of the same year the Pearl was cut out at Rendova; this was
reported by Captain Mair of the Ariel who had been in the
pislands in November 1859- In September 1867 the crew of the 
Marion Rennie were massacred, also at Rendova. The man behind 
both attacks, which resulted in a total of twenty-two European 
fatalities, was Londo, a big-man of Ughele.
The declining number of whalers was compensated by 
Europeans from other sources. In the 1850s the demands of 
New Hebrideans for old pre-European trade items such as tort­
oiseshell resulted in sandalwood traders entering the Solomons 
to obtain these goods, but like the East Indiamen and whalers
MS. Log of the James Arnold, 18 August 1857 - 10 March 1859. 
Original in Dartmouth Whaling Museum, Bedford, Mass., U.S.A. 
MFN Entry for 7 November, 1858.
2 Sydney Morning Herald, 3 January 1861.
 ^RNAS 13 'Pacific Islands 1857-76'. Ferguson to Stirling,
2/11/72.
D. Shineberg, They Came for Sandalwood A Study of the 
Sandalwood Trade in the South-West Pacific (Melbourne. 1967), 
pp. 156-7.
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that had preceded them, they were temporary visitors. A more 
enduring incursion was that of the missionaries, although their 
first essay was a tragic affair. In December 1845 a Marist 
mission under the leadership of Bishop Jean-Baptiste Epalle 
entered the Solomons. The Bishop was killed by the islanders 
of Isabel ten days after his arrival and the remainder retreated 
to San Cristobal. After years of suffering, death and futility
£5the mission finally left the islands in 1847. Not quite so
unsuccessful were the Anglicans, who conceived an interest in
Melanesia in 1849. Throughout the 1850s the New Zealand
Anglican Church made annual voyages amongst the islands
recruiting young men to take to the central mission college in
New Zealand (later Norfolk Island) for a Christian education.
They would then be returned to their island homes in the hope
that they would establish schools and churches to spread the
Gospel. In the Solomons this policy proved to be a sensational
failure: from 1856 to 1860 about fifty scholars were taken but
none, apparently, embarked upon the evangelisation of his
6people on his return. The policy was amended in the 1860s, 
with a more discriminate selection of recruits and the 
requirement that English missionaries were to remain in the 
islands for protracted periods to 'officer' the native teachers
5 H. Laracy, Marists and Melanesians A History of Catholic 
Missions in the Solomon Islands (Canberra, 1976). pp. 18-61.
6 D. Hilliard, 'John Coleridge Patterson Missionary Bishop 
of Melanesia' in J.W. Davidson & D. Scarr (eds.), Pacific 
Island Portraits (Canberra, 1970), pp. 179-8 5.
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and to undertake mission work themselves. As a result, the 
1870s saw English missionaries residing in the islands 
regularly. These developments did not affect the New Georgia 
Group directly, as the Anglicans had confined their activities 
to Isabel and the islands south of it: although they visited 
Marovo Island briefly in 1866, the scattered nature of the 
population had discouraged them from extending their efforts
Q
into the area. However, indirectly their impact was consid­
erable, for they encouraged further involvement by the Royal 
Navy in the area. The missionaries were assiduous watchdogs 
of the activities of labour recruiters and traders, and their 
allegations of transgressions could pressure the Admiralty 
into pursuing investigations. For example, in 1871 the 
Reverend C. Brooke reported (quite erroneously) that traders 
were transporting New Georgian head-hunters to the southerly 
islands and helping them take heads in return for turtle shell.
This necessitated an investigation by Captain Simpson of HMS
qBlanche, which took him to the Roviana Lagoon.
The 1870s also saw the blossoming of the labour trade
7
 ^ibid-^  P- 188.
Isles of the Pacific Account of the Melanesian Mission... 
with a Letter from the Missionary Bishop (Melbourne, 1861), 
p. 23.
Q
Journal of the Mission Voyage to the Melanesian Islands of 
the Schooner * Southern Cross1 Made in May - October 1866 
(Auckland, 1866), pp. 12-q.
9 GBPP, XLIII (1872). 'Further Correspondence Respecting the 
Deportation of South Sea Islanders', pp. 32-9.
GBPP, L (1873). 'South Sea Islands: Communications respecting 
Outrages committed upon Natives of the South Sea Islands',
pp. 210-11.
There is a map of the Roviana Lagoon (Map IV) at the end of 
this chapter.
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in the Solomon Islands although this, too, was to have little
direct effect on the New Georgia Group as the western islands
were poor recruiting grounds. The Group was sparsely populated
in comparison with Malaita and Guadalcanal, which were the
source of most of the recruits. The New Georgians' consuming
interest in head-hunting was probably another factor in their
disinclination to work in Queensland and Fiji, as was the
growing number of traders operating in the area offering the
10islanders an alternative source of European goods. During
the 1870s a boom in trading occurred in the Solomons. In
1872 Captain Simpson of M S  Blanche reported that there were
four vessels operating as traders in the islands; by 1879 there
11were eighteen British vessels alone. Ten of these ships were 
run by one concern, Cowlishaw Bros. & Ferguson: the largest 
were the barques Avoca (380 tons) and Gazelle (360 tons) which 
made four and three trips to Sydney annually to deliver the 
copra and shell collected by the smaller boats. The smaller 
vessels were employed continuously amongst the islands 
collecting and trading, and they varied in size from the 
steamship Emu (130 tons) to the cutters Gitana and Iris 
(both 8 tons). The eight other ships were all schooners 
varying in size from 20 to 130 tons which made on average 
two trips to Sydney each year. Five of them were owned or 
part-owned by their masters. Approximately 124 Europeans and
Corris, op.cit., pp. 29-31-
GBPP, L (1873), op.cit., p. 209.
RNAS 15 'Pacific Islands, 1879-1881 (Vol.3)'.
Purvis to Commodore, 30 September 1879. Enel. No.10, 
'List of merchant vessels'.
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182 islanders were employed on these vessels, and in addition
there were 20 Europeans employed as station hands at trading
12depots throughout the Solomons. In the New Georgia Group
during the 1870s stations seem to have been mainly in the
Roviana Lagoon, although there may have been one on Ghizo for 
18several years. The number of Europeans in the Solomons would
have varied with the seasons as it was generally the practice
of trading vessels to leave the islands in January and return
in May or June with the south-east monsoons, thus avoiding the 
1 Llwetter months. In 1879 these traders shipped some £145,000
worth of produce to 'English markets', and some £27,000 to
China in the form of beche de mer. The principal exports were
copra, 'vegetable ivory' or ivory nuts (fruit of the Metroxylon
15Americarum), turtleshell and beche de mer. y
The increasingly permanent British commercial and 
evangelical presence in the Western Pacific was a spur to the 
establishment of some form of official interest in the islands. 
This eventually took the form of the Western Pacific Order in 
Council in 1877- The Order in Council established the office 
of High Commissioner of the Western Pacific, with Jurisdiction 
over British subjects in the area. This Jurisdiction did not 
extend to the islanders: the investigation and punishment of
RNAS 15 op.cit.
^  RNAS 15 Rendell to Stirling, 14 September 1875-
14 RNAS 15 Challis to Goodenough, 16 February 1874.
15 ENAS 14 'Pacific Islands, 1877-1879 (Vol.2)', Wilson to 
Admiralty, 29 October 1879-
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offences against British subjects committed by the islanders
16was to remain the task of the Royal Navy. The Navy had been
undertaking punitive expeditions in the Solomon Islands for
quite some time; in 1851- HMS Herald had unsuccessfully
attempted to capture the murderers of Benjamin Boyd on
Guadalcanal, and in the process had burnt a village andfired
17upon the islanders. 1 The Royal Navy's Australian Squadron
expanded its activities in the region during the 1870s, as
the incidence of 'outrages' increased with the growing number
of Europeans resident in the islands. Between 1867 and 1879
some thirty four Europeans and thirty five islanders employed
by Europeans were known to have been killed in the Solomons
with the loss of an estimated £21-,000 in property. These
losses were incurred in four attacks on ships and five on
trading stations. Only one of these incidents occurred in
the New Georgia Group: this was the cutting out of the
18Marion Rennie at Rendova in 1867-
The European reaction to the Marion Rennie affair 
was to be fairly typical of later punitive actions in its 
misdirection and ineptitude. A year after the attack HMS
I have not examined in detail the establishment of the 
W.P.H.C., its relationship to the Royal Navy, and the legal 
questions involved, as these subjects have already been 
exhaustively covered by D. Scarr, Fragments of Empire 
A History of the Western Pacific High Commission 1877-1911- 
(Canberra, 1967), pp. 25-52.
^  Admiralty Library. MSS. Adm. Ref. No. 25 'Voyage of HMS
Herald under the command of Capt. H. Margies Denham RN being 
Private Journal kept by John MacGillivray Naturalist'. MFN 
Vol.II, Entries for December 25, 1851- to January 5, 1855.
A O
RNAS 15 Purvis to Commodore, 50 September 1879- Enclosure 
No.12.
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Blanche under Captain John Montgomerie visited the area and 
shelled the islets of the Roviana Lagoon. As the organiser 
of the attack, Londo, was a Rendova big-man, the bombardment 
was considerably off target. Montgomerie also imposed a fine 
of three tons of turtleshell on Londo, and secured an agree­
ment to that effect from the three 'chiefs', Tepalla, George 
19and Heggarty. y It would have required a superhuman effort
indeed to collect such a quantity of shell, and in any event
it transpired that the three 'chiefs' who had undertaken to
force the agreement on Londo were no more than 'underlings'
with some knowledge of pidgin English. In August 1872 the
Blanche revisited the Roviana Lagoon, this time under the
command of Captain Simpson. Simpson recognised the
absurdity of the fine and the true status of the 'chiefs' and
thus arranged a new agreement. This took the form of a
'treaty' between Simpson and the 'chiefs' Izomo and Mbitia, by
which they agreed to deliver up Londo or execute him themselves.
Simpson obtained the islanders' concurrence by threatening to
20destroy their villages. Izomo and Mbitia were both from 
Munda, and were not without authority: Mbitia was the mbangara 
Sosolo, and Izomo was the brother of Pengguvovoso, the 
mbangara Sisieta. Within a month they had succeeded in killing
19J RNAS 13 Extract of letter: Montgomerie to Rowley, 4 October 
1868. 'Copy of agreement between Montgomerie and the Chiefs 
Tepalla, George, Heggarty', dated 11 September 1868.
20 RNAS 13 Simpson to Stirling, 16 August 1872.
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21Londo. Unfortunately for the Royal Navy, this effective
method of inflicting punishment was later criticised by the
Law Officers of the Crown, and the Admiralty was forced to
instruct its officers that they were ’on no account to enter
22into illegal treaties of such a nature in future’.
The Londo affair was an indication of the new focus 
of European interest in the New Georgia Group. Between the 
1850s and the 1870s the centre of European activity had moved 
from Simbo to Munda, in the Roviana Lagoon. Although the det­
ails of this change are undocumented, it is easily explained.
In these years turtle shell was gradually replaced by copra 
as the principal trade item in the islands. In the 1850s 
machinery was developed which enabled the large-scale extract­
ion of the oil from the dried meat of the coconut or copra. 
Copra is easily made and its transportation is without 
difficulties, whereas in previous years the oil had to be
23extracted in the islands and then shipped out in barrels. 
Traders could either collect the coconuts and dry the meat 
themselves, or simply pick up the copra produced by the island­
ers. For these purposes Munda was a more suitable base than 
Simbo: it was central to the Group whereas Simbo was relatively
RNAS 13 Stirling to Admiralty, 27 December 1872. Enel. 
Ferguson to Stirling, 2 November 1872.
J. Roni, ’Buka pa tututi’. Lines of the mbutu mbutu 
Sisieta and Lodumaho.
The Roviana word mbangara has generally been translated as 
'chief', a more appropriate term is 'manager' or 'big-man'. 
See Scheffler, 'Kindred and Kin Groups', p. 145.
22 RNAS 13 Lushington to Stirling, 19 August 1873.
H.C. Brookfield, Colonialism, Development and Independence. 
The case of the Melanesian islands in the South Pacific 
(Cambridge, 1972), p. 26.
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isolated, and the foreshore and islets of the Roviana Lagoon 
were rich in coconut groves. Although the entrance to the 
Lagoon was shallow it was sufficient to allow the passage of 
the ketches that toured the group collecting copra; moreover, 
there was a safe anchorage for large vessels nearby, in the 
Hathorn Sound. In addition, the Munda area had a substantial 
and stable coastal population, providing the trader with a 
ready market for his goods. The Roviana people had probably 
become familiar with the European and his merchandise through 
the medium of their friends on Simbo, and when the opportunity 
to establish a more direct economic relationship arose, they 
were not slow to exploit it.
After the bombardment of the Lagoon in 1868, an action
resulting from the ignorance of the naval officer concerned
rather than from the deeds of the Munda people, the Munda
region was to remain free of such conflict for twenty years.
Despite this, the traders at Munda were far from secure. Their
position was dependent upon the goodwill of the local people
and they were liable to attacks from other islanders. On one
occasion a trader narrowly escaped death after being warned by
24the Munda islanders. With such a precarious footing in the 
district, traders were understandably anxious to avoid antag­
onising their customers: credit was often given, and bad debts
26were not unusual. The fact that the traders were in
RNAS 16 ’Proceedings of the Hon. E.S. Lawson (HMS "Miranda")' ,
p. 6.
RNAS 23 NGSI_1883, p. 6.
Woodford Papers. Item No. 30 'Diary from 4th August 1886 
to November 10th 1886'. Entry for 28 September.
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competition with each other further undermined their position, 
as they were generally unable to adopt a united front on any 
matter. One visitor to the Roviana Lagoon in the mid 1880s 
was told that the traders rejoiced when ever a fellow trader 
was murdered.^
The first trader to regularly visit the Roviana
Lagoon appears to have been Alexander Ferguson, the partner of
Cowlishaw Bros, of Sydney. Ferguson was the biggest trader
operating in the Solomons during the 1870s; he had a dozen
stations scattered throughout the islands, one of the largest 
27being at Munda. The station was generally occupied by a 
European agent: in the mid 1870s this was a Mr Stephens,
28although Ferguson regularly visited the Roviana Lagoon himself. 
Ferguson appears to have been well acquainted with the Munda 
area by at least the early 1870s: in 1872 he acted as an 
adviser and interpreter for the Royal Navy during their invest­
igations of the Marion Rennie affair. He recommended that 
the turtle shell fine be dropped (perhaps with the thought 
that it might severely affect his own supplies of shell), and
urged that Izomo and Mbitia be given rifles as rewards after
29they had succeeded in killing Londo. y 
26 ibid., entry for 1 September.
^  WHPC No.J of 1878. Report on the New Hebrides and Solomon 
Islands by Mr R. Beckwith Leefe (Fiji). Dated 10th March 
1878.
^  RNAS 13 Sanders to Goodenough, 11 January 1875»
29y RNAS 13 Simpson to Stirling, 16 August 1872; Stirling to 
Admiralty, 27 December 1872. Enel. Ferguson to Stirling,
2 November 1872.
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Ferguson was killed on Bougainville in August 1880
and in the following year Cowlishaw Bros, interests in the
30islands were bought out by Kelly and Williams of Sydney.
This firm, in association with the trader Thomas Woodhouse,
maintained the Munda station through to the end of the century.
It was situated on the islet of Nuza Zonga, a few hundred yards
off the Munda foreshore. Kelly, Williams and Woodhouse bought
this islet in October 1881 for £7 (presumably in trade goods)
from one 'Condo'; the transaction was witnessed by the big-men
31Mengo and Ingava. This was the first recorded land sale in 
the New Georgia Group, although there were probably a number 
of undocumented deals preceding it. Frank Wickham, who arrived 
in the Solomons around 1875? apparently purchased the island 
of Hombupeka, situated about half a mile offshore of Munda.
While details of this transaction are unknown, it seems to have 
been concluded to the satisfaction of all concerned as the title 
was never challenged and Wickham and his descendants continued 
to reside there for a century.
A third permanent station was established in the 
Munda area in the mid 1880s. Like those of Wickham on Hombup­
eka and Kelly and Williams on Nusa Zonga, this station was 
sited on an offshore islet. The proprietor was Edmund Pratt, 
who had come to the islands in 1883 and in March 1886 purchased
^  Corris, op.cit., p. 100.
^  DBS 'The Red Book (Book of Certified Copies of Entries 
Affecting Land)', p. 5 (Claim No.82).
A list of the land transactions that occurred in the Group, 
together with a map locating the land involved (Map VI) 
can be found in Appendix I.
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the islet of Hombuhombu in the Roviana Lagoon. In addition 
to these three stations with their resident agents and traders, 
the Munda area was also a base for trading schooners that 
toured the Group,^ and was to remain so through to the next 
century. Elsewhere in the New Georgia Group stations were 
intermittently established, but seldom lasted more than a few 
years. Many of these were, in fact, agencies for the Munda 
traders: Kelly, Williams and Woodhouse had an agent in the Mar- 
ovo Lagoon in the late 1880s, operating from the islet of 
Lilihina.^ Edmund Pratt and his brother Jean purchased islets 
and small blocks of land throughout the Group which were occas­
ionally used as stations and depots.
After the attack on the Marion Rennie in 1867 there 
were no further clashes between the islanders and traders until 
1880; however, the following twenty years saw incidents occur 
regularly every few years. There are a number of possible 
reasons for the hiatus during the 1870s. In these years the 
copra trade was blossoming: islanders who had previously been 
unable to obtain European goods easily because of the monopol­
ising influence of the Simboese and the natural limitations 
on the supplies of turtle shell and beche de mer now found that 
they could satisfy their initial demands with the readily avail­
able and plentiful coconut. In addition it would seem likely
'J e ~ ibid., p. 10 (Claim No.115)- Edmund Pratt was also known as 
Pratt Edmunds, French Peter, Peter Pratt and Pratt Adams. 
This situation was further confused by the presence of his 
brother in the islands; the brother was Jean Pratt, also 
known as J.P. Pratt and Johnny Pratt.
88 Woodford Papers. Copy of Letter addressed to John Thurston, 
dated November 1886, found at end of Item No.30, 'Diary... 
1886'.
3d RNAS 23 NGSI 1889, p. 29.
£iJi& & a-waS Purchased by Kelly in 1885; see DLS 'Red Book' p.1 (Claim No.78;.
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that the European traders entering the area for the first time 
were cautious in their relations with the islanders, taking 
care to avoid exposing themselves in dangerous situations. In 
the 1880s, however, there are indications that some traders 
were becoming careless in their approaches to the islanders.
In 1886 Captain Brooke of the Royal Navy reported that he 
considered that the habit of some traders of going ashore in 
small boats with large quantities of trade was a major factor 
in the incidence of 'outrages'. " Perhaps a more important 
reason for the outbreak of violence in the 1880s was the 
islanders' demand for increasingly sophisticated goods, 
particularly firearms.
By the early 1870s the Roviana people had obtained
muskets, and their ownership by islanders of other parts of the
Group became common during that decade. However, these weapons
were not particularly suited to a wet, tropical climate and
36were often innaccurate. The 1880s saw an increasing demand 
amongst islanders for breech loading rifles, principally 
Sniders. These more expensive guns may have been beyond the 
means of some islanders, who then resorted to more violent 
methods to obtain them. The supply of the new rifles was 
also affected by Queens Regulation No.1 of 1884 which prohibited 
the sale of arms, ammunition and explosives to islanders. While 
this order of the High Commission only applied to British
55 RNAS 23 NGSI 1886, p. 60.
36 John Brazier. Notes. Cruise of HMS Blanche through the 
South Sea Islands. ML. MS. B512. Enbry for 16 August 1872. 
For a full discussion of the significance of guns in Melans- 
ia, see D. Shineberg, 'Guns and men in Melenesia', JPH 6 
(1971), pp. 61-82.
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subjects, and not all of them felt inclined to obey it, it
apparently had some impact. In early 1885 the trader Frank
Wickham described the islanders of the Group as 'crazy* in their
desire to buy rifles, but he doubted whether they could obtain
them from the traders in the Group. ' Wickham was being over-
optimistic for some traders, most notably Edmund Pratt,
continued to supply arms well into the 1890s. Indeed, they may
have had little choice but to do so, for some islanders
apparently refused to produce copra for anything else but fire-
88arms and ammunition. While the desire for modern weapons and 
other goods, and the carelessness of Europeans, were probably 
contributing factors in the upsurge of European/islander clashes 
after 1880, there were also more basic reasons.
The 1870s were a period of familiarisation with the 
European and his ways for many islanders. Prior to those 
years, contact had been sporadic and limited, with Europeans 
being temporary visitors and often using the Simboese as middle­
men in their relations with other parts of the Group. The 1870s 
saw traders residing and operating in the Group on a permanent 
basis, and although they were based at Munda, they toured the 
other islands regularly. Seemingly, familiarity bred contempt: 
in 1875 the Simboese had raised the ire of one naval officer
because of the 'off-hand' manner with which they treated Europ- 
- xoeans. By the 1880s this attitude had become more common
57 ENAS 23 NGSI 1883, p. 7-
58 ENAS 23 NGSI 1889, p. 29.
39 RNAS 15 Sanders to Goodenough ,11 January 1875.
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throughout the Group, with islanders looking upon Europeans
40as 'white trash'. These feelings were understandable, for 
the Europeans in the islands were in no position to assert 
themselves. They lived at Munda on sufferance, tolerated 
because they were useful, and anxious to maintain cordial 
relations with their hosts. This situation was deeply dist­
urbing to some Europeans, particularly for those with strong 
views on the white man's duty to civilise and control the 
'savage'. Such a one was Charles Morris Woodford, who spent 
several weeks at Munda in 1886. Woodford was distressed to 
observe head-hunting, ritual sacrifice and cannibalism being 
practised in the presence of Europeans; he complained of the
traders' familiarity with the islanders and described them as
42a 'very low lot'.
The islanders' refusal to show proper respect for 
the white man was galling; even more, it was a violation of 
faith:
Although they (the islanders) are accustomed
every day to see white men they are a most
treacherous lot.,.-,dp
The accusation of 'treachery' was a familiar one; Cheyne had 
made it in the 1840s and it was repeated frequently thereafter.
'D.H.', 'A Trip to the Solomon Islands', ML. Newspaper 
Cuttings, Vo1.52, pp. 205-5.
C.M. Woodford, 'Life in the Solomon Islands', pp. 477-8.
Woodford Papers. Item No.30, 'Diary from 4th August 1886 to 
November 10th 1886', entry for September 1.
ibid., entry for 28 September.
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It was based in part on the islanders’ raiding methods: their 
fondness for 'unprovoked* surprise attacks. For the European 
this was a moral black mark, but for the islanders it was 
simply an effective tactic - one which they used often on head­
hunting expeditions, and which they expected to be used against 
them in turn. Neither was 'provocation' a necessary condition 
for the organisation of a raid. Heads were required for 
specific ceremonial and religious occasions, and if an insult 
was revenged at the same time, so much the better. In attacks 
upon Europeans head were taken and much desired goods obtained 
at the same time. The fact that a trader might have had prior 
dealings with a group of islanders did not insure him against 
assault from them; heads might well be required immediately 
for the launching of a canoe, and short-term rewards may well 
have proved more attractive than the long-term advantages of a 
stable relationship with a particular trader. In any case, with 
a situation of cut-throat competition between traders it was 
quite likely that another would fill the gap.
It was the nature of these attacks that so disturbed 
the Europeans working in the Group. They were not localised, 
but could happen anywhere: traders were attacked at Vella 
Lavella, Kolombangara, Rendova, the Marovo Lagoon, and even in 
the Roviana Lagoon. The attackers could be islanders with 
whom a trader had done business before, and they could strike 
anytime. Although fifteen Europeans were killed between 1880 
and 1896, the impact of these 'outrages' was profound. Traders 
were never totally secure: they could be assaulted without 
warning and from any quarter. Their insecurity manifested
87
itself in their frequent complaints that the Royal Navy was
taking insufficient action to punish culprits, and that the
44-islanders were becoming more and more arrogant or ’saucy'.
The first three incidents during the 1880s were of 
a similar nature: all involved assaults on traders, operating 
from vessels, by islanders with whom they were doing business 
at the time. In May 1880 the Esperanza, a Cowlishaw Bros, 
and Ferguson ship, was cut out at Kolombangara whilst collect­
ing copra. The entire crew of three Europeans and eight 
islanders was killed, the ship looted and then burnt. Ferguson 
estimated the material loss at £2,000. y In August of the 
following year the Atlantic almost suffered a similar fate.
The ship was at Njorio, Vella Lavella, trading for copra when 
the crew was set upon by islanders using the axes they had 
just purchased. The attackers were forced off with the loss
of one Melanesian crewmember and the wounding of the European 
46mate. In January 1885 the captain of the Elibank Castle, 
his mate and three of his Melanesian crew were killed when 
they were ashore trading at Mbaniata, on Rendova.^ The three 
attacks were not motivated by any particular animus for the 
traders concerned. Their explanation can be found in a
^  RNAS 23 NGSI 1885, p. 6; NGSI 1886, p. 6; SI 1891, p. 22.
^  RNAS15 Ferguson to Wilson, 1 August 1880; Richards to 
Bower, 29 September 1880; Maxwell to Wilson, 31 January 
1881 (printed).
46 RNAS 15 Dawson to Wilson, 6 October 1881.
47 RNAS 23 NGSI 1885, pp. 2-8.
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combination of the desire for goods, and in the more traditional 
demands of island society. The assault on the Atlantic was 
instigated from the Roviana Lagoon. It was learnt that a 
’contract' had been let out from the Roviana area for a 
vessel and heads. This practice was customary in the Group: 
a big-man who required heads but who did not wish to involve 
himself in an expedition at the time, or who was unable to 
obtain heads himself, would offer shell money to another group 
who would undertake to get them. In the case of the Roviana 
people, it may also have been a convenient method of avoiding 
a direct disturbance in their relationship with the traders at 
Munda. When the Njorio people failed to take the Atlantic, 
the contract was said to have been accepted by Tulo, a big-man 
of Mbilua. Shortly after the attack on the Atlantic a Mbilua 
tomako attempted to surprise the trader Nielson at his base on 
Nusa Zonga, but was thwarted when he received warning of the 
raid. The Mbilua men were then forced to purchase a ’slave' 
at Roviana and decapitate him so as not to return homewithout 
48a head. The Elibank Castle murders had a simpler explanation: 
the Mbaniata people involved had recently constructed a 'tambu 
house’ (a hope or paele) and heads were required for its 
inauguration.^
The next incident occurred in December 1885, when a 
Mr Childe was murdered on Mbava, an uninhabited island off 
western Vella Lavella. This unfortunate gentleman had intended
RNAS 15 'Proceedings of Commander the Hon. E.S. Dawson 
(HMS "Miranda”)1, p. 6.
49 RNAS 23 NGSI 1883, pp. 2-8.
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to establish a farm and had been dropped off on the island
with his companion, a young Simbo lad who promptly returned
home and informed his elders of the 'sitting duck'. The Simbo
men, who required a head for new tomako and were attracted
80by the possibility of plunder, seized the opportunity.
Childe was exceptionally foolish: any individual, white or
black, who wandered unprotected into strange territory in the
New Georgia Group was liable to lose his head. Similar cases
occurred in August 1887 and July 1895- bn the first instance
two men who had stolen a yacht (the Spec) in Fiji sailed to
81Solomons and anchored at Ughele, Rendova. In the latter case,
another two men went ashore at the eastern end of the Roviana
52Lagoon after the wreck of their ship, the Amelia. All four 
lost their heads.
In the late 1880s there were another four attacks on 
traders in the Group. In October 1888 Edmund Pratt's station 
at Munda was raided. Two islanders employed by Pratt were 
killed and the station looted of £200 worth of goods. The 
murderers were two Simbo men who subsequently fled to their 
home island. There may have been a personal motive for this 
attack, as it was rumoured that the two offenders had once 
worked for Pratt and had been mistreated by him.^ The next 
incident occurred in June 1889 when two islanders employed 
by Woodhouse's agent in the Marovo Lagoon, Eric Ellingson,
^  ibid,? PP- 25-6.
51 ENAS 23 NGSI 1887, p. 27.
^  WPHC No.283 of 1896, Woodford to Thurston, 12 July 1896. 
r ? 'J  ENAS 23 SI 1891, p. 22.
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were murdered on Marovo Island. As no material goods were
involved in this attack, it would appear that heads were
required for some reason.^ In the same month Edmund Pratt's
station at Munda was again raided. On this occasion three of
Pratt's employees were killed: one European, William Dabelle,
and two islanders. The men concerned in this attack seem to
have been something in the nature of renegades. They were
Mbilua men under the leadership of the big-man, 'Goolie';
Goolie was not a lekasa, but a fighting man who had attracted
a non-cognatic following through his prowess at warfare. They
moved about the Group a good deal and had been in the Roviana
area for some months before the attack on the station, after
96which they returned to Mbilua. The last incident of the
1880s occurred in September 1889, when the European second
mate and four Melanesian crewmen were killed when they went
ashore at Lokuru on Rendova to trade. A new paele had been
97constructed and heads were required for its inauguration. '
The first six years of the 1890s, before the estab­
lishment of the Protectorate administration, saw a number of 
incidents. In March 1891 four Melanesians employed on the 
trading vessel Freak were killed while socialising with the
54 ENAS 23 NGSI 1889' pp. 26-7; NGSI 1890, pp. 18-20.
99^  A lekasa was the traditional leader of a cognatic kin group, 
or toutou.
56 ENAS 23 NGSI 1889. pp. 20-22; SI 1891. pp. 19-21.
57 RNAS 23 NGSI 1889, p. 26; NGSI 1890. pp. 17-18.
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local islanders at Ndovele, Vella Lavella. Their heads were
58
needed for the launching of several recently constructed tomako.
Two months later a similar killing occurred at Munda when two
islanders working on the ship Marshall S were invited ashore
59and then murdered. It was not until March 1891- that the next 
incident occurred, when a trader, Donald Guy, two of his crew 
of Melanesians and two islanders who were passengers were 
killed on board their ship whilst trading with men of south­
west New Georgia in the Marovo Lagoon. Again it seems that
heads were wanted for several new tomako; in addition, there
60was the incentive of a vessel to be plundered.
The islanders employed by the traders in the New 
Georgia Group were, generally speaking, not local people. 
Although a few New Georgians were skilled seamen, working 
regularly aboard trading vessels, the bulk of the labour on 
both stations and ships came from other parts of the Solomons, 
in particular the island of Malaita. The lives of these men 
was even less secure than those of the white traders, with some 
thirty-eight of their number being killed by New Georgians 
between 1880 and 1896 - more than double the European casual­
ties. As well as the dangers of the environment, the Melanesian 
labourers and crewmen had to cope with their employers, some 
of whom behaved quite brutally towards their workers. In these
58 RNAS 23 SI 1891, p. 39.
59 RNAS 23 SI 1891, pp. 38-9.
60 WPHC No. 293 of 1895, SI 1894, pp. 13-16.
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circumstances it was not surprising that there were a number 
of cases of conflict between the labourers and both their 
employers and the New Georgians. Trouble of this kind occurred 
in 1894 and 1895- In the former year, twelve Malaitan labourers 
employed by Edmund Pratt deserted him, going to Kolombangara 
and the Vona Vona Lagoon where all but four were killed by 
the local islanders. It would seem, however, that they were 
partly responsible for their fate, as they had been intimidat­
ing the people in the area and stealing food from the gardens.
Pratt had apparently caused the desertions by frequently
61beating his employees. More trouble occurred in 1899 when 
the trader Charles Atkinson and his European mate were 
murdered by their crew of Malaita and Nggela men in the 
Marovo Lagoon. It seems that Atkinson had prompted the
62attack by killing one of the crew in a drunken argument. In 
the same year, at Munda, a Malaitan labourer attempted to
66assault his European boss after being slapped for laziness. 
Undoubtedly there were many such incidents that went unreported, 
with summary 'justice' being dispensed by the trader concerned 
without recourse to official channels. These episodes were 
forerunners of the abuses and conflict between white employers 
and their black labour that were to become common with the 
establishment of plantations in the New Georgia Group.
ibid., pp. 19-20.
62 WPHC No.14-1 of 1896, SI 1896, pp. 18-25. 
^  ibid., p. 35-
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In late May 1896 Charles Woodford entered the
Solomons aboard HMS Pylades in the capacity of Commissioner
for the British Solomon Islands Protectorate, and soon was
energetically investigating reports of misdeeds and attempting
64to bring some order to life in the islands. This was a 
turning point for the islanders: for the first time British 
authority was to be expressed through a resident with some 
experience of Melanesian society. Prior to Woodford's arrival 
the agent of British power in the area had been the Royal 
Navy, expressed in the form of annual cruises amongst the 
islands in the dry season. It was the Navy's duty to 
investigate and act upon the reports of 'outrages'; a difficult 
task undertaken with mixed results.
The Western Pacific Order in Council in 1877 initially 
caused some confusion with regard to the activities of the 
Navy. The first High Commissioner of the Western Pacific, Sir 
Arthur Gordon, was determined to assert his authority over all 
British affairs in the region, including those previously 
in the Navy's sphere of operations. The impracticality of 
these ambitions soon became apparent and by 1881 conditions had 
largely reverted to their pre-High Commission state.^ In that 
year the Admiralty instructed its commanders that they were 
to deal with 'outrages' upon British subjects on the basis 
of their own judgement: it was no longer necessary to first 
refer the matter to the High Commission. To deal with
WPHC No.199 of 1896, Woodford to Thurston, 6 June 1896.
66 Scarr, op,cit., pp. 36-51.
66 RNAS 15 Hall to Wilson, 12 September 1881.
offences committed by British subjects commanders were 
appointed as Deputy Commissioners to act under the provisions 
of the Order in Council.^ However, these provisions did not 
apply to the islanders who were 'regarded as members of 
responsible communities whose occasional violent acts must
68be interpreted as acts of war and be answered accordingly*.
Thus punitive expeditions became 'acts of war', yet islanders 
captured in such conflicts were not treated as prisoners of 
war, but as criminals. This incongruity escaped the attention 
of the authorities.
The general procedure in dealing with offences 
against British persons and property was to demand the 
restitution of the stolen goods and/or the surrender of the 
offenders under the threat of war. If the demands were 
denied then the community as a whole was assumed to be 
responsible; a state of war was deemed to exist between Her 
Majesty and the community in question, and they were then 
collectively punished with the destruction of houses, canoes, 
coconut trees and anything else that was at hand. If a shore 
party was unable to reach a village, it was shelled from the 
ship.
In the New Georgia Group it was usual for a visiting 
warship to first call at Munda for information and, if necessary 
guides and interpreters. The latter functions were generally 
performed by islanders, although occasionally a trader would
^  RNAS 17 Admiralty to Colonial Office, 19 November 1881.
Scarr, op.cit., p. 167.
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accompany a naval vessel in its investigations. In the 1880s
an islander named Mengo frequently assisted Europeans at Munda;
in the Navy's eyes Mengo was a prominent 'Rubiana chief' whose
life had been threatened several times because of the help he 
69had given them. The latter may have been true, but the former
certainly was not: Mengo had little or no authority at Munda
because he was a refugee. He had been a mbangara at Kolokali,
on eastern Ghizo, but had been forced to abandon the village
with its small remnant of survivors as they were unable to
defend themselves against head-hunters. The Ghizo population
was so reduced that in 1920 only two descendants could be
found, one of them Mengo's son. Mengo's friendliness to
Europeans and his ability to speak pidgin English were the
real basis of his status. He was able to capitalise on the
gullibility of Europeans on a number of occasions, principally
70in the selling of land. While Mengo may have been able to 
attract some following with the wealth he obtained through 
his connections with Europeans, it was evidently not sufficient 
to establish him as a power amongst the other islanders. This 
position was filled by Ingava, the mbangara or big-man of 
Sisieta.
There were many mbangara in the Roviana Lagoon.
Each district might have a big-man, but their influence and 
wealth could vary considerably. In the last few decades of
^  RNAS 15 Dawson to Wilson, 11 November 1881.
^  WPHC No.91 of 1898, Woodford to High Commission, 17 March 
1901. LC I. Lever Report, pp. 195-200.
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the nineteenth century some of the mbangara were Vagimata
of Saikile, Lepe and Vonge of Kindu, Nona of Nusa Roviana,
and Veo of Londumaho. Some of these, notably Vonge, were well
known to the Navy, but none seem to have been regarded with as
much respect as Ingava. In the European accounts of the time
he was often called ’King of Rubiana', and although this was
an exaggeration of his power, he did have a large following at
Munda. His paele at Sisieta accomodated five tomako in 1886,
and he had increased this fleet to seven or eight by the rnid- 
711890s. He also possessed several 'good-sized English built
72boats' and a large arsenal. Ingava would have inherited 
some of his wealth and prestige from his father and uncle, 
Penggu and Izomo, the two previous mbangara Sisieta. Izomo 
was well-known to Europeans and seems to have gained status 
from the relationship. Ingava expanded these connections and 
had a broad reputation as a friend to traders. He spoke a 
little English and seems to have had the knack of making 
Europeans feel at ease: one visitor described him as a 
'pleasant, intellectual man'. This was no mean feat, as he
 ^ Woodford Papers. Item No.30 'Diary...1886', entry for 2 
October.
H. Cayley-Webster, Through New Guinea and the Cannibal 
Countries (London, 1898), p. 120.
72
' Somerville, op.cit., p. 399-
73
' Cayley-Webster, op.cit., p. 108.
Por Ingava's friendship with traders see: 'D.H.', loc.cit. 
R. Festetics de Tolna, Chez les Cannibales Huit Ans de 
Croisiere dans 1'Ocean Pacifique a bord de Yacht 'Le Tolna' 
iParis, 1903J, PP- 327-32.
Papers of William Hamilton. MS. in the Oxley Memorial 
Library, Brisbane, Queensland. MFN. Item 4 'Account of 
Prospecting Voyages for Pearl Shell in New Guinea and the 
Solomons, 1899-1901', pp. 3-0.
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also made no attempt to conceal the more ferocious side of 
his character - as a merciless killer and head-hunter. Indeed, 
Ingava's ability to unite these two roles was the basis of 
his success. The boats, guns and other goods he obtained 
through his European connections were used to increase his 
status in indigenous terms - as a mbangara and tie varane 
(fighting man). His wealth was assiduously employed in the 
construction of tomako, the organisation of expeditions and
74ceremonies, and the production of shell money.
In his relations with the Royal Navy, Ingava was 
very much his own man. He was willing to assist them when 
their attentions were not directed at Munda: he once
75accompanied the Navy on an expedition to Lokuru, Rendova. ^
However at Munda itself, while giving every appearance of
helpfulness, he seems to have preferred to risk the wrath
of the Navy than jeopardise his relations with fellow islanders,
76as on no occasion did he surrender to their demands.' Although 
he was reluctant to act as a de facto policeman for the Royal 
Navy, Ingava was quick to sense the possibilities of the
7 4 Ingava's family had a large collection of indigenous wealth 
objects, such as the clamshell bakia and poata. See J. 
Fleischmann Footsteps in the Sea (New York, 1935), p. 123- 
T.W. Edge-Partington, 'Ingava, Chief of Rubiana, Solomon 
Islands: died 1906', Man, VII (1907), pp. 22-3-
75 ENAS 23 NGSI 1890, pp. 17-8.
76 ENAS 23 NGSI 1889. p. 21; SI 1891, p. 38; SI 1892, p. 12.
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white man's law: in 1893 he made an official complaint about 
the behaviour of Edmund Pratt, and won the ensuing court case 
in 1894.77
The Royal Navy's experience with Ingava was repeated
elsewhere in the Group. Big-men such as Bera of Vangunu and
Belengana on Simbo were reputed to be willing to assist the
Navy in their investigations, but this assistance never
extended to the apprehension of offenders.^ In not one case
did the Navy obtain a wanted man from the islanders, and as
a result had to resort to collective punishment, which varied
considerably in its impact. In some areas such as Kolombangara
and the Marovo Lagoon there was little to destroy, as the
islanders lived deep in the mountains. The most that could
generally be found on the coast were a few makeshift huts and 
79canoes. y Inland villages visible from the warship were
shelled, but this also could be ineffective. The impact of
a bombardment even slightly off target would be smothered by
the dense growth of the forest. Only one islanders was known
80to have been killed in a shelling, although it is highly 
probable that some others were killed and villages were 
considerably damaged. The surest method of inflicting
77 WHPC No.293 of 1895; SI 1894, pp. 11-12.
78 RNAS23 NGSI 1890. p. 19; SI 1892, p. 13- There is a 
possibility that on one occasion Belengana allowed a man to 
go on board a naval vessel knowing that he would be 
punished. See SI 1891, pp- 38-9-
^  RNAS 15 Maxwell to Wilson, 31 January 1881.
RNAS 23 NGSI 1890, p. 19-
80 RNAS 23 NGSI 1886, p. 7-
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punishment was to land a shore party to burn the houses, destroy 
the canoes, and cut down the coconut trees. Such expeditions 
rarely encountered resistance, bar a few haphazard rifle shots 
fired from a distance. If the shore party ventured further 
into the bush they could expect to receive heavier fire, but on 
no occasion was a Navy man killed in such an exchange. The 
islanders fared a little worse, with two islanders being 
killed in clashes in 1891.^
The effect of the Navy's operations on the lives and 
attitudes of the islanders does not seem to have been great.
The loss of houses and small canoes would have been a short­
term annoyance rather than a serious loss. The destruction of 
coconut trees was more severe, as they were a source of income 
and took about six years to reach a fruit bearing stage. How­
ever this blow was also softened, as the Navy were under
82instructions to avoid wholesale destruction of plantations.
The worst loss the islanders could suffer was the destruction 
of their tomako: their material and spiritual investment in 
these vessels was enormous, and could not be replaced easily.
In consequence, the islanders often attempted to conceal the 
tomako if they heard of an impending raid. The Royal Navy's 
operations during the 1880s were in general not particularly 
successful, either as retribution or as a deterrent. A decade 
of shelling and burning had apparently done little to convince
^  RNAS 16 'Proceedings...(HMS Miranda)', pp. 7-8.
RNAS 23 SI 1891, pp. 21, 39-^0.
^  RNAS 15 Hall to Wilson, 22 January 1881; Wilson to Hall,
12 March 1881.
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the islanders of the error of their ways, for in 1889 three
8dfresh 'outrages’ occurred. However, in 189.1 a single tour 
by HMS Royalist was to have more impact than all those of 
the previous eleven years.
The Royalist was given no special brief for the tour: 
her distinction lay in the determination of her commanding 
officer, Captain Edward II.M. Davis. Whereas previous command­
ers had been content to describe the bush as 'impenetrable' 
and to be satisfied with lobbing a few shells in the direction 
of an offending village, Davis marched eighty men into the 
hills of Mbilua on Vella Lavella to take the stockade of the 
big-man Goolie. Although the islanders managed to escape, with 
the exception of one man who was killed, it was an impressive
achievement as the stockade was at an elevation of one thousand 
81-feet. At Ndovele on the same island, in punishment for the 
murder of the crewmen of -the Freak, Davis burned the villages 
and shot a man who turned out to be the big-man, Tono. He 
also managed to ferret out and destroy two tomako which had
O  C
been concealed.  ^ Davis also shelled another village at 
Mbilua and one on Simbo, but it was at Munda that he was to 
extend himself.
On the 25 September he arrived at Munda and demanded 
the murderers of William Dabelle, some of whom had recently
85 ENAS 23 NGSI 1889, pp. 20-22, 25-26, 26-27.
84 ENAS 23 SI 1891, p. 21.
8  ^ibid. , pp. 39-1-0.
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been seen in the Roviana district. When they were not forth­
coming he proceeded to destroy all the villages of Munda: 
landing with a party of eighty men, he burnt 400 houses and.
150 canoes, and smashed 1,000 heads that were discovered in the 
villages. The beaches of the lagoon were reported to be 
'absolutely littered with skulls'.88 The only structures left 
standing were Ingava's house and two paele which were spared 
because Ingava was away at the time and Davis hoped that the 
big-man might thus be made more amenable to future requests. 
Davis also failed to destroy the tomako as they had been 
removed and hidden in the shallow waters of the Vona Vona 
Lagoon.
The impact of the Royalist's tour throughout the 
Group was profound. Some of the Munda islanders moved to 
Vona Vona, eight miles to the east, rather than remain at 
their old village sites. Those who remained were cautious in 
rebuilding. When the Navy called there in 1892 the islanders 
'came from miles round to ask...if they might build again'.88 
On Vella Lavella, the entire Mbilua coastline was deserted, and 
elsewhere in the Group the islanders showed the greatest
0 0reluctance to have any communication with the Navy. The
Somerville, op.cit., p. 399; RNAS 23 SI 1891, pp. 11, 20-21.
87 RNAS 23 SI 1892, p. 12.
88 ibid., pp. 12-13.
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impression left by Davis was still deep three years later: in 
December 1895 Commander Rason reported that the Royalist was 
’a name to conjure by, owing to the strong action of Captain
89Davis, and his name is still respected throughout the Group'.
However, the islanders' awareness that it was the character
of Davis, rather than the general nature of naval operations,
that was responsible for the punitive actions of 1891 may have
weakened their effect as a deterrent. Dor from 189d to 1896
another four Europeans were murdered. Two of these, the men
from the wrecked Amelia, were killed at the eastern end of
the Roviana Lagoon, not twenty miles from the Munda villages
that Davis had flattened.
Much satisfaction was expressed over the razing
of Munda. Davis himself wrote:
this severe punishment will not be lost on 
the noted Rubiana head-hunters, who for years 
have considered themselves perfectly safe in 
their strongholds.
The Sydney Morning Herald echoed these sentiments:
it is to be hoped that these savages, the 
noted Rubiana head-hunters, who have 
depopulated all the surrounding islands 
by their cruel practices, will not soon 
forget their well-merited punishment. ^
The tenor of these statements seems somewhat excessive, 
considering that the Munda people had not directly participated 
in the attack on Dabelle, and were being punished only for 
failing to apprehend the murderers, who were Mbilua men. The
89 WHPC No. 14-1 of 1896, SI 1893, p. 39.
90 ENAS 23 SI 1891, p. 11.
91J Sydney Morning Herald, 10 December 1891, p. A.
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'strongholds' mentioned by Davis did not exist, for the
Roviana villages were unfortified and Europeans had been going
amongst them for decades. It almost appears, in some ways,
that the white man was having his revenge for those long
years of watching impotently as the 'noted Rubiana head-hunters'
continued to act on the basis of their own faith and traditions,
treating the European as an adjunct to their aspirations, not
as a pivot for them. The hope that the Royalist's actions
would induce the islanders to mend their ways was unfulfilled,
for Ingava and the other big-men of Munda immediately stepped
up their head-hunting expeditions in an attempt to replenish
92the stock destroyed by Davis. The supression of head-hunting 
and other 'barbaric customs' was not, in fact, an objective of 
the European authorities. The Navy's attentions were focused 
upon relations between islanders and British subjects, and 
the Western Pacific High Commission held no brief to concern 
itself with what islanders did to one another. However, it 
was inevitable that the subject should confront them.
The New Georgian head-hunters had broadened the 
scope of their activities in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. In these years they had regularly raided Isabel and 
Choiseul, and on some occasions their expeditions had gone 
as far south as Guadalcanal. Such long-distance raiding seems 
to have either commenced or intensified during the 1860s.
Before that time the people of southern Isabel lived in open, 
unfortified villages on the coast, but in the 1860s they were 
forced to move inland and construct stockaded settlements and
92 Somerville, op.cit., p. 399.
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ado pt other defensive measures. The most spectacular of these
were the tree houses of Bugotu, to which the.islanders would
retreat if they feared a raid. They could then keep the
97,attackers at bay by hurling down stones. There are a number 
of possible reasons for the increasing frequency of long­
distance expeditions from the New Georgia Group. One may have 
boon the growing difficulty of finding victims within the 
Group. It would have been an unprofitable exercise for the 
stronger communities of Simbo, Roviana and Vella Lavella to 
attempt large-scale attacks against each other and the weaker 
communities were becoming harder to get at: the people of 
Kolombangara, northern New Georgia and the Marovo lived in 
scattered communities deep in the mountainous bush. Another 
reason for raiding Isabel and Choiseul was that expeditions 
to these islands could include a stopover at the rich turtle 
grounds of the Manning Straits.
A typical mid to late nineteenth century head-hunting 
expedition from the Roviana Lagoon would first progress north­
wards through the Kula Gulf and across the New Georgia Sound 
to the islands of the Manning Straits. Here the men could 
recuperate and gain some revenue by collecting turtle shells. 
The raiders could then choose to go northwest to Choiseul or 
southeast down the coast of Isabel to Bugotu. The New Georgia 
men"often were allied with some of the local villages, who
^  J.C. Patteson, Letters 1855-7'! • MS. London, United Society 
for the Propagation of the Gospel Archives. MPP. Patteson 
to his Sister and Brother, 28 June 1866.
G. Bogesi, 'Santa Isabel, Solomon Islands', Oceania,
XIV (194-3), p. 210.
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would provide guides. An alternative was to use men who had
been captured on previous expeditions as guides. The most
important element in the actual raid was surprise, so a
favourite time for attacking was dawn. The raiders would
move into position at night and then surprise their victims
as they awoke for the morning's chores. Another tactical
necessity was to prevent the women and children from seeking
refuge in the womens' privies, which were regarded as unclean
94and unapproachable by men.
As well as taking heads, expeditions often returned 
with captives, usually referred to as 'slaves' by Europeans.
The term 'slave' is quite inappropriate, considering the 
function of these captives. There were two varieties of 
'slave' in the New Georgia Group, the pinausu and the veala. 
Both could be either captives or individuals bought in a cash 
transaction. Pinausu were normally treated with kindness and 
regarded as a welcome addition to the economic strength of the 
community. Not infrequently a pinausu who distinguished him­
self by industry and skill became an integral part of the 
community, marrying into local families. The latter was 
particularly common with female pinausu. The children of such 
unions were not discriminated against in any way: Ingava's 
mother was a pinausu from the Marovo. While some pinausu were 
accepted as equals, there was another sideto the coin. Pinausu 
with little ability were used as drudge labour and as servants,
Hocart, 'Warfare', pp. J03-4.
C.M. Woodford, A Naturalist Among the Headhunters Being an
Account of Three Visits to the Solomon Islands in the Years 
71086, 1887 and 1888 (London, 1890) i pp. 3pp-q.
A. Penny, Ten Years in Melanesia (London, 1888), p. 50.
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and one or more pinausu were usually killed and buried with a 
big-man on his demise. The veala were even less fortunate: 
they wore captives deliberately selected as human sacrifices. 
They were segregated in houses and carefully tended and fed 
until their death. Such individuals were sacrificed for the 
inauguration of a new tomako, paele or hope. Their bodies 
could be thrown away, or in some cases, eaten. y
It is impossible to state how many people were 
killed by the New Georgian head-hunters. European reports 
of expeditions are sporadic and often unreliable. Traders, 
in particular, who were anxious to impress the Navy with the 
barbarity of the islanders might well have exaggerated their 
descriptions. Woodford’s account of his fortnight stay at 
Munda in 1886 is probably the most accurate eye-witness 
report: he counted a total of thirty-one heads brought back 
to the villages by expeditions during his visit.^ Other 
second and third hand reports mention up to two hundred heads 
being taken on a single expedition,^ but it.is difficult 
to imagine massacres on this scale occurring regularly. The 
accounts of two expeditions given to Hocart by the Simboese are 
much more modest and, one suspects, more typical. The first
^  WPHC No.274 of 1932, Barley to High Commissioner, 5 September
Hocart ’Warfare’, pp. 305-7- 
Woodford, op.cit.
96 Woodford Papers. Item No.30 'Diary__1886', entries for
2d September to 8 October.
97 For example see J.F.Goldie, 'The Solomon Islands', in J. 
Colwell (ed.) A Century in the Pacific (Sydney, 1914), 
pp. 562-3-
was a joint expedition by Simbo and Ranongga men to Isabel.
The raid was a failure, with one of the attackers being killed
by the defenders, and although two Isabel men were killed the
raiders were unable to remove their heads as they were forced
to retreat. The second expedition was Id Nggerasi, in the
Marovo Lagoon. After abandoning a plan to raid a certain
village (because too many men were there) the raiders managed
to ambush two canoes carrying women. Nine were killed and their
heads taken, and two were spared and carried back to Simbo as 
98pinausu. In contrast to these relatively humble accounts, 
there is a description of one of Ingava's expeditions which 
contained twenty tomako, two boats, five hundred men, three
99to four hundred rifles and nine thousand rounds of ammunition. 
The source of these figures was the Munda trader, Kelly, who 
was certainly not impartial, as he had an interest in seeing 
the power of the Roviana big-men reduced. However, the figures 
cannot be entirely discounted: the number of tomako is not 
excessive, as Ingava himself had seven or eight and in 
combination with other big-men in the Lagoon a total of 
twenty could probably be mustered. The possession of European 
boats was also not unusual amongst big-men. As a tomako could 
carry twenty to thirty men with their weapons, such a fleet 
would be quite capable of transporting five hundred men. The 
quantity of arms and ammunition described seems excessive, 
but again by no means impossible.
^  Hocart, 'Warfare', pp. 303-5- 
99 Somerville, op.cit., p. 399-
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The activities of traders and the Navy did nothing 
to discourage head-hunting; in fact, in some cases they seem 
to have directly encouraged it by offering opportunities to 
islanders who, without European contacts, might not have been 
able to employ their talents. Such an individual was Tulo 
(or Pulo), a big-man of Mbilua. Tulo's family was from Sirumbai, 
and thus he had no kin-based following ab Mbilua: the status 
he achieved was derived solely from his own abilities. Tulo 
appears to have worked with Europeans from an early age, 
learning pidgin and the mechanics of the copra trade, event­
ually reaching a position where he traded in his own cutter 
for various Europeans. In this capacity he came to an agree­
ment with the Mbilua lekasa Bisopi: Tulo was allowed to use 
the islet of Ozama and the Mbilua land opposite (called 
Saroparo) as an anchorage for his cutter, and in return was to 
assist Bisopi in his transactions with Europeans. Tulo took 
advantage of this agreement to sell Ozama Island and Saroparo: 
for Ozama, which he sold in 1885, he obtained £17/11-/1- worth 
of goods, including two rifles, ammunition and a large quantity 
of axes and knives. For the Saroparo land he obtained 
£35/18/- worth of guns and ammunition. Tulo managed to make 
these deals without antagonising the Mbilua people, for he 
continued to live in the area as a big-man, organising head­
hunting expeditions and recognised by Europeans as 'chief of 
Mbilua'.100
LC I. Claim No.21, 'Statement of Soso'.
DBS 'Red Book' , p. 6 (Claim No.112) and p. 101- (Claim No.
212).
RNAS 16 'Proceedings...(HMS Miranda)', p. 6.
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The activities of the New Georgian head-hunters were
well publicised and much deprecated. The Melanesian Mission,
which had begun work at Bugotu, complained that the head-hunters
101were killing their potential converts; traders complained
that the islanders were too busy head-hunting to collect copra
102and that as a result their trade was suffering; and the Navy 
recognised that head-hunting was a motive behind many of the 
attacks upon Europeans in the Group, but, as one naval officer 
commented, 'Nothing that a man of war can do will stop these 
expeditions'. The head-hunters took various steps to avoid
the Navy: travelling at night when a warship was about, and 
concentrating their operations in the wet season, when the 
Navy was not in the islands. In addition, the tomako were 
easily concealed in the many rivers and shallow lagoons. For 
effective action against the head-hunters, a well-armed and 
mobile force permanently stationed in the islands was needed. 
Such a group did not come into existence until the late 1890s, 
after the establishment of the Protectorate.
In June 1895 a British Protectorate was declared over 
the southern and western parts of the Solomon Islands - the 
New Georgia Group was included, but not the islands of 
Choiseul and Isabel. The decision to establish the Protector­
ate had been taken under pressure: the resumption of the
Anon., The Island Mission - Being a History of the 
Melanesian Mission from its commencement (London, 1869), 
p.~Z£T.
Sydney Morning Herald, 11 June 1894-. 'Island Voyage of the 
Lark'.
105 RNAS 25 NGSI 1886, p. 62.
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Queensland labour trade, fear of French ambitions in the area
and desire to avoid offending Australian opinion had forced
the British reluctantly to assume responsibility for the islands.
The Pacific Order in Council of March 1893 gave effect to the
decision. Henceforth the Western Pacific High Commission would
be responsible for all affairs in the islands, and not just
104the activities of the resident British subjects. To inform 
the islanders of their new status HMS Curacoa and several 
other warships were dispatched to the Solomons, where they 
toured the islands to plant the flag and proclaim the Protect­
orate. In the New Georgia Group these momentous events were 
somewhat dampened by the unwillingness of many islanders to 
approach the men of war, as memories of the Royalist were 
still strong in their minds. At Munda, however, Ingava was
contacted and he expressed no opposition to the proceedings,
108which were fully explained to him. He evidently understood
the ramifications of the new order of things, for two months 
later he was to put British justice to the test. Ingava's 
antagonist was Edmund Pratt, and the subject of the confront­
ation was land. It was fitting that the colonial era should 
be introduced by a land dispute, for these were to become 
endemic in the years ahead.
Before 1896 there was no legislation dealing with 
the sale of land to Europeans by islanders. British subjects
Scarr, op.cit., pp. 254-5.
105 RNA8 18 Pacific Islands. Confidential. 379 (printed), 
pp. 9-11.
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wishing to establish a claim to land they had purchased could 
forward the papers witnessing the transaction to the High 
Commission in Fiji, whoro they wore registered. However, 
registration of a claim was not a guarantee of title.
During this period there were a number of land transactions 
in the New Georgia Group, both registered and unregistered.
Most of these involved small islets which were intended for 
use as trading stations. Vendors were paid in trade goods, 
but it is doubtful if some understood (or were allowed to 
understand) the precise nature of the agreements they were 
entering. On the other hand, other islanders were quick to 
exploit the credulity of some Europeans by selling them land to 
which they had no claim. Tulo of Mbilua and Mengo of Roviana 
were adept in such matters. The latter sold most of Ghizo 
and the surrounding islets (over 7?000 acres) in 1886; 
although Mengo had originally come from Ghizo his old home 
was a small patch of land not included in the sale, and he 
certainly exercised no control or interest in the rest of the 
island. The recipients of the Ghizo land were Deutsche Handels 
& Plantagen Gesellschaft der Sudsee Inseln zu Hamburg, a 
German planting and trading company whose representatives 
toured the Group in 1886 aboard the Uvea. They also claimed 
'possession* of all vacant and ownerless land on the north 
east and the west coasts of Kolombangara. These massive 
'acquisitions' were never acted upon: there was no attempt 
to settle or cultivate the land, and the claims were virtually
106 Allen, op.cit., pp. 3^ — 5-
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forgotten until the negotiations for the Pacific Islands 
Company land concession at the turn of the century. r The 
only other large land transaction in the pre-Protectorate 
era was the purchase of six hundred acres at Mbanga, two miles 
west of Munda, in 1882 by the trader Lars Nielsen from the 
big-man Lepe. Lepe and his brother Vonge were prominent 
members of the mbutu mbutu Kindu whose land embraces Mbanga 
and thus would have been entitled to sell it after consulting 
with fellow clan members. No-one seems to have disputed the 
sale.108
The ’transaction' which brought Pratt into conflict
with Ingava was one of many in which Pratt had been involved.
Edmund Pratt and his brother Jean were responsible for twelve
of twenty-one known land deals made in the period before the
enactment of legislation regulating land purchases in 1896.^^
The Pratt brothers were far from being two of a kind: 'Johnny*
Pratt apparently got on well with the islanders, although he
was not above a shady land deal on occasion. He had no great
affection for his brother, whom he described as 'a bad man'
110to Frank Wickham. By all accounts Johnny was not exagger­
ating - Edmund Pratt was notorious as an arms dealer, land
107 DLS 'Red. Book', p. 57 (Claim No.355) and p. 59 (Claim 
"No.358)•
LC I. 'Lever Report', pp. 10-14.
DLS 'Deeds and Claims to Land' (Book A), p. 24 (Claim No.20). 
DLS 'Red Book' , passim.
LC I-Claim No.21, Wickham to Woodford, 30 May 1912.110
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grabber, bully and murderer. He first ran foul of the law in
1889 when he was bound over for £200 to keep the peace for
a year, after smashing canoes at Mbilua. It is possible that
this action may have prompted the Mbilua men to undertake the
raid on Pratt’s Munda station which resulted in the death of 
111Dabelle. Pratt was not long in losing his money, for in
1890 ho was charged with shoo Ling an islander on Vella Lavella.
The Navy Officer investigating this affair reported 'At every
place I have touched I have received complaints about this
man's conduct'. Pratt had shot the man when the islanders
had protested over his abduction of another islander. There
was no doubt that he had murdered the man, but he escaped
113prosecution because of lack of evidence. Pratt's relations
with the Vella Lavellan islanders were understandably bad, and 
it seems they would only do business with him if he were able
114to supply firearms. However, in Pratt's case it seems that
crime paid. He was said to have one of the most successful 
businesses in the Solomons, making a profit of between £700 
and £1,000 each year.^^
111
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RNAS 23 NGSI 1889, pp. 20-1; NGSI 1890, p. 15.
RNAS 23 NGSI 1890, p. 24.
RNAS 23 NGSI 1890, pp. 24-30; SI 1891, pp. 24-5.
LC I. Claim No.21, Wickham to Woodford, 30 May 1912.
WHPC No.305 of 1897? Woodford to Berkeley, 21 June 1897.
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Pratt’s dispute with Ingava was generated by the
supposed purchase of about 500 acres of land at Munda in June
1893. The land involved extended from Gurasae Point to Munda
Point at Sosolo, and thus fell under the control of two
mbutu mbutu, the Kindu and the Sosolo or Lodumaho. Edmund
Pratt had married Veladuri, a woman of the Sosolo mbutu mbutu
and they had had a number of children. He approached a number
of men with a view to obtaining permission for his children
to use the coconuts that grew on the land specified in the
deed. Some of these men can be identified: Lepe, the Kindu
big-man and his son Veto and half-brother Ebebo; Kuba, who was
116connected to Sosolo by marriage. These men did have a
genuine interest in the land concerned and they consented to 
allow Pratt's children the usufruct of the trees. From this 
point there were two developments: the straightforward fraud 
perpetrated by Pratt, and the claim by Ingava that the land 
was his and that on this basis (as well as the fraud) Pratt 
had no right to it.
After concluding a verbal agreement on the use of 
the trees Pratt persuaded the islanders involved to sign a 
paper legitimising the deal, but which was in reality a deed of 
purchase. He then attempted to build a station onthe land. 
Ingava objected and then made an official complaint to the 
Navy in August 1893- The Protectorate had just been established 
and the case was regarded as something of a 'test case' in 
impressing the islanders of the wisdom and benefits of British
116 MSS. 'Buka tututi' in possession of H. Bea, Parara.
Justice. The High Commissioner of the Western Pacific,117
John Thurston, toured the Solomons in 1894 and while at Munda 
presided over the court to hear the case. Pratt claimed that 
Ingava had been prompted to make the complaint by another 
trader, Kelly, and that moreover Ingava had no concern in the 
matter as the land was not his. The court seems to have 
accepted Ingava's rights without question and to have concen­
trated on the question of fraud, and Pratt was ordered to
118vacate the land. In fact, Pratt was correct for Ingava's
land was at Sisieta, to the east of Munda Point. Ingava*s
friendship with Europeans over the years, and his reputation as
'King of Rubiana' had paid dividends. He was accepted without
question by Europeans as the spokesman for all of Munda, and
the islanders seem to have been content to allow him to adopt
that role. This was the seed of much future confusion and
dispute in Munda over land, as Ingava's successors attempted
to maintain an overriding interest in land matters while the
119other mbutu mbutu struggled to reassert their independence.
Land questions were to dominate much of the subse­
quent history of the New Georgia Group and many of the problems
WPHC No.249 of 1893, Bowden-Smith to Thurston, 2 October 
1893.
Enclosed: Floyd to Bowden-Smith, 15 August 1893-
118"WPHC No.293 Of 1895, SI 1891-, pp. 11-12; No.308 of 1894, 
Edmund Pratt. Statement concerning land at Moonda Point, 
Rubiana.
Hocart unwittingly observed the progress of this confusion 
in 1908, when he visited Munda. See Hocart Papers,
Item No.22, 'Roviana. Topography - Districts - Chiefs', 
pp. 5-6.
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that did arise had their origins in the pre-colonial period. 
This was not a result of the land deals that occurred in those 
years - the amount of land effectively alienated was quite 
small. On the larger purchases there was little or no attempt 
to settle or extensively cultivate the land, and even the 
smaller islands and blocks used as trading stations were frequ­
ently deserted. This was not a matter of choice, but of 
necessity: Europeans had neither the force nor authority to 
assert themselves in the occupation of land. It was an easy 
matter to find a 'vendor1 and establish a paper claim to a 
piece of land, but to occupy and cultivate meant a protracted 
period of residence which would depend entirely upon the 
goodwill of the islanders. No European could assert himself 
indefinitely in the face of the islanders' hostility. Edmund 
Pratt once attempted to 'bounce' some land on Simbo: he 
forcibly extended a property by cutting down trees under a
cover of arms. After a few days the island became 'too hot'
120for him and he was forced to retire. The activities of the
Royal Navy did nothing to alter this situation: they were not 
successful in either preventing or deterring islanders from 
attacking Europeans. Even Davis' actions did not result in a 
cessation of 'outrages' throughout the Group. The large scale 
alienation of land and the establishment of a plantation 
economy had to await a more effective and enduring 'pacificat­
ion' programme, and this did not occur until the turn of the 
century.
120 LC I. Claim No.21, Wickham to Woodford, 30 May 1912.
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The importance of the pre-Protectorate years in 
relation to the subsequent land problems lay not so much in the 
activities of Europeans, but in those of the islanders. Cont­
inual head-hunting had ensured that many communities kept well 
hidden in the bush of the islands' interiors. Yet these people 
still maintained contact with the coast: they kept canoes for 
fishing and head-hunting, and they had plantations on the 
shore. To a European gazing from the deck of a ship much of 
the land seem uninhabited and unused. The Deutsche Handels 
claim of 'vacant' land on Kolombangara was a forerunner of 
things to come. Thousands of acres of apparently empty 
land was to be declared 'waste' by the Protectorate administ­
ration and turned over to European commercial concerns. The 
coming of Woodford to the islands in 1896 marked the 
beginning of the end of the islanders' ability to determine 
the nature of their relationship with the white man. European 
ambitions and aspirations were to dominate the course of
their lives.

CHAPTER FOUR
PACIFICATION AND EXPLOITATION - 
The early years of the Protectorate, 1896-19^0
Charles Morris Woodford had considerable experience 
in the islands of the Pacific before his appointment as 
temporary Resident Commissioner for the Solomon Islands in 
1896. He was born in 1852 in Kent, the son of a prosperous 
wine and spirit merchant. After his education at Tonbridge 
School he worked in his father's firm for several years until 
he decided to pursue his inclination to be a naturalist and 
travelled to Fiji in 1882 where he spent some time collecting 
butterflies. In 188$ he found employment as a clerk in the 
Fijian treasury, and in the following year acted as a Govern­
ment Agent on a labour recruiting ship on a voyage to the 
Gilbert and Ellice Islands. In June 1886 he made his first 
trip to the Solomon Islands, and was to remain there, off and 
on, until January 1889- In these years Woodford was impressed 
by several things that were to effect his actions as Resident 
Commissioner. He noted the sparse population on many of the 
islands, and concluded that head-hunting had led to the 
extensive depopulation of the areas. This conclusion was 
largely based on his observations of the intensity of head­
hunting in the western islands, and on a superficial compar­
ison between the records of the Mendana expedition and the 
situation as he saw it. The apparent massive decline in
I.C. Heath, 'Charles Morris Woodford of the Solomon Islands: 
A Biographical Note, 1852-1927', (M.A. Qualifying Thesis, 
A.N.U., 1974), PP- 8-51-
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population that he discerned was to provide a basis for his 
attitude on the future of the Solomon islanders as a race: he
considered it to be inevitable that they would eventually 
decline into extinction. He was also impressed by the fertil­
ity of the islands, considering them to be a great prospect for
2future commercial development.
In 1889 Woodford returned to England and worked in 
the London Stock Exchange for several years. In 189H he 
returned to Fiji and later in the same year took up the 
position of British Consul in Samoa. Woodford had applied 
for the job of Resident to the Solomon Islands in August 1899, 
shortly after the British Protectorate had been declared but 
it was not until 1896 that he was appointed an acting Deputy 
Commissioner and instructed to report on the islands. Wood­
ford was in the Solomons from 30 May to A October. The first 
two months of his stay were spent touring the islands on 
board the warship HMS Pylades, and thus his activities had 
much in common with previous naval tours. In the New Georgia 
Group he burnt a village in retaliation for the murder of the 
two men of the wrecked Amelia, and he also turned his attention 
to the problem of head-hunting. Woodford realised that little
Woodford, Naturalist Among the Headhunters, passim.
C.M. Woodford, 'Further Explorations in the Solomon Islands', 
Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society. New Series., 
XII (1890), pp. 393-1-18.
 ^CO 225/1-4 Woodford to Meade, 8 August 1893- 
Scarr, op.cit., pp. 262-3-
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could be done on one short visit, and restricted himself to
collecting a number of heads he knew to have been recently
taken. A permanent solution required 'a settled and continuousqpolicy' based on the regular supply of information - in short, 
the establishment of the colonial administration. Woodford 
saw the futility of relying on warships for effective action: 
their presence simply ensured that the islanders would retreat 
into the hills. A police force based in the islands and the 
enlistment of the support of influential big-men were the 
alternatives envisaged by Woodford. To this end he considered 
that Ingava's power and influence should be 'fostered and 
encouraged in every way'.^
Woodford's report was optimistic concerning the 
economic future of the Solomons. He considered them ideal 
for copra production and that the 'thousands' of low flat 
islands could be exploited in this manner. In 1896 there 
were about fifty Europeans permanently based in the Solomons 
and in that year they had exported 1,383 tons of copra.
Twelve of the fifty resided in the New Georgia Group: seven 
at Munda and five at Simbo. The latter five were the brothers 
Pratt and their employees who had moved from Munda after 
Edmund Pratt's defeat in court. The traders of New Georgia
^ WPHC No.283 of 1896, Woodford to Thurston, 12 July 1896; 
No.285 of 1896, Woodford to Thurston, 17 July 1896.
 ^WPHC No.36 of 1897? Woodford to Collet, 25 January 1897-
5 WPHC No. 285 of 1896, op.cit.
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together employed forty islanders as crew on four vessels.
Other traders also visited the Group to collect copra, ivory
nuts and shell. This produce was generally shipped hack to
Sydney on board the Burns Philp steamship Titus which visited
the Solomons every six weeks. Less regular visits were made
by other ships performing the same function. The copra was
purchased chiefly with tobacco, at the rate of one stick
(costing a little more than a halfpenny) for a string of ten
halved nuts. The copra was of poor quality, as most of it
was smoke dried and discoloured, but Woodford was enthusiastic
at the prospect of large scale planting concerns improving the
quality and the value of the copra, as the nuts were naturally 
7rich in oil.
While Woodford was keen to see the islands developed, 
he was equally concerned to ensure that the administration 
should control the situation. He desired to restrict speculat­
ive land purchases, and advocated that the Western Pacific 
High Commission should assume ownership of all unoccupied 
land and then lease it to suitable concerns. He foresaw little 
trouble with the islanders over this policy: native land 
tenure, he asserted, was so ’insecure’ that there was little
o
chance of injustice being done. Woodford's recommendations 
were embodied in Queen's Regulation No.4 of 1896. This
 ^WPHC No.477 of 1896, Woodford to Thurston, 25 November 1896. 
Enel. 'Report upon the British Solomon Islands', by C.M. 
Woodford.
8 WPHC No. 281 of 1896, Woodford to Thurston, 4 July 1896.
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provided that:
land for trading and agriculture could be 
purchased in freehold or leased from 
natives or in the case of vacant land, 
leased from the Government by non-natives, 
subject to the approval of the High 
Commissioner and subject to forfeiture and 
reversion to the native owners or lessors 
for non-performance of specified improvement 
conditions.n7
The improvement conditions were generally the cultivation of
one tenth of the land within five years. Vacant land was
defined as land 'being vacant by reason of the extinction of
the original native owners and their descendants'. It was also
stated that the High Commissioner's approval was not to be
regarded as conclusive evidence of the vendor or lessor's
10right to sell or lease. This regulation may have caused
some uncertainty or wariness on the part of Europeans in the
New Georgia Group, for no new land was taken up from the
11beginning of 1897 to late 1899. Another factor in this 
hiatus may have been the continuing violence in the islands.
In October 1896 it was reported that it was 'all quiet to a 
certain extent' in the Group, but it was not long in remaining 
so. A month later a trader, Gibbon, was murdered at Rendova.
In March 1897 two islanders working as crew on the Narovo were 
were killed in the Marovo Lagoon whilst trading onshore, and
9 Allan, op.cit., p. 37*
10 ibid., pp. 36-7-
11 LLS 'Red Book', passim.
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in November of the same year Jean Pratt’s ship Eclipse was 
attacked at Mbilua. In addition, the New Georgian head-hunting 
expeditions were continuing unabated: a large number of tomako 
were under construction, and raids on the Russell Islands, 
Guadalcanal, Isabel and Choiseul were reported. This turbulent 
situation confronted Woodford when he returned in April 1897
12to establish a permanent administration of the Protectorate.
Woodford set up his head-quarters at Tulagi, a small
island off Nggela and a considerable distance from the New
Georgia Group. Although he was joined by a force of eight
native police from Fiji he was without transport until October 
181899, and was so forced once more to rely on the Royal Navy 
for communication with other parts of the Protectorate. Thus 
the administration's activities in the New Georgia Group were 
spasmodic, as they had been in the past, although there were 
some new developments. Woodford was now able to take hostages 
to Tulagi in attempts to force communities to surrender 
malefactors. However, this method does not seem to have met 
with much success: the islanders were as reluctant as ever to 
give up their fellows, and thus the burning of villages was 
again the norm. This occurred on Vangunu (for the Narovo 
attack) and at Ughele, Rendova (for the Gibbon murder). More
lc- WPHC No.36 of 1897, op.cit. ; No. 296 of 1897, Woodford to 
Berkeley, 30 April 1897; No. 300 of 1897, Woodford to 
Berkeley, 8 June 1897; No. 8 of 1898, Woodford to O'Brien, 
December 1897«
13 Woodford did have a whaleboat, but this was hardly suitable 
for long-distance travelling. In 1899 he was supplied with 
the Lahloo, a sailing vessel, although he had requested a 
steamer.
WPHC No.203 of 1898, passim.
14- WPHC No.300 of 1897, Woodford to Berkeley, 8 June 1897«
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importantly, Woodford instituted more vigorous action against
the head-hunters: tomako were destroyed, heads confiscated,
15and the return of pinausu demanded. The suppression of head­
hunting had become an international issue, with the German 
Government complaining that New Georgian raiders were killing 
their colonial subjects, as well as threatening commerce and 
the friendly reception of the Emperor's warships in the area.^ 
However, the impact of Woodford's actions against the head­
hunters was still limited by his dependence upon the navy for 
transport.
As the 1890s drew to a close the New Georgia Group 
was still, despite the birth of the Protectorate administration, 
very much a 'frontier'. The colonial power had not yet 
succeeded in imposing its authority fully in the area: trading 
in arms and head-hunting still flourished. In the early 1900s 
this changed as the days of frontier traders operating amongst 
the most 'bloodthirsty race in the Western Pacific' were 
superseded by the establishment of a plantation economy amongst 
an increasingly subdued people. The chief factor in this 
transistion was the setting up of a permanent administration 
in the western islands.
15 ibid.
See also WPHC No.296 of 1897? Woodford to Berkeley, 30 
August 1897; No. 380 of 1897? Woodford to Berkeley,
7 August 1897; No.507 of 1897? Woodford to O'Brien,
25 September 1897«
16 The German sphere included Choiseul and Isabel. See 
PO 58/3^8 Cox to Undersecretary of State, 10 January 1898.
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In January 1898 Arthur Mahaffy arrived in the 
Protectorate as an assistant to the Resident Commissioner. 
Mahaffy was a relatively young man, about 30, with an impecc­
able background: Marlborough, Magdalen College Oxford, Trinity 
College Dublin, and four years as a subaltern in the Royal 
Fusiliers. He had spent some time as a Government Agent and 
Resident Officer in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands in 1896,
and was to serve in the Solomons until 1904, when he became
17Colonial Secretary in Fiji. 1 Thus his importance to the 
Group lay not only in his service as a resident, but also in 
subsequent years when he frequently advised and acted as a 
1 troubleshooter’ for the High Commissioner. Mahaffy was an 
able and efficient officer who did much to pacify the Group.
His army experience and athletic ability (he was an Oxford 
rowing 'blue') helped him to organise an efficient police 
force and undertake vigorous punitive expeditions.
In December 1899 Woodford established a government 
station on Ghizo Island which was to be occupied by Mahaffy 
and a force of about twenty policemen. The latter were recruit­
ed mainly from Isabel, with some from Malaita and Savo. They 
were armed with Martini Henry rifles and drilled by Mahaffy un­
til they attained a ’remarkable degree of smartness' in
18bayonet and firing exercises. However, at the time of
^  The Cyclopedia of Fiji (Sydney, 1907), p. 193- Details of 
Mahaffy's period of service in the New Georgia Group (and 
that of other officers who were stationed there up to 1923) 
are given in Appendix III.
18 WPHC No.831 of 1908, H.C. to C.O., 4 August 1910. Enel. 
Memorandum on the Solomon Islands Police by A. Mahaffy.
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their first mission this discipline was not yet fully imposed,
for apparently there was some wild shooting. The expedition
was to the Roviana Lagoon, in retaliation for a head-hunting
raid on Bugotu which had resulted in the deaths of six islanders.
The offenders were men of Kalikonggu, a few miles to the east
of Munda. On the 19 January 1900 Woodford, Mahaffy and the
police made a surprise raid on Kalikonggu: one man was killed,
five wounded, the village was looted,the canoes destroyed, and
a tomako was taken. The latter was later used by Mahaffy and
iqthe police for transport within the Group. y The Roviana 
area was raided again in March 1901. On this occasion the 
expedition was inspired by a report from three pinausu who 
had fled from the island of Honiavasa as they feared they 
would be killed to celebrate the constuction of a new tomako. 
Apparently since the first punitive raid the islanders had been 
reluctant to make head-hunting expeditions and so had concent­
rated on the pinausu as a supply of heads. This time one man
was killed, one wounded, some houses and canoes destroyed and
20the new tomako removed.
Simbo was also the recipient of Mahaffy's attentions. 
For some years the Simboese had been under pressure to surrend­
er several female pinausu who had been captured in a raid on
19 ibid.
WPHC No.56 of 1900, Woodford to H.C., 21 January 1900 and 
27 January 1900.
20 WPHC No.156 of 1901, Woodford to H.C., 18 September 1901. 
Enel. Report for 1 April 1900 to 51 March 1901. Appendix 
No.2.
Report of Proceedings by Mr Arthur Mahaffy. Mahaffy to 
Woodford, 11 March 1901.
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Nggerasi. In June 1898 Commander Freeman of HMS Mohawk had 
taken the big-man Belengana captive and throughout 1899 
repeated attempts by Woodford and Mahaffy to obtain Uhe 
pinausu were unsuccessful. Finally, in May of 1900 Mahaffy 
and his police encamped on Simbo for over a week and 
systematically destroyed houses, canoes, gardens and pigs until 
the islanders capitulated. After this affair Woodford confid­
ently considered that the Simboese would undertake no more
21head-hunting expeditions.
Mahaffy*s other major action was directed at Mbilua.
The punishment inflicted upon Simbo and Roviana had apparently
been effective, for Woodford reported that the islanders of
the two areas now had the 'friendliest relations' with the
Government. However the head-hunters of Mbilua continued to
22ignore the administration's warnings. In November 1901 an 
expedition was organised by Mahaffy to deal with the 
recalcitrant islanders. It included thirty two police, 
volunteers from Roviana, Kolombangara, Simbo and other islands, 
five traders and Mahaffy, a total of about seventy men. This 
force covered the Mbilua region (coastal and inland) in a 
series of extensive marches over a period of eight days. They 
destroyed ten villages and over one hundred canoes, including a 
heavily fortified stockade in the mountains. No reports of
WPHC No.285 of 1898, Woodford to H.C., 10 July 1898,
11 September 1899, 3 October 1899, 26 June 1900, 10 September
1900.
22 WPHC No.4-1 of 1902, Woodford to H.C. , 15 September 1902.
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casualties were given and Mahaffy later stated that the force
had been well-behaved and fired only on order, being rewarded
2dwith loot from the captured villages. However with such a
force, including many volunteers, it is quite possible that
some indiscriminate killing did take place. Such things did
occur (and were hushed up) in later expeditions of a similar 
24-cliar actor.
By the end of 1901 large-scale head-hunting had
finished, although raiding and fighting on a much reduced
scale did continue in parts of Vella Lavella and the Marovo
Lagoon for some years. The relatively abrupt conclusion of
head-hunting has led some historians to believe that the
administration's punitive actions were merely a coup de grace
to a practice that was already in decline. McKinnon has
sought the explanation in the growth of the copra trade:
Raiding became counter-productive. A man 
drying copra for trade needed the security 
to work his coastal plantations without 
fear of losing his head. As long as raiding 
remained an obsession little copra could 
be produced, and traders were also reluctant 
to risk their necks.n(r
He also sees the copra trade as being responsible for a 
decline in the status of the big-men who organised the head­
hunting expeditions, thus further diminishing their frequency.
2^ ibid., Woodford to H.C., 28 December 1901. Enel. Mahaffy 
■ to Woodford, 15 November 1901.
WPHC No.831 of 1908, op.cit.
24- See pp.179-81, 189, 191-2.
McKinnon, 'Tomahawks, Turtles and Traders', p. 305.25
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Zelenietz also believes the copratrade to be the key to an 
explanation of the cessation of raiding. Such hypotheses 
cannot bo reconciled with the facts. Large-scale raiding and 
trading in copra went on simultaneously in the New Georgia 
Group for thirty years: the two were not incompatible. From 
1870 to 1900 traders lived and worked amongst the head-hunters 
of the New Georgia Group. When Woodford was ab Munda for a 
fortnight in 1886, thirty one heads were brought into the 
Roviana Lagoon and at the same time the traders were locked in 
fierce competition - extending credit freely to the islanders?^ 
This was hardly 'reluctance' on their part. In the late 1890s 
the situation had not changed. When Mahaffy toured the Group 
in June 1898 he reported that head-hunting was as bad as ever 
and that he knew of 151 heads that had been taken during the 
previous year. He saw at least thirty tomako off Vella Lavella, 
and at the same island commented on the large numbers of people
po
who came offshore with copra to trade. In the late 1890s 
competition amongst the traders was so intense as to be potent­
ially ruinous, and an attempt was made to come to an agreement 
to restrict the giving of credit and gifts, and to halt price
M. Zelenietz, 'Heads or Tales? The End of Head Hunting in 
New Georgia, British Solomon Islands Protectorate'. Paper 
prepared for the Association of Social Anthropology in 
Oceania Annual Meetings, 2-6 March 1977, Monterey, 
California.
27 Woodford Papers. Item No.30, 'Diary...1886', entries 
2A September to 8 October.
28 CO 225/57 Woodford to O'Brien, 16 January 1899. Enel. 
Mahaffy to Woodford, 1 August 1898. 'Report from June 18 
to August 1 on a visit to the Western Solomon Islands by 
Mr Arthur Mahaffy'.
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29cutting. Head-hunting does not seem to have adversely
effected the copra trade, and nor does the trade seem to have
diminished the islanders' fondness for raiding.
The cessation of head-hunting was, in fact, primarily
due to the actions of Woodford and Mahaffy in the years between
1898 and 1902. The reluctance of some historians to accept
this is largely based on the contrast between these successful
operations and the failure of many previous naval punitive
expeditions as deterrents. For example, Zelenietz concluded
that because Captain Davis' razing of Munda in 1891 failed to
suppress head-hunting and yet ten years later similar measures
were effective then some other factor, apart from the actual
30punitive operations, must have been responsible. This view
ignores a number of important considerations. Davis' actions
were not intended to suppress head-hunting: he destroyed Munda
to punish the islanders for failing to surrender the murderers
of Dabelle, and the islanders knew this. It was not until after
the declaration of the Protectorate that specific action against
head-hunting was taken. As late as 1898 a naval officer
investigating a head-hunting case on Simbo was told by the
islanders that 'they did not know we white people took head-
31hunting so seriously'. However, even if pre-Protectorate
^  WPHC No.8 of 1898, Woodford to O'Brien, December 1897«
Enel. No.2 Traders Agreement at Gavatu, dated 29 November 
1897-
Zelenietz, op.cit.
^  WPHC No.285 of 1898, Woodford to H.C., 10 July 1898. Enel. 
Freeman to Commander-in-Chief, 24 June 1898.
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naval actions were not aimed at head-hunting, but at ’outrages' 
on British subjects, then they were still ineffective as 
deterrents - why, in comparison, were Mahaffy and Woodford 
so successful?
The punitive operations of the Protectorate administ­
ration were on a completely different basis to the earlier 
naval operations. Mahaffy and his police were based at Ghizo;
using their captured tomako they could reach Munda in less
32than six hours, Simbo in four hours and Mbilua in three. They 
could arrive at any time without warning, and once there could 
stay indefinitely, living off the land. They were familiar 
with the local conditions and had no need to rely upon the 
cooperation of the islanders. In contrast, the Royal Navy's 
warships were in the islands for only short periods at a time; 
they advertised their presence hours before reaching their 
destination, and once arrived often had to rely upon 'friendly' 
big-men and interpreters whose friendship was generally more 
apparent than real. The navy was a seasonal annoyance to the 
islanders, while Mahaffy and his men were an ever-present 
threat. Mahaffy destroyed villages with a thoroughness similar 
to that of Davis, but unlike the latter, he did not sail away. 
The tomako which could be hidden from the navy in the many 
rivers and shallow lagoons did not escape Mahaffy's attentions. 
Although the Gizo police force was small, it was armed with 
modern repeating rifles and well drilled in the use of them.
Mahaffy, op.cit., p. 192 states that he could travel twelve 
miles in two hours in his tomako, and that was with less 
than a full crew.
32
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The fact that a number of the police were Bugotu men also added
to their impact, as the New Georgians were fully aware that
such men had many scores to settle.  ^ Like the naval shore
parties before him, Mahaffy encountered little resistance,
but he readily responded when it did occur, as the shootings
in the Roviana Lagoon attest.
Mahaffy's strongest actions were at Simbo, Mbilua
and the Roviana Lagoon, possibly the three most powerful
centres of head-hunting in the Group, and their impact quickly
spread throughout the islands. Pula, Ingava's adopted
daughter, recalls that he decided to cease head-hunting as a
result of Mahaffy*s actions, although he had not been the
34object of them. The big-men of Ranongga also undertook to
33give up the practice. The people of Rendova were warned
by Roviana islanders of the possible consequences of further
killing, and they seem to have heeded the message. Boaz Bero,
who was a young man at the time, remembers that fighting on
the island continued, but that energies were directed towards
36the destruction of houses and gardens rather than bloodshed.
The efficacy of the administration's measures against 
head-hunting was also increased by the improved communications 
in the islands. Whereas it was sometimes a year or more
55 WPHC No.285 of 1898, Woodford to H.C., 10 September 1900.
34 Interview with Pula, 2 October 1974, at Parara. Pula was 
born c. 1880, as she states that she was just under marrying 
age when Davis burnt her village.
^  WPHC No.41 of 1902, Woodford to H.C., 28 December 1901.
36 Interview with Boaz Bero, 23 September 1974, at Lokuru.
before the navy could investigate a matter and then take 
action, with the administration settled in the islands a much 
quicker response could be made. In 1899 Isabel and Choiseul 
became part of the British Protectorate and thus news of raids 
on these islands could more rapidly become known. In one case
Woodford was almost able to catch a Vella Lavellan expedition
>;yat sea, while they were off Isabel. ' Information about 
possible or completed expeditions was also readily forthcoming. 
The victims of past raids and traders were not slow to take 
advantage of the administration's zeal in punishing the head­
hunters. Even islanders who had themselves suffered at the
hand of Mahaffy and Woodford seem to have been keen for others
58to share the experience. This made it difficult for the 
head-hunters: the construction of a new paele or tomako could 
easily be noted; the tomako could be spotted departing or 
returning, and the absence of many men from a particular 
community was hard to conceal.
Not all islanders acquiesced in the new order, but 
those who resisted were no longer able to continue large-scale 
raiding in the manner of the pre-Protectorate years. On Vella 
Lavella and in the Marovo area there were bands of varani, or 
fighting men, who survived for almost another decade. However 
such groups were forced deeper into the bush to avoid the reach 
of the police. In this situation they were unable to mount
^  WPHC No.96 of 1900, Woodford to H.C. , 14 January 1900. 
WPHC No.41 of 1902, Woodford to H.C., 28 December 1901.
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classical expeditions, but were reduced to raiding neighbouring
communities, and thus alienating any sympathy they might have
received. They were eventually brutally crushed by the
39administration.
Head-hunting was an integral part of the religious, 
political and economic life of the islanders: it was a medium 
for the distribution of wealth, the accumulation of status 
and authority, and the acquisition of spiritual values. In this 
context, the suppression of head-hunting was virtually a social 
revolution. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how such 
a momentous change could be effected in such a short time, and 
be met with so little resistance. The answer to this problem 
probably lies in the shattering epidemics that swept through 
the Group in the years following the enforced reduction of 
raiding.
It was not uncommon for Europeans visiting the New 
Georgia Group in the early twentieth century to describe the 
islanders as 'listless' and 'indifferent'. This was seen to 
be a result of the end of head-hunting, which had deprived the 
men of their chief interest in life and in consequence was an 
important factor in the declining population.^ This view 
gained academic respectability with the publication of W.H.R. 
Rivers' essay 'The Psychological Factor' in the early 1920s.
59 See pp. 174-193.
TO F. Burnett, Through Polynesia and Papua Wanderings with a 
Camera in Southern Seas (London, 1911), p- 84.
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Rivers did his research in the New Georgia Group in 1908.
Using genealogical evidence, he compared the birth rate of
previous generations with, that of the present, and concluded
that 'the people's lack of interest in life...is largely due
41to the abolition of head-hunting'. A key assumption in
Rivers' work was that his sample population, especially that
of Simbo, had not experienced any groat sickness or epidemics
in recent years. Rivers apparently made some inquiries and
4Pconcluded that disease had not been 'especially active'.
Yet in 1907 a letter published in Man stated,
There has been a tremendous lob of sickness 
among the natives, both in Simbo and in 
Rubiana. They have been dying every day 
and are still doing so. It is carrying off 
all the old men and women.,.-.
Nor was this the first such sickness: it would appear that
in 1903-4 there was an influenza epidemic throughout the
44Group which caused many deaths. The sickness of 1906-7 may
have been dysentry, and it also resulted in a great loss of 
43life. Gumi, a Munda big-man, told Hocart that the epidemics
killed between twenty and one hundred islanders each month
46m  the Roviana Lagoon area. Losses on this scale would surely
41
42
43
44
45
Rivers, Essays on the Depopulation of Melanesia, p. 101. 
ibid.
Edge-Partington, op.cit., p. 22.
AMMR, XIII.5 (1903), p. 6; XIII.8 (1903), p. 4; XIII.12 (1904), 
p7Tl; XIV.4 (1904), p. 7.
ibid., XVI.10 (1907), p. 8.
46 Hocart Papers* Item No.22, op,cit., p. 6.
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have had. a demoralising effect on a community, and could 
possibly have drained any will to resist the new order. The 
older generation was particularly hard hit; the numbers of 
mbangara and varani who had achieved status in the head-hunting 
era, and who might have provided a focus for discontent, 
dwindled. Men such as Ingava and Belengana of Simbo died in 
those years, and Uieir successors wore unable to attain a 
similar level of prestige and influence.
The changing order was also reflected, to some
extent, in the European constituent of the Group. In 1906
Thomas Woodhouse died at Gizo. He had traded in the islands
for thirty years, but was penniless and living on charity at
47the time of his death. ' The brothers Pratt were no longer 
part of the scene: Jean Pratt had died in 1898, and in 1901 
Edmund left the Solomons after being fined £100 for selling 
firearms. Ilis departure was not mourned by Woodford, who 
commented to the High Commissioner that the 'Protectorate is 
to be congratulated upon being at last rid of this most 
undesirable resident'. Pratt's blatant transgressions were 
unsuitable for the changing times: future European dealings 
with the islanders were not necessarily any more scrupulous, 
but at least they would have the veneer of civilized legality.
WPIiC No.187 of 1906, Woodford to H.C. , 28 June 1906.
48 WPHC No.71- of 1901, Woodford to H.C. , 7 April 1901.
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When the administration indulged in massive land grabs and
multiple murder, the proper forms would be observed.
Pratt sold his vessel, goods and station to Norman
Wheatley for £1,000. Wheatley was a good example of the coming
man: he had come to the Group in 1893, worked for Wickham for
a time, and then set up his own trading station at Lambeti, on
Munda. Although an erratic entrepreneur (he made and lost a
fortune in the islands), his early work in the establishment
of plantations was an excellent example for his successors in
its method and efficiency. Wheatley was an affable man who got
Zj. Qon well with the islanders. y Although partial to an occasional 
bit of sharp dealing in land, he did not ill-treat his workers 
and generally cooperated with the administration.
The increasing stability of the group was also 
reflected in the coming of two new European concerns to the 
islands: the Pacific Islands Company and the Methodist Mission. 
The political background to the Pacific Islands Company's 
concession in the Solomons has been succinctly stated by D.
Scarr in his Fragments of Empire. The future of the Protector­
ate was by no means assured in the 1890s; the Treasury in 
London was reluctant to have this extra financial burden on 
its shoulders and was in favour of passing the responsibility 
onto the governments of Australia:
The effect...was to add urgency to Woodford's 
personal predilection for large scale commercial 
development of the islands. If the protectorate 
was to be saved, it must stand financially on 
its own feet as soon as possible. This end
49 WPHC No.187 of 1906, Woodford to H.C., 28 June 1906.
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could be attained...only by attracting a 
big company prepared to invest large sums 
in opening copra plantations. ^
The company to be involved was the Pacific Islands Company,
formed in 1898 with high-powered backing: John T. Arundel
was vice-chairman and travelling director; the Chairman was
Lord Stanmore, previously the Governor of Fiji and High
Commissioner for the Western Pacific. Others interested were
Sir Robert Herbert and Sir John Bramstom, both late of the
Colonial Office. Stanmore had political ambitions for the
Company, wishing for the Protectorate administration to be
replaced by Chartered Company rule. This desire was frustrated
by the Colonial Office, but this did not affect the Company's
51application for a concession. Initially Arundel had written 
to Woodford in February 1898 asking for a concession of all 
unoccupied land in the Solomons, estimating it to be approx­
imately 250,000 acres to be purchased at 2/- an acre. Woodford 
forwarded this application to the High Commission with a 
favourable recommendation, but wrote officially to Arundel 
that he considered it was unlikely that the application would 
be granted in its entirety and that it would be better if 
specific areas were named. In a private letter to Arundel 
of the same date (11 April 1898) he stated that although it 
was-difficult to define unoccupied land, he considered the 
Western Solomons to hold the most promise, in particular
50 Scarr, op.cit., p. 264.
51 ibid., pp. 264-6.
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Kolombangara, Ghizo, the Vona Vona islands and the east coast
of New Georgia Island. He advised that these areas should be
inspected and that his services and assistance were at the
G2Company’s disposal. In February 1899 Stanmore forwarded a 
formal application to the Colonial Office for the lands of 
Kolombangara, Ghizo, ’Narovo Lnoo' and the northeast coast 
of New Georgia plus any other unoccupied lands the Government 
was willing to grant or lease. Two months later he offered 
that the Company was prepared ’under reasonable conditions' 
to undertake the regulation and the exploitation of the entire 
Protectorate, adding that the Company was willing to suppress 
head-hunting at its own expense. He evisaged that the Company 
could administer the islands for about ten years after which 
they could come under Australian control. ^ It is unlikely 
that Woodford was apprised of this suggestion otherwise his 
enthusiasm for the P.I.C. might have crumbled rapidly. The 
Colonial Office declined this offer on the grounds that 
Australia would probably take over the islands, but offered 
instead a 99 year lease of 100,000 acres of unoccupied land 
at £200 p.a. for the first ten years, £-4-00 p.a. for the next 
twenty years, and £500 p.a. for the remainder of the term. 
After further negotiation, the concession was increased to 
200,000 acres with a corresponding doubling of the rent, with
52 LC I. Documents accompanying ’Lever Report'. File D. 
'Correspondence Relating to the Solomon Islands' 
(Parliamentary Paper, 1905), Section No.1.
^  ibid., Section Nos. 1-2.
the exception of the first two years which would be reduced 
to £50 p.a. (if 100,000 acres, or £100 p.a. if 200,000 acres)^ 
In November 1899 the Company was informed that it 
had until the 30 September to select its land, and Woodford 
was instructed that these selections were to bo made in areas 
where the selectors would not be exposed to any risk of molest­
ation by the natives, and that the land chosen for alienation 
was to be such that it would not lead to any later claims or 
troubles from the inhabitants.  ^ The contradictions in these 
instructions were apparently overlooked by the High Commission: 
how was Woodford to determine if the land was unoccupied if he 
was unable to penetrate the bush (because of the dangers 
involved)? In addition there were the physical difficulties 
of inspecting the vast tracts of heavily forested, mountainous 
terrain. Woodford's answer to these problems was to ignore 
them, and he must bear the chief responsibility for the gross 
injustices that were involved in the subsequent selection of 
lands. He accompanied the Company party and energetically 
supported their choices before the High Commission.
The selection party was in the Protectorate for two 
months; their examinations of the land involved were extremely 
cursory and they made no attempt to interview the islanders. 
Woodford optimistically reported to the High Commissioner 
that no permanent or occasional occupation was seen and that
^  ibid., Section No.3- 
^  ibid., Section No.8.
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56native claims were therefore unlikely. As most of the
observation was done from the deck of a ship and the inhabitants
of Kolombangara and northeast Now Georgia deliberately designed
their settlements to be hidden from raiders, Woodford's
assurances were meaningless. Woodford had been among the
islands and had observed the effects of head-hunting for about
two decades so his negligence can hardly be excused. This
becomes clearer in his comments on the formal application that
was lodged by the Company in May 1900. Of the north coast of
New Georgia Woodford stated that it was unexplored and
uninhabited, though how one could conclude the latter without
the former he did not say. Regarding the south coast of New
Georgia and Hele Islands he admitted that the area had not
been visited and that it could be subject to possible native
rights. Nevertheless he believed it to be uninhabited and
57recommended the land for inclusion in the con ce ssi on .In
fact this area, in the vicinity of Viru Harbour, was inhabited
58and had to be excluded from the lease. Similarly, land at 
Woodhouse Harbour was discovered to have coconut trees planted 
by the islanders and this too was withdrawn. Interestingly, 
this grove of trees had been noted in a report to the Company 
before the formal application was lodged. No doubt the P.I.C. 
regarded the acquisition of an already established plantation
56 WPHC No.91 of 1898, Woodford to H.C., 15 May 1900.
^  ibid., Woodford to H.C., 29 May 1900.
58 ibid., Woodford to H.C., 25 March 1905.
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as a fortunate bonus, for they do not seem to have enquired
after those responsible for planting the trees. As Woodford
was with the party that inspected Kolombangara, the existence
of this plantation could hardly have escaped him. However,
he did not mention it in his initial comments on the application,
and it was some months later before he informed the High
qqCommission of the situation. The May 1900 application was 
for a total of 200,000 acres, comprising 70,560 acres on 
Kolombangara, 7?000 acres from the Vona Vona islands, 5?550 
from Ghizo and adjacent islets, 32,580 from New Georgia and 
the Hele Islands. The remainder was taken up from islands in 
the Manning Straits, Isabel, Choiseul and Guadalcanal. As no 
surveys had been undertaken, the acreages given were approxim­
ations and were later discovered to be gross underestimations. 
For example, the land on Kolombangara, even after the concess­
ion had been reduced by the Land Commission in the 1920’s, 
involved an area of 107,830 acres, some 37,000 acres more than 
was originally estimated.^
The legal apparatus necessary to enable the High 
Commission to lease the land to the P.I.C. was enacted in 
Queens Regulation No.3 of 1900, the 'Solomons Islands (Waste 
Land) Regulation, 1900'. This defined ’waste land' as any 
land not owned, cultivated or occupied by native or non-native 
persons. No person could take possession of such 'waste land'
^  ibid., Woodford to H.C., 27 June 1900.
LC I., op.cit., Section No.12.
60 WPHC No.91 of 1898, Woodford to H.C., 29 Hay 1900.
WPHC No.2951 of 1925, Kane to H.C., 30 April 1926.
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except under certain conditions: an application for a Certif­
icate of Occupation had to be forwarded through the Resident 
Commissioner to the High Commission. This Certificate 
stipulated the years of the lease, the rental and the improve­
ment conditions. In addition the lessee had to pay for a 
survey; mineral rights were not included, and paths and rights 
of way were not to be affected. The Certificate could be 
cancelled if the conditions were not met. The Regulation came 
into force on the 1 January 1901. However, the Regulation was 
amended in 1901, principally to make it necessary to obtain 
the High Commission's consent if the holder of the Certificate 
wished to assign, underlet or sell any of the concession. This 
was a sensible move to prevent any exploitation by the Company 
of its extremely cheap rental by making huge profits out of 
sub-letting. Both the 1900 and 1901 Regulations were repealed 
in 1904 and replaced by the 'Solomon Islands (Waste land) 
Regulation, 1904', which repeated the conditions of the 
previous two but added the stipulation that the Resident 
Commissioner of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate had 
to approve the application before he forwarded it to the High 
Commission.^
Before the Pacific Islands Co. could obtain its 
certificate further difficulties cropped up. It was discovered 
that the German concern Deutsche Handels und Plantagen 
Gesellschaft had registered prior claims to land on Ghizo and 
Kolombangara with the High Commission. These claims were
61
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purchased by the P.I.C. , who then extracted a quid pro quo
from the Colonial Office for their surrender. This amounted
to £1,500 cash and an abatement of rent to £1 p.a. for the
first four years and £400 p.a. for the fifth to the tenth
year. Stanmore was not satisfied and suggested that a further
50,000 acres or a cash bonus of £500 would be equitable. The
final agreed terms were £2,000 cash, and a rent of £1 p.a. for
the first two years, £100 for the third year, and the remainder
as before. Another problem was the discovery that the land
at Viru Harbour was owned by islanders and had to be removed
from the Certificate. The Company was compensated with an
equivalent area (5,500 acres) on Rendova, but not before
Stanmore had eked out all possible mileage from the situation.
He complained to the Colonial Office that the land at Viru
Harbour was the most important acquisition of the Company and
that this was where the first settlement was to be located.
This was a blatant lie, as the selectors had not even examined
the Viru area and had on the contrary recommended Kolombangara
62as the ideal place for the Company's headquarters.
By the time the final Certificate was completed and 
signed by both parties Woodford had become disenchanted with 
the Company. The initial enthusiasm which he had expressed 
not only verbally but in considerable physical assistance and 
advice waned as the months passed and he saw no sign of 
development by the P.I.C. in the islands. In December 1905 he 
wrote to Stanmore expressing his disappointment that the Company
62 LC I., op.cit., Section Nos.26-42.
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had not begun work in the Protectorate. Even worse, the Company 
was considering an amalgamation with a German concern. Woodford 
was enormously concerned about; the protection of British 
influence in the Pacific, and he considered the Germans to be 
the main threat, so the Company's actions were tantamount to 
treason. He advised Stanmore that the P.I.C. should abandon 
ibs concession if it did nob commence work. His disillusion­
ment further expressed itself in the increasing acerbity of his 
letters to the High Commission in Fiji. In January 1904 when 
discussing the land to replace the withdrawn Viru block he 
indicated (for the first time) that the P.I.C. leases would 
surely extend to more than 200,000 acres, and that as they
did not seem to intend to work their holdings they should not
64be granted the additional land."" Woodford must have realised 
long before that the Company had underestimated the size of 
its concession, but it was only now that he considered apprising 
his superiors of the fact. In June he complained that the 
Company had extended its holdings on Kolombangara and Ghizo 
through errors in the final licence, and that while other 
people were waiting for land, and developing their holdings, 
the P.I.C. was doing nothing. y By the end of 1904 he recomm­
ended that the High Commissioner cancel the Certificate of 
Occupation as the Company was only interested in 'hawking it
WPHC No.91 of 1898, Woodford to Stanmore, 1 December 1903.
64 ibid., Woodford to H.C., 23 January 1904.
^  ibid., Woodford to H.C., 19 June 1904.
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about* for a profit. Woodford was being a little harsh on 
the Company as Stanmore did attempt to raise capital for the 
Solomon Islands operation but was unsuccessful, and the 
prospects for the islands paled in comparison with the commerc­
ial possibilities of the discovery of phosphate on Ocean Island 
- which the Company was strenuously exploiting. In 1905 
the P.I.C. negotiated with Sir William Lever to join in the 
working of the Solomons concession. Lever preferred to acquire 
the holdings outright and eventually purchased them for £5?000, 
and thus the P.I.C. Certificate was surrendered to the High
Commission and Levers Pacific Plantations Ltd. were instructed
67to apply for a new one.
On the whole, Woodford's role in the P.I.C. episode 
was hardly commendable; his eagerness to see the Protectorate 
developed allowed him to overlook the interests of the 
islanders and actively participate in a massive land grab that 
resulted in great injustice and was later to necessitate the 
Land Commission of the twenties. His wide experience in the 
islands should have made him aware that a superficial absence 
of settlement along the coast did not preclude the existence 
of sheltered villages in the mountains constructed as a result 
of the danger of head-hunting raids. Indeed, in 1903, before 
the Certificate was finalised, the effect of the cessation of 
head-hunting could already be seen in certain areas of the
66
ibid. , Woodford to H.C. , 34 December 1904-.
67 Scarr, op.cit., pp. 265-6.
LC I. 'Lever Report', pp. 26-7-
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Solomons. On Santa Isabel coastal areas that had been classed
as ’waste land' were beginning to be occupied by islanders
who no longer had to live in the mountains because the danger
68from New Georgia raiders had passed.
At about the same time that the P.I.C. first became
involved in the New Georgia Group another European concern
expressed an interest in the area. It too was to become a
major landholder, but its presence in the islands was to be
much more protracted and its influence immeasurably larger.
This was the Methodist Mission.
The Methodists had been acquainted with the New
Georgia Group for some years. The Rev. George Brown had
visited the Roviana Lagoon in 1880 on his way to New Britain.
In the 1890s Solomon Islanders connected with the Mission in
Fiji requested the Board of Missions to undertake missionary
work in their home islands. Brown, General Secretary of the
Board, again visited Roviana in the late 1890s and on his
return agitated for a start to be made in mission work in the 
69islands. This suggestion also found favour with Woodford, 
and in 1901 Brown was back in New Georgia to make further 
investigations. The local big-men were unenthusiastic about 
the proposal: Bera of Marovo stated definitely that he did not
WPHC No.91 of 1898, Woodford to Stanmore, 1 December 1903. 
69 G. Brown, George Brown D.D, Pioneer Missionary and Explorer 
An Autobiography (London,1908), pp. 341-3, 516-7.
AMUR, V.16 (1898), pp. 2-3; VIII.8 (1898), pp. 8-9;TXTTl (1900), p. 7.
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want missionaries in his area as he feared an epidemic would
follow as it had in Bugotu. The reaction in the Roviana Lagoon
was no more favourable, but was side-stepped: it was decided to
go ahead and establish the Mission, but not to ask Ingava for
permission as this would only court a refusal. The Missionary
Review reported that the 'chiefs' of Roviana had no 'real power'
over Idle people so l;hat any opposition to the new Mission would
70not be effectively organised.' The authority of the big-men,
which never had been absolute, had probably been diminished in
the wake of the suppression of head-hunting.
Despite the impression that the Mission liked to
create of themselves as pioneers in a land swarming with
ferocious savages, by the time of the arrival of the Methodists
the Munda area was not dangerous, although the same could
certainly not be said of other islands, notably Vella Lavella
and the Marovo. The actual establishment of the Mission
probably owed most to the traders who gave the Methodists every
assistance, including a small island to use as their first
head-quarters. This was Nusa Zonga, originally bought by
the trader Kelly in 1881 and transferred by him to the Mission 
71in 1902. The Mission soon added to this small holding: in 
July 1902 they purchased an estimated 250 acres at Kokenggolo 
for £15. The vendors were Ingava, Gumi and Mia. Ingava had 
already established his right to sell this land, as it involved 
the same area which had been under dispute with Pratt in the
70 AMMR, XI.5 (1901), pp. 2-4; XI.8 (1901), pp. 7-10.
71 AMMR, XI.5 (1901), pp. 2-4; XII.3 (1902), pp. 3-4-. 
WPHC. No.91 of 1898, Woodford to H.C., 1 July 1902.
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early 1890s. It seems that this transaction was facilitated by
Wickham and Wheatley’s good relations with Ingava; they spoke
to him in an attempt to soften his attitude and apparently
succeeded, as he agreed not to oppose the Mission although he
72remained unenthusiastic about it. In December 1902 the 
Mission received another gift from a trader; an estimated 600 
acres ab Mbanga which was sold to the Methodists by Lars 
Nielsen for a nominal £1. This latter block was excellent 
plantation land and was to be used as such by the Mission. In 
less than a year the Methodist Mission had acquired over 800 
acres of freehold land in the Munda region. Why it was felt 
necessary to obtain such tracts is not stated in the Mission 
records: the growing number of these acquisitions seem to have 
been regarded as indications of success, just as an. increase 
in the number of scholars or church attendance was, although 
the connection between acquiring land and saving souls was 
not stated. In later years the connection became obvious as the 
Mission began to develop the so-called ’industrial side' to 
mission work. Thus the Mission could make a profit out of its 
holdings while at the same time teaching the islanders to live 
and work by Christian principles. This was convenient for the 
Mission, but enraged some of the planters and traders who con­
sidered the Mission was exploiting its position as a spiritual 
leader to compete in the secular field of private enterprise.
^  DLS 'Deeds and Claims to Land' (Book A), p. 18.
AMME, XII.5 (1902), pp. 5-4.
^  DLS op.cit., p.24.
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In the years before 1910 the development of the
Mission was rather slow; although the islanders displayed a
thirst for the white man’s knowledge and responded eagerly
to the education programme, they were not so keen to commit
themselves fully to the church. By 1910 the Mission had some
582 scholars and an estimated attendance at public worship of
7 Ll6,300, but only 78 had become full members of the church. 
Nevertheless there were a number of encouraging signs for the 
missionaries. Although the older generation were suspicious 
of the Mission many younger men saw in it the way of advance­
ment in a world increasingly dominated by Europeans. One of 
the most notable of these young men was Boaz Suna, the 
grandson of Ingava's half-sister. Boaz Suna’s father Gumi 
also gave the Mission his support. Gumi did not have the 
stature of Ingava’s nephew Gemu but he was an important man 
in the Lagoon and his conversion established close relations 
with Ingava’s mbutu mbutu. Another significant ally was Boaz 
Veo, a big-man of the mbutu mbutu Lodumaho, whose land was 
adjacent to Kokenggolo.  ^ Ingava died in 1906, and although 
his influence had declined since the cessation of head-hunting 
and with the increasing feebleness of his age, the influence 
and wealth of his family was still strong. This was reflected
^  MCA Vol.178, ’Mission District Minutes, Accounts’. Solomon 
Islands District Synod, 30 November 1910.
J.R. Metcalfe, Papers. Originals in the possession of 
their author. MFN. ’Articles on the Solomon Islands'.
'The Gumi Family', pp. 2-5-
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in mourning ceremonies: he was placed ’in state’ for two 
days surrounded by the emblems of his status - the bakia 
and poata. Hundreds of islanders came to view the body and 
his family organised extensive feasts and mourning arrangement^ 
In the last few years of his life his quiet opposition to the 
church had diminished and he had become, according to Goldie, 
a sincere friend of the Mission, lie had no children and his 
successor as mbangara was Gemu, described by Goldie as a ’fine 
fellow’ who would assist the missionaries. ' The Mission's 
close connections with Ingava's family helped overcome resist­
ance to its teachings, and in later years when the Methodists' 
power in the Group became more established it reinforced the 
stature of Ingava's mbutu mbutu.
The first decade of the century also saw the gradual 
disintegration of customs and practices previously regarded 
as inviolable. In some cases, such as the segregation of 
women during childbirth, the Mission encouraged this process 
by example. In other cases, Goldie used the threat of Govern­
ment action to stop practices involving physical harm to 
individuals. Another boost to the Mission's activities was the 
influenza epidemic of 1903- The Mission claimed that Mrs 
Goldie's medical work resulted in a lower death rate at Munda, 
although it is difficult to see what she could have done in 
the epidemic. Certainly, her treatment of minor ailments was 
popular and brought people to the station.^8 Perhaps the
76 Edge-Partington, op.cit., pp. 22-3.
77 AMMR, XVI.7 (1906), p. 2.
78 AMMR, XIII.8 (1903), p. 4; XIV.1 (1904), pp. 4-5; XIV.2
TT9Ö4), pp. 4-5; XIV.4 (1904), p. 7.
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major benefit the Mission derived from the epidemic was that it 
killed many of the older, more intractable islanders.
Over these years the Mission steadily expanded its
activities throughout the Group. In 1901 Fijian teachers were
placed on Simbo and at Mbilua. At the latter place there
was initial opposition but Gumi and Boaz Veo spoke to the
islanders and llicy agreed to accept a missionary. In the same
year a teacher was sent to Choiseul and in 1906 a European
79missionary was established there. The increase in spiritual 
endeavours was accompanied by further acquisitions of land. In 
June and July of 1907 the Mission went on a buying spree and 
purchased in order, 328 acres at Sikuni, Vella Lavella, 100 
acres on Simbo, 16.5 acres at Kundu, Ranongga, a further 715 
acres at Sikuni, the islet of Perasare near Njorio, Vella 
Lavella, and 160 estimated acres at Njorio itself. The total 
cost to the Mission was £18. These purchases were overshadowed 
by one single transaction at Mundi Mundi, Vella Lavella. Here, 
in June 1907 Goldie, the chairman of the Methodist Mission, 
acting on his own behalf, bought over 6,000 acres for £75-^
It is unknown whether the vendors were aware of the distinction 
between this, a private purchase, and that made several weeks 
beforehand at Sikuni by Goldie on behalf of the Mission. In 
any event the distinction was not apparent on the surface, for
79 AMMR, XIV.1 (1904), pp. 9-5; XIII.11 (1904), p. 4;
OTI76 (1906), pp. 3-5.
DLS 'Deeds and Claims' (A), pp. 173* 175, 177, 179, 181. 
'Miscellaneous Instruments Vol.A', ff. 1, 3.
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both the Mundi Mundi holding and the larger Mission properties 
were to be developed on similar lines.
In the Solomon Islands District Synod of November 1909 
the missionaries requested the Mission Board in Australia to 
provide £,290 per annum for the development of mission lands.
They reported that Woodford had been very encouraging with 
regard lo lhe industrial side of the mission work, and that 
action should be taken as soon as possible. The Synod consid­
ered that development of mission lands would give young people 
suitable employment and prevent them from being scattered by 
recruiting agents. It was convinced that all mission work in 
the islands should be conducted on industrial lines with the
object of teaching the islanders to live and work by Christian 
81principles.
Although such large concerns as the Pacific Islands 
Co., Levers and Burns Philp were expressing their interest in 
establishing copra plantations early in the 1900s, the pioneers 
in this activity were individuals who had spent some time in 
the Protectorate as traders; prominent among them were Norman 
Wheatley and Frank Wickham. Wheatley had begun planting oper­
ations in the Roviana area in the late 1890s; in 1900 he 
expanded his activities with the purchase of the island of 
Rovana or Hamerai, in the Marovo Lagoon. He bought the 360 
acre island with assorted trade goods and then entered into an
81 MCA Vol.178, Solomon Islands District Synod, 12 November 1909.
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agreement with the local islanders under which they would
plant the trees and collect the nuts in return for a consignment
of rifles which they could use to protect themselves against
raiders. In 1904-5 an agent and store were placed on the 
82island. - These somewhat crude efforts were improved upon when 
he obtained an occupation certificate for a number of islets 
off Ghizo encompassing 200 acres in January 1905- He increased 
this holding with another 400 acres of islets in the same 
region in January 1908. Both leases were for 99 years and 
involved improvement conditions that could result in forfeit­
ure if not fulfilled. Wheatley spent a ‘considerable sum' in 
improving and planting the islands but was forced to mortgage 
his properties for an advance from Burns Philp in 1904. By 
1907 Wheatley had planted a total of 48,000 trees on his 
various properties, and was said to be aiming for a total of
100,000 trees. His plantations were recognised as the best
88examples of scientific planting in the Solomons. v
Frank Wickham, who had been trading in the New 
Georgia Group for over twenty years, branched out into planting 
in the early 1900s. Wickham was fortunate in his extremely 
cordial relations with Woodford, who wrote to the High Commiss­
ioner that 'there is not a white trader in the Protectorate who 
deserves encouragement and consideration at the hands of the
Burns, Philp & Co., Ltd., Handbook of Information for 
Western Pacific Islands (Sydney, 1899), p. 50.
WPHC No.152 of 1902, Woodford to H.C., 5 August 1902;
No.164 of 1907, Woodford to H.C., 24 August 1907. Enel. 
F.J. Barnett, 'Report on visit to Western Solomons', July 
1907-; No.208 of 1907, Woodford to H.C., 4 November 1907.
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Government more than Mr Wickham'. He was endorsed by 
Mahaffy, who praised his fairness and kindness to both white 
and black, and his willingness to cooperate with the Government 
at all times. As a result Wickham had no difficulty in obtain­
ing an Occupation Certificate for 400 acres of land on Ghizo
on-
in January 1903.  ^ This was Wickham's first land purchase
since he had acquired the tiny island of Hobupeka as a trading
base in the 1870s, but he was soon to make up the lost ground.
In 1905 and 1906 he acquired 4,800 acres of freehold land at
86Kenelo on Rendova. Another trader who added planting to his 
interests was Joseph Binskin, who had come to the Solomons in 
1899 and had been employed by Wheatley as an agent on Simbo. 
Binskin's acquisitions were interesting in that they illustrated 
the weaknesses of the Waste Land Regulations when combined with 
inadequate investigation by a Government eager for revenue 
and commercial development. The island of Mbava, off the 
coast of Vella Lavella, was uninhabited but used by the toutou 
Bava for hunting and fishing. In 1901 Binskin approached 
representatives of this toutou to arrange the purchase of 
Mbava. Woodford, however, insisted that as the island was 
uninhabited it could not be purchased outright as freehold 
land and acquired it for the Government under the Waste Lands 
Regulation. It was then leased to Binskin under Certificates 
of Occupation, thus bringing in revenue for the administration
81-
84
85
WPHC No.151 of 1902, Woodford to H.C., 5 August 1902. 
ibid.
86 LLS 'Deeds and Claims' (A), pp. 156, 142.
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and ensuring that it was developed through the development
on
conditions. ' Binskin also purchased a number of much smaller 
islands and a block at Njorio, Vella Lavella. Those acquisit­
ions were all freehold.
While individual traders and planters may have 
pioneered the exploitation of the New Georgia Group with copra 
plantations, the larger economic concerns were nob slow to 
sense the possibilities. The steamers of Burns, Philp & Co. 
had been making the Sydney to Solomon Islands run for some 
time. In the late 1890s their ships called at Ranongga,
Simbo and Roviana. By 1903 the service to the Solomons was 
running six times a year, and this was later increased so that 
the S.S. Mindini was making the trip every six weeks. The 
round trip took about thirty-five days and cost £20, stopping
o o
at Ghizo and other ports in the Solomons. In January 1904-
the Company obtained an Occupation Certificate for 14- acres
of land at Ghizo on which they eventually erected a warehouse 
89and store. They also capitalised on the financial difficult­
ies of some planters by accepting mortgages on properties in 
return for advances. Burns, Philp soon began to acquire
87 WPHC No.2001 of 1922, Kane to H.C., 20 June 1922. Enel. 
Alexander to Kane, 1 August 1922.
^  Burns, Philp & Co., Ltd., op.cit., pp. 4-7-50.
Burns, Philp & Co., Ltd., All~about Burns, Philp & Company 
Limited, Their Shipping Agencies, Branches and Steamers 
(January, 1903), p. 267 "
Burns, Philp & Co. Ltd., Cruises to the Pacific Islands and 
Papua (1913;, p. 3- ~ ~
89 WPHC No.137 of 1903, Woodford to H.C., 1 August 1903, 
15 January 1908 and 24- August 1907.
No.808 of 1909, Lucas to Mahaffy, 29 July 1909.
freehold land outright- In 1907 they purchased the entire
island of Tetepare, an estimated 33,200 acres, for £100. This
island had been uninhabited for at least 25 years when the
owners had moved to Mbaniata on Rendova. Woodford reported
that the former occupants had been wanting to sell the island
for some time and that they were pleased with the price they
received. The High Commission considered the sum of £100 to
be 'trifling' and opined that it was the duty of the Government
to safeguard native interests and secure a good price in such
90cases, but they nevertheless approved the transaction. As 
the Company had paid less than a penny an acre, 'trifling' was 
indeed an accurate description. However, there were some 
drawbacks for Burns, Philp. Tetepare is a rocky, inhospitable 
island with few areas suitable for plantations; it also lacked 
a harbour. The western end of the island, in the locality of 
Waugh Bay, was the only area suitable for commercial exploit­
ation.
Levers Pacific Plantations Ltd. had acquired the 
Pacific Islands Company's concession in 1905. In 1907 they 
applied for a new Certificate of Occupation. This certificate 
was not executed until 191H, after protracted negotiations, 
but Levers had been allowed to enter into possession of the 
land in 1907- They were slow to develop their holdings, 
beginning with the land in the vicinity of Hathorn Sound: 
in 1908 clearing was started at Noro, and in the following 
year they began work on Kohinggo. By 1913 only 7^  acres had
9° WPHC No.111 of 1908, Woodford to H.C., 21 February 1908.
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91been cultivated of the entire 200,000 acre concession.
Nevertheless, Levers had not been entirely idle; they were
eager to add freehold properties to their holdings. In 1905
they purchased 5?000 acres c£ land at Rendova Harbour for £50,
and in 1906 a further 4,550 acres at Viru Harbour, New Georgia.
The latter purchase was conducted by the Rev. J. Goldie for
the company and he seems to have sadly neglected his role as
self-proclaimed protector of the islanders. The price was £40
worth of trade goods (later described by Woodford as inadequate),
and the vendors were later discovered to have been bush
dwellers from further up the Viru River with no valid claim
to ownership of the land. For these reasons the transaction
was cancelled by the High Commissioner, on Woodford's advice,
92in 1910. Another Levers purchase was rejected at the same 
time; this was a transaction involving three miles of fore­
shore of mature coconut trees near Cape Satisfaction, Ranongga. 
Levers had paid £100 for this land and it appears that the 
original sale had been for only 250 yards of foreshore.
Woodford considered that the islanders should not be allowed 
to alienate mature tree land for such paltry sums, and the 
High Commissioner supported this c o n t e n t i o n . A  similar
^  WPHC No.61 of 1905, Levers Pacific Plantations Ltd.,
Statement of Expenditure on Development and Cultivation of 
Coconut Estates in the Solomon Islands.
LC I. 'Lever Report', pp. 26-55-
WPHC No.61 of 1905, Woodford to H.C., 4 July 1910; H.C. to 
Levers, 17 December 1910.
DLS 'Red Book', p. 179-
95 WPHC No.61 of 1905, Woodford to H.C., 4 July 1910.
No.204 of 1909, Woodford to H.C., 27 January 1909.
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attempted purchase by Levers on Vella Lavella was also
rejected. This involved a strip of coastal frontage densely
planted with coconuts, owned by several independent natives.
The 'vendors' of the strip had only the right to sell a small
portion of the land. Woodford again protested that the price
94was 'utterly inadequate'.
Woodford's increasingly critical attitude to Levers 
was not only based on what he considered to be the unnecessary 
slowness with which they were developing their properties; 
he also had good reason to believe that they were trying to 
usurp his authority in the islands. In 1908 Mahaffy reported 
to the High Commissioner that Levers wished to become the 
controlling factor in the Solomons. They desired to increase 
their land holding above the 200,000 acres already obtained 
and, like the Pacific Islands Company before them, were 
ambitious to get 'some sort of charter' to run the group. A 
Levers official attempted to organise a deputation to protest 
about Woodford's administration, but the move was ignored by 
the other European residents who had no love for the Company, 
sensing the danger of monopolisation of the Solomons if 
Levers managed to increase their influence any further. The 
agents and managers that Levers had recruited to run their 
plantations were also causing trouble. Most of these men were 
Australians whose dislike and hostility towards the 'niggers' 
often led to cruelty in their treatment of labourers on the 
plantations. This problem was accentuated by drunkeness;
94 ibid.
161
many of the men could not adapt to the loneliness and physical
discomfort of island life and sought refuge in the bottle. ^
Some of these matters came to a head in August 1908 with an
incident on Levers'Rendova Plantation. George Pulton, the
Assistant General Manager of Levers' Pacific Plantations Ltd.,
was visiting the Rendova plantation and desired a photograph
of a naked Malaita woman. Hermes, an employee of Levers,
attempted to take the photograph but was threatened by the
woman’s lover, another Malaitan labourer. Hermes shot the man
and he later died. In the subsequent inquiry Fulton attempted
to suppress the evidence concerning the photograph: Hermes left
the Protectorate and a prohibition order was placed against
his return. This sordid affair not only illustrated the
callous irresponsibility of Levers' employees, but also
provided the administration with a stick to beat the Company.
Levers headquarters in Australia hastily assured the High
Commission of their desire to work in harmony with the
administration and emphasised that the Company did not sanction
hostile attitudes towards the Government on the part of their
employees in the Solomons. The High Commission in return,
frostily criticised the conduct of Fulton and warned that
such behaviour could lead to serious attention being paid to
96the affairs of Levers in the islands.
95 WPHC No.830 of 1908, Mahaffy to H.C., 21 December 1908.
WPHC No.833 of 1908, Mahaffy to H.C., 22 December 1908; 
Meek to H.C., 12 October 1908; H.C. to Levers, 16 October 
1908. (These letters are filed in No.444 Of 1908).
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By the beginning of 1910, of the estimated 2,000
square miles that comprised the New Georgia Group, an
approximated 218,1-1-1 acres had been alienated. This figure
was the sum of 54,557 acres of freehold alienated land, and
163,881- acres leased under Occupation Licence. Of the latter
figure, 160,870 acres was under the one concession - that of
Levers Pacific Plantations Ltd. Although the actual lease
was not finalised until 1914, Levers had been allowed into
possession in 1907 and the rent payable was calculated from
1904, the time of the first lease to the Pacific Islands
Company. During the negotiations the length of the lease was
increased from 99 years to 999 years, so for all practical
0 7purposes the land was to be alienated indefinitely. Although
the proportion of alienated to non-alienated land was not
high (17-07%), it was the nature of the alienated land that
was to cause trouble. The ideal location for the cultivation
of coconuts is below an altitude of 1,000 feet, preferably near
the coast on sandy/loamy soils just above the highest flood 
98level. Thus virtually all of the alienated land involved 
stretches of foreshore, the very areas that were to be preferred 
for village settlement once the danger of head-hunting had 
passed. Land excluded from possible settlement because of 
alienation included: the entire islands of Tetepare and Mbava; 
the north-western, northern and eastern coasts of Kolombangara; 
the northern and western coasts of New Georgia and Rendova;
97 DLS 'Red Book', passim; 'Deeds and Claims' (A), passim; 
'Deeds and Claims' (B), passim; 'Miscellaneous Instruments', 
passim. LC I., loc.cit.
^  J.J. Ochse and others, Tropical and Subtropical Agriculture 
(2 vols., New York, 1961), II, pp. 1035-6.
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substantial parts of the foreshore of Vella Lavella and 
numerous small lagoon islands. Although these areas had been 
alienated by deed by January 1910, the actual proportion that 
had been occupied was quite small: less than 1% of the Levers 
concession had been developed, and the other large block, 
Tetepare (33?200 acres) had not been touched. These two 
holdings together comprised about 90% of the entire sum of 
alienated land.
The slowness of development of holdings in the
islands was in part due to the cost involved. Although the
price of copra had been steadily increasing throughout the first
ten years of the century, a considerable capital sum was
required to commence a plantation. One could not expect a
return from a plantation until the sixth year when the trees
began to bear fruit, but expenses during the first five years
were high. In 1905 it was calculated that to clear and plant
3,015 acres over a five year period would cost £26,050, and
that it would not be until the eighth year that returns began
to exceed expenses. By the twelth year, after having planted
cumulatively some 5?750 acres one could hope for a return of
£3J,920 minus expenses of £7,A50. These figures were based on
the 1905 prices which were bringing in a profit of about £12
per ton of copra in the islands so that if the price dropped
99a great deal of money could be lost. Another problem facing 
the developers of plantations was the difficulty in obtaining 
labour to clear the bush and then work the plantations. The
99 WPHC No.70 of 1906, Woodford to H.C., 10 February 1906.
Enel. Giblin to Stanmore, 21 July 1905*
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issue was one which aroused considerable ill-feeling between 
Woodford and the High Commission in Fiji. In 1904 Woodford 
advocated the cessation of recruiting of Solomon Islanders for 
labour in Fiji on the grounds that the men were needed in the 
Solomons for local development. He was to cross swords with 
the High Commissioner, Sir Everard Im Thurn, a number of 
times over this issue and the tone of his correspondence was 
frequently extremely hostile and his manner of expression 
b l u n t . L e v e r s '  solution to the labour shortage was the 
importation of indentured labourers from India or other Asian 
sources, but despite support from the Solomons administration 
and the High Commission this was disallowed by the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies.
The labour question was just one aspect of a general
deterioration in the relations between Woodford and the High
Commissioner's office which almost led to the former's enforced
retirement. Woodford considered that since the departure of
Sir John Thurston and Wilfred Collet, the Secretary to the
High Commissioner, officials in Fiji had been 'entirely out
102of touch with the Western Pacific'. He continually
corresponded directly with the Secretary of State instead of
WPHC No.127 of 1904, Woodford to H.C., 21 November 1904 and 
11 January 1908.
No.136 of 19Ö4, Woodford to H.C., 16 January 1907.
WPHC No.77^ of 1909, Meek to H.C., 3 August 1909; C.O. to 
H.C., 27 October 1909; Woodford to H.C., 26 December 1909; 
Meek to H.C., 13 July 1910; H.C. to C.O., 30 June 1911;
C.O. to Levers, 28 December 1911.
WPHC No.59 of 1907, Woodford to H.C., 6 May 1907.
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proceeding through the correct channels because he believed
that neglect and delay in the High Commissioner's office was
harming the welfare and progress of the Protectorate. Woodford's
request that control of the Solomons be transferred from the
High Commissioner to the Resident Commissioner was refused by
the Colonial Office and he was eventually forced to apologise
106to Im Thurn or face the prospect of his enforced retirement.
Im Thurn was of the opinion that Woodford's
'deviations' in behaviour were the product of his health, which
104
had suffered after years of protracted residence in the tropics.
This was probably true, especially when combined with his
finely tuned sense of his own importance and his mounting
frustration over the pace of development in the Protectorate.
The latter, he considered, had been impaired by the parsimony
and neglect of his superiors, who had consistently refused
to recognise that the Solomons were 'the finest group in the
Western Pacific and compared with them New Guinea is a desert
106and the New Hebrides a howling waste'.
There was some justification for Woodford's 
complaints: from 1897 to 1907 the value of the Protectorate's 
exports had increased from £16,818 to £50,279, Government 
revenue had increased from £1,257 to £4,618, but Government 
expenditure had hovered between £1,000 and £5,000. Apart
105 WPHC No.65 of 1907, H.C. to C.O., 11 June 1907; H.C. to 
Woodford, 28 March 1908; H.C. to C.O. , 18 May 1908.
1041 WPHC No.65 of 1907. H.C. to C.O. , 18 May 1908.
105 WPHC No.82 of 1898, Woodford to H.C. , 21- May 1905.
from some Imperial Grants in the 1897 'to 1901 period totalling
£4,200, the Solomons administration was expected to pay its
own way - it was notoriously difficult to extract funds from
the Treasury in London. As a result, the salaries of
officers of the administration were quite low; in 1905 Woodford
complained that the Acting Resident at Gizo was receiving
the ’mere pittance’ of £150 per annum, quite insufficient
107for such a responsible position. ' The role of the Govern­
ment officer at Gizo was an extremely difficult one: his 
functions included running the Government plantation, super­
vising both police and prison, acting as a magistrate, collect­
or of customs and postmaster. In addition he had to contend 
with the constant rivalries and antagonisms between the 
various planters, traders and missionaries, and to undertake 
the often hazardous navigation of the Group in the course of 
his work. The strains of the physical environment also left 
their mark - malaria, dysentry and tropical ulcers - however 
the burden of loneliness had abated with the increasing 
commercial development of the islands. In 1908 there were 
over twenty Europeans resident in the New Georgia Group, 
several of whom lived at Gizo in close proximity to the 
Government station.
RNAS 44 ’Northern Division Box’. Enclosure No.19, Reports 
on the Solomon Islands, 1900 and 1908. Includes ’Statist­
ical Information upon the British Solomon Islands 
Protectorate’, supplied to Captain Vaughan Lewes by 
C.M. Woodford, dated 6 August 1908.
107 WPHC, loc.cit.
^ R N A S  44, loc.cit. 'White Residents and Settlers in the 
British Solomon Islands 1 August 1908'.
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The early history of the Gizo station was somewhat 
turbulent, reflecting the difficulties of the position. From 
the opening of the Gizo Station in 1899 to 1910 there were only 
two full-time Resident Magistrates, with the powers of Deputy 
Commissioners of the Western Pacific, appointed to the post. 
These were Arthur Mahaffy and T.W. Edge-Partington, both 
energetic and efficient officers. Mahaffy left the Protector­
ate in September 1904 to become the Colonial Secretary and 
Receiver-General in Fiji; he was replaced by Edge-Partington, 
initially appointed as a temporary and provisional 'Peace 
Officer', though soon confirmed as a District Magistrate and 
Deputy Commissioner. Edge-Partington was young, born in 18 8 3, 
an ex-Navy man who had left the service after failing his 
lieutenant's examination. He had taken part in the expedition 
to relieve Peking, and had a strong family connection with the 
islands as his father was J. Edge-Partington, a noted ethnolog­
ist of the Pacific.
Edge-Partington's service to Gizo ended in 1909 in 
scandalous disgrace. In the words of Mahaffy, he 'contracted 
a connection of an immoral kind' with a Simbo woman. The 
understanding Mahaffy, though noting that he had 'permanently 
impaired his influence with the natives' by reducing himself 
to the level of the disreputable traders, most of whom kept 
women, decided that there was 'certain allowance to be made' 
as Edge-Partington was a young, sociable man leading a very 
solitary life and that his work, otherwise, was excellent.
109 WPHC No.112 of 19 0 0, Woodford to H0C., 31 December 1904.
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As a result Edge-Partington was shifted to Malaita on a
110year's probation. This affair, though illustrating the
pressures on colonial officers posted to isolated stations, 
was of minor importance when compared to other difficulties 
afflicting the administration at Gizo. The basic problem was 
replacing the regular officers, Mahaffy and Edge-Partington, 
when they took leave. The poor pay of Acting Officers was not 
likely to attract suitable men, even if they had been available, 
and as a result Woodford often had to make do with what was at 
hand in the Protectorate. Some of these men were unused to 
life in the tropics and could tolerate the conditions for only 
a few months. Others were the sons of 'gentlemen', who had 
spent years of aimless wandering though the colonies, and 
who were likely to throw in the job at the smell of something 
different. Some, like William Hazelton, saw more attraction, 
and profit, in trading; and were not reluctant to capitalise 
on their past government service in establishing their busin­
ess.
Hazelton worked for the administration from January
1901 to April 1904, during which he was Acting Officer in
charge of Gizo for over a year. He resigned because of the
smallness of his pay (£150 p.a.) to go into trading, being
financed by another trader who probably saw the value of
having an ex-government employee. Woodford described Hazelton
as a 'most zealous and energetic officer', and these qualities
111soon appeared in his business dealings with the islanders.
110lu WPHC No.836 of 1908, Mahaffy to H.C., 22 December 1908.
111 WPHC No.112 of 1900, Woodford to H.C., 9 June 1903, 1S June 
1903, Hazelton to H.C., 5 May 1904.
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Capitalising on his status, Hazelton introduced a new system
of copra collection to the Group. A station would be
established near extensive groves of native owned trees and all
the coconuts found in the groves would be 'collected'. When
the owner appeared he was paid the price the 'collector'
thought fit, and had to be satisfied with it. One of Hazelton's
collaborators in this scheme was Hermes, whose attitudes and
actions have already been described. This simple form of
robbery was soon adopted by other traders and was to be a cause
112of considerable trouble in the Marovo area.
Hazelton's methods were an indication of the changing
nature of European-islander trade in the Group. In 1910,
Arthur Mahaffy reporting to the High Commission on the state
of the Protectorate, noted that relations between Europeans
and islanders were not as friendly as they had been in the
past. He concluded that this was due to the increasing
numbers of young and inexperienced traders in the islands.
In the 'old days' the traders were relatively few in number
and conservative in their methods; they were well known by
the islanders and they knew that if they departed from a
certain line of conduct their trade could be damaged and
their lives endangered. In more recent times, however, the
younger traders had adopted methods that were not only
difficult for the islanders to comprehend, but also often
11zamounted to extortion. v The presence of the government
WPHC No.830 of 1908, Mahaffy to H.C., 21 December 1908. 
No.784 of 1910, Mahaffy to H.C., 8 April 1910.
WPHC No.784 of 1910, Mahaffy to H.C., 8 April 1910 and 
11 May 1910.
113
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and the threat of punitive action had reduced the islanders'
options in retribution. Mahaffy's comments seem to have been
justified: certainly a number of the old-style traders were
rogues, but even a scoundrel like Edmund Pratt had to reconsider
11 4his methods in the face of retaliation from the islanders.
In the decade after the attack on the Eclipse in 
1897 there were no reported assaults on traders by islanders of 
the New Georgia Group. This growing security not only dimin­
ished the constraints on the conduct of traders, but it also 
resulted in an increase in their numbers. The government 
station at Gizo had been the seed of a town. Burns, Philp &
Co. had established its warehouse and wharf nearby and Gizo 
had become the port of the Group, with the company's steamer 
calling every six weeks. On these occasions large numbers of 
traders would congregate at the port to ship their copra and 
exchange mail. Several other traders had built houses at 
Gizo, and by 1908 there were Europeans engaged in trading or
planting at Vella Lavella, Ranongga, Simbo, Mbava, Rendova,
11SMunda, Marovo and Vona Vona.
With the increasing numbers of traders competition
became fiercer, profits suffered and new methods to boost
116them had to be devised. The situation became so critical
114'LC I. Claim No.21, Wickham to Woodford, 30 May 1912.
115 WPHC No.164 of 1907, Woodford to H.C., 24 August 1907. Enel. 
F.J. Barnett, 'Report on visit to Western Solomons', July 
1907. RNAS 44, loc.cit.
116 An indication of the difficulties facing traders can be 
found in the accounts of Oliver Burns. Between July 1906 
and November 1907 Burns had costs of £1045/12/5; from 
September 1906 to July 1907 he obtained only £720/-/2 worth 
of copra and shell. See WPHC No.855 of 1910, Woodford to 
H.C., 10 June 1910.
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that in 1908 the 'Western Solomons Traders Assocation' was 
formed. This short-lived group was organised in an attempt 
to enforce some form of regularity in trading practices so that 
profits could recover. The increasing competition had 
resulted in credit trading getting out of hand. Traders 
anxious to establish 'contracts' with the islanders who 
supplied copra had been giving credit lavishly and were now 
finding themselves out of pocket, as such 'contracts' were 
difficult to enforce without permanently alienating customers. 
Hence the 'Traders Association' was keen to have the administ­
ration make credit trading illegal and to enforce the payment 
of debts. Woodford agreed that credit trading was undesirable 
but stated that he had no power to punish debtors and consid­
ered it unlikely that a law to enforce a trading agreement 
would be sanctioned by the High Commission. The traders then 
attempted to discipline themselves. Under an agreement they 
were all to deposit £50 which would be confiscated if any 
member broke the conditions of the agreement. These involved
a list of set prices, a ban on credit and the giving of
117gratuities in connection with trading.
The consequence of the traders' pact was an 
increasing use of the Hazelton-Hermes method of collecting 
copra. Often the parties that collected the nuts from the 
groves (without prior consultation with the owners) were armed, 
theoretically for protection but more probably to discourage
117 WPHC No.219 of 1908, Woodford to H.C., 20 May 1908. Enel. 
No.2 Meek to Woodford, 11 April 1908.
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intervention. Armed groups of indentured labourers (usually 
Malaitans) were also used by European traders to conduct 
Irading operations and to clear new plantations. The intimid-
/ |  / ]  Q
ation and coercion of islanders into concessions was common.
By such means the traders could undermine the islanders' 
ability to contain exploitation through the boycotting of 
dealings with offending Europeans. Short of violence, this 
was the only tactic left open to them in any attempt to 
influence the course of their relationship with the white 
man.
In the first decade of the Protectorate administ­
ration, the indigenous society of the New Georgia Group had 
been subject to severe pressure. In a few short years the 
islands had been largely 'pacified' and large-scale raiding 
had been completely suppressed. The administration had been 
fortunate in that its actions had been followed by serious 
epidemics, which probably further weakened the will of the 
people to resist. Nevertheless in some isolated areas, 
notably the interior of Vangunu and Vella Lavella, local 
raiding on a much reduced scale continued. Elsewhere in the
Group, heads were taken surreptitiously on important occasions,
119such as the death of a powerful big-man. y The purchasing of 
pinausu, generally from Choiseul, still went on and was
WPHC No.784 of 1910, Mahaffy to H.C., 8 April 1910.
RNAS 44, loc.cit., Report entitled 'Solomon Islands, 
Condition, August 1908', by Captain Vaughan Lewes.
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accompanied with some of the ceremony and ritual that had been
associated with the big head-hunting expeditions. It seems,
however, that the satisfaction and excitement derived from
120this form of substitution was limited and declining.
In the same period island society was placed under
further stress by the intensification of European commercial
activities in the Group. For the first time larger blocks
of land were being permanently alienated: bush once used for
hunting was being cleared and planted, and more Europeans
were taking up residence on their blocks. Traders were adopting
strong-arm tactics and destroying what once had been an
equitable commercial relationship. The administration's
officers at Gizo did nothing to 'protect' the islanders from
these and other developments. The Gizo station functioned
largely as a police force, with the district officer's other
main interest being the management of the government's copra 
121plantation. The Protectorate had no provisions for the
improvement of the health and general welfare of the islanders, 
beyond suppressing and punishing violence. After Woodford and 
Mahaffy's actions of 1898-1901 the Gizo station faced no 
major crisis for seven years, and its inadequacies went 
undetected. Indeed, to some the administration seemed to be 
doing a marvellous job:
^^Hocart, 'Warfare', pp. 305-6, 312-15- 
121 With assiduous work on this plantation, some officers 
were able to produce a profit for the government over 
the cost of running the Gizo station for a year. WPHC 
No.112 of 1900, Hazelton to H.C., 5 May 1904. Enel. 
Hazelton to Woodford, 8 April 1904.
If one wishes to behold an object-lesson 
in support of the British method of sus­
taining The White Man's Burden, he need go 
no further than the Solomons to seek it ...
Nowhere could there be a better example of 
the peculiar genius of the Englishman for 
the ruling of uncivilized subject races, and 
for his splendid natural capacity for 
reducing order and good government out of 
chaos and anarchy.
Unfortunately for the islanders of the New Georgia Group, the 
image and the reality were poles apart: for in 1908-10, when 
the administration was confronted with serious trouble, the 
'splendid natural capacity' was to prove spectacularly 
deficient.
From 1908 to 1910 the pressures of the previous 
decade boiled over, and conflict broke out in the Marovo 
Lagoon and on Vella Lavella. This was to be the last attempt 
by islanders of the Group to assert their independence from the 
administration and to dictate the terms of their relationship 
with the white man. The Marovo and Vella Lavella affairs were 
similar to a certain degree: both involved assaults on traders 
and were partly inspired by the administration's stupidity, 
and both were reactions to the transitions that were occuring 
in island society. However, on a deeper level there were 
differences. The Marovo troubles involved islanders who had 
comprehensive dealings with Europeans, and who were not 
initially 'outlaws' or 'renegades', although they soon became 
so. The troubles were further fomented by the avarice of 
traders and the insensitivity of the government. The violence
122 J.H.M. Abbott, The South Seas (Melanesia) (London, 1910), 
pp. A6-7 .
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in Marovo was primarily a reaction to the manner of change in 
the islands. On Vella Lavella, at the heart of the troubles 
was a violent rejection of the fact of change. The central 
figure was an 'outlaw' big-man who struggled to maintain his 
status on traditional terms, as a head-hunter and fighting 
man. This affair, like that in the Marovo, was complicated by 
the inept actions of the administration. The conflicts of 
1908-10 also mark a significant point in the relations between 
the various European interests in the islands - commerce, 
mission and government. They highlighted the growing dissension 
between the three, and saw the emergence of the Methodist 
Mission as a power in the Group. All these events can be seen 
in much greater detail than is usual with the history of the 
Group, for in addition to the administration's records there 
are abundant references to them in the Methodist Mission's 
archives and also an account from the viewpoint of the traders. 
The latter is in the form of a book written by Frank Burnett, 
a traveller who was residing with Norman Wheatley at the time.
The Marovo troubles exploded in May 1908, when 
Oliver Burns, an independent trader with his headquarters at 
Nono, was murdered on board his boat. The killer was Lanesi, 
who undertook the murder at the instigation of a Vangunu 
big-man, Lela. The origins of this affair went back to 1906, 
when Lela's brother Ara was arrested for killing twelve other 
islanders and sent to Tulagi. There he committed suicide before 
he could be tried. On hearing of this Lela determined to take 
a European's head in revenge. Burnett states that Ara's 
original crime was in part due to the ineptitude of the 
administration. According to this source, Ara's village had
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been raided and some of his people killed. He approached the
administration which, in Burnett's words, 'favoured him with
some ambiguous advice, which he construed as an authorisation
128to take the law into his own hands'. Accordingly he raided
his enemies and then reported the matter to the authorities.
How much of this is true is impossible to determine, as Woodford 
did not mention the Ara affair in his correspondence (apart 
from the suicide). Neither is it dealt with in Mahaffy's 
later reports on the Protectorate. However, Burnett's account 
is tobe treated with some suspicion. His principal informant 
was Wheatley, who was then harbouring a grudge against the 
administration over the rejection of several land claims. In 
general, Burnett's highly critical view of the Protectorate 
administration is representative of the views of the traders 
with whom he resided when in the islands. One interesting 
fact is that Ara was 'arrested' by the trader Harry Wickham, 
the son of Frank Wickham and Lupatina, a Bougainville woman.
It seems unlikely that Ara would allow himself to be taken 
and then transported to Gizo unless he was unconcerned about 
the consequences of his actions. This could possibly be 
construed as evidence that Ara believed himself to have been 
acting with official sanction. Whatever the circumstances
126J Burnett, op.cit., pp. 105-6. See also WPHC No.830 of 1908, 
Mahaffy to H.C., 21 December 1908. RNAS 14, Enclosure No. 
18, 'Correspondence relating to the murders of Patrick 
Brown at Russell Islands, Mr McKenzie in Malaita, and Mr 
Oliver Byrnes in Marovo Lagoon', Vaughan Lewes to Commander- 
in-Chief, 21 August 1908.
Burnett, op.cit.
WPHC, op.cit.
WPHC, No.793 Of 1910, Wheatley to H.C. 
Burnett to H.C., 7 June 1910. 8 July 1910, and
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surrounding the death of Ara, and the subsequent act of 
revenge by his brother Lela, they were to set in motion a 
chain of events that were to severely affect the people of 
the Marovo Lagoon for several years.
Oliver Burns was unlucky: he was said to have been 
a quiet, 'respectable' man, liked by the islanders. He was 
chosen as the victim because the prime candidate, a semi­
imbecile trader named Faddy, had promised to take Lela on a 
visit to Sydney. Burns was unsuspecting and he was easily 
surprised on board his boat; he and one of his native crew 
were cut down but the rest of the crew escaped. The boat 
was looted and then burnt, and the head of Burns was taken 
to Lela's village on Ndure, a small island just off the coast
of north western Vangunu, an area where Lela was regarded as
125the most powerful big-man. The reaction amongst the
Europeans in the Group was immediate: a deputation of traders 
approached Sykes, the Acting Government Officer at Gizo, 
offering their services for a punitive expedition and insist­
ing on the importance of action. Sykes, a rather weak man 
who was later dismissed for continual drunkeness, acceded to 
the traders' demands and an expedition consisting of twelve 
Europeans and sixty labourers got underway. Most of the 
prominent traders took part: Frank and Harry Wickham, Wheatley, 
Binskin, Hermes and interestingly, the Methodist missionary 
the Rev. Ernest Shackell. Shackell was an unorthodox toiler
WPHC No.830 of 1908, op.cit.; No.784 of 1910, Mahaffy to 
H.C., 9 July 1919.
The location of Ndure, and other places from the central 
Marovo Lagoon mentioned in the text, is given on Map V.
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f o r  t h e  L o rd ;  he a lw ays  c a r r i e d  a gun,  even  t o  c h u r c h ,  and
was known f o r  h i s  ru d e  and a r r o g a n t  demeanor to w a rd s  t h e
i s l a n d e r s .  lie e x c u se d  h i s  p r e s e n c e  on the  e x p e d i t i o n  by
s t a t i n g  he was t h e r e  t o  h e l p  Sykes r e s t r a i n  t h e  t r a d e r s  from
i n d i s c r i m i n a t e  m u rd e r ,  a s  t h e  l a t t e r  f e l t  t h a t  he m ight  be
u n a b le  t o  c o n t r o l  them. I n  t h e  e v e n t ,  t h e  e x p e d i t i o n  was a
f a i l u r e :  Ndure was r a i d e d  b u t  L e l a ,  a f t e r  some exchange o f
f i r e ,  e s c a p e d .  The v i l l a g e  was d e s t r o y e d  and t h e  p e o p l e s '
b o a t s  and c a n o e s  c o n f i s c a t e d .  The n e t  r e s u l t  was t o  foment
f u r t h e r  ' r e b e l l i o n ' ,  L e l a  and h i s  men vowing t h a t  more w h i t e
h e a d s  must be t a k e n ,  and a t  t h e  same t im e  making i t  n i g h
i m p o s s i b l e  t o  t r a c e  t h e  o f f e n d e r s  a s  t h e y  had  s c a t t e r e d  i n t o
t h e  Vangunu m o u n ta in s .  The t r a d e r s '  e x p e d i t i o n  was i l l e g a l ,
a s  Sykes a t  t h a t  t im e  d i d  n o t  have t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  a Deputy
126Com m iss ioner  o r  D i s t r i c t  M a g i s t r a t e .
The s e co n d  p u n i t i v e  e x p e d i t i o n  was o f f i c i a l ,
b e in g  composed o f  t h e  o f f i c e r s  and  men o f  HMS Cambrian
accom panied  by Woodford.  T h i s  t o o ,  a c c o m p l i s h e d  l i t t l e .  A
number o f  v i l l a g e s  and c a n o e s  were d e s t r o y e d  bu t  t h e  i n h a b i t -
127a n t s  had  a l l  v a n i s h e d .  '  As a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  c o n t i n u i n g  
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  t h e  i s l a n d s  t h e  High Com miss ioner  
s e n t  M ahaffy  t o  r e p o r t  on t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  On M a h a f f y ' s
WPHC N o .261 o f  1908,  Woodford t o  H .C . ,  22 August  1908. 
E n e l .  N o .1 ,  Sykes t o  Woodford,  22 August  1908.
N o .483 o f  1910,  Woodford t o  H . C . , 16 F e b r u a r y  1910. 
RNAS AT, o p . c i t .
MCA V o l . 1 1 6 ,  S im io n i  Teke t o  Danks, 16 August  1908 and 
9 Sep tem ber  1908;  G o ld ie  t o  Danks,  14 J a n u a r y  1909.
127 RNAS A4, o p . c i t .
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arrival in the Marovo in November 1908 it was found that Levers'
store on Mase Island had been looted and apparently the two
Malaitan labourers in charge of the station had been murdered.
It was assumed that Lela and his men were responsible. Mahaffy
also noted that the Hazelton-Hermes method of collecting copra
was causing unrest amongst the islanders and attempted to get
1 28Levers to suppress it. ‘ As it later transpired, the attempt 
was fruitless. The administration's answer to the second 
assault on the Mase station was another punitive expedition 
in December 1908. This effort was to prove the most excessive 
and undisciplined so far.
The expedition consisted of Woodford, Heffernan, who was 
the District Magistrate for the Shortland Islands, and fifty 
'militia' most of whom were Shortland Islanders. The men 
were all armed with rifles and the long-handled tomahawks 
which were much favoured by the head-hunters of previous 
years. The Shortlands 'militia' were to use them in a similar 
fashion. There was some dispute about what actually occurred 
during this expedition, the conflicting informants being 
Woodford and Burnett. Burnett's source of information was 
Wheatley, who was with Woodford on board the government 
steamer Belama during the action. Wheatley was used to 
procure the services of one Woosi, the big-man of Nono, 
whose brother had been killed and himself driven from his 
district by Burns' murderers. The expedition concentrated 
on two areas: the district of the Pondokana people near the
128 WPHC No.830 of 1908, op.cit.
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Kolo River on New Georgia Island, and that part of Vangunu 
inland from Mase and Ndure Islands. The Pondokana people were 
allied with Lola and somo of bheir men had participated in the 
Burns murder. In the official version of the affair Heffernan 
and his forty-four strong Shortlands 'militia' marched into 
the Pondokana territory, were fired upon, and so returned the 
fire, eventually killing two men, one of whom was chopped 
down with a tomahawk. At Vangunu, shots were again exchanged 
with no casualties to the 'militia' but five deaths on the 
other side. In both areas villages were burnt and trees and 
gardens destroyed. Woodford confined himself to criticising 
the Shortlands men as an 'undisciplined horde' whose only 
thoughts had been for loot. In Burnett's account the 'militia', 
which he incorrectly stated to have been Malaita men, went on 
a rampage, indiscriminately killing men, women and children.
He also claimed that someof those killed were decapitated.
It is impossible to determine the exact truth in 
this matter. Burnett's veracity is open to doubt, for there 
are a number of confirmed inaccuracies in his account, but 
there is also no reason to accept Woodford's version unquest­
ioned. Indeed, after the publication of Burnett's book 
Woodford elaborated on a number of the charges made against 
him and in doing so revealed details that he had not thought
129 WPHG No.261 of 1908, Woodford to H.C., 11 January 1909. 
Burnett, op.cit., pp. 112-14.
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to include in his initial report. While denying the 
accusations he also made some comments inconsistent with his 
first account. One incident that did come to light was the 
manner of death of one of the islanders. This man was being 
pursued along the foreshore; Woodford and Wheatley both fired
at him from the deck of the Belama, one shot wounding him.
1dOHe was then hacked to death by a Shortlands man. In
conclusion, it would seem that some butchery did take place: 
men who could have been taken alive were killed by uncontroll­
able members of the 'militia'. The assumptions behind these 
punitive expeditions, that of collective guilt and correspond­
ing collective punishment, remained unquestioned. The whole 
community was deemed to be criminal, and their homes, gardens 
and the plantations that gave them a source of income, were 
destroyed. As a result of the expedition, the Pondokana 
people moved further up the lagoon to Hau, a few miles from 
Ramata, leaving their remaining plantations at the mercy of 
the traders. Other communities in the Marovo were also forced 
to move further inland for protection. Not only was there 
the fear of being caught up in one of the successive punitive 
expeditions but there was also the threat from the marauding 
groups of outlaws who had been dispossessed of their homes 
and food supply by government action. The deserted plantat­
ions were ripe for the plucking, and the employees of Levers' 
Mase station were not slow to sense the opportunity. Armed
130 WPHC No.577 of 1912, Woodford to H.C., 11 February 1912.
parties of labourers would collect the nuts and often defraud
the owners, and this in turn caused further unrest amongst the
T31islanders in the Marovo district.
The Mase station had been re-occupied early in 1909 
by the trader Cromar. Interestingly, he developed strong 
relations with Lela who sold him copra and gave his sister 
to the trader as a ’wife'. This was not as surprising as it 
first appears, for both Lela and the Levers' store were 
profiting from the situation in the Lagoon. The unsettled 
condition of the area helped conceal the exploitation of the 
untenanted plantations by Levers, while the arms and goods 
that Lela obtained through the traders would help reinforce 
his position amongst the people he was terrorising. Other 
traders apart from Levers were also profiting from the 
situation; Anderson on Warata Island was selling firearms 
and Wheatley was using the people's fear of the government to 
increase his influence. In November 1909 Wheatley persuaded 
the Ndure people to surrender Lanesi, the actual murderer of 
Burns, and thus to avoid further retaliation by the administr­
ation. The unfortunate Lanesi was a man of little influence 
in his community, being the son of a captive brought back from 
Isabel by head-hunters, and was thus less able to resist 
Lela's orders to murder Burns and also more dispensable than 
others among Lela's following. Wheatley also actively 
discouraged the Pondokana refugees from communicating with
151 WPHG No.784 of 1910, Mahaffy to H.C., 8 April 1910 and 
11 May 1910; Minute: Mahaffy to H.C., 27 July 1910.
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132the administration.
In March 1910 Mahaffy again visited the Marovo area 
and once more arrived at a time of crisis. The constant 
defrauding of the islanders by unsolicited copra collection 
and the bullying tactics of armed parties of labourers had 
prompted retaliation. In the temporary absence of the Europ­
ean trader at Mase, unidentified Marovo men murdered one of 
his labourers. When the trader returned the other terrified 
labourers demanded to be allowed to leave the area. The 
trader, Panke, refused and was in turn murdered by the 'head 
boy' who with the other labourers then fled in a boat for 
their home, Treasury Island. The wheel turned full circle 
when the labourers, having second thoughts about the wisdom 
of their action, murdered the 'head boy' and returned to 
Mase. In an attempt to halt the continuing violence in the 
Marovo, Mahaffy and Woodford engaged A.W. Walsh as a Police 
Officer and stationed him with fifteen policemen at Mase. 
Walsh was ordered to try and contact Lela and through him 
obtain the murderer of the labourer. In addition a Prohib­
ition Order was placed against all trading in the Marovo 
Lagoon. Mahaffy and Woodford also went to Ramata to persuade 
the Pondokana people to return home, assuring them of police 
protection. The meeting was inconclusive; they were willing 
to return, but still afraid of Lela.^^
132 ibid.
155 ibid.
WPHG No.806 of 1910, Woodford to H.C. , 13 May 1910; 
Meek to H.C., 6 June 1910.
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The administration's actions finally had some 
effect, and the Marovo region quietened down. In July 1910, 
in a surprising burst of commonsense, the High Commission 
commuted the death sentence passed on Lanesi commenting
that another man should not die 'as a part of the long series
154of mutually retributive acts' in the Marovo. The edict
against; trading was lifted by the end of 1910 and steps were
155taken to stop traders defrauding islanders. In 1911 when
the High Commissioner, Sir Henry May, visited the Solomons
he was able to report that the Marovo Lagoon was quiet and
156only a few traders were operating there. In April 1915
the government station in the Lagoon was closed down because
15rthere was now no need for a police establishment in the area.
The Marovo episode had demonstrated that a 
combination of administrative blundering and commercial 
avarice could enlarge an isolated act of vengeance into a 
tragedy affecting innocent communities over a broad area.
The people of the Marovo found themselves caught between an 
insensitive administration, rapacious traders and the outlawed 
Lela. Lela and the other islanders had no fundamental 
quarrel with the white man: they had traded peacefully with 
Europeans since 1895- However, a perceived injustice had
WPHC No.261 of 1908, H.C. to Woodford, 16 July 1910.
155 ibid. , Woodford to H.C. , 18 August 1910.
WPHC No.2161 of 1911, May to C.O. , 8 December 1911.
WPHC No.942 of 1913, Woodford to H.C. , 18 April 1913.
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goaded  L e l a  i n t o  m u rd e r ,  and t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  of
b o t h  t h e  government  and t h e  t r a d e r s  s p r e a d  t h e  t u r b u l e n c e .
The l e s s o n s  of  t h e  Marovo t r o u b l e s  were n o t  l e a r n t ,  and w h i l e
t h e  s i t u a t i o n  t h e r e  s u b s i d e d  e v e n t s  on V e l l a  L a v e l l a  were t o
b r i n g  t h e  P r o t e c t o r a t e  government  f a c e  t o  f a c e  w i t h  a n o t h e r
c r i s i s  t o  which  i t s  r e s p o n s e  was even  more damaging. T h is
t im e  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  were t o  be more e x t e n s i v e ,  f o r  t h e
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  opponen t  was t h e  M e th o d i s t  M is s io n .
On t h e  23 Sep tem ber  1909 a  p a r t y  o f  e i g h t  V e l l a
L a v e l l a  men l a n d e d  on Mbava, a t  t h e  home o f  J o s e p h  B i n s k i n ,
w i t h  t h e  su p p o sed  i n t e n t i o n  o f  t r a d i n g  c o p r a .  I n s t e a d ,  t h e y
m u rd e re d  B i n s k i n ' s  M e la n e s i a n  w i f e ,  h i s  two d a u g h t e r s ,  and
t h r e e  o f  h i s  M a l a i t a n  l a b o u r e r s ,  one of  whom was a woman.
138B i n s k i n  was a b s e n t  from h i s  s t a t i o n  a t  t h e  t i m e .  T h is
m a s s a c r e  had  a l o n g  and i n v o l v e d  h i s t o r y ,  much o f  i t
r e v o l v i n g  a ro u n d  t h e  c a r e e r  o f  Z i t o ,  a  v a r a n i  o r  ' f i g h t i n g
man' from M a r a v a r i ,  M b i lu a .
Z i t o  was a man who had  r i s e n  t o  p rom inence  a s  a
h e a d - h u n t e r  i n  t h e  l a t t e r  d e c a d e s  o f  t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y .
U n l ik e  t h e  t r a d i t i o n  l e k a s a  o f  t h e  V e l l a  L a v e l l a n  t o u t o u ,
Z i t o ' s  a u t h o r i t y  was n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  l i m i t e d  t o  h i s  c o g n a t e s
bound t o g e t h e r  i n  a c l o s e  r e s i d e n t i a l  u n i t .  He a t t r a c t e d
f o l l o w e r s  t h r o u g h  h i s  a b i l i t y  a s  an o r g a n i s e r  o f  h e a d - h u n t i n g
139e x p e d i t i o n s  and h i s  own p e r s o n a l  b r a v e r y .  Z i t o ' s  c a r e e r
158 WPHC N o .1121 o f  1909,  B a r n e t t  t o  H . C . , 18 O c to b e r  1909.
^59 McKinnon, B i l u a  R e p o r t , p .  6 .
I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  D. R a r i q e t o ,  5 November 1979-, M b i lu a .
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as a head-hunter was long and distinguished: he was credited 
by Woodford with having lead an expedition to southeast Isabel 
in 1886 which allegedly took the lives of one hundred villagers 
at Boko. Woodford also considered that Zito was responsible 
for the death of the European settler Childe at Mbava in 1885, 
but this claim was incorrect as the investigations of the 
Royal Navy at that time had clearly implicated islanders from 
Simbo in the murder. At the turn of the century the 
Protectorate administration had begun retaliating against 
raiders from the New Georgia Group who had been attacking 
settlements on Isabel, because such expeditions readily came 
to the attention of the government through the Melanesian 
Mission establishment at Bugotu. As a result Zito and his 
fellow head-hunters changed the direction of their assaults 
to the island of Choiseul, which was less accessible to 
official inquiry. One of these raids was reported to have 
taken seventy heads. The activities of Mahaffy and Woodford 
in destroying the tomako of the head-hunters further limited 
their operations and Zito began to maraud within the New 
Georgia Group and on Vella Lavella itself. Zito's attacks on 
Vella led to the migration of refugees to Kolombangara,
Ghizo and New Georgia Island.
It is not known precisely when and why Zito conceived 
his animosity for Europeans. According to Burnett, it was 
the result of a deal between Edmund Pratt and Zito for the 
purchase of firearms; a deal on which Pratt reneged because
14-0 WPHC No.1121 of 1909, Woodford to H.C., 20 December 1909.
This storyof government action against the arms trade.
has the ring of truth: Pratt was a notorious arms trader
so unpopular at Mbilua that the people there would only deal
with him because he was able to supply guns. Whatever its
cause, Zito's displeasure soon expressed itself. In November
1897 he attacked the Eclipse at Mbilua, severely wounding
its owner Jean Pratt, brother of Edmund. Jean Pratt died a
year later, apparently as a result of the wounds he had 
142received. 1 Woodford attempted to warn off the Vella Lavell- 
an outlaws but drew only defiant messages in reply and armed 
parties of Zito's men were seen reconnoitring Ghizo for a 
surprise attack. Mahaffy's punitive expedition to Mbilua in 
November 1901 was largely in response to Zito's activities, 
and although it failed to catch any of the outlaws, it did 
reach a number of Zito's deserted strongholds in the mountain­
ous forest. These were impressive constructions; fortified 
villages built on cleared hilltops or on precipices so that
the entrance was narrowly restricted. If occupied, they were
145in Mahaffy's view, 'impregnable'.
Mahaffy's actions did not lessen Zito's belligerency;
twice he landed on Ghizo in unsuccessful attempts to secure the
144head of a District Officer. These failures seem to have
141 Burnett, op.cit., pp. 145-6.
142 WPHC , op.cit.
WPHC No.344 of 1898, Woodford to H.C., 21 October 1898.
WPHC No.41 of 1902, Woodford to H.C., 28 December 1901. 
Enel. Mahaffy to Woodford, 15 November 1901.
141
144 WPHC No.1121 of 1909, op.cit.
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discouraged Zito, for he retired to inland Vella Lavella and
for the next few years things quietened down. In 1908
Mahaffy visited the area and opined that Vella Lavella
could now be regarded as 'safe', with the exception of one
145or two inland places. Outwardly the island reflected
this peace: a number of plantations commenced and the
Methodist Mission began operating on the island. Initial
resistance to the introduction of the Mission at Mbilua
in 1903 was overcome with the assistance of the Roviana big-
men Gumi and Boaz Veo, who persuaded the people to accept
146a Fijian missionary teacher. The Mission developed very
slowly as some of the Fijian teachers were unsuited to the
work. One of them, Aisea Kili, had to be removed from the
island because his conduct was antagonising the islanders.
He was in the habit of helping himself to the produce of
the villagers’ gardens, and had been known to physically
147assault people. In 1907 the first European Methodist
missionary to be permanently stationed on Vella Lavella 
arrived. This was R.C. Nicholson, who was to work on the 
island until 1916, and later from 1919 to 1922. Nicholson 
was much given to self-advertisement; so much so that an 
exasperated Goldie was forced to write to the Mission Board 
in Sydney: 'We have been made quite a laughing stock in the 
islands by Mr. Nicholson's determination to pose as a martyr
^ ^  WPHG No.830 of 1908, Mahaffy to H.C., 21 December 1908.
1460 AMMR, XIV.1 (1904), pp. 4-5.
147 MCA Vol.116, Goldie to Small, 1 March 1911.
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in the press ... You need to be careful about anything he
148sends for publication'. Goldie was referring to Nicholson's
eloquent descriptions of the terrible hardship that faced
the self-styled 'Pioneer Missionary to Vella Lavella', most
of which was 'purely imaginary'. In fact, in. his first
year at the Mbilua station very little mission work was done
by Nicholson and it was not until the Mbava massacre and its
consequences that the Methodists were to make substantial
gains in obtaining the confidence and allegiance of the 
149islanders.
The coming of the Mission did not go unnoticed by
1 SOZito, who in 1908 asserted that he would kill a missionary. 
However, circumstances were to frustrate this ambition. Two 
of Zito's kinfolk reported him to the authorities at Gizo 
for having murdered his uncle. Edge-Partington descended on 
Mbilua in an attempt to capture the outlaw, but instead 
succeeded in killing Zito's wife and adopted daughter. There 
is no reliable detailed account of this senseless butchery - 
they appear to have been shot during the course of a general 
assault on Zito's house by the Government 'militia'. Zito 
himself escaped and then determined he would have his revenge 
for the massacre of his family. The Protectorate records 
still extant do not mention this incident as a possible 
motive for Zito's later actions; indeed, they do not mention
MCA Vol.116, Goldie to Danks, 17 November 1909. 
MCA Vol.238, Goldie to Danks, 28 October 1908. 
150 AMMR, XVII.12 (1908), pp. 13-5.
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it at all. Woodford's explanation of Zito's motivation
was rather lame: he reported that as Zito was now an old
man and approaching death, he had vowed to kill someone in
every district of Vella Lavella, Ranongga, Ghizo and
Kolombangara. That the killing of his family by the
administration was the major reason for Zito's later actions
is confirmed by Nicholson, who talked to him after his event-
151ual capture, Burnett, and the people of Mbilua themselves.  ^
Zito's rage first vented itself on the two men who had 
reported him to the authorities. These men had fled to 
Ghatere, on Kolombangara, when they heard that Zito had 
survived the government attack. They were traced down by 
Zito himself, who then killed them. He then determined to 
murder a European and so instructed a party of his men to go 
to Mbava and kill Binskin. Binskin being absent, the party 
massacred his family and staff. Zito himself did not partic­
ipate in the raid. It was also alleged, by Woodford, that 
Zito was responsible for the murder of a man at Levers'
station on southern Ranongga, and for an assault on Levers'
152store at the northern end of the same island. ^
The Mbava massacre created near-panic amongst 
the European residents of the area. One trader (a Levers man) 
hastily left Vella Lavella to return later with a police
^  MCA Vol.116, Goldie to Danks, 11 March 1910.
Interview with Tola Pitu and Remu, 6 November 197^S Mbilua. 
Burnett, op.cit., p. 11-9.
WPHC No.1121 of 1909, op.cit.
152 WPHC, ibid.
Interview with Tola Pitu and Remu.
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guard; other traders also requested police protection.
Nicholson who went to Mbava shortly after the murders, was
met by the trader Martin and forty armed labourers who twice
155fired at him before realising who he was. Woodford was
absent on leave at the time of the attack and did not return
to the Solomons until late November of 1909- In his absence,
according to Burnett, there was an abortive punitive expedition
under the leadership of Wheatley and Claude Bernays, the
young Acting Officer in Charge of the Shortlands Government
station. Bernays was reluctant to act without the sanction
154of his superiors and little was accomplished.  ^ On Woodford's 
return a full-scale expedition was organised in December: 
this was to follow the well-trodden path of its predecessors 
and end in fiasco. The punitive force consisted of Woodford, 
a number of traders, and the usual 'militia'. The 'militia' 
numbered about 200 and incorporated men from the Shortlands; 
Malaitan labourers, some of whom were related to those 
murdered at Mbava; and islanders from Ndovele, Vella Lavella, 
who were eager to hunt Zito because he had recently been 
responsible for murders in their district. With these
ingredients, it was a recipe for disaster. According to
MCA Vol.16, Nicholson to Danks, 4 October 1909 and 
-11 October 1909- 
AMMR, XIX.8 (1909), pp.12-3-
^  Burnett, op.cit., pp. 15^-5-
155 WPHC No.1121 of 1909, op.cit.
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Woodford's official report, the operations on Vella Lavella 
resulted in the killing of six men, and the apprehension of 
sixteen others. In reality the death, toll was closer to 
thirty, with traders, labourers and Ndovele men making the 
most of the opportunity to even up scores. Woodford obtained 
the cooperation of the Mbilua people through the simple 
expedient of threatening to deport the entire population to 
Malaita if it was not forthcoming. Although the 'militia' 
failed to capture Zito, they did however accomplish a great 
deal of wanton destruction and murder.
The general state of terror existing on the island
forced many of the people to take refuge at mission stations,
and Nicholson was forced to accompany the women to the gardens
to ensure that they would not be attacked. The migration to
the mission stations opened the Methodists to the charge that
they were harbouring the outlaws. This accusation was
apparently made by Wheatley and Binskin to Woodford, who
unfortunately believed it. As a result a great deal of
material damage was done to a number of mission stations.
Goldie also accused a number of the traders of using the
punitive expedition as an excuse to kill off some of their
creditors among the islanders. Eventually it was the Mbilua
people, under the threat of deportation, who captured Zito
and several other of the murderers, and killed the remaining 
156ones. However, this was not to be the end of the matter,
ibid.
Interview with Tola Pitu and Remu.
Burnett, op,cit., pp. 154-7.
MCA V0I.II0, Nicholson to Banks, 7 December 1909, 27 
January 1910, and 1 March 1910. Goldie to Danks, 7 Febru­
ary 1910 and 11 March 1910.
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for two of the prisoners were taken to Mbava and put in the 
custody of Binskin before they were transported to Gizo.
While at Mbava they were beaten savagely by Binskin and his 
Malaitan labourers, and later died as a result of their 
injuries.
An inquiry by Mahaffy and Woodford into this
affair found the Malaitan labourers guilty of murder, and
Binskin an accessory before the fact. However, no action was
taken against the men, and Binskin was found not to be
responsible for his actions as he was at the time suffering
157'acute mental anguish'. The whole matter was eventually
buried by the Colonial Office; it was decided that Mahaffy
and Woodford had been part to a 'serious miscarriage of
justice' in not charging Binskin or the labourers, but
ordered that the matter should not be resuscita ted .W ith
regard to the conduct of the entire punitive operation, the
High Commission in Fiji merely noted that it did not like
the use of head-hunters as agents of reprisal. This comment
was prompted by the fact that the 'militia' and the Mbilua
people brought in the heads of those killed to demonstrate
159that the guilty had, indeed, been punished.
With Zito safely in irons, it was important to 
Woodford that his trial and execution should occur near to 
the place of the crime so as to extract the maximum deterrent
157 WPHC No.1121 of 1909, Woodford to H.C., 4 April 1910.
158 ibid. , C.O. to H.C. , 5 April 1910.
159 ibid., minute by H.C., 1 February 1910.
value from the occasion. Accordingly the Pacific Order in 
Council was amended so that executions could be conducted in 
the Solomons at the High Commissioner's discretion, and Mr 
Major, the Chief Judicial Commissioner for the Western 
Pacific, was sent to the Protectorate to preside over the 
court. Alas for Woodford, the affair ended not with a bang, 
but with a whimper, for Zito was acquitted. There was 
insufficient evidence for a conviction. Zito was, however, 
transported to Fiji because it was judged that it would be 
too dangerous for others, and himself, to allow him to return 
home. He was, officialdom decreed, in a condition of 'almost 
hopeless savage madness
Woodford not only lost his case against Zito, he
also had to back down to the Methodist Mission. Well could
Goldie exult, 'we have come out on top - and on the very
top', for the Mission benefited from the Zito affair in 
161several ways. Its efforts in protecting the islanders of
Vella Lavella from the marauding 'militia' resulted in an 
enormous boost in its prestige on the island. In Nicholson's 
words, it was
the chief factor in bringing to pass that 
spirit of goodwill and confidence between 
the natives and ourselves, which we knew 
so well to be the primary requisite for 
successful work. This confidence was shown 
in increased attendances at the Sunday 
services and day schools, as well as in the 
large number of permanent homes that were 
erected near to the Mission Station.
160
161
162
ibid. , H.C. to C.O. , 11 July 1910 and 4 May 1910.
MCA Vol.116, Goldie to Danks, 29 March 1910.
R.C. Nicholson,_Thq Son of a Savage The Story of Daniel Bula (London, 1924') , p. 91.----- ^ — — ------ s2— ---------
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The second, benefit was political: the Mission's position in 
relation to that of the administration and the traders was 
reinforced. The Mbilua people connected with the Mission had 
brought in Zito where the administration and its two hundred 
men had failed. They had demonstrated conclusively that the 
Mission had not shielded the outlaw and Woodford was forced 
to apologise and offer compensation for the damage done to 
Methodist property.
Goldie was magnanimous in victory; he appreciated 
the assistance Woodford had given the Mission in the past and 
was not inclined to pursue the matter of the abuses of the 
administration's 'militia'. The chief villians in Goldie's 
eyes were the traders whom he considered had prejudiced Wood­
ford and had used the whole affair to attempt' to further their 
own interests. That the mission may have had a similar 
attitude did not occur to him. The discrediting of a number 
of the traders in the eyes of the islanders and of the 
administration was a source of great pleasure to the mission­
aries; a pleasure accentuated when Woodford and Mahaffy came 
to the Methodist's headquarters at Kokenggolo and endorsed
the work of the mission publicly before the Roviana mbangara 
16Zand people. Woodford's administration had again narrowly
averted a scandal; the minutes of the Mission Board in Sydney 
reveal how close it had been to exposing the excesses of the 
Zito affair to the public. On the 6 April 1910 the Board
^63 Vol.116, Nicholson to Danks, 10 March 1910: Goldie
to Danks, 11 March 1910, 29 March 1910, 6 April 1910,
20 April 1910; Woodford to Danks, 19 May 1910. *
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resolved that a report of the affair be sent to various
newspapers for publication. Twelve days later, on hearing of
the administration’s backdown in the islands, it was deciding
164-to withhold the information from the press. When the expos­
ure did come, in the form of Burnett's writings, it could be 
easily brushed aside. Burnett’s book contained a number of 
inacuracies which could be used by Woodford to discredit his 
account. The High Commissioner informed Woodford that he was 
to take no notice of Burnett, and in his report to the 
Secretary of State dismissed the author as a man 'who will 
stoop to advertise a book dedicated to his wife with indecent
photographs which he claims to have made himself but which
165happen to be hawked for sale in Tahiti and Rarotonga’. ^
Thus was the reputation of the British colonial service upheld.
Zito was a man out of his time. He struggled to 
maintain his status as a varani, or fighting big-man, at a 
time when European power and ’civilisation* were extinguishing 
the species. Unlike other big-men such as Ingava who saw 
the tide and eventually moved with it, Zito resisted. His 
resistance was protracted, but doomed to failure. The 
suppression of large scale head-hunting, the destruction of 
the tomako, had catastrophically reduced his sphere of 
operations. His prestige, his mana and the satisfaction 
of his followers, could no longer be maintained and increased 
at the-expense of the unfortunate people of Choiseul and
MCA Vol.204, Mission Board Minutes, 6 April 1910, 
18 April 1910.
165 WPHC No. 577 Of 19-12, H.C. to C.O. , 23 March 1912.
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Isabel. He was forced to concentrate on the inhabitants of 
Vella Lavella and its neighbouring islands, both islanders 
and Europeans. The response of the administration to 
this threat was typical in its ineptitude, the reaction of 
the traders was the familiar combination of hysteria and 
greed. Saddest of all, his own people were forced to turn 
against him in order to preserve their own community from 
both Zito's excesses and the depredations of the administ­
ration. The troubles* in the Marovo Lagoon and on Vella 
Lavella both reflected the changing circumstances of the 
Protectorate, but in different ways. Lela and his men in the 
Marovo were reacting not against the transition from the 
old to the new, but against the manner of this change, 
accompanied as it was with administrative insensitivity and 
stupidity, and grasping commercial exploitation. Zito's 
rebellion was against the fundamental fact of change, a 
transition that was slowly but surely destroying the assumpt­
ions that were the basis of his position in island society. 
Both affairs also marked a turning point in the nature of 
European-islander relations. It was die last time that island­
ers would initiate action within the framework of their own 
society in an attempt to do something about the changing 
circumstances of their lives. In future theywere to be 
restricted to the perimeters of European morality, justice 
and commerce. In these circumstances it was not surprising 
that they were increasingly to become pawns in the battle 
of wills between government, missions, and commercial 
enterprise.
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The administration's inept, but effectively brutal, 
response to the Marovo and Zito troubles were the final 
stages of the pacification of the New Georgia Group: there 
were to be no more such challenges from the islanders. Just 
as the successful operations of Mahaffy and Woodford in 
1898-1901 gave a boost to European commercial activities 
in the islands, so did the actions of 1908-19*10. Yet, there 
was a difference: the white settlers who came after 1910 saw 
themselves primarily as planters, and the freewheeling trader 
of the previous years became an endangered species. The 
traders' livelihood had depended upon their relationship with 
the islanders, although this connection had been gradually 
eroded in recent years. With the blossoming planting commun­
ity, however, there was scarcely a need for any relationship 
with the people of the Group. In the settlers' world, and 
in their vision of the future, the New Georgians were 
peripheral. The settlers built, as it were, an island within 
the islands.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE WORLD OF THE SETTLERS, 1910-29
With the burgeoning plantation economy of the New 
Georgia Group, there developed a more stable and numerous 
European community of settlers. The desires and ambitions 
of this European planting community were increasingly to 
diverge from the needs and aspirations of the islanders. This 
divergence became more pressing as the settlers grew in 
number, and became better organised and more vocal in their 
demands. The years after 1910 saw the intensification of 
requests for representation in the administration, relaxation 
of regulations controlling labour recruiting and working 
conditions, the importation of outside labour, more favour­
able terms regarding land and the imposition of higher 
'native* taxes to encourage the slothful to seek employment 
on the plantations. The administration was in a difficult 
position in responding to these pressures: the encouragement 
of the commercial development of the Protectorate could reach 
a state where it was prejudicial to the rights and welfare 
of the islanders. The Protectorate administration's reaction 
to the demands of the settlers was ambivalent: there was no 
long-term policy to act as a basis for decisions and 
recommendations, which were frequently made without serious 
thought for the future. The political and economic ambitions 
of the European settlers, had they not been checked by fort­
uitous circumstances and the Colonial Office, would have had 
severe repercussions for island society0 The planting commun­
ity equated the future progress and prosperity of the islands
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with their own objectives and requirements; the role of the 
black man was to be a cheap and reliable source of labour. 
Although the future of the islanders was not entirely sacrif­
iced to the vaulting ambitions of a tiny white minority, the 
gulf between plantation and village continued to widen. This 
gap was especially apparent in the New Georgia Group, the 
scene of intense European commercial activity and the centre 
of planter-settler agitation. The people of the Group 
refused to work on the plantations, preferring instead to 
participate in the European economy on their own terms. The 
New Georgian preferred to collect and sell his own copra 
and shell, as he had done for decades, rather than earn a 
living toiling for the white man. The plantations, the 
overseers, and the predominantly Malaitan labourers, were 
virtually a separate world within the Group.
In 1908 the European population of the Protectorate 
was some 250, of which between twenty and thirty lived in the 
New Georgia Group. This number included the District Officer, 
two missionaries, about ten employees of Burns Philp and 
Levers, and at least seven self-employed planter-traders.
There do not appear to have been any European women in the 
Group other than Mrs Goldie, the wife of the Methodist
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Missionary. By 1922, the number of Europeans in the 
Solomons had risen to about 500, of which 79 resided in the 
New Georgia Group. Of the 79, seventeen were female, many 
of whom were connected with the missions. Only a small 
number of the men involved in planting and trading had Europ­
ean wives: the exact number is not known, though it would
2seem to have been between five and ten. Most of the others 
appear to have married or cohabited with island women. An 
unusual feature of the New Georgia Group was the extent of 
miscegenation. In 1922 there were thirty-three Euro-Melanesi­
ans in the Group, but only seven throughout the rest of the
7Protectorate. Inter-marriage had been common since the 
early trading days: Frank Wickham, Edmund and Jean Pratt, 
Norman Wheatley, Joseph Binskin all married island women, and 
had children by them. This practice continued with the later 
planter-traders, and was still common in the 1920s. There 
are some possible explanations for the existence of this 
situation in the New Georgia Group and not elsewhere. Inter­
marriage with outsiders was no new phenomenon to the islanders
'i
Protectorate of the British Solomon Islands Statistics to 
$1 March 1909 Compiled by the Resident Commissioner 
(Sydney, 1909), p. 12.
RNAS 44, Enclosure No.19, 'White Residents and Settlers ...
1908’ .
^ WPHC No.2991 of 1922, Kane to H.C., 28 September 1922.
No.1976 of 1923, Kane to H.C., 13 July 1923. No.1977 of 
1923, Kane to H.C., 13 July 1923.
5 WPHC No.299a of 1922, loc.cit.
of the Group, as pinausu captured in head-hunting expeditions,
both men and women, frequently inter-married with their
qcaptors and became full members of the community. To
European eyes, the women of the Group were not unattractive.
Although much darker in complexion, the people of the
western Solomons have a facial bone structure and appearance
much closer to the European type than that of the islanders
of the south-east Solomons.
The nature of inter-racial 'marriages' and the fate
of the offspring of such unions varied considerably. In the
islands, a man and a woman who lived together for any length
of time and had children were inevitably regarded as married.
For instance, Norman Wheatley married several times, and had
seven children: one of his wives later married an islander and
had another two children; his other wife later married a Euro-
Melanesian and had another child. All such unions were
regarded as valid marriages, the children taking the name
of their respective fathers.^ In official eyes, a marriage
between a European and an islander could be recognised as
legally valid if 'native custom and law' had been followed,
nif it was a voluntary union, and not polygamous. These
^ WPHC No.274 of 1932, Barley to H.C., 5 September 1932.qC. Mytinger, Headhunting in the Solomon Islands Around the 
Coral Sea (New York, 1942), p. 215.
6 Interview with B. Gina and J. Zinihite, 28 August 1974, 
Munda.
 ^WPHC No.1318 of 1922, Greene to Kane, 6 June 1922.
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dicta, however, were often inapplicable in the New Georgia 
Group, where 'native custom and law' had been eroded by the 
missions. Marriages conducted under the auspices of the 
church were also not necessarily binding. The situation was, 
sensibly enough, a fluid one. The children of these unions 
experienced widely varied treatment. Some traders rejected 
their parental responsibility and the children were brought 
up within the islanders' community; others were sent to 
Australia for education. As a result the status and position 
of individual Euro-Melanesians could differ markedly, though 
as a group, their social mobility was generally high. Harry 
Wickham, the son of Frank Wickham and a Bougainville woman, 
educated at a private school in Sydney and a cultured and 
intelligent man, returned to Roviana because he considered 
life in the islands was free of the restrictions that 
plagued 'civilised' society. He married an island woman, 
pursued a career as a planter-trader and had his son educated
Q
in Australia. His half-brother Alick was credited with 
introducing the 'Australian crawl' to swimmers in Australia; 
he enjoyed a brief career as a stunt diver, married a
QEuropean woman and eventually returned to the islands.y Peter 
and John Pratt, the sons of Edmund Pratt, both became traders. 
The daughters of mixed marriages, particularly those of 
Wheatley, frequently married other European or Euro-Melanesian
^ Fleischmann, op.cit., p. 123.
9 WPHC No.1306 of 1936, Kidson to H.C., 5 August 1936.
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traders. 10
Of the Europeans resident in the Group in the 1920s,
about half were employed as managers, overseers or assistants
by the large companies and more prosperous planters, while
11the other half were self-employed planter-traders. The 
living conditions of these men varied considerably. While 
those employed by Levers, Burns Philp and the other larger 
companies could be assured of relatively comfortable accomm­
odation (taking into account the difficulties of the environ­
ment), those whose welfare depended upon their own resource­
fulness could easily end their lives as destitute beachcombers. 
Young men who came to the islands to work for Levers and 
then decided to go it alone as planters or traders, only to
find their abilities insufficient for the task, ended as
12derelicts living off the charity of the islanders. Others 
went 1native':
Unshaven and dirty, with one sleeve entirely 
missing from his strange coat-like garment, 
and with trousers rolled up exposing his 
brown calves and bare feet, it was bewilder­
ing to hear the cultivated drawling voice 
issuing from such a scarecrow. He was an 
interminable talker, of the type that is 
always about to do great things, but never
Wheatley's daughters Florrie, Anne and Lena respectively 
married Joseph Binskin, Ernest Palmer and Frank Hickey.
WPHC No.1976 of 1923, op.cit.; No.1977 of 1923, op.cit. 
P.S. Allen, Stewart's Handbook of the Pacific Islands 
(Sydney, 1920), pp. 15-9-
WPHC No.2270 of 1954, Ashley to H.C., 28 June 1934.
does ... he lived with a native woman in 
an old hut and his boat was almost a wreck.
Notwithstanding these things he 
invariably referred to his few miserable 
trees as his "plantation", his one bony 
bullock as his "cattle", and his water­
logged derelict as his "schooner".^
Their health ravaged by alcoholism, and with insufficient
funds for a trip to Sydney to shake off the enervating malaria
14and dysentery,such men often suffered an early death. Excess­
ive drinking was common, as men tried to combat the physical
13and psychological damage caused by the unfamiliar environment. 
Such total failures, however, were outnumbered by those who 
were successful, or who managed to keep their heads just 
above water, or who cut their losses and left the islands 
without facing complete ruin.
Norman Wheatley arrived at New Georgia in 1892 and 
died there in 1930, sixty-two years old. His house at Labeti 
was renowned for its comfort, and his hospitality was 
legendary. Wheatley was reputed to have had assets of 
£48,000 in 1920, but his 'open-handedness* and his passion 
for throwing money away on exotic sea-craft made its mark,
 ^C.W. Collinson, Life and Laughter 'Midst the Cannibals 
(London, 1926), p7 34« Collinson was a planter in the 
New Georgia Group in the early twenties, and his book 
gives the best account of the planter's life in those 
days.
14 0. Johnson, Bride in the Solomons (London, 1946), pp. 162-
4.
Burnett, op.cit., p. 76.
A.S. Meek, A Naturalist in Cannibal Land (London, 1913),
p. 191.
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16and he died insolvent. Frank Wickham, after over thirty
years in the islands, made enough money to retire and live in
17comfort in Australia for the last fifteen years of his life. 
H.A. Markham, who started as a trader on Ontong Java, moved 
to New Georgia and established a model plantation at Segi.
His earnings were sufficient to enable him to educate his 
daughter in New Zealand. ° Other traders and planters such as 
F. Green, Binskin, MacKinnon, Pybus, Leslie Gill and Musgrave 
seem to have survived despite the vicissitudes of the copra 
market. These men and others may not have amassed a fortune 
- few, if any, did - but they managed to maintain a reasonable 
livelihood.
The fortunes and conditions of work of those Europ­
eans employed by otha?s could differ markedly. On the large 
plantations of Levers and Burns Philp, Europeans led a life 
as comfortable as possible in a tropical environment. For
WPHC No.846 of 1927, Ashley to H.C., 21 November 1930.
No.2327 of 1930, Kidson to H.C., 16 July 1930.
G.H.P. Muhlhauser, The Cruise of the Amaryllis (London,
1924), p. 216.
S.G.C. Knibbs, The Savage Solomons As They Were and Are 
(London, 1929), pp. 139-40.
S.M0 Lambert,A Doctor in Paradise (Melbourne, 1943), p. 344.
^  WPHC No.1'306 of 1936, op.cit. Wickham left £4,000 on his 
death in 1927; he was also able to buy a ten ton vessel 
for his daughter-in-law in 1925»
^  R. Struben, Coral and Colour of Gold (London, 1961), pp. 109-
10.
Johnson, op.cit., pp. 134-61.
Knibbs, oplcit., pp. 163-4.
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the European wives of the managers, however, life could be
extraordinarily dull, as platoons of servants took care of
the domestic chores; whereas the European wives of self-
employed planters could play a more active role in running the 
19plantation. One luxury available to the Europeans living on 
the big company plantations was the availability of fresh 
meat, as they often used herds of cattle to keep the under­
growth beneath the trees level. Less fortunate Europeans had 
to be satisfied with a constant diet of 'bully beef' and other
tinned foods, as they often displayed a myopic aversion to
20locally grown produce. Some Europeans employed by individ­
ual planters were not so fortunate in their accommodation:
Griffiths, Wheatley's assistant, was described as living in
21conditions of extraordinary discomfort.
The social life of the European community was some­
what constrained, as the plantations were scattered and 
communication between them arduous. The six-weekly trip to 
Gizo to meet the steamer offered an opportunity to come togeth­
er, and perhaps a binge at Freddy Green's store, which had a
22bar joined to it. Otherwise one was dependent on chance 
visits from those passing through, either fellow planters and
19 Muhlhauser, op.cit., pp. 212-13. A few women ran plantat­
ions; Mrs Newall and Rose Statham being examples.
20 Pastoral Finance Association Ltd., P.F.A. Quarterly 
Magazine, XIII.31 (December 1921), pp. 64-5, 'A Paradise 
for Cattle'.
Collinson, op.cit., p. 219.
WPHC No.454 of 1'$18, Workman to H.C., 17 January 1918.
21 Muhlhauser, op.cit., p. 216.
Collinson, op.cit., pp. 77-8.
WPHC No.2710 of 1916, Barnett to H.C., 4 September 1916.
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traders, or the occasional cruising yacht. It seems to have 
been common to let off steam at these occasions - drinking, 
gambling, and above all, talking. It is easy to underestim­
ate the importance of these gatherings to Europeans isolated 
in an alien cultural and physical environment. The opport­
unity to talk in their own tongue again, and to reinforce 
their collective identity as cultural and social superiors, 
was a valuable safeguard against * slipping downhill', or 
'going native'. It was for similar reasons that lonely and 
isolated District Officers would each night ceremonially dress 
for dinner, read Punch, and then salute the lowering of the
24Union Jack with a presentation of arms by the native police.
The legendary hospitality of the planters to European
visitors was equally a reflection of their isolated position
within island society, as it was a consequence of their
generous natures. Markham at Segi was so eager to entertain
visitors that he was reputed to have shot through the rigging
of any vessel that passed through the lagoon without showing
25signs of calling.
While the plantations were scattered and often 
isolated, and despite the variations in wealth and status with­
in the numbers of settlers, there did develop the sense of a
25 M. Johnson, Through the South Seas with Jack London 
(London, n.d.j, pp. •
24 D. Collins, Sea-Tracks of the Spee,jacks Round the World 
(London, 1923), pp. 89-93.
25 Struben, op,cit., p. 109.
Burns, Philp and Co. Ltd., Tours to the South Sea Islands 
(n.d.) Tour No.1 'Solomon Islands'. ' " ~
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European community within the islands. This was a consequence 
of the growing settler population, and the increasing 
regularisation of life in the islands. The frontier days 
had well and truly passed, and so had, by and large, the cut­
throat competition that had characterised the business pract­
ices of the pioneers'. Indeed, it was the self-destructive 
effects of such competition that had prompted the first 
attempts to establish some form of organisational unity with­
in the European community. As most of those involved were 
shipboard traders whose common trait was intense competition,
it was not surprising that the 'Western Solomons Traders
26Association* in 1908 was short-lived. As the numbers of
traders declined in proportion to those involved in planting,
27so did the freebooting tactics of the early days. ' The 
planting community was not so much involved in competing for 
the islanders' copra, but in producing their own, and in 
doing so they faced the same problems and had similar 
objectives.
The growing sense of identity among the European 
population of the New Georgia Group was mirrored in the 
development of Gizo. Although one would be reluctant to 
describe Gizo as a 'town', it was the closest thing to it in
WPHC No.219 of 1908, Woodford to H.C., 20 May 1908.
27 WPHC No.1976 of 1923, Kane to H.C., 13 July 1923. Only 
five Europeans designated themselves as traders, while 
over forty were planters or planter/traders in 1923-
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the Protectorate outside of Tulagi. While Tulagi was 
dominated by the presence of the administration, Gizo was not, 
and despite its miniscule population it was rightly regarded 
as the 'centre of the Group' and of 'growing importance'. For
po
these reasons it was re-opened as a Port of Entry in 1920.
Gizo was the headquarters of Burns Philp in the western Solo­
mons, and 'The Octopus of the Pacific' played a crucial role 
in the economic life of the Group: it had a virtual monopoly 
on the trade, and was instrumental in keeping many planters 
afloat. Most independent planters sold their copra direct 
to 'B.P.', as the cost and difficulty of freighting it to 
Sydney at their own expense was prohibitive. The company
also financed struggling planters when they were hit by sudden
29falls in the copra price. y Every six weeks Burns Philp's 
vessel, the S.S. Mindini would call at Gizo to deliver mail 
and goods and collect the produce of the islands. It was the 
only regular contact the Europeans had with the outside 
world, and was thus the occasion for the gathering of most 
of the white population. Thus despite their usual scattered 
distribution, the settlers could regularly share information 
and act in concert to exert pressure on the administration.
In 1917 the government leased their plantation at Gizo to 
Burns Philp for £250 p.a. The news of this transaction quickly 
spread throughout the settler population and provoked a furore:
WPHC No.155 of 1920, Workman to H.C., 31 December 1919. 
Gizo was a Port of Entry from July 1907 to January 1912.
Collinson, op.cit., pp. 216-17.29
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the plantation was at the time producing copra worth £800 a
year, and no tender was called despite the willingness of
other planters to offer up £500 p.a. for the lease. The
administration was acutely embarrassed, finding it 'most
painful' that it should be common knowledge, and eventually
50in 1921 an excuse was found to cancel the lease. This 
incident illustrated that settler opinion could force the 
government to rectify an obviously bungled decision, without 
constructively influencing administrative policy. For this 
task a better organised expression of political opinion was 
required. The settlers of the New Georgia Group were to be 
prominent in the establishment of such an organisation.
In 1917 ’the 'Solomon Islands Planters Association' 
appeared. While the exact details of the origin of this 
organisation are unknown, its objectives were clear, as they 
were expressed in the form of a petition to the High Commiss­
ioner. The Chairman was William Hamilton, who had been among 
the islands since the 1890s when he had run a pearl-shelling 
business in the Admiralty Islands and the Solomons, operating 
out of Gizo in the latter area. He also acquired large land
holdings, mainly on Choiseul, and by 1910 had some 7?000 acres
51in the Protectorate. The main concern of the petition that
^  WPHC No.823 of 1918, Workman to H.C., 18 February 1918.
Also No.2557 of 1917, Barley to H.C., 25 July 1917 and No. 
967 of 1921, Hill to H.C., 10 March 1921.
31 Pambu (Journal of the Pacific Manuscripts Bureau, A.N.U., 
Canberra), No.3 (October 1968).
For Hamilton's early career, see, Papers of William Hamil­
ton. MSS. Oxley Memorial Library, Brisbane, Queensland.
MFN. 'Logbook and Diary', January 1903 to November 1905; 
and Reports on Pearling Voyages, 1899-1901.
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Hamilton presented to the High Commission was that the 
Protectorate should not have any connection with the Austral­
ian Commonwealth, but rather should be made a Crown Colony,
with the European residents having a voice in the administrat-
7,2ion in matters that -affected their interests. Other 
recommendations to alter the status of the Protectorate had 
already been made from official sources. After a visit to 
the Solomons in 1911, the High Commissioner Sir Henry May had 
considered that the control of the Protectorate ought to be 
placed directly in the hands of the Resident Commissioner.
He believed the existing system was not a success, as the 
High Commission in Fiji knew little of conditions in the 
Solomons and there were lengthy delays in communication, it 
taking some three months for correspondence to pass between 
Tulagi and Suva. The Secretary of State declined to adopt
7)7)these suggestions.^ In 1913 a report on the Protectorate 
by R.V. Vernon recommended that it become a Crown Colony, 
with the Resident Commissioner the 'Governor' or 'Administ­
rator' : his reasons were similar to those of Sir Henry May. 
His advice was rejected by the Colonial Office.^ This
52 WPHC No.114-9 of 1917, Hamilton to H.C. , 3 April 1917.
^  WPHC No.2161 of 1911, May to C.O., 8 December 1911;
C.O. to H.C., 13 March 1912.
J WPHC No.63 of 1913, 'Notes on the Solomon Islands Protect­
orate', by R.V. Vernon. Dated 17 December 1912. This 
report became a C.O. Confidential Print (February 1913), 
Australian No.213. See also, No.1518 of 1913, C.O. to H.C., 
10 July 1913.
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pattern was to continue: in 1916 A.S. Meek, on behalf of 
Levers Pacific Plantations Ltd., argued that the residents of 
the Protectorate paid for the administration through taxation 
and thus should have representation. To this suggestion, and 
to the petition of the Planters Association in 19^7? the 
response of the Colonial Office was negative. The Secretary 
of State considered that the existing state of development 
of the Protectorate did not warrant a Legislative or Executive 
Council.^
Relations between the settler community and the 
administration worsened after 19^7 - The planters petition 
had not been overly critical of the government, but an article 
in the Sydney Bulletin of January 1918, written from the 
settlers' point of view by T.J. McMahon attacked the 
administration unmercifully. McMahon asserted that 'Within 
the whole of the British Empire there will not be found ... 
such a bitterness of feeling, such an open aggressiveness 
towards an administration, as now exists here'. The main 
force of his criticism was directed at the government's economic 
policies: he considered that it was deliberately setting up 
obstacles to commercial development; and its 'soft' attitude 
towards the islanders, accompanied by a highly exaggerated
55 WPHC No.3026 of 1916, Meek to H.C., 23 November 1916.
No.1389 of 1917, C.O. to H.C., 23 March 1917; No.2593 of 
1917, C.O. to H.C., 23 July 1917.
T.J. McMahon, 'The British Solomon Islands and thoir 
Administration', The Bulletin (31 January 1918). ML 
Newspaper Cuttings, Vol.150," p. 19-
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57account of the dangers faced by Europeans in the islands.
The Resident Commissioner's reply to these charges was closer
to the truth: Workman pointed out that the 'immense influence'
of Levers, Burns Philp and the missions, 'who exercise an
imperium in imperio', had prevented the development of an
official autocracy, and that the administration had given
great assistance to the planters. As an illustration he
cited official eagerness to assist land purchasers, which
had resulted in the deprivation of the islanders of their 
58land. This was indeed true, though the irony of the 
administration parading its past negligence as a defence 
against charges of incompetence seemed to escape the Resident 
Commissioner.
The ill-feeling between the government and 
settlers did not abate. Officials were soured by the unflatt­
ering comparison between the state of government residences 
and that of the 'imposing' mission stations and 'commodious' 
houses of the planters. The Gizo government residence was 
the exception: 'the one station in the Protectorate which for 
site and planning stands out as an Imperial outpost'.^ 
Workman had a less flattering view of the non-official Euro­
pean population in the Gizo district: when recommending
57 ibid.
WPHC No.1694 of 1918, Workman to H.C., 9 June 1918.
^  WPHC No.454 of 1918, Workman to H.C., 17 January 1918.
Captain Francis as District Officer for the area, he noted
that he had no fear of Francis 'descending to the level of
the (European) people round him'.
In December 1920 the Solomon Islands Planters
Association published the first issue of its journal, The
Planters Gazette. The Gazette lasted only till May 1923, a
total of nine issues, but in that time it provoked considerable
hostility. In 1922 the Resident Commissioner complained of the
scurrilous abuse of the administration that appeared in the
paper, and was reassured by the High Commissioner that he was
prepared to consider the control or supervision of the Gazette
1-1if it exceeded the limits of criticism. What these limits 
were was left unstated, but in any event such action was not 
required. The final issue of the paper was a great deal more 
conciliatory in tone towards the administration. The Planters 
Association (S.I.P.A.), and the Gazette, were largely the 
creation of the European community of the New Georgia Group.
The executive of S.I.P.A. in December 1920 comprised of
J.F. Goldie (Chairman), D. MacKinnon (Vice Chairman), L.F. Gill
LlOL.F. Stanley, H. Beck and R. McKerlie. All except Stanley 
were planters in the New Georgia Group. In 1921 Goldie 
resigned because he was leaving the Protectorate for some
WPHC No.2445 of 1919, Workman to H.C., 8 December 1919.
WPHC No.1316 of 1922, Kane to H.C., 9 May 1922; H.C. to 
Kane, 18 May 1922.
PG, 1 (December 1920), p. 7«
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time; he was replaced by MacKinnon, whose previous position
was filled by Gill. Stanley also left the executive, and
two new members were added - Wheatley and W. De Courcy
Browne, both planters in the Gizo district. The Gazette
was largely produced by Gill, who wrote numerous articles
44under a variety of pseudonyms.
Originally, the membership of the S.I.P.A. was 
limited to planters with at least fifty acres under cultivat­
ion, but in 1922 the organisation expanded to include all 
European residents of the Protectorate, and afterwards 
became the Solomon Islands Planters and Settlers Association 
(S.I.P.S.A.). ' However, this organisation continued to be
dominated by settlers from the New Georgia Group: the general
46meetings of S.I.P.S.A. were held at Gizo. This domination 
reflected the developing sense of community amongst the 
European population of the Group, as well as their keen 
interest in political activity. They were, in a number of 
ways, apart from the other Europeans in the Protectorate.
They had their own port and centre, Gizo, whereas the Europ­
eans to the south-east looked towards Tulagi. By the 1920s 
the Group had been in a stable and peaceful state for a 
decade, and the vast majority of the islanders were under the
45 PG, 2 (April 1921), p. 7; 3 (August 1921), p. 7.
^  PG, 9 (May 1923), p. 3-4.
^  1 (December 1920), p. 7; 7 (August 1922), p. 8.
Ilf.
PG, 9 (May 1923), p. 16-7.
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influence of the missions, and had little to do with life on 
the plantations. The Europeans were free to concentrate on 
their own interests and prosperity, and in most cases they 
had the same objective: the making and selling of copra 
for a wage or a profit. The Europeans in the Group, too, had 
plenty of experience of political in-fighting, as attested by 
the constant internal quarrels between missions, officials, 
traders and planters. Officialdom in Gizo was grossly 
outnumbered, and non-officials such as Goldie were never slow 
to express their displeasure with the administration.
The high level of political consciousness and 
activism amongst the Europeans of the Gizo district was 
demonstrated emphatically in 1923- In that year S.I.P.S.A. 
organised a comprehensive petition on the state of the 
administration of the Protectorate which was signed by 166 
European residents. While the non-official European populat­
ion of the New Georgia Group comprised only 17$ of that of 
the whole Protectorate, some 33$ of the signatories were 
from the Group. More significantly as an indication of the 
keen interest and involvement generated by such matters, the 
petition was signed by 70$ of the non-officials in the Group, 
whereas the figure for the rest of the Protectorate was 29$.^ 
The. dominance of S.I.P.S.A. by the Europeans from the western
47 WPHC No.1976 of 1925, Kane to H.C. , 13 July 1923. End. 
Petition. For the population figures, see: No.2991 of 
1922, Kane to HC., 28 September 1922, and Handbook of the 
British Solomon Islands Protectorate (Suva" 1923)-
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islands did attract some comments from other planters who
4-8complained it was too Gizo-oriented. This criticism was
in part justified: the S.I.P.S.A. did press for a number of
changes that were of direct importance only to the New Georgia
Group, notably the opening of Gizo as a port of entry, certain
changes to the labour regulations, and the stationing of
a doctor at Gizo. However, the main body of its policies were
4-9concerned with ihe entire Protectorate.
The first issue of the Planters Gazette in December
1920 listed the objectives of the Association: these were the
promotion of the planting industry, the co-operation with
government in passing suitable legislation, and the attainment
80of representation on a governing body for the Solomons.
The partial fulfilment of the latter objective was to come
sooner than the settlers realised. In September 1920 the
High Commissioner visited the Protectorate. He noted that the
unofficial population was apt to be kept unnecessarily in the
dark on government and administrative matters, and so
recommended that a small Advisory Council be established to
S1consult with the Resident Commissioner. This advice was 
accepted by the Colonial Office, and in 1921 the Council was
^  PG, 9 (May 1923), p. 17.
^  WPHC No.1917 of 1920, Greene to Workman, 19 October 1920; 
and, No.153 of 1920, Workman to H.C., 34 December 1919«
^  PG, 1 (December 1920), p. 7-
51 WPHC No.2787 of 1920, H.C., to C.O., 8 November 1920.
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introduced. In reply to the Planters Association petition
for Crown Colony status, the Colonial Office stated that the
Advisory Council had been created as a result of ’careful
consideration of the position of the Protectorate' and that
no other change in the administration was contemplated at the 
52present time. This hardly satisfied the Association: the 
Council was considered to be 'a step in the right direction', 
but only a temporary measure and that a legislative body, 
elected and controlled by the (white) people was still the 
ultimate objective. The 'Olympian aloofness' of the administ­
ration and the absence of any large constructive policy
55continued to be criticised.^
The Council comprised the Resident Commissioner and 
four appointed non-officials; the latter group were a diplo­
matic balance of the various interest groups in the Protector­
ate. On the first council were Dr Steward, the Bishop of 
Melanesia; J. Symington, manager of Levers headquarters at 
Gavatu; and two planters, Hamilton and MacKinnon.^ Although 
the membership tended to change frequently, as the members 
were regularly absent from the Protectorate, the balance
mission, company and individual planter interests was main- 
55t a i n e d . T h e  creation of the Council did eventually have the
52 WPHC No.3339 of 1921, C.O. to H.C., 28 March 1922.
^  PG, 3 (August 1921), pp. 1-3.
^  PG, A (November 1921), p. 10.
55 WPHC No.2533 of 1923, Kane to H.C., 18 October 1923,
12 November 1923, 20 November 1923.
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effect of improving relations between the administration and
the settlers. The latter group now at least had a channel
for their complaints and suggestions, and the new Resident
Commissioner, R.R. Kane, who had arrived in 1921, was
56sympathetic to their aspirations." Agitation for Crown 
Colony status, however, continued, culminating in the S.I.P.S.A. 
petition of 1925. Kane, in giving his ’personal opinion' on 
the petition, commented that he considered that the time had 
come for the extension of wider powers of responsibility 
to the Protectorate government and noted that Woodford had 
recommended that the Solomons become a Crown Colony in 1909-^ 
In the Advisory Council, Kane opined that the authorities 
would require an indication that the islanders desired to 
become a Crown Colony before considering such a decision, but 
that he personally thought that a larger share of government 
should be given to the settlers."5® This new atmosphere of 
conciliation was echoed in the Gazette. In the May 1923 issue, 
the last before the paper folded because of lack of funds, the 
editorial stated that the S.I.P.S.A. was out to help, not 
’fight’, the government, and to kill the idea that relations 
between officials and settlers should be hostile and suspic­
ious.
56 PG, 7 (August 1922), p. 3.
57 WPHC HO.1976 of 1923, op.cit.
WPHC N0.6A of 192A, Kane to H.C., 28 November 1923.
Enel. Minutes ofthe 3rd Meeting of Advisory Council, 20 
November 1923-
59 PG, 9 (May 1923), p. 2.
The 1923 petition produced a reaction from the
Colonial Office: the High Commissioner, Sir E. Hutson, was
to visit the Protectorate to personally investigate the
situation and to meet representatives of the settlers. This
occurred in September 1923. In a meeting with a deputation
of representatives of the European residents Hutson expressed
the view that there was little chance of the Protectorate
having a council without an official majority as a necessary
safeguard for native interests.^ However, his report to the
Colonial Office did recommend some changes. He considered
that the Advisory Council should be converted to a Legislative
Assembly with powers to pass regulations, subject to the veto
of the High Commissioner. This assembly was to be comprised
of appointed members, and an official majority would be
retained. In addition, he recommended that the Resident
Commissioner’s powers be extended so that he be able to
engage and dismiss temporary officers, and incur expenditure
61of up to £50 without reference to the High Commission.
The Colonial Office approved the latter recommendation but
firmly quashed the concept of a Legislative Assembly, with a
note that Europeans in the Protectorate could have no greater
say in the administration of the Protectorate at the present 
62time. Although the settlers' political ambitions were
WPHC No.1976 of 1923, 'Deputation of Representatives of 
Residents' 29 September 1925-
WPHC No.2366 of 1925, H.C. to C.O., 26 October 1925- 
ibid., C.O. to H.C., A March 1926.
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frustrated by the Colonial Office, they were to have more 
success in other directions. Apart from their eagerness to 
participate in government, the focus of most settler 
agitation was the conditions and regulations governing the 
copra industry.
The economy of the Protectorate was dominated by
the coconut. Copra exports generally comprised 85% or more
of total export earnings; the only other products of any
consequence being trochus shell, ivory nuts and timber. In
1908 some ten thousand acres were under coconuts; by 1924
68this had increased to fifty-five thousand acres. v From 1910
to 1925 the quantity of copra exported increased from 4,030 to 
6A19,206 tons. There are no exact figures describing the 
proportion of the Protectorate's copra that was produced in the 
New Georgia Group, and the acreage under cultivation in the
 ^RNAS 44, Enclosure No.19, 'Statistical Information'.
WPHC No.1065 of 1925, Memorandum: Information desired by 
the High Commissioner in connection with his visit to the 
Solomon Islands, 14 May 1925« A list of the plantations 
operating in the Group up to 1925, together with a map 
showing their distribution is given in Appendix II.
Handbook of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate (1923), 
pi 48. Colonial Reports - Annual. No.133M British Solomon 
Islands Protectorate Report for 1925-26 (London, 1927), 
’Return of Exports*.
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latter area. Some idea, however, can be gained from later
years. In 193^, in his report on the Census, the Gizo District
Officer listed 12,803 acres cultivated in plantations,
producing some 3,862.5 tons of copra per annum. In addition,
the islanders were said to produce between 800 and 900 tons 
66each year.  ^ Although the quantity of copra produced in the
Solomons increased in tie years between 1925 and 193^, this
was not so much due to the expansion of the acreage cultivated,
but as to trees planted prior to 1925 coming into bearing. It
was estimated that the total Protectorate area of cultivated
land increased from 55,000 to 60,000 acres in that five year 
66period. The price of copra declined steadily between 1925
and the early thirties, and few were encouraged to undertake
new development work. In the New Georgia Group some plantat-
67ions were abandoned, and the large companies acted 
cautiously. By 1922 Levers had planted 2,842 acres on
68Kolombangara, and this figure had not increased by 1931- 
Thus the 193^ figures would not differ markedly from those 
of the mid-twenties. On this basis, it would appear that the 
Group contained about 21% of the Protectorate's cultivated 
land; from which it contributed about 20% of the B.S.I.P.'s 
copra production.
65 WPHC H o . o f  1932, 'Census of the B.S.I.P. for 1931', 
Ch.2, 'Gizo District', pp. 24-39-
66 WPHC No.827 of 1930, Barley to Ashley, 23 January 1930. 
Report of Labour Commission.
67 WPHC Ho.274 of 1932, loc.cit.
68 ibid., LC I. 'Lever Report', pp. 111-12.
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In January 1925, there were forty European-owned 
plantations employing 951 indentured labourers within the 
New Georgia Group. The size and density of the plantation 
community was much greater in the Group than elsewhere in the 
Solomons. In the early 1920s, there was one European for 
every eighty islanders, and one indentured labourer for every 
sixty-nine islanders in the Group. The corresponding ratios 
for the whole Protectorate were 1:175 (Europeans) and 1:150
(labourers). The indentured labourers, in 1925, comprised
/ 69some 15% of the resident population of the Group. About
two-thirds of these men came from the island of Malaita, with
the remainder principally coming from Guadalcanal, San
Cristoval and Santa Cruz. Since the 1870s Malaita had been
the principal source of Solomons labour for the plantations
of Queensland and Fiji: it was the most heavily populated
island in the Solomons, and one of the least pacified. The
island did not really quieten down until the 1950s, after
the Bell murders and the savage reprisals that resulted from
them. The young men in the twenties signed on for New Georgia
for basically the same reasons that their fathers had signed
on for Queensland and Fiji: to escape from an unhappy or
dangerous situation, to earn money for the bride price, to
gain experience, or just simply as a change of scene. They
69 WPHC No.1191 of 1925, Kane to H.C., 12 October 1925. Enel. 
Medical Officer's Returns for Labourers in Gizo District, 
April 1925. No.1065'of 1925, loc.cit.
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were recruited by a flotilla of small ships that plied the
’passages’, where the prospective labourers congregated to be 
70picked up.' Most of these vessels were schooners, ketches, 
and cutters in the 25-45 ton range. They were owned by the 
companies and the planters who recruited their own labour. 
Levers had two large steamships, as well as several smaller 
boats, for this purpose. There were very few men who owned 
their own vessel and made a living out of contract recruiting, 
and the number of ships involved in recruiting steadily 
declined as the large concerns increasingly dominated the 
trade.
Recruiting was fairly tightly controlled by the
government, and abuses would not have been very common.
Undoubtedly some gun-running did occur,, and labourers were
probably misled over their destination, if the plantation
71concerned had a bad reputation. Indeed, considering the 
behaviour of some plantation owners and overseers, such 
deceit would have been necessary if they were to secure 
recruits. On signing up, the recruits were given a 'beach 
payment', usually about £8 in value in the twenties. This was 
normally distributed to the recruits' relatives and friends 
in the form of goods, although some 'old hands' might
70
' K. Groenewegen, Report on the Census of the Population,
1970 (Southampton, n.d.J, p. 9 (Table I H) 
üörris, op.cit., pp. 107-8.
WPHC No.801 of 1914-, Woodford to H.C. , 21 February 1914;
No.875 of 1916, Barnett to H.C., 25 February 1916; No.550 
of 1925, Kane to H.C., 18 January 1925; No.1554 of 1925, 
Kane to H.C., 51 May 1925.
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stipulate that they personally receive the beach payment in 
cash. Most recruiting vessels also carried a trader's licence 
and store items so that they could give with the one hand and 
then take with the other. As the customary mark up in price 
for goods was 100%, they did quite well out of this business.^ 
The recruits signed on for two years, at a wage 
of between 10/- and 20/- a month. In addition they received 
board and lodging on the plantations. The housing conditions 
and food rations of the labourers was governed by regulation 
and theoretically subject to regular official inspections. 
However, the regulations themselves provided for only the most 
basic of needs and isolated plantations had little difficulty 
in ignoring them. The specified rations consisted of rice, 
meat, tobacco, tea, sugar and soap. Some plantations supple­
mented this by growing their own vegetables and fruit, while 
others ignored the schedule and made the labourers exist on a 
constant diet of rice. This kind of abuse was not very 
common, as such a plantation would soon have difficulty in 
securing any recruits. The housing provided was basically a 
row of huts containing sleeping mats, and could not be 
described as either cheerful or comfortable.r The close
72 WPHC No.243 of 1924, Hill to H.C. , 22 December 1923; No.
827 of 1930, op.cit.
WPHC No.801 of 1914, op.cit.
Collinson, op.cit., pp*. 153-d.
PG, 8 (December, 1922;, pp. 14-15-
Müspratt, op.cit., pp. 66-7.
WPHC No.1094 of 1922, Allardyce to H.C., 19 April 1922.
Enel. Allardyce to Kane, 17 April 1922.
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conditions in which the labourers lived facilitated the 
spread of epidemics. In 1914, when a dysentery epidemic struck 
the Solomons, some 10% of labourers on Levers plantations in 
the Protectorate died, and the government was forced to 
suspend recruiting for several months until the outbreak sub­
sided. The poor medical services available on the plantations 
continued through to the early 1920s, when eventually regulat­
ions were enacted to force the larger plantations to provide
medical facilities and to regularly report on the health of 
79their workers. ^
The labourers worked a six-day week; generally 
rising at dawn and working through to dusk, with a break of 
two hours in the middle of the day. Work was usually on the 
'contract' or 'task' system whereby each man was assigned a 
certain daily task, such as the cutting of 450 lbs of copra.^ 
The relationship between the labourers and their white 
overseers was one of continuing controversy. It was a con­
stant complaint of Europeans working plantations that the law 
favoured the labourer at the expense of the white man's 
prestige, and that this made the maintenance of discipline 
among the workers impossible. It was stated frequently that 
if a white man dare to lift a finger against a labourer he 
would be harshly punished; or, if the workers retaliated
^  WPHC No.1987 of 1915, C.O. to H.C., 9 June 1915; No.35 of 
1916, C.O. to H.C., 3 December 1915« Enel. Hart to C.O.
22 November 1922; No.2061 of 1921, Kane to H.C., 16 June 
1921; No.1094 of 1922, op.cit.
76 WPHC No.1197 of 1925, Kane to H.C. , 6 May 1925.
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against a ’disciplinary action' by assaulting the European
concerned, the law would protect them if the white man had
struck first. The Planters Gazette was studded with examples
of unfortunate managers and overseers who had been thrashed
by their labourers, and had then been convicted of ill-
treating their workers.^ The common philosophy was that the
'natives’ were like schoolchildren, and had to be beaten
when they misbehaved. It was generally held that if a
supervisor detected trouble within the labour lines, he must
take immediate and vigorous action or else his prestige and
78authority would be destroyed.' This picture of the embattled 
white man was further enhanced by the emphasis on the potent­
ially ferocious nature of the primitive native: the white 
man 'dare not show much kindness openly to these untutored
savages, who would only mistake kindness for weakness, and
79become dangerous'.r y Such images appear to have been largely 
illusory. It seems to have been the case that labourers 
would naturally react when treated harshly, but that this would
^  6 (May, 1922), pp. 4-8; 7 (August 1922), pp. 19-20;
8 (December 1922), p. 2.
See also W.A. Robinson, 10000 Leagues Over the Sea (New 
York, 1930), p. 212.
^  Meek, op.cit., pp. 191-2.
R.W. Williamson, The Ways of the South Sea Savage (London,
191*0, PP- 45-6.
79( S.N. Hogg, 'A Trip to the Solomons or, Two Months on an 
Island Steamer', ML Newspaper Cuttings, Vol.24, p. 64. 
(Written in 1911).
229
often provoke punitive action by the European out of all 
proportion to the offence.
Before 19^2, when labour regulations and inspect­
ions began being enforced regularly, there are accounts of 
plantation managers whose actions were unbelievably cruel.
In 1908, when Martin Johnson was visiting the Solomons with 
Jack London, he witnessed an incident at Penduffryn plantation 
on Guadalcanal. There was unrest amongst the labourers, and 
on finding two of the men carrying spears, the owner George 
Darbishire stripped them naked and thrashed them with 'a big 
boor-hide whip' which, Johnson complacently noted, made 'deep
OQcuts in their hide, from which the blood spurted'. Another 
planter of Isabel described his attitude to Jack McLaren: 
'Treat them as muck. Remember that a white man's the only 
human being and that there isn't any other kind'. This 
opinion was manifested in his actions: he worked his 'boys'
13 hours a day; beat them without provocation, and if
CMinsubordinate, whipped them or shot them in the legs. These 
men may have been exceptional in their cruelty, but there are 
numerous indications that many others shared their attitudes 
although their behaviour may not have been so extreme. Part­
icularly disturbing was the frequency of intemperance and 
violence amongst the managers and overseers who worked for 
Levers, the largest employer of labour in the Protectorate.
M. Johnson, op.cit., p. 312.
81 J. McLaren, My Qddysey (London, 1923), pp. 219-20.
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These men were often young and inexperienced Australians,
82described by one traveller as a fine set of manly fellows.
Their manliness expressed itself in strange ways. In 1914 two
Levers overseers were charged with tying a labourer to a tree
and whipping him, and with wounding a man with a revolver
respectively. There were also four other charges of assault
against one of the overseers. Both men were acquitted, though
83they were later dismissed by Levers.  ^ In 1915 William Ross,
another Levers overseer, threatened to beat any labourer who
complained to the Labour Inspector. He was convicted and
84fined £20 or two months goal. In the same year, a Levers
manager, V.J. Francis, struck a labourer who later died as
a result. Francis was drunk at the time. On being charged
Francis stated, 'what does it matter if I did kill a nigger'.
The court apparently agreed, for Francis was only required to
pay costs and a surety of £25.* 8  ^ Both Ross and Francis were
sacked by Levers after pressure was applied by the Colonial
Office, though the company considered that Ross was only doing 
86his duty. In 1917 Eric Hylton, a Levers overseer, kicked
Hogg, op.cit.
8  ^WPHC No.1663 of 1914, Woodford to H.C., 6 June 1914;
No.1779 of 1914, Woodford to H.C., 15 June 1914.
84 WPHC No.2747 of 1915, Barnett to H.C., 15 September 1915;
No.263 of 1916, Barnett to H.C., 28 December 1915«
85 WPHC No.258 of 1916, Barnett to H.C., 23 December 1915-
86 WPHC No.740 of 1916, C.O. to H.C., 18 January 1916. Enel. 
Lever to C.O., 11 January 1916 and 13 January 1§16; No. 1652 
of 1916, C.O. to H.C., 18 May 1916.
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and punched a labourer to death for not shutting a gate.
This man escaped punishment by fleeing the Protectorate.^
In 1922 another three Levers overseers were charged with the 
murder of a labourer, but were acquitted on a plea of self- 
defence.^
In 1918, the annual Labour Report for the previous
year stated that the time of the brutal ’Nigger-driver' seemed
to have passed, and that managers and overseers were now more
educated and enlightened, although Resident Commissioner
Workman, whose view of the non-official Protectorate populat-
89ion was generally unfavourable, disagreed. y Nevertheless, 
it does appear that with increasingly regular labour inspect­
ions and more stringent regulations, the situation on the 
plantations improved. This seems to have been a forced change, 
rather that the result of a change of attitude on the part of 
the Europeans concerned. In the 1920s the Planters Gazette 
regularly complained about the restrictive regulations that 
hindered the maintenance of discipline on the plantations, 
and grew almost hysterical when a white man was charged with 
manslaughter and forced to submit to ’galling indignities'.
The latter consisted of being confined aboard his yacht in
^  WPHC No.430 of 1918, Workman to H.C., 10 January 1918.
^  WPHC No.1000 of 1922, Turner to H.C., 19 April 1922;
No.1227 of 1922, H.C. to Chief Judicial Commissioner,
9 May 1922.
y WPHC No.1284 of 1918, Workman to H.C. , 12 April 1918.
Enel. Report of Native Labour Department for 1917.
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Tulagi harbour in full view of the public, while the police
90patrolled the shore.
The abuses perpetrated by certain planters and
overseers was largely a product of their own characters:
their inexperience, drunkeness, or their bullying natures.
The settlers' reaction to the problem as a whole, though,
was symptomatic of more basic concerns and attitudes. The
existence of regulations to protect the black man from
extreme abuses was accepted, but that the black man was able
to exploit the law for his own advantage was a bitter pill to
swallow. Instead of Europeans disciplining their fellows out
of a respectable sense of paternalistic responsibility, the
'childlike native' was using the law to enforce his rights
and to 'humiliate' the white man. That the labourers could
understand and use the law was a shattering realisation.
The Gazette fulminated against those labourers who kept within
the borderline of the law, and at the same time goaded the
employer to 'madness'. Thus they considered European authority
became a 'bluff', the labour regulations a 'farce'; and the
much prized prestige of the white man evaporated. The
planters urged that the laws be changed so that the labourers
would not be able to insult white men with impunity, and so
91that they work without debate or insolence. It was argued 
that the protective legislation was responsible
90 PG, 6 (Hay 1922), pp. 4-5. 
ibid., pp. 7-8.
233
for the occasional violent deaths of labourers: as the
European could not trust the law to protect him, he was forced
to take strong sudden measures - sometimes leading to a
92trial for murder or manslaughter. The doctrine that one had
to react quickly and forcefully before a situation got out
of control was much in vogue. What constituted a potentially
explosive situation was not defined - an imagined insult, a
hint of truculence, a sign of laziness - depending upon the
sensitivity and irascibility of the overseer, such things
might constitute open rebellion. For some planters, the
only incentive the labourer understood was the rod, and they
were outraged when its use was forbidden.
Although the planters of the New Georgia Group
were ^ust as vehement as their colleagues elsewhere about
the maintenance of the white man's prestige, there were few
cases of extreme abuses in the district. In 1911 Louis
Austen, who ran a plantation in the Marovo, was charged with
the manslaughter of one of his labourers. He had attempted
to force a man to work on Sunday, and a conflict occurred in
which Austen and two labourers were wounded, one of whom
later died. Austen was acquitted of the charge, although
he was prohibited from entering the Protectorate for two 
93years. v The proximity of the government station at Gizo to 
most of the plantations, and the presence of a strong mission
9? PG, 8 (December 1922), p. 2.
WPHC No. 229-5 of 1911? Woodford to H.C. , 23 November 1911 ; 
H.C. to C.O., 11 April 1912.
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that was never reluctant to seize on such incidents as 
ammunition in the interminable battle for influence and 
prestige, had a fortunate restraining effect. The racial 
line was also not drawn so emphatically in the Group, with 
many of the planters having islanders as wives and children 
by them. Nevertheless, most maintained 'the usual Solomon 
Island code of severity, discipline and punishment', along 
with the belief 'that the laws favor(ed) the native too much'?^ 
They were outraged with the injustice of the laws when an 
overseer who had assaulted a labourer for disobedience was in 
turn assaulted by the Malaita men, who then only suffered a 
small fine and a few months in goal.  ^ Such outrage was 
hardly merited: Europeans convicted of murder or manslaughter 
received laughably light sentences, and the rate of acquittal 
was high. With the well advertised reputation of the Malaitans 
as cunning and ferocious savages, a plea of self-defence was 
often entertained favourably. Islanders convicted of assault
96or murder could expect much harsher treatment from the courts.
While conditions on the plantations improved 
gradually from 1910 to the mid-twenties, this could not be 
said to have been the result of a developing sense of respon­
sibility on the part of the planters, or the administration.
94y Robinson, op.cit.
95 PG, 7 (August 1922), p. 19.
96 PI. McQuarrie, Vouza and the Solomon Islands (Sydney, 1945), 
pp. 11-12, 22-3T“
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Throughout this period the planting community continually 
pressed for changes in the regulations or in the attitude of 
the Colonial Office that they considered were prejudicial 
to their own economic interests. In quite a few cases, these 
demands were supported by the Protectorate administration.
The intensity of agitation from the planting 
community naturally varied with the economic situation. In 
good times the clamour for change was muted; with the crash 
of copra prices, it was almost deafening. The planters seemed 
to regard boom conditions as a natural right: their expect­
ations knew no bounds, and many gave little thought to 
balancing their income and expenditure over the years. As a 
result, when hard times came they were often unprepared. In 
their despair they turned on the administration: rents, duties 
and regulations which they had borne without worry, and even 
supported, now became draconian and oppressive. The price 
of copra varied considerably between 1910 and 1925- In 1912 
it was a booming commodity, and there was ’enormous growth in 
the copra industry'. This was due to technological improve­
ments which had enabled the refining of the oil to remove the 
smell and flavour and thus allowing it to be used as a sub­
stitute for butter fat and lard. In the Solomons, plantations 
were fetching over £100 per acre, from which a planter could 
obtain a return of between £30 and £70 p.a., depending upon
236
qvhis efficiency. This happy state of affairs did not last 
long. With the outbreak of the war prices crashed: in 1913-14-, 
Solomons copra was worth £19/10/- per ton; by 1915-16 the price 
had dropped to £13/12/-. From this low point, the price stead­
ily improved and in 1920-21 had reached the dizzy height of 
£27 per ton. Once again, the boom was followed by a catastro­
phic crash, and in 1922-23 the planters could only obtain 
£12/10/- a ton. This was the lowest price in over a decade, 
but things steadily improved and by 1925-26 the return was 
£19/4/- per ton.^
As well as the erratic market, the planters had to 
cope with a regular increase in costs. According to the 
calculations of one member of the administration, the cost 
of living in the Protectorate, based on necessities alone, 
rose by A3$ between 1913 and 1920.^ With regard to the 
total costs of running a plantation, the planters claimed 
that they had increased by 300/ in the years between 1913 and 
1925.^^ The effect of the rising costs, and of the variable
^  The Age, 23 March 1912, p. 22, 'Islands Set in Summer Seas'.
^  Handbook of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate (1923),
Colonial Reports - Annual. No.1189 B.S.I.P. Report for
1922-23 (London, 1924). 'Return of Exports'.
„Colonial Reports - Annual. No.1331, loc.cit.
99 WPHC No.26 of 1920, C.O. to H.C., 26 December 1919. Enel.
Knibbs to Workman, 1A July 1920 (Minute).
100 WPHC No.1976 of 1923, 'Deputation of Representatives of 
Residents' (29 September 1925).
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market, was particularly hard on those in the process of 
developing a plantation. To clear the land, plant and main­
tain the trees, required a considerable capital outlay. A 
plantation would generally become self-supporting after 8-9
years, but to reach this stage it would entail an expenditure
101of £60 per acre. Thus a planter who committed himself to
development during a period of good prices, could find himself 
facing huge losses if the price had fallen badly when the 
trees came into bearing. It was not surprising that only 
large companies could afford to undertake extensive develop­
ment, while the individual planters contented themselves with 
maintaining a plantation of mature trees and cautiously 
expanding in good years. This was possible because the 
improvement condition for freehold property purchased under 
the 1896 regulation had resulted in most of the land in this 
category being at least partly under bearing trees by the time 
of the first copra price crash, in 1914-15- Thus they could 
afford to sit out the bad years. For the holders of leases 
the situation was more grim, and quite a few were forced to 
cancel them. For instance, on the 1 January 1914 the 
government let a total of 2,120 acres to various lessees, in 
the New Georgia Group; with the war and the drop in copra pri­
ces, all but 170 acres was eventually cancelled by the
Handbook of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate 
(1923;, p. 44. ----- ----------
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The principal targets for planter agitation were 
the labour supply, the leasehold system and the various forms 
of taxation and duties. It was a truism amongst the planting 
community that the population of the Solomons was insufficient 
to provide the labour for the development of the Protectorate. 
The solution was to import labour from elsewhere, or if this 
was not possible, to introduce some form of coercion to force 
the islanders who 'loafed' to work on the plantations.
Levers had for years lobbied for the introduction of indent­
ured labour from outside sources. To achieve this objective 
they proposed a bewildering variety of schemes, as one 
after the other was rejected by the Colonial Office. Indians 
from the sub-continent or Fiji, Javanese, Chinese 'coolies', 
were all offered as solutions to the labour shortage. These 
proposals were often supported by the administration. In 
1909 Woodford and the High Commissioner, Im Thurn, agreed 
that Indian immigration was necessary as the Melanesian 
population of the islands was doomed to eventual extinctions^ 
In 1911 Sir Henry May was blandly recommending that the
102 British Solomon Islands Protectorate List of Lands Leased 
to March 1917 (Suva, 191?)•
-Freehold land purchases were phased out in the years 
1910-1914. In the latter year King's Regulation No.3 
replaced previous legislation: under its terms land could 
only be purchased by the administration, which then leased 
it (with improvement conditions) to interested parties. 
(See Chapter 6).
WPHC No.774 of 1909, Woodford to H.C., 26 December 1909.103
2$9
Solomons 'be regarded as a country to be gradually filled
104with the overflow of the Indian population'. These
assumptions were not supported by J.H.P. Murray, who conduct­
ed an inquiry into the labour situation in the Solomons in 
1916. Murray conceded that the island population was 
declining, but he did not believe that its extinction was 
inevitable. He did not support the importation of labour 
to the islands and considered that the existing supply was
sufficient for the needs of the current plantations, and
10Salso for slow and cautious development.  ^ Nevertheless, 
Levers persisted in their proposals for the introduction of 
outside labour. The government of India had vetoed the 
suggestion that indentured labourers be recruited from the 
country in 1914-, so Levers pressed forward with a scheme to 
obtain Indian settlers from Fiji. This too came to nothing 
because of the difficulties of ensuring that free settlers 
should be obliged to work for the Company. Undaunted Levers 
proposed Chinese coolies as another source of labour. This 
suggestion was supported by the Protectorate administration,
s\
but again rejected by the Colonial Office. Throughout
the whole debate over this question, the recommendations of
Scarr, op.cit., p. 294.
^ 5  ^PHC No.1779 of 1916, Governor-General of Australia to 
H.C., 19June 19^6. Enel. J.H.P. Murray, Report on labour 
in the Solomon Islands, dated 29 April 1916.
106 WPHC No. 1994- of 1923, Kane to H.C. , 27 August 1923; C.O. , 
to H.C., 18 September 1923.
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the officers of the Protectorate had betrayed a notable lack 
of serious thought. They accepted the simplistic thesis of an 
inevitably doomed Melanesian population, without investigating 
the premises or accuracy of the argument. There was no 
analysis of the causes of the decline in population, or of 
actions that might be taken to prevent it.
The attitude of the administration towards the 
planters and their objectives depended largely upon the 
personality and views of the Resident Commissioner. Between 
1910 and 1925 there were four occupants of this post, although 
one was officially appointed only in an ’Acting* capacity. 
Woodford remained at the helm until January 19^5i when he 
retired, although he left the Protectorate in July of the 
previous year on leave. His passionate commitment to the 
commercial development of the islands placed him at one with 
many of the demands of the planting community, but this 
support was modified by his frustration and disappointment at 
what he considered to be the slow pace of progress. For 
this he partly blamed the speculative tendencies of certain 
planters, including the large companies. Woodford was a 
leading proponent of the ’dying race' attitude towards the 
Melanesians, and was enthusiastic over the idea of imported 
labour. He also agitated for measures to increase the labour 
supply within the Protectorate. In 1910 the term of indenture 
had been decreased from three to two years. Not two years 
later, Woodford was arguing for the restoration of the longer 
term. At one stage he also advocated that the Government take 
responsibility for the recruiting of labourers, though his
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Support for the measure declined when the costs involved 
107increased. ' Woodford's keenness to increase the labour 
supply landed him in hot water on one occasion. After the 
outbreak of the war Bougainville was occupied by imperial 
forces, whereupon Woodford recommended to the planters that 
they use it as a recruiting ground. This advice, given 
without consulting his superiors, was later negated and Wood­
ford was called upon to explain his action though by that time 
he had retired.
Woodford was replaced by F.J. Barnett, who had been
the Treasurer of the Protectorate. He was to remain Acting
Resident Commissioner until 1917- Barnett had been a long
term resident of Fiji, where he was a prominent merchant and
was involved extensively in public life in a honorary capacity.
He had also been long associated with the Fiji Planters 
10QAssociation. He had come to the Protectorate in 1906, and
in spite of his background was to prove no particular friend 
to the planting interests, especially toward the large compan­
ies. He was active in promoting the idea of a land commission 
and considered that Levers should not be allowed to expand
107 WPHC No.1713 of 1912, Woodford to H.C., 29 July 1912.
WPHC No.467 of 1915) Barnett to H.C., 19 January 1915; 
"H.C. to C.O., 22 February 1915 (Draft).
^ ^  Cyclopedia of Fiji, p. 216.
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110their holdings. He criticised the fuel monopoly held
by Burns Philp and Levers, and considered them to be
profiting from the uncertainty in supplies caused by the
111outbreak of war by charging extortionate prices.
Barnett was not active in 'encouraging* the island­
ers to work on plantations: on one occasion he advised the 
people of Alu not to recruit if it meant ignoring communal 
duties, and also warned them of the dangers of credit trading. 
In general he seemed to consider that the energies of the 
islanders should be directed towards improving the general
conditions of the community, and that finance could be
112raised by the cultivation of communal plantations. This
doctrine of self-help was not likely to please the planters.
Barnett, however, was not involved in any confrontation with
the white settlers, partly, perhaps, because he was consumed
in wrangles with his own staff, and harboured bitter feelings
over his status. One observer commented upon the 'continual
state of friction that exists between the Acting Resident
11 dCommissioner and the officers serving under him'. Barnett
WPHC No.480 of 1917, Barnett to H.C., 12 January 1917. 
No.490 of 1917, Barnett to H.C., 29 January 1917.
No.3103 of 1915? Barnett to H.C., 12 November 1915-
111 ^WPHC N0.23I6 of 1914, Barnett to H.C., 26 August 1914. 
No.2499 of 1914, Barnett to H.C., 22 September 1914.
WPHC No.2288 of 1916, Barnett to H.C., 31 July 1916.
WPHC No.868 of 1916, Barnett to H.C., 25 February 1916. 
Memo, in folder by Auditor.
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favoured a lenient and understanding approach towards islanders
convicted of offences which were in accordance with their own
custom, but against the European law. Other officers, notably
Bell, believed a more vigorous attempt should be made to
114eradicate such heathen practices. Ihe prefix 'Acting'
gnawed at Barnett's soul: he was exceedingly bitter that his
appointment was not made permanent, and that the perquisites
115of the office were beyond his grasp. His health suffered
and he died shortly after leaving the islands, a wretchedly 
frustrated man.
Barnett's replacement was Charles Workman, who had 
previously served in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands and Nauru.
He assumed duty in June 1917, and served until September 1921, 
although he was absent from the islands from November 1920 on
f '
leave. As has been noted already, he had no great affection for
the white settlers, considering them a somewhat inferior class.
He reacted strongly towards criticism of the administration and
the demands of the settlers, noting that the planters wanted
laws to drive all men to work on their estates and that in
fact they were allowed more latitude in the matter of labour
conditions than in other colonies. If anything, he considered
that the government had gone too far in assisting the settlers,
especially as they did not appreciate their 'extreme good
116fortune' in receiving such help. Workman chafed under the
WPHC No.481 of 1917, Barnett to H.G., 17 January 1917- 
Enel. Bell to H.C., 16 December 1916.
WPHC No.3066 of 1916, Barnett to H.G., 26 October 1916- 
No.1860 of 1917, E.A. Barnett to H.C., 16 July 1917.
116 WPHC No.1694 of 1918, Workman to H.C. , 9 June 1918.
power of the missions, particularly when it was united with 
the planters' demands in the form of the Rev. J.F. Goldie. 
Commenting on a series of submissions by S.I.P.A. relating to 
the recruiting of labour and extension of indenture terms he 
stated:
the planters as a class consider only their 
present interests and have no sympathy with 
large views on the welfare of the natives 
whom they wish to exploit ... Their leader 
is the Reverend J.F. Goldie ... whose subtle 
influence has been steadily opposed to 
Government throughout his twenty years 
residence in the Protectorate.
Fortunately for the planters, Workman did not serve long in the 
islands, leaving to become the Colonial Secretary for the 
Gambia. His replacement was the flamboyant Capt. R.R. Kane, 
who had served in Fiji and was to remain in the Solomons until 
1928.
Kane entered the Solomons at an unfortunate time.
The bottom had just fallen out of the copra market and the 
settlers, rather than the 'natives', were restless. The 
export duty on copra had been increased from 10/- to £1 per
118ton when the price was high and import duties had also risen.
The Planters Gazette was heaping abuse upon the administration
and there was talk of rebellion in the air. In May 1922
S.I.P.A. informed the High Commission that the white residents
had..reached the limits of their endurance and that they were
119prepared to organise opposition to the administration. Despite
WPHC No.1912 of 1920, Workman to H.C. , 8 July 1920.
118 WPHC No.122 of 1921, McKerlie to H.C., 4 April 1921.
119 WPHC No.1316 of 1922, Kane to H.C., 9 May 1922. Enel. 
S.I.P.A. to Kane, 5 May 1922.
PG, 5 (February 1922), pp. 1-2.
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this inauspicious beginning, relations between Kane and the
settlers rapidly improved. For this, the creation of the
Advisory Council, the gradually improving price of copra, and
the attitudes of Kane were responsible. The personality of
Kane may also have had some influence. With his fondness for
the bottle, and his predilection for the wives of his District
Officers, Kane may have appeared more human and sympathetic
120that the austere Workman.
Kane’s favourable responses to the settlers political 
aspirations and their demands for labour have already been 
described: he was also active in promoting their interests 
with regard to land and rentals. In 1922 he supported a 
S.I.P.A. request for a reduction in leasehold rentals. This
was opposed in the High Commission which prompted Kane to 
attack such attitudes as dealing with the subject from 'a short 
sighted commercial and legal aspect'. He then launched into 
a spirited defence of the 'pioneers' who by their enterprise 
had developed the islands. He advocated that the government 
acquire all surplus lands and then lease them at moderate 
rentals, thus encouraging settlement and eventually boosting 
revenue through the consequent increase in imports and exports. 
This scheme also involved the acquisition of all 'native 
leases' by the government. Kane concluded that the large 
areas claimed by the islanders were in reality never occupied
1 ppor used, and that their rightful title was extremely doubtful.
120
121
122
McQuarrie, op.cit. pp. 9-10.
WPHC No.185 of 1923, Kane to H.C., 11 July 1923. 
WPHC No.622 of 1922, Kane to H.C., 9 May 1922.
WPHC No.2659 of 1922, Kane to H.C., 18 August 1922.
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As a land commission was at that time in the process of
assessing, and in many cases validating, these claims, Kane’s
judgement seems extraordinary. Like Woodford before him, Kane's
eagerness to see the islands commercially developed led him to
endorse policies that could have had disastrous long-term
consequences for the islanders. Such policies envisaged a
future where white entrepreneurs vigorously developed the land
with imported labour, while 'the Melanesians, confined to
adequate reserves, dwindled away in a cultural twilight which
administrators would make as comfortable as the limitations
123of science and of protectorate funds would allow'.  ^Of the
administrators, only the beleaguered Barnett seems to have
formulated a policy which saw the islanders as central to the
future of the Protectorate. The 'Great Panjandrum', as one
124-planter referred to Workman, did not express any long-term 
policy, and his anti-settler position seems to have been 
motivated by a personal distaste for the protaganists, rather 
than any objective analysis of the situation.
The principal victory for the planters in the years 
after 1940 was the relaxation of improvement conditions and 
leasehold rentals. The depressed state of the copra market 
after 1914 caused anxiety amongst the planters that their 
inability to meet improvement conditions might imperil their 
tenure. This fear was allayed when the Colonial Office 
announced that the improvement conditions would not necessarily
Scarr, op.cit. , p. 294.
Collinson, op.cit., p. 33«124
24?
apply, and that land holders would have their cases considered
125on their merits. In application, this decision became a
moratorium on improvement conditions, and was extended for a
y\ 20
further three years in 1920. For similar reasons,
the Colonial Office also agreed to an amendment to the rates 
of rental on crown leases, whereby the initial rate (3d per 
acre for the first five years) was e x t e n d e d . T h e  planters 
obtained further assistance in 1921, when proposed increases
1 PPiin licence fees and duties were shelved.
In 1923 the planters working crown leases pressed
for further concessions. In petitioning for the conversion of
leaseholds into freeholds, they argued that:
the Leasehold System of land tenure is opposed 
to that sturdy individualism which so markedly 
characterises pioneering British Colonists, 
who delight to feel that when engaged in 
wresting cultivation areas from the primeval 
jungle, they are improving their own 
freeholds and not winning virgin lands for 
a landlord. ^ ^
This endearing image of heroic pioneers struggling manfully 
against a barbarous environment failed to touch the cold hearts 
at the Colonial Office. Anticipating this result, the
125 WPHC No.2277 of 1917, C.O. to H.C., 11 July 1917-
126 WPHC No.73 of 1920, C.O. to H.C., 19 March 1920.
127 WPHC No.568 of 1923, C.O. to H.C., 20 January 1923- 
No.83 of 1921-, C.O. to H.C. , 16 May 1924.
72® WPHC No.2099 of 1921, Barley to H.C., 19 November 1921; 
H.C. to Barley, 16 December 1921.
129 WPHC No.1977 of 1923, Kane to H.C. , 13 July 1923. Enel. 
Petition from Leaseholders of Crown Lands.
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petitioners had added a rider appealing for a reduction in
rentals. This request was received more favourably, and in
1501926 there was a considerable cut in the rates.
The most significant changes in the regulations 
governing plantations and labour occurred in the 1920s. In 
late 1920 the High Commissioner toured the Solomons and was 
not impressed by the labour conditions on the plantations.
In his report to the Colonial Office, he recommended the 
establishment of a commission to investigate the matter, 
although the tenor of the suggestion was low-key. After 
several months' reflection in Fiji, however, his concern became 
more acute: he wrote of the necessity for a special enquiry to 
look into the grave abuses and conditions that existed, and 
how it was probable that only the remoteness of the Solomons
151had prevented the arousal of public attention over the issue.
As a result, K.J. Allardyce was sent to the islands as a 
Special Commissioner in early 1922. Apparently the High 
Commissioner's agitation was unwarranted, for Allardyce produced 
no startling disclosures and the general tone of his report 
was quite mild. He found that the conditions and treatment 
of labour was 'on the whole, satisfactory'. Housing he 
described as 'fairly good', though never cheerful or comfortable. 
He also recognised that there should be more regular inspections 
of plantations, otherwise there was a tendency for overseers to
150 WPHC No.2364 of 1925, C.O. to H.C., 1J February 1926.
No.99-7 Of 1926, H.C. to Kane, 27 April 1926.
131 WPHC No.2787 of 1920, H.C. to C.O., 8 November 1920.
No.2608 of 1920, H.C. to C.O., January 1921 (only date given).
WPHC No.2764 of 1921, Greene to Allardyce, 16 December 1921.
249
155take the law into their own hands.
Allardyce’s report was inconsistent and superficial, 
which was hardly surprising considering the brevity of his 
investigation and his inclination to rely on European informants. 
Allardyce considered the medical care available to be adequate, 
and indeed recommended that there be a reduction in the 
compulsory medical obligations of employers of labour. In this 
he was supported by Kane. In 1914 a dysentry epidemic had 
killed 10% of Levers’ labourers. In 1919 an influenza epidemic 
caused many deaths, especially on Malaita, the source of most 
labour. Surveys had discovered that almost 50% of plantation 
labourers had hookworm, that yaws was practically universal, and 
that gonorrhea was widespread. Just ten months before Allardyce 
visited the islands a report by the Chief Inspector of Labour 
had criticised plantation housing as below standard, and 
stated that there was insufficient medical services for 
labourers. v Thus did Allardyce and Kane agree: hundreds of 
labourers who lived in sub-standard, gloomy and uncomfortable 
quarters were housed in a 'fairly good' manner; labourers who 
were almost universally infected with some form of disease 
nevertheless received satisfactory medical care.
135 WPHC No. 1094- of 1922, op.cit.
134~WPHC No.1987 of 1915, C.O. to H.C., 9 June 1915.
No.1289 of 1918, Workman to H.C., 16 April 1918. Enel. 
Medical Report for 1917-
No.2491 of 1920, Workman to H.C., 15 September 1920. Enel. 
Report on Influenza Epidemic of 1919, by N. Crichlow.
No.1152 of 1921, Barley to H.C., 51 October 1921.
No.2061 of 1921, Kane to H.C., 16 June 1921. Enel. Report 
by Chief Inspector of Labour, dated 18 April 1921.
N0.I5O6 of 1923, Kane to H.C., 7 May 1923. Enel. Report 
on Hookworm Campaign, dated 4 April 1923«
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The three major recommendations of the Allardyce
report were the abolition of 'beach payments', an increase
in wages from 10/- to £1 per month, and the prohibition of the
right of recruiting vessels to trade. He had ascertained that
Levers, Burns Philp and S.I.P.A. agreed with these measures;
in fact, the Planters Gazette had agitated for the first two
measures not long before as inflation had forced the 'beach
155payments' up to an uneconomical level. These recommendations
came into force in 1924, but by that time a section of the
planting community had rescinded their support of the changes.
To these planters' protests the administration replied that
the new legislation was the result of the loudly expressed
156opinion' of the settlers. Thus the recommendations of the
Allardyce commission, a commission which had been conceived of 
as an investigation into the conditions of labour and any 
abuses that might exist, was now perceived as a response to 
planter demands.
Those planters-recruiters-traders who opposed the 
introduction of the new regulations were predominantly from 
the southeast end of the Solomons: they protested that S.I.P.A. 
and the Gazette, who advocated the changes, were the voice of 
the planters from the western district, and did not represent 
the views of other settlers. They had some economic justific­
ation for their objections. On the surface the new regulations 
were equally bad for all employers of labour. Under the old
155 WPHC No.1094 of 1922, op.oit.
PG, 2 (April 1921), pp. 2-3.
156 WPHC No.243 of 1924, Hill to H.C., 22 December 1923.
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System an employer paid, per labourer, £12 in wages (over the
two-year indenture term), plus £12 recruiting cost and £8 beach
payment: a total of £52. Under the new system wages were £24,
157plus the £12 recruiting cost: a total of £56. However, in
reality the new system favoured the planters of the western 
islands, who were more distant from the main sources of labour, 
Malaita and Guadalcanal. There were a number of reasons for 
this. A planter who employed another party to recruit for him 
faced a cash charge of £20 (£12 recruiting cost plus £8 beach 
payment). As recruiting vessels were also allowed to trade, 
the beach payment was likely to be given in, or exchanged for, 
goods with a retail value of £8, but a much lower wholesale 
value (as low as 50%). Thus an employer who hired a recruiter 
was subsidising the latter for up to £4 per labourer. While 
the larger planting concerns could afford to do their own 
recruiting, the small individual planters in the western district 
could not sustain the costs and time involved and thus relied 
on other recruiters. With the passage of the new legislation 
these settlers were only required to pay £12 cash per recruit. 
Although they had to face a doubling of wage costs, this money 
was paid out monthly to the labourers, who were then likely 
to spend it at the store on the employers own plantation, and 
thus he recouped on the 10C% profit margin, rather that the 
recruiters and/or the traders in the southeast. For the 
planters in the southeast Solomons, these benefits were not so 
apparent. Because of their proximity to the labour sources, 
they were more able to do their own recruiting, and thus avoid 
the £20 cash payment for each new labourer.
157 ibid.
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The story of the European settlers, their political 
and economic aspirations, and the reaction of the Protectorate 
administration to them, is hardly elevating. The years after 
19^ 10 saw the development of a stable European community, and 
this was accompanied by increasingly vociferous demands for a 
greater say in the running of the islands, and for more favour­
able policies affecting the plantation economy. This was 
particularly true in the New Georgia Group where the white 
residents demonstrated an ability to organise and dominate 
settler opinion. The reaction of the administration to the 
settler ambitions was not edifying. The demands for a 
greater localisation of power in the Solomons, with a corres­
ponding increase in the influence of the tiny settler population 
over the policies that were to determine the future of the 
Protectorate, were often supported by the officials at Tulagi.
The same assumptions lay behind the official response to certain 
economic policies - most notably, the question of imported 
labour. The administration also tolerated conditions on the 
plantations that were, to say the least, unsavoury. Overseers 
sententenced for maltreating labourers received ludicrously 
light sentences; housing and medical facilities were substandard. 
The commission appointed to investigate these matters failed 
to do so; instead it responded to settler agitation from that 
group most able to organise their demands - the planters of 
New Georgia.
The indigenous people of the New Georgia Group had 
been relatively fortunate: their islands had not become the
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dumping ground for the ’overflow' of the empire; they had not 
been dragooned on to the plantations, and their future 
had not been placed in the hands of an irascible and selfish 
minority. Yet, in the years following 1910 they suffered in 
other ways: consideration of their welfare was submerged in the 
vindictive bickering of government, missions and settlers, and 
the impact of the alienation of large amounts of their best 
land began to make itself felt.
CHAPTER SIX
LAND AND LEVERS, 1910-1920
The decade after 1910 saw an increase in troubles 
concerning land. The reduction of the last elements of 
resistance amongst the islanders in 1908-10 had resulted in 
increasing numbers of land purchases, as Europeans sought to 
capitalise on the growing stability of the Group. Speculation 
in land became common, eventually forcing the administration to 
take action to bring the situation under control. No sooner 
had this occurred than the problems created by the earlier 
cavalier alienation of land began to emerge. At the centre of 
this development was the Levers concession. As negotiations 
over the scope and terms of the Occupation Certificate 
continued, it became apparent that many of the thousands of 
acres included in the concession were not 'waste' land, bat 
were owned and used by the islanders. Land which had appeared 
to be uninhabited in the head-hunting years was now found to 
be occupied. There was also a growing number of claims by 
islanders against other European holdings in the Solomons. The 
mounting difficulties concerning alienated land forced the 
administration to call for an inquiry, and in 1919 a Land 
Commission was established.
In March 1910 Arthur Mahaffy was in the New Georgia 
Group reporting to the High Commission on the disturbances in 
the Marovo Lagoon. At that time he also noted that some land
transactions were causing trouble amongst the islanders. There 
had been a rapid growth in the number of Europeans attempting 
to exploit the availability of relatively cheap land and the 
steadily increasing price of copra. In 1904- there had been 
no Europeans resident on Vella Lavella, but by 1910 there 
were seven settlers on the island, not including the missionar­
ies. Mahaffy made no specific recommendations regarding land 
alienation, and only cautioned that the greatest care was to 
be taken in determining the proper owners in all land purchases.
Woodford was also concerned with the changing
circumstances of land alienation . Speculation was becoming
common, and companies were mushrooming in the rush to obtain
property. Some of these concerns had solid financial backing
and were genuinely intending to develop their holdings, but
this did not prevent them from attempting to acquire property
far in excess of their capability to develop it. Burns Philp
& Co. formed the Solomon Islands Development Co. with a stated
capital of £100,000 to work their 33,200 acre freehold property,
Tetepare Island. In addition, they wished to acquire a 1,300
acre holding at Renard Cove on Rendova, as it was the nearest
2anchorage to Tetepare. Other companies had less reliable 
backing. Ulberts Plantations Ltd., for instance, was foimed 
by a syndicate in Sydney with a registered capital of £6,000.
Of this only £2,500 was in cash, coming from the instalments 
of six subscribers who were to each contribute £1,000. Walter
WPHC No.784- of 1910, Mahaffy to H.C. , 8 April 1910.
WPHC No.808 of 1909, Lucas to Mahaffy, 29 July 1909; No.977 
of 1909, Burns to C.O., 27 February 1912.
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H. Lucas, a Burns Philp man, described Ulberts as a ’Jew
Company' intent on obtaining a property then refloating it 
*for a profit. This accusation proved to be incorrect, for 
Ulbergs eventually became the Union Plantation and Trading Co. 
which did undertake the development of its holdings. However, 
the suspicion was probably justified, as much speculation was 
occurring. The Liapari holding on Vella Lavella was conveyed 
thrice and mortgaged once between 1908 and 1910. In the rush, 
clashes of title and fraud were inevitable: the Methodist Miss­
ion and E.H. Pybus both claimed Ozama Is. and Saroporo on 
Vella Lavella as being within their respective deeds. The 
Vella Lavella Plantation and Trading Co. Ltd. foolishly 
acquired two 'deeds’ from the old swindler Edmund Pratt, without 
verifying the claims first. The 'deeds', themselves of doubtful
validity, were for a stated 825 acres which on inspection was
6revealed to be only 50 acres. The land rush was not limited 
to newcomers: older established residents were also buying up 
heavily. Norman Wheatley entered eight separate claims in 
1910 alone, all of which were eventually approved. The total 
area of these purchases was not large, being approximately 200 
acres, but Wheatley had revealed his acumen by concentrating on
 ^WPHC No.782 of 1909, Woodford to H.C., 23 June 1909; Lucas to 
Mahaffy, 12 August 1909-
^ LC I. Claim No.21, 'Certified Copies of Titular Documents'.
 ^WPHC No.812 of 1909, Woodford to H.C., 12 March 1912.
^ WPHC No.977 of 1909, Woodford to H.C., 17 April 1912. Enel.
No.2 Woodford to Drummond, 17 April 1912.
DLS 'Red Book', pp. 7^-5 •
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small lagoon islets: ideal for coconuts, easily developed, and
7with no possibility of boundary disputes.
The continuing large-scale alienation of land with 
its accompanying speculation prompted Woodford to recommend 
some changes to the system of land transactions. In early 
1910 he advocated that the administration should purchase land 
from the owners and then lease it, with appropriate improvement 
conditions, to European concerns. Under the Waste Land Regul­
ations the government could acquire land that was not owned, 
occupied or cultivated and then lease it under a Certificate 
of Occupation. However, the terms of the Waste Land Regulations 
did not cover the land that was not ’waste' because it was 
nominally owned and used for hunting. According to Woodford 
there was a large amount of this type of land in the islands
o
that the owners were willing to sell for a low price. Under
Woodford's proposed system, speculation would be dampened
because it would no longer be possible to acquire freehold
titles, and development would be assured through stipulated
improvement conditions. At the same time the administration
would be deriving income from the rental. In October 1910 the
Colonial Office expressed agreement with the principle that the
sale and lease of native land should only take place through
9the government. Although regulations enforcing this decision
 ^DLS 'Deeds and Claims' (A), pp. 311, 315, 31-1— 7, 365, 375«
® WPHC No.977 oT 1909, Woodford to H.C. , 11- Eebruary 1910.
9 ibid., C.O. to H.C., 20 October 1910.
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were not enacted until 1911-, it was adopted as practice much 
sooner as a result of the situation on the island of Vella 
Lavella.
By early 1911 conditions on Vella Lavella were 
improving. Zito had been removed to Fiji and the unrest on 
the island had quietened down. The Methodist Mission was 
steadily expanding, encouraging the people to resettle in 
larger villages near mission stations and on the coast. With 
this increasing stability there was a rush of traders and 
speculators to buy land on the island. The land in question 
was extremely good: on parts of Vella Lavella, particularly 
the east coast, there is a flat foreshore strip up to a mile 
wide and ideal for plantations. Moreover, much of this land 
was already thickly covered in coconuts planted by the island­
ers, many of whom had died in the previous decades of head­
hunting and internecine warfare. The rush to acquire these 
valuable acres was ended abruptly in February 1911 when Woodford 
issued a notice stating that he would decline to recommend any 
transactions of land on Vella Lavella. Instead he proposed to 
visit the area himself, seek out the surviving claimants and
then purchase the land for the government; later making it
10available for leasing. A few months later Woodford acquired 
1,250 acres at Sakasukuru, Vella Lavella for £200 (to be paid 
in annual instalments of £10). There were some hundred coconut 
trees already planted on this block. The lease was offered to 
several companies before being accepted in 1915- Concerns such 
as the Vella Lavella Plantation and Trading Co., eager to 
acquire freehold properties, were not so keen to accept a 99
10 ibid., Woodford to H.C., 9 March 1912.
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11year leasehold that would entail immediate development work.
The Sakasukuru purchase was not the first occasion
that the government had acquired land that was not 'waste1:
in 1910 Woodford had bought a small block at Mbili in the
Marovo Lagoon which he leased to the Malayta Co. as a trading 
12station site. Sakasukuru was, however, the first substantial
plantation property acquired by the administration. At the
beginning of 1912 the rental for such 'coconut land' was
determined by the High Commission to be a minimum of 3d per
acre for the first five years, 6d per acre for the second five
years, 3/- per acre for the third five years, and 6/- per acre
for the remaining years of the lease. This was soon amended to
3/- per acre from the eleventh to the twentieth year, 6/- per
acre from the twenty-first to the thirty-third year, and
thereafter 5°/° of the unimproved value of the land.^ It was
also decided that in no case should more than 2,000 acres be
leased to one individual and that as general policy it was
desirable to limit the areas leased so that they were within
14the ability of the lessee to develop the land.
Initially, in April 1912, the High Commission decided 
that only in cases where native ownership was doubtful was land 
to be bought directly by the government in 'fee simple'. Where
'' ibid., Woodford to H.C., 1? April 1912; No.1141 of 1913, 
Woodford to H.C., 6 May 1913; No.1660 of 1915, Barnett to 
H.C., 25 May 1915-
WPHC No.1221 of 1910, Woodford to H.C., 4 August 1910. 
Minute by Mahaffy.
15 WPHC No.2161 of 1911, H.C. to Woodford, 31 January 1912; 
No.1708 of 1912, Woodford to H.C., 26 July 1912.
14 WPHC No.2161 of 1911, loc.cit.
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no doubt existed the land was to be leased on behalf of the
owners through the government, with the owners receiving the
full rental less 10%, which was deducted by the administration
in payment for the service it provided. v This stipulation
was apparently ignored by Woodford, who throughout 1912
purchased several blocks from specific owners in 'fee simple'.
One such transaction, the Sakasukuru property, involved a
single vendor, and thus could hardly have been a case of
16disputed ownership. In April 1913 it was decided by the
Colonial Office that in future all transactions involving
native land would take the form of either direct purchase
by the Government and subsequent lease to non-natives, or lease
through the Government on behalf of native owners with the
deduction of the 10% commission. It was left to the Resident
Commissioner's discretion to adopt either method, paying due
17regard to the wishes of the owners. ' Woodford replied to
this directive by stating that he had, in fact, followed this
1Rcourse since the beginning of 1912. This was untrue, as some 
900 acres had been alienated as freehold throughout 1912. It 
is possible that Woodford had allowed these transactions to be 
concluded in that year because they had been arranged some time
15 WPHC No.182 of 1912, H.C. to Woodford, 21- April 1912.
16 ibid., Woodford to H.C., 31 May 1912.
DLS 'Register of Conveyances to Crown' (Book A), f.13.
17 WPHC No.877 of 1913, C.O. to H.C., 2 April 1913.
WPHC No.1408 of 1913, Woodford to H.C., 18 June 1913.
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before; but if this was the case then he was certainly display­
ing a fine sense of selectivity, for a number of other trans­
actions in that category were rejected by him. Most surprising 
of all was the largest freehold purchase of 1912; a 700 acre 
block at Njorio, Vella Lavella. This was a similar property, 
and just fifteen miles distant, to the Sakasukuru block that
Woodford had refused to allow the Vella Lavella Plantion and
19Trading Co. to acquire. One further freehold acquisition
was allowed during 1913; this deal, as we shall see, was part 
of the protracted negotiations between Levers and the 
government over the status of their freehold properties.
The legal basis for the abolition of freehold 
alienation was enacted in King's Regulation No.3 of 1914 
('The Solomons Land Regulation'). This repealed the regulations 
of 1896 and 1904, although those holding freehold land would 
continue to do so on the terms of those regulations. It 
provided for the leasehold of native and public, or crown, land 
under the system that had already been in practice. The defin­
ition of 'public' land allowed for 'waste' or vacant land to be
recognised as public land, though in practice the tendency was
20'to avoid assuming land to be public unless it was bought'.
This was perhaps fortunate as the concept of 'waste' land 
as described in the 1904 regulations was proving to be a problem. 
In 1910 two applications were made for Certificates of Occupation 
of 'waste' land on Kolombangara. The two blocks, totalling
DLS 'Deeds and Claims' (B), p. 102.
Allan, op.cit., pp. 40-1.20
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4,500 acres, were adjacent on the south-west coast of the
island: and both applications were recommended by Woodford
and Mahaffy. However, it soon became apparent that the land
was not in fact ’waste', and that there were islanders living
in the area. As the Group became increasingly more peaceful,
more islanders moved from the bush and began to settle nearer
the coast. Woodford was forced to purchase their 'rights',
and reserve for their use the coconuts on the foreshore. Both
of the certificates lapsed and the land for which Woodford
had acquired the 'rights', at a cost of £100, was classified
21as public land. The Land Commission in the 1920s investig­
ated this section of Kolombangara and found extensive evidence
22of occupation, and it was thus classified as native land.
By mid 1913 the concept of 'waste' land, which had enabled 
the alienation of several hundred thousand acres, had become 
obsolete: Woodford declared that in future it would be conven­
ient to consider that vacant land in the Protectorate was
25'practically non existent'.
By the time of the 1914 Land Regulation, and after 
the finalisation of the Levers Certificate in October of the 
same year, an approximate 218,000 acres had been alienated:
WPHC No.525 of 1910, Woodford to H.C., 1 April 1910; No.676 
of 1913, Woodford to H.G., 31 January 1913; No.2306 of 
1913; Woodford to H.C., 27 October 1913; No.2301 of 1916, 
Barnett to H.C., 12 August 1916.
^  LC I. 'Lever Report', pp. 93-^12.
25 WPHC No.1408 of 1913, Woodford to H.C., 18 January 1913.
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of this figure some 54,000 acres were freehold, and the
p/iremaining 164,000 on Occupation Certificate. This represented
some 17% of the total land area of the Group. Land alienation
was to continue, but under the auspices of the administration.
Up to the end of 1925 a further 15,170 acres was to be
acquired as Crown land, and 4,528 acres were let as ’Native
Leases'. The form of Crown land leasehold and the 'Native
Leases’ were similar. Small station sites were leased for ten
or twenty years on a fixed rental, while the large holdings
were subject to the general cultivation lease previously descr-
28ibed, and were usually let for ninety-nine years.  ^ While 
the legal framework for the alienation of land may have changed, 
the form of acquisition in reality did not. A European 
interested in obtaining a lease would select the land, negotiate 
the price on behalf of the government, then apply to the 
Resident Commissioner for the lease. The documents were then 
drawn up. As Allan has indicated, it was not surprising that 
some confusion existed amongst the islanders, and they were 
given the impression that they were dealing with non-official 
individuals.^
The transition in the nature of land transactions 
during the period from 1910 to 1914 was not accomplished with­
out dispute. One of the resulting wrangles shed interesting
24 DLS 'Red Book', passim; 'Deeds and Claims' (A, B), passim; 
'Miscellaneous Instruments, Vol.A', ff.1-3. For acreages 
after survey see WPHC No.1445 of 1926, Kane to H.C.,
14 April 1926. Enel. Wilson to Kane, 13 April 1926.
25 WPHC Ho.14-4-3 of 1926, loc.cit.
B.S.I.P. List of Lands Leased to March 1917 (Suva, 1917).
26 Allan, op.cit., p. 39.
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light on the methods employed by various planters and mission­
aries. The chief protagonist in this affair was F. Snowball, 
manager of Gizo Solomons Pty. Ltd. Snowball's commercial 
interests in the islands had begun in 1908, when he acquired 
Frank Wickham's holdings for £6,4-00. These holdings included 
an Occupation Certificate for 400 acres on Ghizo, and a 
large freehold property on Rendova. In 1940 he sought to 
increase his holdings by acquiring land on Vella Lavella. The 
land was at Njorovetto, and involved a one and a quarter mile 
shore frontage thickly planted with coconuts: the price for the 
2,000 acre block was £35- Woodford considered that the value 
of the land, in lease, was £60 per annum. There also seems 
to have been some doubt whether the vendor had the right to 
sell all the coconut trees on the land. On Woodford's 
recommendation, the High Commissioner refused to sanction the
sale, and despite a number of later protests this decision was 
27upheld. ' Snowball claimed that he had not bought the 
coconuts, but had provided for their retention by the islanders, 
but if this was the case the agreement must have been verbal, 
for it was not mentioned in the deed. Snowball was supported 
by the Rev. R. Nicholson, who affirmed that he had acted as 
interpreter and had checked the details of the transaction.
As it transpired, Nicholson's support was not disinterested, 
as he was a relative by marriage of Snowball. When, in 1913, 
the government made inquiries about purchasing land in the
27 WPHC No.1223 of 1910, Woodford to H.C. , 21 August 1910;
No.123 of 1913, Snowball to H.C., 14 December 1912; No.792 
of 1913» Woodford to H.C., 15 March 1913«
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same area, District Officer Hill was informed by the owner,
Kaponi, that he would not sell anything until he consulted
Goldie or Nicholson, as he was afraid of the latter who had
told him to stall any possible purchase of the land that
28Snowball had attempted to buy.
During the last five years of his post as Resident 
Commissioner, Woodford's frustration at what he considered the 
slow pace of development in the Protectorate was mirrored in 
his increasingly intransigent attitude towards those he 
considered responsible, the European land-owners. This was 
expressed not only in his reaction to opportunistic land 
deals such as that of Snowball, and in his adoption of new 
land regulations to suppress speculation, but also in the hard 
line he maintained against Levers. Since their entry into the 
Solomons in 1905? with the acquisition of the Pacific Islands 
Co. concession, Levers had steadily increased their holdings in 
freehold lands. This was ended abruptly in 1910, when their 
applications for land at Viru Harbour and on Ranongga were 
quashed by the Colonial Office, and they were informed that no 
further applications from the company would be entertained.^ 
However, in the same communication, they were allowed to take 
up a block at Njorovetto, Vella Lavella for which they had 
already negotiated the purchase. This transaction was allowed 
on the condition that the area be limited to 100 to 200 acres,
WPHC No.123 of 1913? loc.cit. ; No.24-61 of 1913? Woodford to 
H.C., 22 November 1915. Enel. Hill to Woodford, 6 November 
1913.
^  WPHC No.61 of 1905? H.C. to Levers, 17 December 1910.
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and they were later also forced to pay 5/- per coconut tree as
60compensation to the owners. Despite these restrictions, 
Levers still managed to increase their holdings through the 
acquisition of already established plantations.
In early 1911 they negotiated with Wheatley for the 
transfer of his Occupation Licences to the company. Wheatley's 
success as a planter was undoubted, whereas Levers had failed 
in a number of their attempts to establish plantations. Wood­
ford considered this was due to their poor selection of land,
and that now they were seeking to make amends by acquiring
61already established plantations. Woodford regretted that 
Levers were increasing their land holdings in this manner, but 
could find no valid ground to refuse to sanction the transfer. 
However, he did urge that their freehold properties be subject 
to forfeiture because of non-compliance with improvement 
conditions, and that their Occupation Certificate be cancelled 
for the same reason. Action was soon taken in this direction 
when it was revealed that Levers had failed to cultivate the 
requisite one tenth of their 5?000 acre Rendova freehold prop­
erty. The company was offered two acres for every one cultiv­
ated and so the Rendova holding was reduced to 1,362 acres. 
Levers suffered badly also with their properties in other parts 
of the Protectorate, forfeiting 20,000 acres out of a total
5° ibid., H.C. to Woodford, 24 April 1912.
^  WPHC No.1325 of 1910, Woodford to H.C., 19 January 1911.
WPHC No.977 of 1909, Woodford to H.C., 14 April 1911;
No.111 of 1911, Woodford to H.C., 14 March 1911.
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of 34,680.^ Even this was not enough for Woodford, who 
complained that the promise of two acres for every one cult­
ivated went beyond the provisions of the regulation. In this he 
was correct, and the offer was technically illegal; but as the 
Colonial Office had already made it, Woodford's opposition was 
futile.^1
Although Levers' cultivation of its freehold propert­
ies was insufficient for it to avert forfeiture in many 
instances, it was quite substantial when compared to the 
development they had undertaken on their concession holdings: 
by September 1911 they had cultivated only 7 ^  of the 200,000 
acres they held under Occupation Certificate. There were a 
number of reasons for this concentration on the freehold 
properties, among them being, according to R.V. Vernon, 'an 
almost superstitious reverence for the virtues of freehold
tenure as compared with occupation on license for 999 years
36at a peppercorn rent'. Expenditure on freehold land also
gave the company an immediate return, whereas development of
the huge concession would take some time before it resulted in
37an increment of its capital value. Under the terms of the
33 WPHC No.61 of 1905, H.C. to Levers, 10 April 1912; No.11-62 
of 1912, C.O. to H.C., 20 June 1912. Enel. Levers to C.O., 
30 May 1912.
^  WPHC No.39 of 1913? Woodford to H.C., 18 November 1912.
^  WPHC No.61 of 1905, Levers Pacific Plantations Ltd.
Statement of Expenditure on Development and Cultivation of 
Coconut Estates in the Solomon Islands.
56 WPHC No.63 of 1913, loc.cit.
37 ibid.
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Occupation Certificate, Levers were required to expend 2/- per 
acre (a total of £20,000) by 1 January 1914-. Woodford believed 
they would not be able to make this deadline, but when the 
company was confronted with an ultimatum from the Colonial 
Office Levers quickly ordered it representatives in Australia 
(Levers Pacific Plantations Ltd.) to ensure that the proper 
amount was spent.
Another problem with the concession was that land
on Isabel included within its boundaries was discovered to
be occupied, and so the company was ordered to select other
tracts in lieu of this land, which was withdrawn from the
certificate. Levers requested that they be allowed to select
some of the freehold land they had already forfeited, but this
was refused. This selection was completed by 30 September 1913,
and so a decade after the original certificate was issued to
the Pacific Islands Co. the way was open to finalise the replace-
39ment certificate for Levers. y The new certificate was finally 
issued on the 19 October 1914-. The licence was for '200,000 
acres', of which 133,870 acres were in the New Georgia Group. 
Although the New Georgia acreages were reasonably accurate, the 
other holdings were grossly underestimated: after survey the
^  WPHC No.1803 of 1912, C.O. to Levers, 7 August 1912;
No.1922 of 1912, C.O. to H.C., 23 August 1912. Enel.
Levers to C.O., 13 August 1912; No.39 of 1913, Woodford to 
H.C., 18 November 1912.
59 WPHC No.7^ of 1913, C.O. to H.C., 11 December 1912. Enel. 
Levers to C.O., 8 November 1912 and C.O. to Levers, 11 
December 1912; No.764- of 1913, C.O. to H.C., 7 March 1913. 
Enel. C.O. to Levers, 7 March 1913; No. 114-7 of 1913,
Woodford to H.C. , 14- May 1913«
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total area was found to be 280,000 acres, and this was later
40embodied in the Certificate.
The signing of the 1914 certificate was not, however, 
the end of the matter, for the fertile imagination of the 
Levers organisation had produced yet another scheme. Levers 
signed the certificate on the understanding that a 'supplemental 
deed' be later prepared that would embody certain changes in 
their land holding. The company wished to surrender land
41they held on Isabel in return for more land on Kolombangara. 
Behind this exchange lay the question of labour. Levers had 
long agitated for the introduction of indentured Asian labour 
to the Solomons to overcome the shortage of local manpower.
Their request for indentured Javanese and Indian labour was 
refused by the Colonial Office, who did not however reject 
outright the possibility of importing free Indian labourers 
and their families from Fiji. Levers feared that such free 
labour might well desert the company to work for other concerns, 
and so to reduce this risk they suggested that Indian labour 
be used to develop the island of Kolombangara, and thus be 
isolated from other plantations. If they could obtain the 
interior of Kolombangara, not including the land reserved for 
the islanders in the south western corner, they could also 
offer their labourers a piece of land in the island's interior 
on terms. This presumably would have had the effect of binding
WPHC No.966 of 1914, Woodford to H.C., 28-March 1914; 
No.2804 of 1915, Levers to H.C., 28 October 1915*
WPHC No.2992 of 1919, C.O. to H.C., 9 August 1915.
LC I. 'Lever Report', pp. 26-55«
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42them to the company. There were no other European concerns
operating on Kolombangara, and the only alienated non-Levers
land on the island was the block which Woodford had acquired
for £100, after discovering that it was not 'waste'. It was
agreed that this block would become part of the 'native
qxreserve' in the south western corner. Woodford was agreeable
to the Levers scheme on the grounds that the population of
Kolombangara would eventually die out, and that unless labour
was supplied the progress of the Protectorate would come to a 
44standstill. The Kolombangara exchange was embodied in
King's Regulation No.3 of 1921, which issued a new certificate
which included the interior of Kolombangara in its schedule -
an increase from 90,470 to 148,010 acres of the island. There
were some minor alterations in the acreage of other parts of
the concession, with the end result of increasing Levers
Occupation Licence holding in the New Georgia Group from
160,870 (1914) to 216,000 acres, which was 77% of the entire
45Solomon Islands concession. Levers other ambition,to 
import labour, was never fulfilled despite constant appeals to 
the Colonial Office.
LC I., loc.cit.
WPHC No.1373 of 1914, C.O. to H.C., 29 April 1914. Enel. 
Levers to C.O., 9 April 1914.
^  WPHC No.3103 of 1915? Barnett to H.C., 12 November 1913;
No.2301 of 1916, Barnett to H.C., 12 August 1916; No.480 of 
1917, Barnett to H.C., 12 January 1917.
44 WPHC No.1784 of 1914, Woodford to H.C., 26 June 1914.
45 LC I. Documents Accompanying 'Lever Report'. File C,
Printed Copy of King's Regulation No.3 of 1921.
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While the labyrinthine negotiations over the Levers
concession continued in the rarified atmosphere of Whitehall,
it was becoming increasingly apparent that something was
seriously amiss in the islands. In his report on customary
land tenure in the Solomon Islands, Allan noted that from 1914
onwards a developing ’land consciousness' could be detected
46amongst the islanders. In the New Georgia Group such 
feelings had existed for a considerably longer period. Land 
sales had been made for forty years, and a number of islanders 
had been quick to exploit the credulity of some Europeans in 
such matters. The islanders were aware that land was a 
'negotiable asset', that land transactions had to follow 
certain proper forms if they were to be binding, and that 
redress could be obtained for violation of these forms by 
appealing to European jurisdiction. In the early 1890s Ingava 
had successfuly disputed Edmund Pratt's claim to land at Munda 
before the High Commissioner's Court. While this awareness 
was at first limited to the more 'sophisticated' areas of the 
Group, such as the Roviana Lagoon, it soon spread to other 
districts. By 1910 islanders of Mbilua were successfuly 
complaining about land 'jumping' by Europeans. ^
The 'land consciousness' that Allan discerns after 
1914 was not a new development, but rather a reflection of the 
changing circumstances in the islands. Land was now being 
cleared and planted on a greater scale, and in some cases it
Allan, op.cit., pp. 42-3.
LC I. Claim No.21, 'Correspondence Before Submission of 
Claim'. Goldie to Brown, 1 February 1911.
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became apparent to the islanders that the purchaser's under­
standing of the extent of the transaction did not tally with 
their own. An even more important factor in the growing 
restiveness over land at this time was that clearing and 
planting began on land that had not been subject to any trans­
actions - the so-called 'waste' land that had been deemed to 
be unoccupied and unused. The islanders had no way of knowing 
the extent of the Levers concession until the company began 
to utilise its holdings, and when they did commence operations, 
complaints were soon made. ^
The original Pacific Islands Company concession had 
been selected in a superficial, slap-dash manner. Investigation 
of the land involved and consultation with the islanders had 
been cursory in the extreme. It was hardly surprising that 
much of the land appeared unoccupied, for the islanders had 
taken good care that it did so in order not to attract the 
attentions of raiders. Nevertheless, the foreshore and its 
hinterland were still frequently used. Temporary bases were 
set up for fishing expeditions; nuts were collected from the 
scattered plantations, and the bush was used by hunting parties. 
There were, as well, numbers of hope distributed throughout the 
'waste' land. The population of these areas, Kolombangara 
and north-western New Georgia, was not large, but it was more 
than the pessimistic estimates given by Woodford, who was 
convinced that the islanders were well on the road to extinction.
LC I. 'Lever Report', pp. 35-44. 
49 ibid., pp. 18-23.
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Woodford estimated the population of Kolombangara at 90 in 
1914; in 1913 it was given as 70, but according to the Land 
Commissioner in the early 1920s, it was well above this figure. 
The 1931 census counted 257 on the island, and it was quite 
likely that this was less than the population in the late 
1890s. There were a number of serious epidemics in the inter­
vening years, and on other islands in the Group it is known
50definitely that the population declined.
With the end of head-hunting the people in the hills 
began to establish settlements closer to the coast. This 
migration had already been observed on Isabel in the early 
1900s, and had led to the withdrawal of a portion of the Levers 
concession on that island. The migration was slower in parts 
of the New Georgia Group, as the suppression of raiding was 
not totally accomplished until the conclusion of the Marovo 
and Zito troubles. The movement from the bush to the coast 
was also encouraged by the Methodist Mission, as it facilitated 
their contact with the people. For instance, the mission 
station at Menakasapa, on the northwestern tip of New Georgia, 
soon attracted a large settlement in its neighbourhood.^ With
50 ibid., pp. 200-14.
As well as the epidemics of the early 1900s, there was an 
outbreak of influenza in 1919- See WPHC No.2491 of 1920, 
Workman to H.C., 15 September 1920. Enel. Report on 
Influenza Epidemic 1919, by N. Crichlow.
The population of Simbo declined from c.400 in 1908 
(Hocart's figure), to 379 in 1931- See WPHC No.274 of 1932, 
'Census of the B.S.I.P. for 1930', Return for the Gizo 
District.
51 LC I. 'Lever Report', pp. 137-54-
the migration bo the coast, the islanders began to realise 
the extent of the Levers concession: on New Georgia Island 
about fifty miles of foreshore had been included in the 
concession, incorporating the entire coastal area used by the 
Kusaghe and Lupa people. Similarly, as villages began to 
appear along the coast, the administration was confronted with 
a problem it could no longer ignore.
In August 1916 the Acting Resident Commissioner wrote
to the High Commission detailing a number of land disputes
and recommending that a commission be appointed to investigate 
52them. The disputes mentioned included several involving the 
Levers concession, and a number of complaints involving free­
hold properties. The part of the Levers concession which had 
prompted the islanders to complain was the holding in the Vona 
Vona Lagoon area: the eastern and northern foreshore of 
Kohinggo with the adjacent islets, and the northern end of 
Yona Vona Island had been included in the Occupation Licence. 
The western half of the Lagoon, including Vona Vona Island, was 
the province of a number of Munda mbutu mbutu, some of the 
members of which had settled in the area following the 
Royalist * s actions at Munda in 1891. The western half of the 
lagoon, including Kohinggo, was the land of the Kindu and other 
mbutu mbutu with strong Kazukuru connections who had long 
maintained an interest in the area, using it for pig-hunts, 
fishing and camping. Levers had begun planting on Kohinggo 
in 1909 and this soon prompted complaints from the islanders.
In 1911 the company gave £50 to representatives of the Kindu
52 WPHC No.2289 of 1916, Barnett to H.C., 1 August 1916.
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and Munda mbutu mbutu as part of an agreement in which the 
islanders surrendered their claim to the land already cleared 
on Kohinggo and in return Levers waived its rights to the 
land on Vona Vona Island. This, at any rate, was the islanders* 
understanding of the agreement, although apparently Levers 
saw it differently, and after 1914- rumours that the company 
was about to commence work on Vona Vona Island prompted further 
complaints. Whatever the nature of the 1911 agreement, it was 
nevertheless clear that the land in question was not 'waste' 
land and as such should never have been included in the concess­
ion. This also applied to some of the Levers land on Kolomban- 
gara, which was also mentioned by Barnett in his request for a 
commission.
The other disputes referred to by Barnett involved
freehold properties on Kohinggo and Rendova. In both cases
the buyers had occupied land which was in excess of that
originally conveyed. Barnett stated that in his experience the
islanders did not renege on a transaction if they understood
the original agreement. In many cases a vendor had assumed
that the conveyance only included the land that he was entitled
to sell, whereas buyers had taken advantage of vague boundaries
and loose definitions to expand their holdings outside these
limits, with resulting complaints from other islanders whose
54-land was affected.
^  LG I. 'Lever Report', pp. 112-28. 
54 WPHC No.2289 of 1916, op.cit.
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Barnett repeated his call for a commission in 
November 1916 and February 1917? stating that it was becoming 
increasingly apparent that large tracts of the Levers concess­
ions were claimed by islanders who wished to keep the land, 
and that trouble was bound to arise when the company attempted 
to cultivate it. The Government Surveyor, S.G.C. Knibbs, had 
investigated parts of the Levers concession and looked into 
other disputes and his report convinced the High Commission 
that a commission was necessary. Accordingly, the High Commiss­
ion recommended to the Colonial Office that a commission be 
appointed to investigate disputed claims, the working of the 
Solomon Islands Land Regulations, and to generally inquire and
report on all matters connected with the tenure and disposal
56of land in the Protectorate. Unfortunately, the Colonial 
Office, while accepting the need for a commission, disagreed 
with the recommended terms. It decided that a general inquiry 
into native rights with the object of determining an overall 
policy regarding land matters was not necessary, and that all 
that was required was an investigation of specific cases of 
native claims or rights to land then held by Europeans under 
freehold title, occupation certificate or leasehold arrangement. 
This decision may have saved the Colonial Office some expense in 
the short term, but it paid dearly in the continuing friction
^  WPHC No.3263 of 1916, Barnett to H.C., 2 November 1916;
N0.A9O of 1917, Barnett to H.C., 29 January 1917- Enel.
Knibbs to Barnett, 29 January 1917.
^  LC IV. 'General Correspondence Files'. No.1/12,
H.C. to C.O., 23 March 1917-
57 ibid., No.1/15, C.O. to H.C., 19 June 1917.
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over land matters that persisted in the Protectorate throughout 
the subsequent decades and eventually, in the 1950s, a full 
inquiry had to be held.
The wheels of the colonial bureaucracy turned slowly, 
for it was not until mid-1919 that the appointment of a commiss­
ioner was confirmed.^ The Land Commission began hearings in 
the islands in early 1920, and its deliberations were to 
continue, with some interruptions, for the next five years.
The Commission had been an almost inevitable consequence of 
twenty five years of ill-supervised land alienation in the 
Solomon Islands. The New Georgia Group had been atthe centre 
of this process, and had borne the brunt of the resulting 
problems. While comprising only 17# of the total land mass 
of the Protectorate, the New Georgia Group contained 42# of 
the alienated land in the Solomon Islands. Much of this (some 
70#) was in the form of the Levers concession, and the problems 
created by this mammoth holding had been the single most 
important factor in the establishment of the commission. The 
Land Commission was to have particular significance to the 
New Georgia Group in other ways: it became the focus of the 
rivalry amongst the Europeans in the islands and the culminat­
ion of a decade of conflict between missions and the 
administration.
58 ibid., No.1/16, H.C. to Barnett, 2 May 1919-
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE METHODIST MISSION IN CONFLICT, 1910-1920
The multiplication of land problems which culminated 
in the establishment of the Land Commission occurred in 
conjunction with another development: this was the intensific­
ation of ill-feeling amongst the white residents of the Group.
At the centre of this squabbling was the Methodist Mission: 
the Mission competed with commercial interests for copra, it 
struggled with the administration for power and influence, and 
it battled with the Seventh Day Adventist Mission for converts. 
The arrival of the second mission provided an alternative for 
those islanders who, because of a reluctance to associate 
themselves with a mission connected with their former enemies, 
had shunned the Methodists. The Methodist Mission, and in 
particular Goldie, did all in their power to restrict the 
growth of the Adventists and to negate the islanders’ act 
of choice. The conflict between the Methodists and other 
Europeans in the islands was to reach a climax in the Land 
Commission, as Goldie attempted to impose his terms upon the 
Commission and to use it as a weapon to attack the rivals of 
his mission.
From 1910 to 1920 the Methodist Mission gained 
considerable influence in the New Georgia Group, but in doing 
so it found itself in a state of almost continual confrontation 
with other Europeans in the islands. The Mission's 'industrial' 
work and business activities, and its increasing power, were 
perceived by both the commercial interests and the administration
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as a threat to their status. In /\C)'\L\- the Seventh Day 
Adventists came to the Group, and the Methodists did all in 
their power to restrict the development of this new rival.
Goldie, the Chairman of the Methodist Mission, was at the centre 
of these conflicts: he dominated the Mission and its policies, 
and had an unswerving determination to uphold both his own, and 
the Mission* s, authority in the Group. The welfare of the 
indigenous population, ostensibly the object of these struggles, 
became a secondary consideration to the pursuit of prestige 
and power.
The Mbava massacre and its consequences had demonstrat­
ed the ill-feeling which existed between the Methodist Mission 
and some of the traders and planters in the Group. These 
relations were a far cry from the cordiality with which the 
Mission had been received when it first settled in the islands.
At that time it had obtained crucial assistance from Wickham, 
Wheatley and Binskin. Frank Wickham remained on good terms 
with Goldie and the Mission, for he was a pious man who 
strongly sympathised with the objectives of the Church. The 
same could not be said of Wheatley, who became a bitter 
critic of the Methodists. His feelings were shared by many of 
his colleagues, when it soon became apparent that the 
missionaries had no intention of limiting their activities to 
the"spiritual welfare of the islanders.
The commercial activities of the Methodist Mission 
were on two levels: that of official policy, otherwise known 
as the 'industrial side* of mission work, and the efforts of
1 WPHC No.812 of 1909, Lucas to Mahaffy, 29 July 1909»
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individual missionaries as planters and traders on their own
behalf. In November 1909 the Solomon Islands District Synod
requested a grant of £250 from the Mission Board for the
purpose of developing the Mission's properties. The Synod
resolved that mission work in the islands should be conducted
on 'industrial lines'. The justification of this policy was
that it would prevent the dispersal of young men who were being
recruited by other plantations, and would teach them honesty,
cleanliness and industry. It would also retain the people
close to the influence of the Mission, and prepare them for
establishing small plantations of their own. Another
consideration was that the development of the Mission's holdings
would be an excellent investment and would assist it to become
self-supporting. Woodford was very encouraging to this side
of mission work, and Goldie considered that the church should
pmake the most of his approval. Goldie's argument that plant­
ation development by the Mission would reduce the dispersal of 
islanders through recruitment to other plantations was sophist­
ical: from the 1870s through to the 19^ -Os the New Georgia Group 
maintained a reputation as a notoriously poor recruiting 
ground. The numbers of New Georgian recruits had always been 
extremely small, and Goldie's heart-rending tales of villages 
being entirely denuded of their young male population were 
quite imaginary. Of course, in later years the Mission itself
MCA Vol.178, Report of Solomon Islands District Synod, 12 
November 1909; Vol.116, Goldie to Danks, 17 November 1909; 
Vol.168, Goldie to Danks, 18 December 1910.
MCA Vol.168, op.cit.
Corris, op.cit., pp. 29-31- 
Report on the Census ... 1970^ p. 9 (Table 1H).• • •
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used indentured labour to work its developing plantations 
without shedding any tears for the disrupted village life of
4the young Malaitans who had been recruited.
The commercial development of Mission properties 
rapidly got underway. In 1910 a store and wharf were construct­
ed at Gizo on land leased from the Government. The labour for 
the constuction was provided by forty boys from the Kokenggolo 
school. In the following year it was resolved at the annual 
Synod to set aside £500 to develop the Mbanga holding. Not only 
was this desirable on the grounds of policy, but it was also
necessary because there was the danger of losing the property
6if it were not developed. Work was soon commenced: the labour
7lines were constructed and forty or more recruits obtained.r 
By 1919 the Mbanga plantation was employing an average of about 
thirty labourers and had a cultivated area of 500 acres, involv­
ing 25,000 trees. The total number of coconut trees on mission
o
property in the Roviana district was about 37,000. The 
increasing size of the mission plantations was accompanied by
WPHC No.1191 of 1925, Kane to H.C., 12 October 1925. Enel. 
Medical Returns of Indentured Labour. These reveal that in 
January 1925 Goldie was employing 45 labourers on his plant­
ation at Mundi Mundi, and the Mission itself was employing 
27 labourers at Mbanga.
 ^MCA Vol.116, Goldie to Lanks, 20 April 1910 and 10 November
1910.
^ MCA Vol.179, Report of Solomon Islands District Synod,
9 November 1911.
 ^MCA Vol.117, Goldie to Danks, 1 August 1912.
^ MCA Vol.185, Report on Solomon Islands District Synod,
25 October 19^7; Vol^86, Report on Solomon Islands District 
Synod, 22 October 1918.
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the growing conviction that the 'industrial method' was the
best, and the Synod echoed with such phrases as 'Land develop-
9ment means character development'.
In 1917 the Mission Board in Sydney passed a number
10of resolutions regarding 'Industrial Missions' in the islands.
The general tenor of these was to reinforce the existing 
situation by establishing more business-like accounting proced­
ures. Industrial work was described as a valuable and essential 
part of mission work which should be conducted with regard to 
the educational and spiritual interests of the natives employed, 
and not just for profit. However, it was recognised that 
industrial work need not only be self-supporting, but could 
also provide funds for the extension of mission work. To clarify 
these matters it was decided that the financial arrangements 
for Industrial Missions be separated from the allocations for 
normal mission work, and that a yearly statement of assets, 
profit and loss be required. In conclusion, the Board expressed 
its dislike for the term 'recruited labour' with reference to 
Industrial Missions. It was decided that when such labour was 
employed on mission stations it was to be called 'voluntary', 
though still protected by the regulations laid down by the 
government regarding the employment and condition of indentured 
labour. By 1919 the Methodist Mission in the New Georgia 
Group owned freehold land estimated at 3,^ -OT acres with a given
97 MCA Vol.184, Report on Solomon Islands District Synod,
9 November 1916.
10 MCA Vol.205, Minutes of the Mission Board, 7 February 1917-
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value of £27,416.^
Although the burgeoning planting operations of the
Mission wore regarded by some of the other Europeans in the
Group as an indication that its objectives were commercial
rather than spiritual, they were not the major cause of their
antagonism towards the Methodists. This was largely based on
the 'trading' activities of the Mission, and the fact that the
Mission was attracting much of the islanders' wealth and
produce that had once passed through the traders' hands. The
Mission not only produced its own copra, but also obtained a
great deal from the donations of its converts. Between 1918
and 1921 it collected £3,d3d from Roviana and £2,118 from Vella
12Lavella in copra contributions. Goldie always denied that
the Mission engaged in 'trading', claiming that all the copra
sold by them came from donations or was the product of the
plantations on mission freehold land, and that none was purchased
13from the islanders. Other traders remained unconvinced, and 
in their eyes the Mission was taking advantage of its position 
to trade without having to pay the usual licence and ships' fees.
The distinction between 'trading' and the Mission's 
activities was extremely fine, and in 1913 the administration 
entered into the debate. The Mission had opened stores at 
Munda and Mbilua which, Goldie claimed, operated on a non-profit
MCA Vol.187, 'Property Schedules', 1919-
12 MCA Vol.186, op.cit.; Vol.187, Report on Solomon Islands 
District Synod, 29 November 1919; Vol.188, Report on 
Solomon Islands District Synod, 8 December 1§20; Vol.189, 
Report on Solomon Islands District Synod, 10 November 1921.
^  MCA Vol.168, Goldie to Danks, 1 February 1911.
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basis and dealt only with islanders connected with the Mission.
Woodford was unconvinced, especially as Goldie was not prepared
to state categorically that goods had never been sold for a
profit. It was also quite obvious that the stores sold goods
to 'non-mission' customers, and so Woodford accordingly demanded
that the Mission pay the £10 trading licence for each of the
stores. Woodford also requested that the Mission pay a £10
ship licence for the mission vessel Tandanya which he had heard
carried trading goods. Goldie denied this, but paid for the
14three licences under protest.
The unpopularity of the Mission was increased by its 
attitude with regard to a number of land deals in the Group.
In 1940 the administration forced Wheatley to vacate Samarai 
and Repi, two islands in the Vona Vona Lagoon which he had 
'jumped' several years earlier. As Wheatley had cleared and 
planted the islands, this represented a considerable loss. 
Wheatley believed that the Mission had prompted both the 
administration and the islanders in this matter, although he 
was clearly in the wrong. Certainly Goldie did not attempt 
to hide his pleasure over the outcome of this affair, and 
gloated over the financial loss sustained by the planter.^
The bitterness between Wheatley and the Mission was intensified
WPHC No.1660 of 1914, Woodford to H.C. , 3 June 1914-. Enel. 
Goldie to Woodford, 7 November 1913 and 11 December 1913.
^  WPHC No.793 of 1910, Woodford to H.C. , 9 May 1912. Minute 
by Mahaffy, 2 July 1910.
MCA Vol.116, Goldie to Danks, 29 March 1910.
Burnett, op.cit. , pp. 139-4-0.
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by their proximity to each other: Wheatley's station at
Lambeti was a mile from the Mission's headquarters at Kokenggolo.
Clashes between Wheatley's Malaitan labourers and the local
islanders connected with the Mission occurred, with the former
being reinforced by Levers labour from Kohinggo and Rendova 
16on occasion.
Another confrontation between the Mission and a
planter over land occurred at Vella Lavella in 1911. This
affair involved somewhat complex questions of title that
were not finally settled until the Land Commission in the 1920s.
The centre of the dispute was the island of Ozama and a piece
of land opposite it at Mbilua. Although the acreage in question
was not large, the emotions aroused were violent. The
antagonists were Nicholson (for the Methodist Mission) and E.H.
Pybus (for the Union Plantation & Trading Co.); both laid claim
to the land and attempted to collect the nuts on it. The climax
to the dispute was a 'battle', later described by the Land
Commissioner, F.B. Phillips:
It is to be doubted whether even a casual 
visitor to the Western Solomons could fail 
to hear of the struggle at Saroporo in which 
detachments of Mission "boys" and the Company's 
native labour, respectively headed by a former 
missionary and a former manager of the company, 
were engaged: the story of this encounter, of 
the coconuts hurled, of its battle-cries 
(sacred and profane) has become, by repetition, 
almost Homeric.^
WPHC No.790 of 1912, Woodford to H.C., 12 March 1912.
^  LC I. Claim No.21, Land Commissioner's Report, 16 May 1923- 
See also WPHC No.812 of 1909, Woodford to H.C., 12 March 
1912.
At the time of the encounter, however, the participants were not
inclined to be so reflective. Pybus described the missionaries
as being 'traders pure and simple, hiding it under the cloak
of religion'; and to Goldie, Pybus was one of the 'most
plausible, most accomplished rogues' he had met. The affair
ended inconclusively, as it was discovered that Woodford's
'l 8inquiry into the matter had no judicial authority. This 
dispute, like many other petty quarrels between Europeans in the 
islands, had a certain ridiculous aspect in the arousal of 
such fierce antagonisms over a patch of land and a few coconuts. 
To the participants, however, it was a further campaign in a 
perpetual war in which European generals marshalled their 
black troops in a struggle to uphold white 'face'.
Although the 'industrial policy' of. the Methodist 
Mission was sufficient to cause dissension within the European 
community, it was increased by the commercial activities of 
individual missionaries, in particular those of Goldie. Goldie 
was a remarkably able and determined man, with an unshakeable 
confidence in his own position and attitudes. He was willing 
to fight hard and long over any issue that he considered would 
affect either the influence and prestige of the mission, or his 
own personal standing. For these ends he was willing to 
confront not only the planters and administration, but also his 
own superiors in the church. In June 1907 Goldie purchased a 
block of land at Mundi Mundi, Vella Lavella, estimated to be 
3,000 acres, for £75* This was a bargain, as the land contained
18 WPHC No.248 of 1911, Clark to H.C., 14 February 1911 and 
26 April 1912; H.C. to Clark, 22 May 1912.
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many mature coconut trees, and a survey of the block in 1913
19revealed that its true area was 6,197 acres. y Goldie 
attempted to extend his holdings in 1909 when he purchased 
several islands in the Roviana Lagoon for £20. In a letter to 
Woodford he explained that the people had wanted to give him 
the land as it was too stony for gardens, no-one lived on it, 
and they did not wish to sell it to anyone else. Woodford 
disapproved of the transaction, noting that the price was inade­
quate, that the islands were good coconut land, and that 
the islanders used to live on them. Accordingly, the High
Commissioner did not sanction the sale, and Goldie seems to
20have allowed the claim to drop.
Goldie's ownership of the Mundi Mundi plantation
first came to the notice of the Mission Board in Sydney when
Wheatley complained about it in 1911- Wheatley claimed that
Goldie was actively trading, and that he used the mission
plantation at Kokenggolo as a nursery for his own Mundi Mundi 
21property. Dr George Brown was in the Solomons at that time, 
and he investigated these matters on behalf of the Mission 
Board. The charge of trading was not sustained, but Goldie's 
ownership of the plantation could not be ignored. Brown also 
discovered, to his surprise, that Goldie owned the ex-mission 
vessel, the Bondai. In 1909 Goldie had written to the Board
^  WPHC No.2001 of 1913, Woodford to H.C., 12 September 1913- 
MCA Vol.168, Brown to Danks, 24 January 1911.
20 WPHC No.1213 of 1910, Woodford to H.C., 4 August 1910.
MCA loc.cit.
21 MCA Vol.37? Danks to Goldie, 10 January 1911.
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recommending the sale of the Bondai, which was bought in the 
following year by a Mr Teague in Australia, who was Goldie’s 
father-in-law. Goldie had originally intimated that he could 
get £90 for the ship, but Teague purchased it for £80. His 
explanation was that he was unable to get more than £55 for the 
ship in the Solomons, so he had written to Teague to tell him 
to offer £80. This noble gesture was not without profit:
Goldie chartered the vessel to the government for 50/- a day, 
and also used it to carry cargo for other companies and to 
recruit labour for his own plantation. Other traders protested 
that if Goldie paid no licence fee for the Bondai, then they 
would refuse to pay their own. Woodford eventually demanded
that Goldie pay the licence fee and he did so under protest.
2?He later resold the ship to Harry Wickham.
Goldie vigorously defended his ownership of the Mundi 
Mundi plantation before Brown. He stated that it had been 
purchased by Teague on his advice, and although he had a 
financial interest in the property and it was in his name, he 
spent no time on the estate and it did not interfere with his 
mission work. The plantation was run by an overseer and labour 
recruited at normal rates from the eastern Solomons. He 
also denied using the mission vessel to carry stores for the 
plantation, and rejected the suggestion that he traded on the 
estate. Brown accepted these explanations but still considered 
that the plantation could eventually interfere with Goldie's
22 MCA Vol.168, Goldie to Danks, 19 October 1909 and 10 June 
1911; Brown to Danks, 24 January 1911.
WPHC No.1660 of 1914, Woodford to H.C., 3 June 1914.
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mission work, and that it would give a bad impression of the
Mission. The Board notified Goldie that he should carefully
consider his position as both a planter and a missionary;
Goldie replied that he had now appointed a manager for the
estate who relieved him of all responsibility, and that if asked
sever his connection with the property he would have no
alternative but to resign from the Mission. In view of this
28determination, the Board decided not to press the matter.
Goldie's planting activities became a matter of con­
troversy again in 1913, when the Mundi Mundi property was 
surveyed and it was discovered that the acreage was 6,197, 
rather than the 3,000 stated in the deed. Under the improvement 
conditions of Clause 6 of Queens Regulation No.4 of 1896, one 
tenth of the total acreage had to be cultivated within five 
years of the High Commissioner's approval of the transaction.
Goldie had cultivated only 435 acres, and so the land was liable 
24to forfeiture. When informed of this, Goldie struggled 
desperately to avert the loss of his land. He argued that he 
had not been informed of the High Commissioner's sanction of 
the sale until late 1909; that the surveyor had made an error; 
that he had been prevented from recruiting labour; that he 
paid an additional £200 to islanders who appeared to have an 
interest in the land; that he supported old people on. the land
^  MCA Vol.168, Brown to Danks, 24 January 1911; 'Report of 
Deputation to Solomon Islands District, January-April 1911'; 
Goldie to Danks, 1 February 1911, 15 March 1911, 7 June 
1911, 10 June 1911.
24 WPHC No.2001 of 1913, op.cit.
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and undertook educational and religious work at the expense
of the plantation; and that he had established a company,
Mundi Mundi Plantations Ltd., with a nominal capital of £20,000
to develop the property so that forfeiture would result in great
25financial loss to himself.
Woodford's reply to these claims shed some interesting 
light on the missionary's tactics. The Resident Commissioner 
produced documents that proved Goldie had been informed of the 
High Commissioner's sanction in April 1908; he pointed out 
that the survey had been based on Goldie's own plans, and that 
the only delay Goldie had experienced in obtaining labour had 
been the result of his employing a well-known arms dealer,
Sam Atkinson, as his recruiter. Atkinson's licence had been 
cancelled because of gun running to Choiseul, and thus he was 
unable to recruit for Goldie. Goldie then asked that his 
original area be reduced to 4,000 acres: this would have brought 
him inside the terms of the improvement conditions. The reason 
he gave for this reduction was that the original vendors had no 
right to sell 2,000 acres of the property, and so now he had 
recognised their claim and surrendered the land. Woodford 
cynically noted that he had heard of complaints about this 
before, but that it was the first time Goldie had admitted to 
their validity.2^
25 WPHC No.2014 of 1913, Woodfordto H.C., 29 September 1913. 
Enel. Goldie to Woodford, 23 September 1913, 23 September 
1913, and 26 September 1913* Woodford to Goldie, 29 
September 1913•
WPHC*No.1234 of 1914, Woodford to H.C., 11 April 1914. Enel. 
Goldie to Woodford, 30 March 1914*
291
Goldie*s efforts were fruitless: his holding was 
reduced to 1305 acres, on the basis of two acres for every­
one cultivated. His request to lease the land he had lost was 
refused. In making this decision, the Colonial Office also 
asked the High Commissioner to ask the Methodist Mission Board 
if theyapproved of their missionaries engaging in commercial
activities, and that in the Secretary's opinion such practices
27were 'to be deprecated'. ! The ball was back in the Board's 
court: they replied ambiguously that they did not approve of 
their missionaries engaging in trade, and that they would 
take action if their members infringed regulations on mission 
trading. What these regulations were was left unstated. The 
minutes of the Board reveal that they did not, in fact, exist.
It was decided that no action would be taken to enforce the 
rule against missionary trading, and "the entire question was 
quietly swept under the carpet. It emerged briefly in 1917 
when one of the missionaries in the islands, William Leembruggen, 
objected to the Board about Goldie's commercial interests.
Goldie assured the Board that he had no such interests and
poLeembruggen was transferred to Queensland.
There was no room for independent voices within the 
Mission: Goldie dominated its deliberations and policy - the 
annual Synods were little more than a rubber stamp. J.R. 
Metcalfe, another missionary, wrote in his diary:
27 WPHC No.7 of 1914, C.O. to H.C., 19 November 1913.
2® WPHC No.228 of 1915» Wheen to H.C., 13 January 1915.
MCA Vol.205, Minutes of the Mission Board, 6 November 1914,
8 January 1915, 3 February 1915, and 23 February 1917»
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Synod is always unsatisfactory ... It is no 
use kicking but it is by no means right that 
one man, though the pioneer, should have such 
absolute sway & that the business & especially 
spiritual affairs of the church should not 
receive adequate discussion.^
Goldie's activities as a planter were not challenged again,
and he was left to develop his Mundi Mundi property in peace.
Both Goldie and the Mission continued to expand their
50commercial operations through to the 1920s. Despite this,
however, their relations with other European settlers in the
Group steadily improved. Although opponents of the Mission
were still vocal, their number in proportion to the entire
white population in the islands declined. They were comprised
largely of long-time foes of the Mission, such as Wheatley
and Pybus, and of individuals who derived a large part of their
income from trading. As Collinson stated:
what antagonises the legitimate white trader
more than anything else is the way in which
some of the missionaries deliberately set out
to compete with him in the acquisition of copra
from the natives.^.5 I
As the numbers of traders declined, to be replaced by settlers 
who were predominantly planters, opposition to the Mission 
diminished. Goldie and the Mission ceased to be competitors 
and became colleagues. When the Solomon Islands Planters
Metcalfe Papers. Diaries 1911-1969- Entry for 9 December 1921. 
50 Goldie almost doubled the cultivated area on his Mundi Mundi 
property between 1913 and 1925- See WPHC No.73 of 1924,
Kane to H.C., 6 December 1923-
MCN Minutes for 4 and 5 February 1925-
31 Collinson, op.cit., p. 190.
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32Association was formed. Goldie was its first chairman, and
although a number of the planters had doubts about the propriety
of a religious concern engaging in business they did not adopt
an actively hostile attitude towards the Mission. Metcalfe
noted that Goldie had the ’respect if not always the goodwill'
of the settlers, and that the same was true of the Mission as 
33a whole. Metcalfe himself was on amicable terms with many 
of the planters, regularly visiting and helping them, but these 
were generally the more 'respectable' of the Europeans. At the 
same time he was careful to avoid the 'shouting enemies' in the 
bar atGizo.^
At the same time as the Mission was improving its
standing with the settlers in the Group, its relations with the
administration were steadily growing worse. The Mbava
massacre and its consequences had seen the Mission, in Goldie's
39words, 'come out on top'. The administration had been forced 
to retract its accusations against the Methodists and to 
endorse publicly the Mission's work, or else face disclosure 
of the facts of the affair. The administration had also 
suffered in the eyes of the islanders. The senseless butchery 
of bungled punitive expeditions and a general lack of consider­
ation for the welfare of the islanders had left their mark.
^  PG, 1 (December 1920), p. 7-
^  Metcalfe Papers. Diaries. Entry for 11 July 1920.
^  ibid., entry for 30 September 1924.
^  MCA, Vol.116, Goldie to Danks, 29 March 1910.
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After 1910 the Mission, rather than the government, increasingly
became the focus of the islanders* aspirations and respect.
The Mission's following on Vella Lavella grew dramatically after
the Zito affair, and they made their first inroads in the
Marovo Lagoon in the aftermath of the troubles in that district.
One of the islanders arrested, but not convicted, by the
administration after the murder of Burns was befriended by
the Mission and used to make contact with the people of Vangunu
•56and a mission station was eventually established at Patutiva.
The standing of the administration was also not 
helped by the character of some of the officials who had 
served in the Group: a racketeer such as Hazelton, and drunkards 
like Sykes and Walsh, did nothing to improve the islanders' 
estimation of the government. These difficulties were not 
restricted to the New Georgia Group, and after fifteen years 
of control, the Western Pacific High Commission finally began 
to detect some shortcomings in the system of administration 
in the Solomon Islands. Sir Henry May, after a tour of the 
Protectorate in 1911, reported to the Colonial Office that 
there was, indeed, some room for improvement. District 
Magistrates, he considered, although 'gentlemen' had no 
administrative or legal education. Their positions were often 
isolated which rendered supervision difficult, and generally 
they were prone to undisciplined and irresponsible action.
He suggested that they should be required to pass an elementary 
law examination, and that future District Magistrates should
Metcalfe Papers.'Articles on the Solomon Islands'.
'Methodism in the Marovo', pp. 2-A.
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be cadets sent out from the United Kingdom. Nevertheless,
he expressed absolute confidence in Woodford, and indeed
recommended that the Protectorate be removed from the control
of the High Commission in Suva and placed under the Resident
Commissioner's direct authority. This latter suggestion was
57rejected by the Colonial Office.
A memorandum by Mahaffy went further into the role
and function of the District Magistrate: Mahaffy recognised
that at present the D.M. was basically a police officer, and
that apart from maintaining peace the government did little
for the islanders. He realised that unless the islanders liked
an officer, he would have very little contact with them, and
that generally the government did not rate highly in their
estimation. To deal with such a situation the administration
58required 'a quite special type of man'. In 1952 the Cadet
system was established in the Solomons, and the prospective
District Officers were required to learn a native language
and to pass an examination on the laws that they would be
59expected to administer. These developments were a little 
late for the Gizo District, and that 'special type of man' 
was proving to be as elusive as ever.
57 WPHC No.2161 of 1911, H.C. to C.O., 8 December 1911.
WPHC No.1196 of 1911, 'Memorandum on the duties of "District 
Magistrates" in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands and the 
Solomon Islands', by A. Mahaffy. Dated 16 December 1911.
^  ibid., H.C. to Woodford, 29 January 1912 (two letters).
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In late 1909 R.B. Hill was appointed as District
Magistrate of the Gizo station. Hill, whose previous experience
had been with the army in India, was a man accustomed to
obedience, and likely to resort to extreme methods when it was
40not forthcoming. His actions were to be the centre of a fresh
controversy between the government and the Methodist Mission;
a conflict in which the Mission again came out on top. By the
beginning of 1912 Hill was becoming increasingly frustrated by
what he considered to be mission obstruction and the
assumption of authority to a degree that was threatening the
standing of the administration. When the crisis came he was
41determined to make a stand. The trouble began with the
appointment by Hill of Soso as a district headman at Mbilua.
Soso had an interesting background: he was not a lekasa but 
a big-man who had risen to prominence because of his exploit­
ation of European contacts. He was brought up by his uncle 
Pulo, another man who spoke good pidgin English and had used 
his understanding of ’the white man's ways' to rise in the 
world. Soso followed in his uncle's footsteps, exploiting 
his familiarity with the language and methods of the white 
man to amass material wealth. His name appears on a number 
of deeds of sale for land in the Mbilua area as a 'chief', and 
owner. In reality he had no claim to the property, but acted 
as a middleman for others or simply sold land that was not
WPHC No.2000 of 1913, Woodford to H.G., 11 September 1913.
WPHC No.701 of 1915, Barnett to H.C., 15 February 1915-
LC I. Claim No.21, 'Correspondence Before Submission of Claim', Barley to Workman, 26 September 1919-
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Soso's prestige was sufficient for Hill to consider 
him a 'chief of Biloa1 and appoint him as a headman. According 
to Hill, Soso did a great deal to preserve order and settle 
down the district in the aftermath of the Zito troubles. 
Unfortunately Soso also appears to have used his position to 
enrich himself, and he was also inclined to act in an arrogant 
and arbitary manner. Nevertheless he retained the full 
confidence of Hill, perhaps partly because he was not a member 
of the Mission. This latter fact also helps explain the 
Methodist's opposition to the appointment. The direct confront­
ation between the Mission and Hill arose when a native mission 
teacher interfered with Soso's apprehension of a suspected 
offender. Hill backed up Soso, had the man arrested and 
sentenced, and ordered the teacher to leave his home and to go 
and remain indefinitely at the Methodist Mission station at 
Mbilua.
The next few years were to see a spate of charge and
counter-charge between the administration and the mission.
Goldie complained that Hill's hostile attitude to the Methodists
gave the impression of a 'determined plan to injure the 
Zl Zlmission'. He instanced cases where Hill had held court on 
Sunday near the mission station and compelled people to attend,
45 WPHC No.958 of 1913, Danks to H.C., 1 May 1913- Enel.
Goldie to Danks, 12 April 1913; Goldie to Woodford, 12 June 
1912, 2 September 1912, 12 September 1912; Woodford to 
Goldie, 14 August 1912, 2 September 1912.
No.2020 of 1914, Barnett to H.C., 3 August 1914. Enel.
Hill to Woodford, 7 July 1912, 5 February 1912.
MCA Vol.117, Goldie to Danks, 12 June 1912.
44 WPHC No.985 of 1913, op.cit.
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thus preventing them from going to church. He accused the 
district officer of making irrational and unjust decisions in 
court cases; of requisitioning a canoe and damaging it without 
paying recompense; and of striking a man for no reason. The 
administration replied that the mission was undermining the 
government’s authority. Mission teachers were initiating 
rumours that the administration would be replaced by a 'mission 
government', that Goldie was 'the Great Master', and that the 
mission would protect the islanders from the government. More 
specifically, Tongan and Samoan mission teachers were abusing 
their position, acting in an over-bearing manner and over­
exercising authority. They were physically punishing people 
for church offences, and threatening them with gaol if they did 
not obey requests. Members of the mission were also said to be 
smashing hope and other 'tabu' objects, and deliberately
violating traditional customs no matter what the reaction of 
T6the people.
In his correspondence with the High Commission over 
the controversy, Woodford consistently dodged answering the 
specific charges against Hill and preferred to make counter­
charges against the missionaries. Even by the time he left 
the islands, in July 1914, he had still failed to reply in detail 
to the accusations. Woodford saw the issue in terms of
WPHC No.2000 of 1913, Woodford to H.C., 11 September 1913- 
No.2098 of 1913, Woodford to H.C., 3 October 1913- Enel. 
Hill to Woodford, 20 September 1913, 24 September 1913- 
No.756 of 1915, Barnett to H.C., 23 February 1915-
46
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whether the authority of the government or the mission was to
be 'paramount'. Although it was clear that Hill was guilty of
misconduct in some matters, he thought it necessary to stand
behind him to preserve the integrity of the administration
in the face of mission pressure. It was becoming obvious to
the High Commission that something had to be done, and so it
was proposed that Hill be transferred to another district. The
Colonial Office approved this suggestion but insisted that Hill
explain his conduct. Hill admitted that in February 1912,
when calling at Roviana in search for some escaped prisoners,
A8he had struck a man who had given him an 'impudent message'.
Hill was cautioned, and sent to the Malaita District where he 
resumed his duties as a District Officer in May 1915- Shortly 
afterwards he was given special leave for military service.
The Mission Board in Sydney expressed itself satisfied at this 
outcome.44
It had become clear to the Protectorate administration 
that something had to be done to remedy the situation in the 
Gizo District, so J.C. Barley was despatched by the Acting 
Resident Commissioner, Barnett, to make a 'thorough investigat­
ion'. Jack Barley had come to the Solomons as a cadet under 
the recently introduced system, and he was to serve in the 
Protectorate until 1933 when he became the Resident Commissioner
47 WPHC No.2000 of 1913, op.cit.
No.2098 of 1913? op.cit. 
llq WPHC No.32 of 1915? Barnett to H.C., 11 December 1914.
No.88 of 1915* C.O. to H.C., 7 December 1914.
No.701 of 1915? op.cit.
47 WPHC No.1274 of 1913? Barnett to H.C., 19 April 1913- 
No.2886 of 1915? Wheen to H.C., 10 August 1915-
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of the Gilbert and Ellicelslands. He was a well-educated
(M.A. Oxon), sensitive man with a 'passion for ethnology'
50and an 'affectionate responsibility for the natives'. He had 
been Acting Distinct Magistrate at Gizo in 1912, when Hill was 
on leave. Of that time, he noted that the Methodists had 
exercised almost complete control over native affairs. When 
he tried to establish contact with the islanders he had 
encountered an 'invisible wall of silent suspicions and distrust', 
and was told when he issued instructions that they would have 
to be referred to Goldie for approval. He was forced to con­
clude that it was the 'deliberate policy' of the Mission to 
maintain and fortify their power by posing as 'heaven-sent 
intermediaries' between a ruthless and ignorant government and 
the oppressed islanders. It was extremely difficult for one 
District Officer to pit his authority against a number of 
missionaries with superior local knowledge and a better 
system of transport around the islands: the mission schooner
Tandanya as opposed to the open whaleboat used by the
51administration. When Barley returned in 191$, the situation 
remained the same. The islanders showed a marked objection to 
approaching the government, and there were regular reports that 
mission teachers were telling the people that the Mission was 
more powerful than the administration. A common rumour stated 
that the 'great Master', Goldie, had Woodford removed from the 
Solomons because he was against the Mission and that he was
^  Lambert, op.cit., p. 110.
51 WPHC No.$808 of 19$$, Memorandum on Mission Influences in 
the B.S.I.P., by J.C. Barley. Dated 24 November'19$$.
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also having Hill punished. Goldie denied making such 
statements but admitted that he had told the islanders that 
the government had no right to do wrong, and that he would act 
if they did. Apparently these remarks were being construed 
incorrectly.^
There was little the administration could do to 
remedy this situation; Barnett recommended stationing another 
officer in the Marovo Lagoon, as had been done between 1908 
and 1912. However, some steps could be taken to prevent a 
recurrence of previous blunders. The Gizo station, it was 
emphasised by Barnett, required 'an officer of discrimination 
and action, without causing disaffection among the natives'.
To avoid the many blunders and errors made in the 
past it was necessary to restrict the authority of District 
Officers to magisterial powers: the authority to hold courts 
and transact Judicial business should be maintained only by 
the government headquarters at Tulagi.  ^ These recommendations 
were really too little and too late. A decade of administrative 
stupidity and insensitivity had alienated the people of the 
New Georgia Group.
The Methodist Mission had benefited from this situat­
ion and now had the loyalty of many communities throughout the 
Group. In 1910 there had been 78 members of the church: by 
1915 the membership had increased to 1,239. To be classified 
as a 'member', an individual had to approach the Mission and 
profess faith in its teaching, undergo a 'trial' period, and
WPHC No.756 of 1915, Barnett to H.C., 23 February 1915. 
^  WPHC No.758 of 1915, Barnett to H.C., 1 March 1915*
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then be baptised. So while membership might not necessarily
indicate a permanent commitment to Christianity, it did
represent a voluntary identification with the Mission. The
Methodists in 1915 also claimed to have 1,075 scholars at 23
<54.schools, and a public worship attendance of 5*4-90. The latter 
figure was an exaggeration, as it represented about 80-90% of 
the population of the Group, and the Mission had yet to 
establish itself in northern and eastern New Georgia, Vangunu 
and Nggatokae - areas which contained about 30% of the people 
in the islands.Nevertheless, the Methodist Mission was well 
entrenched in the Group: as planters, politicians, and even as 
missionaries they had been successful. In 1915 their influence 
with the islanders was paramount: they had met and defeated 
challenges from the administration and their religious monopoly 
was apparently secure. However, the Methodists soon encountered 
a new rival in the Seventh Day Adventist Mission.
There had been a number of earlier attempts to 
challenge the Methodist's religious hegemony, but all had 
failed. In 1904- the Mission expanded its activities to Choiseul 
an island considered by the Melanesian Mission to be their 
'territory', although they had not begun work there. The follow 
ing year the Anglicans retaliated by placing teachers from 
Isabel on Vella Lavella. In 1906 this action was consolidated 
by the stationing of a European missionary, G.H. Andrews, on the
^  MCA Vol.178, Report on Solomon Islands District Synod, 30 
November 1910; Vol.183, Report on Solomon•Islands District 
Synod, 4- November 1915*
55 WPHC No. 274- of 1932, op.cit.
same i s l a n d .  I t  was n o t  an i d e a l  t im e  f o r  p r o s e l y t i s a t i o n  on
V e l l a  L a v e l l a ;  even  t h e  M e t h o d i s t s  made l i t t l e  p r o g r e s s  i n  t h e
a r e a  u n t i l  a f t e r  1910.  The M e la n e s i a n  M is s io n  t h r e w  i n  t h e
t o w e l  s o o n e r ,  w i th d r a w in g  t h e i r  men from t h e  New G e o r g ia  Group
56i n  1907 and e n d in g  t h e  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  M e t h o d i s t s .
I n  1 9 H ?  W h ea t ley ,  i n  an a t t e m p t  t o  underm ine  t h e  s t r e n g t h  o f
t h e  M e t h o d i s t s ,  e n c o u ra g e d  t h e  M a r i s t s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a s t a t i o n
i n  t h e  R o v ian a  Lagoon.  A g a in ,  t h i s  was h a r d l y  a good s i t e ,  a s
t h e  Lagoon was t h e  h e a d q u a r t e r s  o f  t h e  M e t h o d i s t s .  I s o l a t e d  on
t h e  s m a l l  i s l e t  o f  H im b i , and u n a b le  t o  p u r c h a s e  l a n d  f o r  an
a l t e r n a t i v e  s i t e  on K olom bangara ,  t h e y  met w i t h  a n o t a b l e  l a c k
57o f  s u c c e s s  and w i th d rew  i n  1912.
A f t e r  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  M a r i s t s ,  Norman W h e a t l e y  d i d  
n o t  g i v e  up hope of  f i n d i n g  a r i v a l  w o r th y  o f  t h e  M e t h o d i s t s .  
When v i s i t i n g  Sydney i n  1913 be a p p ro a c h e d  t h e  A d v e n t i s t s  and 
s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e y  m igh t  e s t a b l i s h  a s t a t i o n  i n  t h e  New G e o rg ia  
Group.  H is  s u g g e s t i o n  was a d o p te d ,  th o u g h  i t  would  seem t h a t  
t h e  S.D .A. would have  expanded  t h e i r  m i s s i o n a r y  a c t i v i t i e s  t o  
t h e  Solomon I s l a n d s  i n  any c a s e .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  W h e a t l e y ' s  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  was a s p u r  t o  a c t i o n  and d i d  d i r e c t  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  
o f  t h e  S .D 0A. t o  t h e  w e s t e r n  i s l a n d s  o f  t h e  P r o t e c t o r a t e . ^  The
56 D. H i l l i a r d ,  ' P r o t e s t a n t  M is s i o n s  i n  t h e  Solomon I s l a n d s ' , 
Ph.D . T h e s i s  ( A .N .U . , 1 9 6 6 ) ,  pp .  1 2 1 -2 .
C. W i l so n ,  The Wake of  t h e  S o u t h e r n  C r o s s  Work and A d v e n tu re s  
i n  t h e  S o u th  Seas  (London,  1 9 5 2 ) ,  on .  243, 247.
^  H i l l i a r d ,  o p , c i t . ,  pp .  296-7-
H. L a r a c y ,  M a r i s t s  and M e l a n e s i a n s  A H i s t o r y  o f  C a t h o l i c  
M is s i o n s  i n  t h e  Solomon I s l a n d s  (C anberra . ,  1 9 7 6 ) ,  pp .  4 7 - 8 .
58 H i l l i a r d ,  o p . c i t . ,  pp .  4 1 6 -7 .
Adventists' pioneering party, Pastor G.F. Jones and his wife, 
arrived in the Solomons in 191A. They received some encourage­
ment from Woodford and further advice from Wheatley and event­
ually decided to establish a station at Viru Harbour, an area 
previously untouched by mission activity. The S.D.A. strategy 
was to spend some time at Viru coming to grips with the local
conditions and language and to then tackle the much more
59populous Marovo Lagoon.
There had been several previous mission efforts in
the Marovo; in 1911 the Marists had made a brief foray into
Vangunu, which met with little success, and in the following
60year the Methodists began work in the area. The Methodists'
activities were centred on the Pondokana and Vangunu people who
had been involved in the Burns murder and had suffered in the
ensuing punitive expedition. Ngatu, a Pondokana mbangara, was
instrumental in introducing his people to Methodism. He had
been arrested and released, and had then spent some time at a
mission school in Kokenggolo. He encouraged Goldie to establish
a station in the Marovo, and acted as a go-between when the
61Methodists visited the area.
The Methodists' connection with the Pondokana people 
may have been a factor in their relative lack of success in 
other parts of the Lagoon. People who had suffered at the
59 AB, Vol.18, No.27 (6 July 1914), p. 3; Vol.18, No. 32
T^ TO August 191A), p. A; Vol.18, No.A3 (19 October 191A), p.3.
^  Hilliard, op.cit. , p. A12.
Metcalfe Papers. 'Methodism in the Marovo', pp. 1-A.
61 Metcalfe Papers, ibid.
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hands of the Pondokana and Vangunu outlaws after the Burns
murder appear to have been unwilling to associate with their
former enemies' new allies. Similarly, traditional foes of the
islanders associated with the Methodists saw in the Adventists
an opportunity to align themselves with a mission without
compromising old hostilities. Although the S.D.A. Mission made
slow headway in convincing people to accept the constraints of
their doctrines, they nevertheless found many communities in the
Marovo Lagoon willing to identify themselves with the Mission
62and resist advances from the Methodists. With this acceptance, 
the Adventists were then able gradually to win over converts 
to their precepts, particularly amongst the young people 
anxious to secure an education. This pattern was repeated 
elsewhere in the Group. The Adventists did not attempt to 
'poach' Methodist adherents, but made advances amongst the 
various communities which had resisted the Methodists because 
of indigenous rivalries. In some cases, such as at Viru, the 
Adventists gained a foothold when the Methodists had ignored 
an area because of its isolation and small population. In a 
few instances islanders who considered themselves to have been 
slighted by the Methodists turned to the Adventists. The 
coming of the S.D.A. Mission to the Group provided many 
communities with an opportunity to exercise an act of choice. 
Prior to their arrival the only avenue by which an introduction 
to the knowledge of the white man could be obtained had been 
the Methodist Mission, for the administration had no educational
AP, Vol.19, No.33 (16 August 1915), pp. 3-4; Vol.19?
No. 34 (23 August 1915), P- 5; Vol.1 9, No. 35 (3 0 August 1915), 
pp. 3-5.
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f a c i l i t i e s .  The A d v e n t i s t s  n o t  o n ly  o f f e r e d  a means o f  o b t a i n i n g
knowledge w i t h o u t  com prom is ing  t r a d i t i o n a l  r i v a l r i e s ,  b u t  t h e y
a l s o  p r o v i d e d  a c h o ic e  i n  t h e  manner o f  e d u c a t i o n .  E a , a
mbangara  o f  L okuru ,  w an ted  t h e  S.D.A. t o  e s t a b l i s h  a sc h o o l  on
Rendova b e c a u se  t h e y  t a u g h t  E n g l i s h ,  w h e rea s  t h e  M e t h o d i s t s
63spoke i n  R o v ia n a .
By t h e  end o f  1917 t h e  A d v e n t i s t s  were w e l l  e n t r e n c h e d
i n  t h e  Marovo Lagoon. The F i r s t  Annual  C o u n c i l  o f  t h e  M is s io n ,
h e l d  i n  December 1917 a t  S a sa g h a n a  on Marovo I s l a n d  was a t t e n d e d
64by o v e r  t h r e e  h u n d re d  i s l a n d e r s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t w e n ty  one b ig-m en.
The S.D.A. advance  i n  t h e  Marovo had  been  g r e a t l y  a s s i s t e d  by
t h e  numbers o f  E uropean  s t a f f  w o rk in g  i n  t h e  a r e a .  Jo n e s
had  been  j o i n e d  by O.V. H e l l e s t r a n d  i n  1914,  D.H.Gray and
D. N i c h o l s o n  i n  1915? S .R .  Maunder and R.H. T u t t y  i n  191?» I n
c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  M e t h o d i s t s  had  o n ly  t h r e e  m i n i s t e r s  f o r  t h e  e n t i r e
Group: two were s t a t i o n e d  a t  R o v ia n a ,  and one on V e l l a  L a v e l l a .
The M e th o d i s t  s t a t i o n  on Vangunu was n o t  s t a f f e d  by a European
u n t i l  1922? when Thomas Dent a r r i v e d .  As a r e s u l t ,  t h e
A d v e n t i s t s  were a b l e  t o  s t a f f  a number o f  e l e m e n t a r y  s c h o o l s
65o f f e r i n g  t h e  e d u c a t i o n  t h a t  many of  t h e  young d e s i r e d .  I n  t h e  
a c c o u n t s  o f  t h e  e a r l y  y e a r s  o f  t h e  A d v e n t i s t  M is s io n  i n  ehe 
Marovo, i t  i s  t h i s  a s p e c t  which  s t a n d s  o u t .  While  b ig-men were 
w i l l i n g  t o  t o l e r a t e  a  s c h o o l ,  i n  p a r t  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  r e a s o n s ,  i t
^  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  A l i  P i t u ,  23 S ep tem ber  197^? L o k u ru .
^  AR, V o l . 2 2 ,  N o.4 (25  F e b r u a r y  1 9 1 8 ) ,  p .  4 .
^  M e t c a l f e  P a p e r s ,  o p . c i t .
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was amongst the young men that the Mission scored its greatest 
66success. A fully-fledged member of the Mission was
expected to abstain from smoking, betel-nut, pork and shell-fish.
These obligations were easier for the young, as they had not
yet become habituated to the use of tobacco and betel nut.
Ironically, it was the Methodists who could take much of the
credit for stimulating the young islanders’ desire for knowledge,
as it was their school at Kokenggolo which first provided the
examples of the benefits of education.
There was little the Methodists could do to arrest
the growth of the Adventists in the Marovo. They lacked the
staff to improve their one school at Patutiva, which was of a
poor quality when compared with those of the Adventists. Their
attempts to persuade communities to reject the S.D.A. failed,
with a number of villages openly declaring that they would have
67the Adventists, or no mission at all. ' In addition to the 
rivalries within the Marovo area, the Methodists strong connect­
ions with Roviana were probably a further handicap to them.
Many communities in the Marovo had suffered badly at the hands 
of Roviana head-hunters, and the raids had continued until the 
late 1890s.
Outright conflict between the Adventists and the Meth­
odists accelerated after 1916, when the former began to expand 
the-ir activities outside of the Marovo and Viru. From 1916 to
AR, Vol.20, No.3 (2A January 1916), p. A; Vol.20, No.29 
T24 July 1916), p. 3.
C.H. Watson, Cannibals and Headhunters Victories of the 
Gospel in theHSouth Seas (Washington,' 1926)7 no. 220-A.
67 AR, Vol.19, No.35} op.cit.; Vol.20, No.6 (1A February 1916),
p. A.
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1920 the S.D.A. made significant advances on Rendova, Vella 
Lavella and Ranongga. On all three islands there were districts 
which had resisted the Methodists when other communities on the 
same island had accepted the Mission. On Rendova the Methodists 
had begun work at Lokuru in 191$ and at Mbaniata in 191$, but 
the people of the Ughele district rejected their offer of 
a teacher. This was despite the close connections between 
Ughele and Nusa Roviana, a Methodist stronghold. The Ughele 
people had been particularly cautious in their relations with 
Europeans. The district had a long history of conflict with 
the white man, beginning with the Marion Rennie massacre in the 
1860s and continuing to the murder of the trader Gibbon in 1896. 
In addition, the Ughele people had suffered badly at the 
hands of raiders from Mbaniata and Lokuru, and although violence 
had ended in Mahaffy's time they remained wary of the outside 
world and did not leave the mountains to settle on the coast 
until about 1910. Roni, a mbangara of Nusa Roviana, had sent 
a Methodist teacher, a Roviana man, to Ughele but he had been 
sent back. In 1916 the Ughele big-man, Romiti, accepted the 
Adventists and in the following year a missionary, S.R.
Maunder, was stationed at the district.
On Vella Lavella the Methodists had made impressive 
advances since the conclusion of the Zito troubles. Their 
main strength was at Mbilua, although they had many adherents 
on other parts of the island. However, the people of the 
district of Ndovele had continued to resist the Mission. The
Interview with Leunga, Hite, Bamu, Navoko, Beti, Jonga and 
Malasai, 2A September 197^, Ughele.
AR, Vol.21, No.$8 ($ December 1917), pp. 2-3.
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Ndovele people considered themselves somewhat apart from the 
other islanders on Vella Lavella, as they traced their anteced­
ents to Choiseul. Conflict between Ndovele and Mbilua had 
persisted until 1909, when Ndovele men had participated in the 
hunt for Zito, who had raided their villages. The S.D.A. made 
their initial contact with Ndovele through the medium of a 
Ndovele man who lived in the Marovo. In 1918 the Ndovele big-
man Vari asked the mission to come to his district and in March
691919 R.H. Tutty was stationed there. The Ndovele mission was
partly responsible for the Adventists also gaining a footing on
Ranongga. Since 1918 the S.D.A. had visited the district of
Ghanongga, on the northwestern corner of the island but the
people had been undecided about accepting the Mission. The
Methodists had been established in the two other districts on
the island, Lungga and Kumbokota, for some time and were also
pressing the Ghanongga people to make a start in their district.
Apparently, the Ghanongga people were reluctant to join their
former enemies in the one mission, for they eventually chose
the Adventists. The turning point came when some Ghanongga
people visited the Ndovele mission station and were sufficiently
impressed to request a school in their own district. In 1920
70a Marovo man, Pana, was sent to Ghanongga as a teacher.1
R. H. Tutty, 'History of the Dovele Mission (Seventh-day 
Adventist Mission, Solomon Islands)'. TS. Original with the 
National Library, Canberra, pp. 2-3.
LC I. Claim N0.A8. File titled "'Land Dispute at Dovele'.
S. D.A. Mission and Methodist Native. Correspondence re, and 
D.O. Barley's Notes of Evidence given at Inquiry thereinto.", 
passim.
70 AR, Vol.2A, (1 November 1920), p. 3- 
Watson, op.cit., pp. 225-30.
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The islanders of the Ughele, Ndovele and Ghanongga 
districts had taken advantage of the presence of the alternative 
mission to obtain the educational facilities they desired with­
out compromising the traditional rivalries that existed on their 
islands. As in the Marovo, the schools were the initial 
attraction for the islanders, particularly the young. Young men 
who had served in the police or who had observed the products 
of the Methodist schools were aware of the benefits of a know­
ledge of reading, writing and arithmetic, and were anxious to 
secure them for themselves. The missionaries constantly 
commented on the eagerness of the young people to learn, and it
was generally from the 15-25 age group that they obtained their
71first converts.'
The hostility between the Methodists and the Adventists 
which had been accelerated by the latter’s expansion was further 
increased when individuals and villages within the Methodist 
fold switched their adherence to the rival Mission. This 
occurred at Lokuru when the big-man Ea and his followers sent 
their children to the S.D.A. school at Ughele, which Ea consid­
ered to be better than that of the Methodists. The movement 
away from the Methodists at Lokuru increased when Goldie 
withdrew one of his teachers from the area, and eventually the 
Adventists established their own school in the district. A 
similar thing occurred at Nusa Hope, a small island at the 
eastern end of the Roviana Lagoon, when the local big-man
^  AR, Vol.22, No.20 (23 September 1918), p. A; Vol.23, No.17
X7? August 1919), p. 2; Vol.2A, No.3 (9 February 1920), p. A;
Vol.2A, No.16 (9 August 1920), p. 3; Vol.2A, No.22 (1 November
1920), p. 3.
Interview with Ali Pitu, 23 September 197^? Lokuru.
Interview with Boaz Bero, 23 September 197^? Lokuru.
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invited the S.D.A. to establish themselves because he preferred 
73their schools. ^
The steady expansion of the S.D.A. was viewed with 
alarm by the Methodists, who almost immediately began a 
campaign of obstruction. The campaign was an impressive 
combination of brute force and legal pressure: ’raids' were 
made on new S.D.A. stations, while Goldie attempted to expel 
the Adventists from their new districts by having their land 
leases invalidated in court. The result of these efforts was 
inconclusive: while some victories were scored by the Methodists, 
the larger objective - the withdrawal of the Adventists from 
their new districts - was not achieved.
The Methodists’ first sally was at Ughele. In 
reaction to Romiti's acceptance of the Adventists, a Methodist, 
Muzicolo, was dispatched from Nusa Roviana to establish a 
village adjacent to that of the rival Mission, and to lay claim 
to the land which had been leased to the Adventists. Muzicolo 
had sufficient lineage connections to live at Ughele, but the 
basis of his claim to Romiti's land was tenuous. Although 
Muzicolo's great uncle had been a big-man at Ughele, he had 
been a roving varani rather than a mbangara of a particular 
place. Muzicolo himself had always lived on Nusa Roviana and 
had, in Knibbs' words, 'not a tittle' of authority on Rendova.^ 
In .contrast, Romiti had always lived and been recognised as a 
mbangara in the area. Muzicolo's village was established by
73 Interview with N. Kera, 29 October 1971-, Roviana Lagoon.
74 TLC I. Claim No.23, 'Copies: Official Correspondence',
Knibbs to Workman, 3 July 1920.
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Methodists from other islands brought to Ughele by the mission
ship Tandanya, although it did eventually attract a few of the
local Ughele islanders.
Friction between the adjoining villages soon
occurred, with both sides attempting to disrupt each other's
Sabbath. In 1919 the District Officer, Barley, ruled that
Romiti owned the land on which the Adventist mission stood and
thus the lease was valid. However, with respect to other land
in Ughele he was unable to determine the rival claims based on
nebulous ancestors and so, in an attempt at compromise, gave
joint control to Romiti and Muzicolo. This was not the end of
the matter, for some months later there was further conflict
between the two parties. Barley attributed this to the
Adventist missionary, Maunder, whom he accused of fomenting
discord. Maunder was found guilty of incitement and ordered to
leave the Protectorate. v Unlike Goldie, who was-always careful
to avoid direct involvement in sectarian battles, Maunder had
been incautious and the administration was not slow in seizing
the opportunity of ridding the Protectorate of a troublesome 
76missionary. After this defeat Pastor Jones advised the S.D.A. 
adherents to avoid confrontation and the district settled down. 
Goldie, however, did not give up easily for he again attempted
^  ibid., Barley to Workman, 26 July 1920.
Interview with Leunga and others, 24 September 1974.
WPHC No. 2924 of 1920, Workman to H.C., 1 November 1920;
No.2370 of 1922, Kane to H.C., 26 August 1922. Enel. Extracts 
from 'Gizo Occurence Book*.
Maunder had already been in trouble with the administration. 
In June 1918 he was convicted of perjury after a case 
involving the dynamiting of fish.
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to invalidate the Adventist lease at the hearings of the Land 
Commission.
Another confrontation occurred in 19^9 in the Roviana
Lagoon, previously a bastion of Methodism. The big-man Koito
invited the Adventists to establish a school amongst his people
on the small island of Nusa Hope at the eastern end of the
Lagoon, and J.C. Radley, the S.D.A. engineer, visited the area.
Koito's brother was Miduru, the mbangara Saikile and a staunch
Methodist. Miduru sought Goldie's advice at Kokenggolo and
was told that if his people did not want the new mission they
could send them away. As a result seventy men from Kalikonggu,
Munda and Nusa Roviana went to Nusa Hope and forcibly removed
Radley. In the ensuing court case Jones and Radley with
twenty witnesses faced Goldie and Nicholson with thirty
witnesses. This impasse was resolved when the Adventists
withdrew their complaint for the sake of peace. Of course
Miduru, though a mbangara, had no authority to impose his
preferences on Koito and his followers on Nusa Hope and they,
77in fact, maintained their adherence to the Adventists. r 
Goldie's role in this affair was, as usual, sufficiently 
ambiguous to preclude the possibility of his prosecution. 
Throughout the entire course of the sectarian struggles in the 
Group the administration was continually frustrated in its 
att-empts to obtain tangible proof of Goldie's militant methods,
no
although his objectives were quite obvious.
77 WPHC No.2924 of 1920, op.cit.
Interview with N. Kera, 29 October 197^ -, Roviana Lagoon.
78 WPHC No.2370 of 1922, Kane to H.C., 1922.
The third major mission confrontation was at Ndovele. 
As soon as it became apparent that the Adventists were intending 
to obtain a lease to establish a station in the district Goldie 
protested vehemently to the administration, arguing that the 
proposed lessor had no right to the land concerned and that 
the S.D.A. mission would only cause 'perpetual disorder and 
strife' in the area. The Resident Commissioner, Workman, 
initially refused permission for the lease on the grounds that 
there was insufficient demand for the S.D.A. mission, but was 
forced to reconsider when it became obvious that the Ndovele 
people did want the Adventists. Goldie again protested, this 
time producing a counter-claimant to the land that was under 
consideration for the proposed lease, and in July 1919 Barley 
convened a Court of Inquiry at Ndovele. The Methodist claimant 
Olemoa, who had been living at Munda for the previous six years, 
admitted that he had been told by Goldie to put forward his 
claim to stop the S.D.A., and that he had no rights to the 
land concerned. He then withdrew his claim. This defeat did 
not deter the Methodists, and soon a rumour circulated amongst 
the islanders that Olemoa had been forced to withdraw his claim 
under threat of imprisonment. Once again the administration 
was unable to track this rumour to its source.^ The Methodists 
took more direct action in November 1919 when about sixty 
Methodist islanders from Mbilua stormed Ndovele, cutting down 
the bush and trees near the S.D.A. station. The expedition was 
led by Daniel Bula, the head native teacher at Mbilua. This 
seems to have been a symbolic act of protest, for it was not
79 LC I. Claim No.48, op.cit.
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accompanied, by more land claims or followed up with further
action. Although the S.D.A. missionaries complained about this
’raid', the administration took no action, stating that it was
up to the islanders who owned the land to lay a charge of
80trespass, not the Mission.
The government's decision regarding the ’trespass' at 
Ndovele, along with the deportation of Maunder, the partial 
acceptance of Muzicolo’s claims at Ughele, and the failure to 
prosecute those involved in the assault on Radley, were consid­
ered by the Adventists to be evidence of bias on the part of 
the administration. In June 1920 the Australasian Union 
Conference of Seventh Day Adventists petitioned the High
Commissioner, complaining of their treatment at the hands of
81the administration of the Protectorate. This protest was
short-lived, for in September of the same year a delegation of
Adventists from Sydney visited the Solomons and after further
investigation of the complaints withdrew the petition and
apologised to the Resident Commissioner, for the administration
was able to demonstrate that all of its actions had a solid 
82legal basis. Although it was true that the Adventists had 
suffered to a degree, this was more the result of their own 
inexperience than administrative partiality.
WPHC No.2370 of 1922, op.cit.; No.2924 of 1920, op.cit. 
Tutty, op.cit., pp. 4-5.
WPHC No.1428 of 1920, Petition to H.C. by C.K. Meyers 
(President) and W.G. Turner (Secretary) of Australasian 
Union Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 10 June 1920.
82 WPHC No.1428 of 1920, Allum & Turner to H.C., 19 September 
1920; No.2924 of 1920, op.cit.
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From 1915 to 1920 the Methodist Mission attempted, 
but failed, to stem the increasing influence of the Adventists. 
This failure was largely the result of the determination of 
a number of communities to assert their preference and indep­
endence in the face of intimidation. The S.D.A. Mission 
offered these islanders a means of obtaining the education and 
self-improvement they desired, without compromising the 
identities and independence of their various communities.
Although Goldie had so far failed to overcome this determination, 
he had not yet surrendered, for with the establishment of the 
Land Commission he was to revive his campaign to dislodge the 
S.D.A. from a number of their districts. More importantly, 
he also sought to establish himself in a position whereby 
he could control the direction of the Land Commission's 
inquiries so as to benefit both the status of his Mission and 
what he conceived to be the interests of the islanders. This 
was to once more bring him directly into conflict with the 
administration.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE LAND COMMISSION
Although blie need Tor a Land Commission had been
accepted in 1917, it was not until December 1919 that it got
underway. In that month G.G. Alexander, the former Chief
Police Magistrate in Suva, arrived in the Protectorate and was
given the following commission by Workman:
To enquire and report upon such specific cases 
as may be submitted to you by a deputy appointed 
by me on behalf of the natives of claims to land, 
including claims to native rights of way, or rights 
over land, including customary rights, claimed by 
natives over any land in the British Solomon 
Islands Protectorate now held by non-natives namely
(a) Land purchased by non-natives.
(b) Waste or unoccupied land (or land assumed 
to be unoccupied) held under any certific­
ate of occupation.
(c) Land leased under King's Regulation No.3 
of 1914 (or under the previously existing 
Regulations).^
Alexander's tenure as Land Commissioner was brief, for in 
August 1920 he resigned the post to take up a position on the 
Bench of the High Court in Tanganyika. He spent only three 
months in the Protectorate during which he heard four claims, 
although he also conducted negotiations in Sydney with a 
number of companies whose holdings in the Solomons had been
pthe subject of claims. Alexander's replacement was F.B. Phill­
ips, a Melbourne barrister and solicitor who had been recommended
LC IV. No.1/26, Copy of Commission given to Alexander.
WPHC No.1999 of 1920, Workman to H.C., 22 September 1920.
G.G. Alexander, From Middle Temple to the South Seas (London, 
1927), pp. 256-7.
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by the Government of Australia. Phillips was given the same 
commission in November 1920, and at that time he believed that 
the work would take four months to complete. This estimate 
proved wildly astray, for he did not finish his last report 
until May 1925-^
The work of the Land Commissioner was extremely 
difficult. The Protectorate's records of land dealings were 
devoid of system, and when Phillips arrived after the abrupt 
departure of Alexander he found the affairs of the Commission 
in a 'chaotic state': the records were in a shambles, 
particulars of claims were vague or had not been received, and 
a number of Alexander's decisions were unsatisfactory and the 
claims had to be reheard. In the following years Phillips 
travelled 7?500 miles throughout the Protectorate aboard the 
Wai-ai, a sturdy but hardly comfortable fifteen-tonner for 
whose navigation and provisioning he himself was responsible.
He had no regular clerical assistance for two-thirds of the 
time.+
The basic procedure of the Land Commission was fairly 
straightforward. All parties concerned in a particular claim 
would be given notice of the proposed inquiry, which would then 
be held on the disputed ground. Phillips would first inspect 
the land with the native claimants and European owners, or 
their representatives, to determine the extent of the dispute.
 ^WPHC No.1999 of 1920, H.C. to Workman, 16 September 1920.
LC IV No.1/95, Phillips to H.C., 1 July 1924; No.1/141, 
Phillips to H.C., 5 May 1925-
4 LC IV No.1/95, Phillips to H.C., 1 July 1924.
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This was followed by the hearing and recording of evidence
tendered by both parties, and subject to cross-examination by
the representatives of both sides and the Commissioner. In no
case were any parties represented by legal counsel and Phillips
5adopted an informal approach at the hearings. The islanders
were represented at the hearings by a 'Deputy for the Natives'
appointed by the Resident Commissioner whose duties were to
investigate the islanders' claims, put them into a proper form
6and present them to the Land Commissioner. In most of the
New Georgian claims this position was filled by C.C. Francis, 
who had served in the Protectorate since 1912 and had been 
District Officer at Gizo since October 1919- The Land Commiss­
ioner submitted his recommendations to the High Commissioner 
through the Resident Commissioner who could state if he agreed 
with them or otherwise; they were then gazetted and if no 
objections were lodged within six months they were forwarded 
to the Secretary of State for the Colonies who had the power 
to confirm or vary them. King's Regulation No.8 of 1923 
provided that after final confirmation all parties had to 
conform to the recommendations or face a fine of £100 or a
7six month gaol term.'
5 LC IV. N0.33P, Phillips to Kane, 26 January 1926.
a. LC IV. No.8/0, 'Extracts', Deputy for the Natives to Resident 
Commissioner, 1 July 1920; Resident Commissioner to Deputy 
for the Natives, 20 October 1920.
7 WPHC No.1067 of 1925, Minute by Pilling, 25 May 1925; No. 
2969 of 1923, Copy of King's Regulation No,8 of 1923.
All told, the Land Commission investigated sixty-nine
claims in the Protectorate. Of these, nineteen were in the 
New Georgia Group and were, in Phillip's words, the 'largest 
and most intricate of the Claims'.The New Georgian cases 
occupied Phillips for twenty of the fifty four months he spent 
investigating and reporting on claims in the Protectorate.
There were two main reasons for this: seven of the nine claims 
against the Levers Occupation Certificate were in the Group, 
and these were to involve time and effort out of all proportion 
to their number. Phillips spent some six months on inspection 
and hearings of the Levers concession claims in the Group, and 
a further eight months on the compilation and writing of the 
report. Secondly, the Land Commission became the focus of the 
bitter political and sectarian controversy in the Group. The 
crux of this conflict was Goldie's attempt to force the admin­
istration to recognise him as the islanders' representative 
before the Commission; in other words, to take the place of 
the 'Deputy for the Natives'. This of course would have 
enabled Goldie to control the direction and presentation of 
all claims, including those of Adventist adherents, in the 
Group. In Kane's words, this struggle was 'looked upon as a 
final test of strength between the Government and Mr Goldie both
Qby natives and Europeans'. While Goldie failed to attain his 
objective in this matter, he continued his attack on the 
Adventists through the Land Commission by challenging the
LC IV. No.1/141, Phillips to Kane, 6 May 1925.
WPHC No.2671 of 1922, Kane to H.C., 26 August 1922.
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validity of their land leases in a number of districts.
In October 1919 Jack Barley, the District Officer at 
Gizo since 1915» was transferred. Barley had generally maintain­
ed much better relations with the Methodist Mission than his 
predecessors, and his period of office had not seen a major 
confrontation. He had, however, grown increasingly exasperated
with the power of the Mission and in September 1919 voiced his
10concern over the situation. Barley’s attitude was echoed at
a higher level: in early 1920 the Mission Board asked the High
Commission to consult with the Mission before the formulation
of any regulations affecting the islanders, and commented that
Goldie's experience would be of great assistance in such matters.
These suggestions were taken by the administration as evidence
of the Mission's desire to 'share' the government of the
Protectorate , and to obtain some sort of veto power. The
situation in the New Georgia Group continued to worsen with
the appointment of Francis as Barley's replacement. Francis
was a capable and conscientious officer, but his manner was a
12far cry from that of the easy-going Barley. Francis and 
Goldie were soon accusing each other of a succession of real
LC I. Claim No.48, op.cit., Barley to Workman, 16 September 
1919.
WPHC No.31$ of 1920, Wheen to H.C., 19 February 1920. 
Minutes.
WPHC No.1309 of 1923, Kane to H.C., 3 May 1923. Enel. 
Confidential Reports on Officers.
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13or imagined slights, presumptions and injustices. These 
developments coincided with the beginnings of the Land Commission, 
which got underway in early 1920.
Alexander first visited the Group in February, when 
he interviewed the claimants to a block of land on Kohinggo 
owned by Kindar Ltd. (Claim No.20). This dispute had been 
festering since 1915? and Alexander’s brief investigation did 
nothing to resolve it. He made no attempt at a detailed 
examination of the disputed land and misunderstood the islanders’ 
complaints. When the claimants were informed of his recommend­
ations in August 1921 they objected strongly and the case had
14to be reheard by Phillips. Alexander's next recommendation 
concerned a dispute over land at the southern end of Mbilua 
(Claim No.21). This dispute dated back to 1911 and was 
extremely complicated. This, however, escaped Alexander's 
attention for he did not examine it in detail but contented 
himself with negotiating with the European owners, Union 
Plantation and Trading Co., for an agreement on compensation.
This case also had to be reheard.^ It was perhaps fortunate 
that the other two claims concerning the New Georgia Group 
that were dealt with by Alexander were straightforward. One
15 WPHC No.1328 of 1921, Wheen to H.C., 2 May 1921; Kane to 
H.C., 20 August 1921.
14 -WPHC N0.9OA of 1920, Alexander to H.C., 9 April 1920. Enel. 
Alexander to Workman, 9 April 1920; Barley to H.C., 16 
January 1922.
LC.I. Claim No.20, 'Copies of Official Correspondence Before 
Claim', passim. 'Copy of Correspondence', Francis to 
Barley, 22 August 1921.
^  WPHC No.1208 of 1920, Alexander to H.C., 11 May 1920;
Barley to H.C., 16 January 1922.
involved, a Levers freehold property on northern Rendova; the
company admitted the validity of the claim and surrendered the 
16disputed land. The other concerned the island of Mbava,
which Woodford had classified as 'waste1 and had leased under
Occupation Certificate to Joseph Binskin. Although unoccupied,
the island had been regularly used for hunting and fishing by
members of the toutou Bava whose ancestors had once lived
there. Under Alexander's agreement the surviving members of
17the toutou agreed to sell to the government for £100. This 
case was an indication of the situation that was to confront 
Phillips when he examined the Levers Occupation Certificate 
holdings, which like Mbava had been declared 'waste' by 
Woodford without adequate investigation.
The Mbava claim also revealed that islanders were 
quite capable of acting independently to press claims when they 
realised the possibilities offered by the Land Commission, for 
the Mbava claimants had come forward on their own accord 
after learning of the Commission's activities. This situation 
was repeated elsewhere in the Group as the hearings continued, 
in contrast to Goldie's claim to be the endorsed spokesman and 
representative of the islanders. In fact, on a number of 
occasions during the course of the Commission Goldie was 
confronted with independent attitudes and initiatives on the 
part of 'his' islanders and was forced to act quickly to avoid
LC IV. No.22/1, Alexander to Workman, 12 April 1920;
No.22A/1, Fulton to Alexander, 16 April 1920.
LC I. Claim No.18, Alexander to Workman, 9 August 1920.
17 WPHC No.2001 of 1922, Kane to H.C., 20 June 1922. Enel.
Alexander to Workman, 1 August 1920. (Report on Claim No.29).
embarrassment.
At the outset of the Commission the Methodist Mission
approached the administration, expressing their concern
regarding the islanders' land rights and requesting to be
informed of the negotiations between Levers and the government
on the Occupation Certificate. This request was denied, and
'l 8the Mission did not pursue the matter. Alexander's period of 
office was free of controversy, probably because he did not 
touch upon the claims against the Adventists or Levers 
Occupation Certificate, which were at the centre of the 
Methodist Mission's interest in the Commission. The unsatisfact­
ory nature of some of Alexander's recommendations did not 
become apparent until after his resignation, and even then does 
not seem to have attracted any adverse comment from the Mission.
The situation changed with the resumption of the 
Commission under Phillips, who affirmed that claimants must be
represented by the 'Deputy for the Natives' or legal counsel,
19and not by missionaries interested in their claims. y In 
February 1921 Goldie wrote to Phillips stating that the 
claimants had strong objections to having a government Deputy 
'forced on them' and that if he was not allowed to represent 
them, they would require time to obtain legal assistance. In 
the following month these demands were repeated in a petition 
from thirty-one 'chiefs' of the New Georgia Group and Choiseul, 
which Goldie urged Phillips to accept in a number of interviews
WPHC No.2623 of 1919? Workman to H.C., 30 December 1919«
WPHC No.3131 of 1920, Hill to H.C., 27 December 1920. Enel. 
Memorandum of the Land Commissioner, 27 November 1920.
at Tulagi. Phillips refused, and the petition was then sent
20to the High Commission. The petition was accompanied by a 
number of complaints concerning the behaviour of the 
administration towards the Mission and its adherents. Goldie 
specifically accused Francis of unjustly arresting Methodists, 
of declining to take action in cases of offences against 
Methodists, and of encouraging the destruction of Church 
buildings. Goldie also stated that many of the land disputes 
in the district were the result of recommendations by officials 
who had deliberately refrained from obtaining information that 
would have prevented the occurrence of mistakes. The implic­
ation was clear: government officers were not fit to represent
21the islanders before the Land Commission. The question of
representation had thus become part of the broader conflict
between the Mission and the administration ahd when Francis
successfully rebutted Goldie’s charges against him, it became
the focus of that conflict.
Goldie visited Fiji in July 1921 to press his case,
and was successful in obtaining a number of concessions,
unconnected with the charges against Francis. The concessions
included the exemption of native teachers and scholars from
head tax and an easing of the procedure whereby islanders could
opaccompany missionaries outside of the Protectorate. However, 
20 WPHC No.26 of 1922, Memorandum: from the Land Commissioner 
to the Acting Resident Commissioner, 10 December 1921. Enel. 
Goldie to Phillips, 21 February 1921.
21 WPHC No.1328 of 1921, Wheen to H.C., 2 May 1921.
22 WPHC No.1952 of 1921, Memorandum of Interview with Goldie 
by the Acting High Commissioner, 29 July 1921.
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he did not obtain satisfaction on the question of representation, 
and was told that it was the responsibility of the Land Commiss­
ioner to accept or refuse, on application, any request to
23represent claimants.  ^ In August, Phillips, Goldie and the
Melbourne Secretary of the Methodist Mission Board, Burton,
met in Australia. Phillips suggested that Goldie assist the
’Deputy for the Natives’ by providing information and
suggesting questions. Although Burton considered this proposal
fair, Goldie rejected it, stating that he wanted official
recognition of his position and that he was not prepared to
24-put his information through the Deputy.
Goldie was determined to press ahead with his demands, 
and on his return to the Solomon Islands began organising 
another petition, this time to the Colonial Office, at the same 
time warning of a possible boycott of the Commission. The 
administration reacted quickly to these threats, warning the 
Colonial Office of the impending petition and possible boycott, 
and stating that there were strong objections from both offic­
ials and non-officials to Goldie representing the islanders 
before the Commission, particularly from the adherents of the 
S.D.A. Mission. It also stated that an acceptance of Goldie's 
demands could lead to the resignation of the Land Commissioner?^ 
The administration also communicated with the Methodist 
Mis-sion Board in Sydney, relaying the rebuttals of Goldie's
^  WPHC No.1328 of 1921, Note of Interview between Greene and 
Goldie, 14- July 1921.
24 WPHC No.26 of 1922, op.cit.
25 WPHC No. 2970 of 1921, H.C. to C.O. , 24- September 1921.
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charges against Francis and stressing the inadvisability of 
both the petition and boycott. In October 1921 the High 
Commission again warned the Colonial Office that Goldie might 
go to any lengths to achieve his objectives, and in anticipation 
of an attempt to excite public opinion against the Protectorate 
administration they supplied the Secretary of State with the 
details of a sordid incident in which Goldie had been 
involved.^
In November a petition from forty-two ’chiefs' of
the Western District of the Protectorate was forwarded to the
Colonial Office. It requested that Goldie be allowed to
represent them before the Land Commission. In a covering
letter Goldie stated that the petitioners had desired that
the Commission be delayed until their petition had been
answered, but as this had been refused they would decline to
27appear before the Commission. In May 1922 Goldie and the 
petitioners were informed of the Secretary of State's reject­
ion of their request. However, at the same time the Resident 
Commissioner reiterated Phillips' suggestion that any 
'assistance' offered by Goldie to the official Deputy would be 
welcomed. When asked by the 'Chiefs of the Western Solomon 
Islands' to define 'assistance' he replied that Goldie might 
present and give evidence, help in the preparation of cases, 
direct the Deputy's attention to possible witnesses and 
suggest points of examination or cross-examination to the
WPHC No.1328 of 1921, Haskess to Wheen, 7 October 1921;
H.C. to C.O., 12 October 1921. In the incident referred to, 
Goldie was said to have assisted the trader Collinson in 
exhuming and decapitating the body of the Choiseul big-man 
and head-hunter, Lilliboi.
27 WPHC No.26 of 1922 Goldie to Barley, , Barley to H.C., 19 November 1921. 6 December 1921. Enel.
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ppDeputy. This offer was rejected by the 'Chiefs', who then
listed a long series of complaints about the administration's
conduct, stated that they refused to recognise the Land
Commission, and that Goldie was going to London to lay these
matters before the Colonial Office. The complaints mentioned
included instances of unjust alienation of land, Alexander's
unsatisfactory recommendations, the Zito affair, and the
29administration's 'bitter personal animosity' to Goldie.
In August 1922 Phillips visited Gizo to meet the 
islanders and attempt to remove any misunderstandings that 
might exist. Goldie had previously told the Resident Commiss­
ioner that he would advise the petitioners to see the Land 
Commissioner, but according to both Francis and Phillips 
several of the islanders who had intended to meet the 
Commissioner changed their minds after talking to Goldie. 
Phillips, however, did manage to meet a few of the petitioners 
who expressed themselves satisfied with the administration's 
position. Phillips made it clear that the Commission would
go ahead, and to this end posted a preliminary notice of
30claims to be heard from March 1923-' These developments did
u WPHC No.26 of -1922, Kane to H.C. , 22 May 1922.
No.2332 of 1922, Kane to H.C., 20 July 1922. Enel.
Chiefs of the Western Solomon Islands to Kane, 21 June 1922; 
Kane to Chiefs of the Western Solomon Islands, 19 July 1922.
29 WPHC No.2371 of 1922, Kane to H.C., 8 August 1922. Enel.
Chiefs of the Western Solomon Islands to Kane, 21 June 1922.
50 WPHC No.2671 of 1922, Kane to H.C., 26 August 1922. Enel. 
Francis to Kane, 22 August 1922.
LC IV. No.25/24, Phillips to Francis, 22 August 1922.
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not affect Goldie's attitude, and the Methodist Mission went 
ahead with preparations to send Goldie to London, to secure 
the support of other missionary bodies, and to lobby influential 
Methodist members of the House of Commons. However, in 
December Goldie reported to the Mission Board that the London 
trip might not be necessary, as he was going to meet the Land 
Commissioner to discuss matters. Goldie did not go to London, 
and in June 1923 the Mission Board congratulated him for the
31'favourable results' he had obtained from the Land Commission.
It is not known what transpired at Goldie's meeting with 
Phillips, but he certainly did not secure any further concess­
ions or come to an agreement with the Commissioner. For when 
Phillips began hearings in March 1923 he still considered that 
the boycott was a possibility, and Francis remained the 
official Deputy. In fact, Goldie retreated and agreed to offer 
his 'assistance' to the Deputy on the terms that he had
previously rejected, for this was the role he adopted during
32the subsequent hearings.
There were several possible reasons for Goldie's 
uncharacteristic backdown. In previous confrontations with the 
administration, such as the Zito affair and the question of 
District Officer Hill's conduct, Goldie had solid evidence of 
misconduct on which to base his case, and was thus eventually 
able to force the government to retreat. However, in his
* MCN Minutes for 14- August 1 9 2 2, 12 December 1 9 2 2, 24-23  
January 1 9 2 3, and 11 June 1 9 2 3.
^  LC IV. No.22C/23, Phillips to H.C., 17 April 1923-
LC I. Claim No.20, Notes of Proceedings at Inquiry of 
Land Commission.
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stand on the Land Commission, there was no such evidence. He
had no answer to the rebut als of the charges he had made
against Francis, which in any case did not directly bear upon
the Land Commission. The list of complaints that Goldie
supposedly was to take to London did not bear up to examination.
The charge that the administration had been responsible for
the unjust alienation of land was true - but the Land
Commission had been established to deal with this matter. It
was also true that some of Alexander's recommendations had been
unsatisfactory - but the administration had already ordered
rehearings of these cases, without the prompting of the Mission.
The threat to drag out the details of the Zito affair was an
empty one: the officers involved had all retired or left the
Protectorate, and Goldie himself had been content to sit on
the truth for over a decade. Goldie had been bluffing, and
when his hand was called he lost the game.
Throughout the entire course of the argument over
representation Goldie maintained that he was merely acting
in accordance with the islanders' wishes, taking no active
part in the formulation of policy, and that he had no
ambitions or motives apart from the protection of the islanders' 
33interests.  ^ Goldie considered himself to be 'not in any way
34an interested party'. This latter statement was demonstrably 
unbrue: three of the claims were sectarian in origin and
^  WPHC No.26 of 1922, Memorandum: from the Land Commissioner 
to the Acting Resident Commissioner, 10 December 1921.
LC IV. No .33P, Goldie to Barley, 21 October 1921.
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directed, at Goldie's evangelical rivals, the Adventists. In
addition, there was a non-sectarian claim against a Methodist
holding on Ranongga, a claim on Vella Lavella which affected
Goldie's property at Mundi Mundi, and another claim against
the property of a deceased planter who had appointed Goldie
as his executor, a position which obliged the missionary to
35negotiate with the claimants.  ^ Although Goldie was clearly
an 'interested party' in all of these cases, there still
remained his claim to be the desired representative of the
'native claimants' and the 'Chiefs of the Western Solomon
Islands'. Goldie never specifically defined the number and
nature of those who had supposedly given him their endorsement,
but preferred to speak generally of the 'claimants' or
'native owners of land' in the Western Solomons, without
• 36excluding any particular group or individual. Obviously,
Goldie did not have the support of those Adventist adherents
whose ownership of land they had leased to the S.D.A. Mission
was being challenged by Methodist claimants. The Adventists
stenuously denied Goldie's unqualified claim to be representing
the wishes of the people of the New Georgia Group, and their
objections were probably the strongest argument against
37accepting Goldie's demands.
^  "Claim Nos. 25, 26, 27, 50, 52, 53, respectively.
^  WPHC No.26 of 1922, op.cit. Enel. Goldie to Phillips,
6 January 1921, 14 February 1921, 21 February 1921.
57 WPHC No.2370 of 1922, Kane to H.C., 8 August 1922. Enel. 
Blunder to Kane, 8 August 1922.
No.2970 of 1921, H.C. to C.O., 24 September 1921.
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Goldie's status as a representative of the 
'claimants' ultimately rested upon the signatories of the 
petitions, which provided the only hard evidence to substantiate 
his position. The largest petition, that sent to the Colonial 
Office in November 1921, contained the signatures (or marks) 
of forty-two 'Chiefs of the Western Solomon Islands', of which 
three were from Choiseul, two from Mono, and the remainder from 
the New Georgia Group. While not 'Chiefs', most of the signat­
ories were the recognised leaders of 'lines' or mbutu mbutu, 
and thus would have been entitled to speak with authority on 
matters concerning land, after consulting with their kinsmen.
The thirty-seven New Georgian signatories were all Methodists. 
Twenty-four were from the Roviana Lagoon area, of which nineteen 
were from the western end of the Lagoon, in the vicinity of 
the Methodist headquarters at Kokenggolo. Of the remainder, 
seven were from Vella Lavella, three from the Marovo, two
38from Kusaghe, and one each from Rendova and Kolombangara.
Of the thirty-seven New Georgians who signed the 
petition, sixteen are mentioned in the records of the Land 
Commission as claimants; twenty-four other claimants so 
mentioned do not appear on the petition. The petition was 
thus endorsed by 40% of those who had lodged claims to be heard 
by the Land Commission. However, there is evidence to suggest 
that some of the signatories did not know, or were misled, 
about the contents of the document. Francis obtained statements 
from Aqo and Iqolo, two of the signatories, that they had
38 WPHC No.26 of 1922, Barley to H.C., 6 December 1921. Enel. 
Petition.
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39been told to ’touch the pen’ and that they were unaware of
the meaning of the petition. Phillips also claimed that he
had been told by signatories of the petition that they thought
it was merely a request for Goldie to help them at the Commiss- 
40ion. Thus Goldie could only legitimately claim the support 
of less than half of the claimants, and it is by no means clear 
that these were fully informed of the nature of their endorse­
ment. Two-thirds of the signatories came from Roviana, where 
Goldie was stationed and his influence was at its strongest. 
There is no evidence to suggest a widespread feeling throughout 
the Group in support of Goldie's efforts. Once armed with the 
petitions, Goldie acted as though he was the arbiter in the 
matter. He rejected the compromise offered by Phillips at 
the meeting in Australia without reference to or consultation 
with the petitioners. He appears to have been reluctant to 
allow the islanders to discuss the matter on their own behalf 
with either Phillips or the administration: he advised the
islanders against seeing Phillips in August 1922, and admonished
41others who talked to Francis about land questions.
Ultimately, it was the sudden resolution of the affair 
which revealed that Goldie's stance was not an accurate reflect­
ion of the wishes of the islanders. In February 1923 the 
Methodist Mission Board was preparing itself for Goldie's
59 WPHC No.2671 of 1922, Kane to H.C., 26 August 1922.
Enel. Francis to Kane, 22 August 1922.
40 WPHC No.3658 of 1926, Kane to H.C., 10 January 1927. Enel. 
Phillips to Kane, 4 December 1926.
41 WPHC No.2671 of 1922, Kane to H.C., 26 August 1922. Enel. 
Francis to Kane, 22 August 1922.
trip to London: this was to be the culmination of two years of 
sustained opposition to the form of the Land Commission. In 
March Phillips convened his first hearing in the Group, and 
it was conducted on the terms of the administration. This 
hearing was at Kohinggo, a few miles from Munda and in the 
neighbourhood of the majority of the petitioners. It was
attended by the eight claimants (six of whom had signed the
\ 4Ppetition;, fifty other islanders, and Goldie. In the next
three months Phillips heard a further four claims, and his
inquiries were attended by over five hundred islanders.
Phillips had predicted that nothing would hinder the islanders
from participating once the hearings commenced, and events
44proved him right. The Land Commission had created 
tremendous interest amongst the islanders of the Group, and 
it is doubtful whether Goldie would have been able to organise 
and sustain a boycott of its proceedings. If the missionary 
had gone to London, the hearings would have gone ahead in his 
absence and he would have forfeited any chance of influencing 
their outcome. Neither could Goldie now refuse to assist 
the islanders before the Commission, for such an action would 
make a mockery of his claim to be only concerned with their 
interests.
42 LC I. Claim No.20, 'Notes of Proceedings at Inquiry'.
4d LC I. No.21, 'Report of Land Commissioner', dated 16 May 1923 
Claim No.32, 'Report of the Land Commissioner', dated 9 June 
1923. Claim No.25, 'Land Commissioner's Preliminary Report' 
dated 30 July 1923.
WPHC No.2671 of 1922, Kane to H.C., 26 August 1922.44
The dispute over the terms of the Land Commission
was the culmination of over a decade of conflict between
administration officials and the Methodist Mission in the
Group. To the Resident Commissioner, Kane, it was a 'final
trial of strength' from which the government had to emerge
45victorious or else 'forfeit all prestige'. Goldie also saw
the dispute as part of a continuing struggle in which the
beleaguered Mission had sought to restrain a misguided and
46unjust administration. Only in Goldie's mind, his own and 
the Mission's prestige had become indistinguishable from the 
welfare of the islanders, which was ostensibly the objective 
of his actions. According to Phillips, Goldie was even prep­
ared to guarantee Levers and other planters acceptable settle­
ments if they would support his campaign to be the representat-
47lve of the islanders at the Land Commission. 1 While there
is no reason to believe that Phillips fabricated this story,
its validity must remain open to doubt, for it is not known
who were the Commissioner's informants. Levers had no love
for Goldie, as they considered him to have been responsible for
48promoting many of the claims against their holdings. Whatever 
the truth of Phillip's allegation, it is nevertheless clear
^  ibid.
46 _LC IV. No.33C, Goldie to Barley, 27 September 1921.
^  WPHC No.3658 of 1926, Kane to H.C., 10 January 1927- Enel. 
Phillips to Kane, 4 December 1926.
48 Unilever Archives. MFP. TT3734.112A 'Sunlight Works Sydney 
1906-23', Meek to Leverhulme, 5 November 1923.
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that Goldie had assumed an authority to speak and act for the 
islanders which, in reality, he did not possess. In his 
determination to secure a victory over the administration 
Goldie had not reflected the desires of the islanders, whose 
first consideration was their land rather than the prestige 
of Goldie and the mission.
In contrast to the friction generated by the dispute 
over representation on the Commission, which seems to have been 
confined to the European participants, the actual hearing of 
the claims in the New Georgia Group proceeded smoothly and 
without difficulties. There was no apparent reluctance on the 
part of the claimants to work with the official Deputy and the 
Commission. With the exception of the Levers Occupation 
Certificate cases, which were in a different category, Phillips 
attempted to get both claimants and defendants to negotiate 
settlements acceptable to all parties. By encouraging concil­
iation, Phillips hoped to foster lasting settlements which 
would not be the cause of further acrimony and debate. This 
approach was largely successful, and the Commissioner was 
able to make his recommendations on the basis of negotiated 
agreements in all but one case. In the Levers cases, there 
were no ’defendants', as it was the government, and not the 
company, which had declared the land 'waste'. Thus it was 
Phillips' duty to determine the validity of the islanders' 
claims to have occupied or owned the 'waste' land, and if
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satisfied of their truth, to recommend to the government that 
such land be withdrawn from the Certificate.
There were ten non-Levers claims in the New Georgia 
Group listed for Phillips’ consideration. Two of these were 
settled in 1922, before the dispute with Goldie had ended. 
Interestingly, both directly involved the missionary. The 
first concerned a Methodist Mission block at Kundu, on 
Ranongga. Goldie had purchased this property in 1907 for £5 
from the islander, Sondo. The original deed contained a rough 
description of the boundaries of the block and estimated its 
area at 15 acres. In July 1920 two men, Maipio and Tukejama, 
complained to Francis that the Methodist property encroached on 
the land of their clan, Sondo supported their claim, stating 
that the mission had occupied more than he had sold, and that 
furthermore, he had not been paid the £5- When the block was 
eventually surveyed, it was found to be 150 acres rather than 
the 15 acres stated in the deed. When Goldie was confronted 
with the claim, he was at first inclined to bluster, demanding 
that the administration compensate the islanders as it had 
approved the transaction. However, this approach ignored the 
disparity in acreages, and in March 1922 Goldie reconsidered 
and came to an agreement with the claimants, thus obviating 
the necessity of an inquiry by the Land Commissioner. Sondo 
was paid the £5 and the block was reduced to about 15 acres.^ 
Goldie could hardly afford to be placed in the position of a
^  LC IV. N0.25A/3, Goldie to Phillips, 6 January 1921.
LC I. Claim N0.5O, 'Report of the Land Commissioner', dated 
27 May 1922. 'Particulars of Claim'. 'Certified Copies 
of Documents'.
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defendant in a public inquiry, as he was at that time arguing 
that he was the desired representative of the ’native claimants'.
A similar situation arose with another claim: this 
involved a property at Mumea, Mbilua, that was part of the 
estate of a deceased planter, Julius Oien. Oien had appointed 
Goldie as his executor, and thus the missionary once more 
found himself in the embarrassing position of being the oppon­
ent of the claimants. Phillips inspected the land involved in 
the claim in March 1922, but a formal inquiry was not necessary, 
as Goldie, the claimants, and the official Deputy, Francis,
50reached an agreement which was satisfactory to the islanders.
Both of these cases were in stark contrast to Goldie's claims
at the time. Goldie had written without qualification, that
the 'natives' would never accept an official Deputy, yet the
Kundu and Mumea claimants had worked with Francis quite readily.
These claimants were not Adventists, but came from Methodist
villages. Goldie had cooperated with the Commission to
produce two successful settlements, despite his description of
51it as an 'instrument of injustice'. These contradictions 
were ignored by the missionary, and he persisted with his 
campaign to alter the terms of the Commission for another year.
In the four months following March 1923 Phillips 
dealt with the remaining eight non-Levers cases. These comprised 
four claims against planting companies, three against the S.D.A. 
Mission, and one claim by a European concern, the Union
^  LC II. '(Photostat Copies) 1920-1924'. Claim No.53, 'Report 
of the Land Commissioner.13 June 1922'.
^  LC IV. No .33F, Goldie to Barley, 8 December 1921.
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Plantations Co., to land at Ndovele. It is difficult to see
how this last case came within the terms of the Commission,
which specified 'native' claims to land. In any event, the
question did not arise for the company withdrew its claim in 
52June 1923- The first case considered, at Kohinggo, 
involved a freehold 1,600 acre block purchased in 1911 and 
owned by Kindar Ltd. The dispute centred on a misunderstand­
ing concerning the boundaries of the property. In 19^5 the 
islanders had complained that the company was clearing land 
they used for gardens, and the dispute had continued from 
that time. Alexander had recommended a cash compensation and 
the establishment of a ten acre 'native reserve' for gardens. 
The claimants, who included the original vendor and other 
representatives of his mbutu mbutu objected 'in no uncertain 
manner' when they were fully informed of Alexander's 
recommendations. Phillips inspected the ground with the 
claimants, the manager of Kindar Ltd., Francis and Goldie and 
a settlement was eventually made: the company surrendered the
land used for gardens, but was compensated with other land to
55bring its holdings back to 1,600 acres. ^
The next three cases heard by Phillips were all on 
Vella Lavella, and the basis of the claims in all three was 
the same: that the original vendor had had no right to sell 
all-, or part, of the land. Again, the Land Commissioner managed
LC I. Claim No.48, Copy of Gazettal No.20 of 1923- 
53 LC I. Claim No.20, 'Report of the Land Commissioner on Claim 
No.20', dated 28 March 1923-
WPHC No.904 of 1920, Alexander to H.C., 9 April 1920. Enel. 
Alexander to Workman, 9 April 1920.
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to secure agreements that were satisfactory to all the parties
concerned. One of the cases was straightforward: the
representatives of a toutou which had not been consulted in
the sale of a block of land at Simbilando, in the Njava
district, and two islets offshore, claimed an interest
in the land. A settlement was reached whereby the European
owners, the Union Plantations Co. returned the islets to
54the claimants, and retained the remainder.
The other two cases were more complex, and had their 
origins in developments that had occured in the previous 
century. One of these, concerning land at Liapari, at the 
southern end of the Mbilua district, had already been the 
subject of a brief inquiry by Alexander. His recommendation, 
a straight cash compensation, was unsatisfactory to both 
parties. The Liapari claim had its origins in the rise of the 
big-man Tulo in the latter decades of the nineteenth century. 
Tulo had attracted a non-cognatic following through the acquis­
ition of wealth and prestige in dealings with European 
traders. Tulo was not a traditional lekasa in Mbilua with 
rights to the land, but he did acquire a reputation amongst 
Europeans as a 'chief' of the district. Tulo's nephew and 
heir, Soso, continued in his uncle's footsteps. He too was 
regarded by Europeans as a chief, and eventually was appointed 
a headman by the administration. One of Soso's main sources 
of income was the sale of land, and it was these transactions 
which were at the centre of the Liapari claim. Tulo had been 
given permission to live on the Liapari land by the Mbilua
^  LC I. Claim No.49, 'Report of the Land Commissioner', 
dated 21 May 1923.
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t o u t o u , i n  r e t u r n  f o r  a c t i n g  a s  a  m i d d l e m a n  i n  t h e i r  d e a l i n g s  
w i t h  E u r o p e a n s .  I n  1 9 0 8 ,  a f t e r  T u l o ' s  d e a t h ,  S o s o  s o l d  t h i s  
l a n d  t o  H u se n  & C o . , a n d  i t  w as  e v e n t u a l l y  t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  t h e  
U n io n  P l a n t a t i o n s  Co. The p o s i t i o n  was  f u r t h e r  c o m p l i c a t e d  by 
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  some o f  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  l a n d  o v e r l a p p e d  w i t h  t h e  
a d j a c e n t  h o l d i n g s  o f  t h e  M e t h o d i s t  M i s s i o n ,  a t  S i k u n i , a n d  
t h e r e  h a d  b e e n  v i o l e n t  d i s p u t e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  tw o  c o n c e r n s .  
P h i l l i p s  a p p r o a c h e d  t h e s e  p r o b l e m s  w i t h  g r e a t  t a c t ,  a n d  t h e  
e v e n t u a l  a g r e e m e n t  s e t t l e d  a l l  t h e  d i s p u t e s  i n  t h e  L i a p a r i /  
S i k u n i  a r e a ,  s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  c o m p a n y ,  t h e  M i s s i o n  a n d  t h e  
c l a i m a n t s .  T h e r e  w as  a n  i n t e r e s t i n g  s i d e l i g h t  t o  t h i s  c a s e .  
D u r i n g  t h e  i n s p e c t i o n  o f  t h e  a r e a ,  P h i l l i p s  n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  
c l a i m a n t s  s e e m e d  d i s p o s e d  t o  d i s p u t e  p a r t  o f  t h e  M e t h o d i s t  
h o l d i n g s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h o s e  o f  t h e  c o m p an y .  T h i s  was  h a r d l y  
s u r p r i s i n g ,  a s  S o s o  h a d  a l s o  b e e n  on e  o f  t h e V e n d o r s -  o f  t h e  
M i s s i o n ' s  l a n d .  G o l d i e  s ee m s  t o  h a v e  b e e n  s u c c e s s f u l  i n  
q u i e t e n i n g  t h e s e  s t i r r i n g s ,  f o r  t h e  M e t h o d i s t ' s  p r o p e r t y  
e m e r g e d  i n t a c t  i n  t h e  f i n a l  s e t t l e m e n t  w h i c h  was  a c c e p t e d  by  
t h e  c l a i m a n t s .  ^
The t h i r d  c a s e  i n v e s t i g a t e d  by  P h i l l i p s  on V e l l a  
L a v e l l a  was  a n o t h e r  t r i b u t e  t o  h i s  d i p l o m a c y .  T h i s  i n v o l v e d  
l a n d  on t h e  n o r t h e r n  e n d  o f  t h e  i s l a n d ,  a t  V o r a m b a r i .  I n  1918  
t h e  R u r u v a i  P l a n t a t i o n s  S y n d i c a t e  a p p l i e d  f o r  a  Crown L e a s e  o f  
a  b l o c k  o f  l a n d  a t  V o r a m b a r i .  I n  1 9 2 0  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
o f  t h e  S o r e j a r u  t o u t o u  d i s p u t e d  t h e  r i g h t  o f  t h e  l e s s o r s ,  t h e
LC I .  C l a i m  N o . 2 1 ,  ' C o r r e s p o n d e n c e  b e f o r e  S u b m i s s i o n  o f  
C l a i m ' , p a s s i m .  ' R e p o r t  o f  t h e  L a n d  C o m m i s s i o n e r ' , d a t e d  
16  May 192$2
WPHC N o . 1208  o f  1 9 2 0 ,  A l e x a n d e r  t o  H . C . , 11 May 1 9 2 0 ;  B a r l e y  
t o  H . C . , 16  J a n u a r y  1 9 2 2 .
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Zondo toutou, to convey the land. The basis of this claim was
traditional: the Sorejaru toutou had not lived at Vorambari 
in living memory, but according to tradition their clan had 
originated in the area. The lessors had migrated from Choiseul 
'generations ago', and had settled in northwest Vella Lavella, 
then unoccupied. Phillips had to tread carefully in this 
case, as there was the possibility of exacerbating sectarian 
tension, as the two sides were adherents of different missions. 
After hearing the evidence Phillips suggested the basis for 
a comprehensive agreement, which would not only cover the 
Vorambari land, but also settle the disputes between the Sore­
jaru and various other toutou. Phillips then left the islanders 
to discuss the matter. The eventually produced an agreement 
much the same as that suggested by the Land Commissioner: it 
involved the foreshore, hinterland and adjacent islets of a 
coastal stretch seven miles long, and was agreed to by the 
representatives of eight separate toutou. It confirmed the 
right of the Zondo toutou to let Vorambari, but also conceded 
certain areas to the Sorejaru toutou.^6 This case was a 
tribute to the diligence and tact of the Land Commissioner: 
he produced a workable agreement from a mass of contradictory 
and obscure evidence, and then wisely allowed the islanders 
to determine its justice.
Phillips abilities were to be further tested by the 
last three non- Levers cases he heard; these were the claims
56 WPHC No.1975 of 1925, Kane to H.C. , 13 July 1923. Enel.
Claim No.52, 'Report of the Land Commissioner', dated
9 June 1929. Incorporating 'Notes of Proceedings'.
by Methodist adherents against certain holdings of the S.D.A. 
mission, which were a continuation of Goldie's campaign to 
curtail the expansion of the Adventists. In 1919 he had 
unsuccessfully attempted to have the S.D.A. leases in Ndovele 
and Ughele invalidated, although in the latter district the 
Methodists had been able to establish their land rights in 
some parts of the area. The Ughele claim was revived at the 
Land Commission. The other two claims were against the 
Adventist leases at Viru, in southeastern New Georgia, and on 
Telina Island, in the Marovo Lagoon. The passions roused 
in these disputes, particularly on the part of the European 
participants, was vastly disproportionate to the amount of 
land in question - a mere 73 acres. It was perhaps ironic 
that the Methodist Mission, whose holdings hugely exceeded 
those of the Adventists in size and which were all held under 
freehold title, should attack the small leaseholds of the rival 
mission. Of course, as the Adventist properties were leases, 
the claims were in fact against the lessors, who were accused 
of having no right to the land. This prompted one Adventist 
missionary to comment sarcastically that as soon as an islander 
Joined his mission, it was 'found' that he had no land. ^  The 
S.D.A. Mission was prepared to engage counsel to defend the 
cases on behalf of its adherents, but fortunately for Phillips, 
the. prospect of protracted legal battles before the Commission 
was averted when both missions agreed to do without such
57 AR, Vol.26, No.17 (7 August 1922), p. A.
assistance.
Phillips heard the three Adventist cases in success­
ion, beginning with the Ughele claim in early June 1925- This 
inquiry, over a piece of land worth £2-5, was attended by 
four Adventist missionaries, Goldie, and 200 islanders.
Phillips concluded, unsurprisingly, that the dispute was 
essentially a sectarian struggle, and he drily noted that 
there was less tension and more friendliness amongst the 
islanders by comparison with the manner of the European 
participants. Phillips was determined to avoid sectarian 
difficulties and he appealed to the islanders to come to an 
agreement amongst themselves which would settle all disputes 
in Ughele. He considered that if free from the influence of 
the rival missionaries, the islanders would probably come to an 
understanding. This expectation was fulfilled, and an 
agreement was reached by the islanders. Under its terms the 
land of the mbutu mbutu of both Methodist and Adventist 
adherents, represented by Muzicolo and Romiti respectively, 
was defined. Romiti's land included that which had been 
leased to the S.D.A. mission, whose title was thus confirmed. 
The only obstacles to a total acceptance of the agreement 
were the Europeans of both missions. Muzicolo refused to 
sign the agreement until Goldie had assented, which he did 
although believing that the Methodist islanders had conceded 
too much. Pastor Turner of the Adventists had similar thoughts
^  LC IV. No.5/^0, Allen, Allen & Helmsey to Phillips, 10 June 
1921. No.5/19, Allen, Allen & Helmsey to Phillips,
29 September 1921.
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he considered that the agreement was too favourable to the 
Methodists and that it might jeopardise the expansion of his 
own mission. However, in January 1924 the agreement was event­
ually confirmed, and appears to have contributed to a marked
59decrease in sectarian conflict in the district.
The second Adventist case, at Viru, was a much 
simpler affair. The two claimants, Lukata and Vundere, were 
members of the Galasa 'line* that had leased the land to the 
S.D.A. Mission. They were both Methodists who no longer lived 
on Viru, but at Saikile, in the Roviana Lagoon. As the remain­
der of the Galasa 'line' lived at Viru and had consented to 
the lease, there was little chance of it being overturned. 
Francis, the Deputy, encouraged the claimants to withdraw
their claim on the understanding that they would be consulted
60in the future land dealings of their ’line’A Interestingly, 
both Lukata and Vundere were both signatories of the petitions, 
in which they had been designated ’Chiefs' of Saikile.
The final non-Levers case heard by the Land Commission­
er was the claim against the Adventist lease on Telina, a small 
island in the Marovo Lagoon to the north of Vangunu. This was 
the only case heard by Phillips that was not settled by agree-
59 LC I. Claim No.25, 'Report of the Land Commissioner 4 June 
1924'. 'Land Commissioner's Preliminary Report $0 July 
9925'.
AR, Vol.28, No.27 (7 July 1924), p. 2.
LC IV. N0.3A/7, Phillips to Turner, 21 June 1923«
N0.3A/8 , Phillips to Goldie, 22 June 1923- 
N0.3A/8A, Goldie to Phillips, 23 June 1923-
60 LC I. Claim No.27, 'Report of the Land Commissioner', 
dated 27 June 1923-
LC IV. N0.3C/5, Phillips to Turner, 26 June 1923.
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ment. The claimants were Mbareke 'bush* people, who had lived
in the mountains of Vangunu until the cessation of conflict in
the Marovo. The defendants were 'salt-water’ people who had
lived on Telina for several generations. The two groups were
traditional foes whose animosity had continued with their
respective adherence to the rival missions. Both sides
ultimately based their cases on events that had occurred three
or four generations beforehand. As the evidence was at total
variance and incapable of proof either way, Phillips decided
against the claimants as they had not been able to explain
the admitted fact of the defendants' occupation of the
61island. Thus the S.D.A. lease was confirmed.
The success of the Adventists before the Land 
Commission increased their prestige and confirmed them as an 
established force in the New Georgia Group. The spheres of 
influence of both missions were now firmly established and 
demarcated, and although there were to be recurrent skirmishes 
between the two, their basic areas of support were to remain 
unchanged. By the mid-1920s practically all of the islanders 
in the Group were committed to either of the missions; thus 
while Goldie could no longer hope to roll back the Adventist 
advance, neither could the latter expect to make further 
large gains.
Phillips' hearings of the non-Levers cases in the 
New Georgia Group had been an exceptional piece of work. He 
had constantly striven for consensus, attempting to encourage 
settlements that would encompass all aspects of the disputes
LC I. Claim No.26, 'Report of the Land Commissioner', 
dated 18 June 1924. 'Notes of Proceedings at Inquiry of 
Land Commissioner'.
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and be successful in the long term. Wherever possible he 
had allowed the islanders to be the determinants of the agree­
ments, realising that their cooperation and satisfaction were 
the key factors in guaranteeing the success of a settlement.
He had tried to act as a conciliator, and not as a judge. The 
Levers cases were to be much more difficult: here there was 
no scope for negotiation and conciliation, and the Land 
Commissioner's only option was to judge. As a consequence, 
Phillips' performance was more open to adverse criticism. - How­
ever, considering the restrictive terms of his Commission, the 
Land Commissioner's handling of the Levers cases was commendable.
When Phillips commenced duty as Land Commissioner in 
November 1920 he was informed that consideration of the Levers 
claims would be deferred until the issue of a new licence to
replace the Occupation Certificate that had been signed in
ftp191 A." King's Regulation No.3 of 1921 empowered the High
Commissioner to grant the new certificate, which was embodied
in its schedule. Clause 6 of the schedule gave the High
Commissioner the right to withdraw any land determined to be
owned, occupied or cultivated by the islanders at the date 1 
63January 1904. Such land would revert to the islanders with­
out compensation to the holder of the certificate; however, 
Clause 3 allowed for a reduction in rent in the event of a
WPHC No.3151 of 1920, Hill to H.C., 27 December 1920. Enel. 
Memorandum of the Land Commissioner, 27 November 1920.
This was the date of the first Certificate of Occupation.63
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withdrawal of land. Levers agreed to the withdrawal of 
any land recommended by the Commission, on the condition of a 
proportional adjustment of rent. The company adopted the 
attitude that as the government had granted the concession, 
it was its responsibility to determine the validity of the 
claims, and settle them. They made no attempt to defend the
65cases, but did sent a representative to watch the proceedings.^
In any event, there was no chance of an agreement being reached
between the islanders and either Levers or the government, for
the claimants were all unwilling to sell or lease any land that
was returned to them. This attitude was maintained throughout
66all the hearings of the Levers cases. This was not surpris­
ing. In some areas, most notably the Vona Vona Lagoon and 
southwest New Georgia, Levers had caused great resentment 
amongst the islanders when it began to develop parts of its 
concession, of which the islanders were totally unaware. In 
other districts, such as Kusaghe and Hoava, the Levers concess­
ion incorporated all the coastal land that was available to 
the islanders, and its loss would have denied them access to 
the sea.
The uncompromising attitude of the islanders 
surprised Phillips when he returned to the Group in September
64
LG I. Documents Accompanying 'Lever Report' File 'C', 
Printed Copy of King's Regulation No.3 of 1921.
65 LC IV. No.22C/35 (1), Fulton to Kane, 16 June 1923. 
No.220/35 (15)? Fulton to Kane, 1 August 1923.
66 LC I. 'Lever Report', p. 73*
1923 to begin hearing the Levers cases, for several months 
earlier he had commented on the 'conciliatory mood' of the 
islanders and had expressed a hope that it might facilitate 
a quick settlement of the Levers claims.^ the Land Commiss­
ioner appears to have mistakenly assumed that because the 
islanders were willing to negotiate on the smaller claims, 
then they would be happy to do so with regard to the Levers 
cases, which involved tens of thousands of acres.
The mode of inquiry adopted by Phillips was much the 
same as that employed in the previous claims, only on a vaster 
scale. The land was first inspected by the Commissioner with 
the claimants: the area under dispute was thus clearly 
demarcated, and signs of previous occupation or use could be 
verified. The inspections also had the effect of further 
advertising the hearings of evidence that followed. With 
few exceptions, the islanders testified in their own languages, 
which were translated into pidgin English by interpreters.
Even islanders who could speak English generally seem to have 
preferred this procedure, apparently fearing possible misunder­
standings. The interpreters were all islanders, and ambiguities 
were eliminated by cross-examination. The unique feature of 
the Levers cases was that the claimants were required to prove 
that the land had been either 'owned', 'occupied' or 'cultivat­
ed' some twenty years earlier, in 1904, and then to establish 
a definite connection between the former 'owners' and themselves. 
Phillips adopted a broad definition of occupation and allowed 
a reasonable latitude in the question of dating. The whole
67 LC IV. No.22C/32, Phillips to Kane, 12 July 1923«
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zone of land surrounding areas which had been used for gardens 
and which was likely to be used for more cultivation was regard­
ed as 'occupied'. Phillips did not consider land which might
have been vacant in 1904, but which had been formerly occupied
68and not definitely abandoned, as 'waste land'.
Practically the entire Levers concession in the New 
Georgia Group, some 216,000 acres, was the subject of claims 
by islanders. The claims were in conglomerate form; that is, 
each separate claim referred to an entire island or district, 
and was put forward by a group of representatives of all the 
people concerned. There were seven claims, referring respect­
ively to those parts of the concession on Kolombangara,
Vona Vona, Kohinggo, the southwestern coast of New Georgia 
from Noro to Enoghae Bay, the Kusaghe-Lupa district (from 
Enoghae Bay to Lever Harbour), the Hoava district (from Lever 
Harbour to the Niva River), and Ghizo.^ Phillips began work 
on the claims in September 1923, and concluded the hearings in 
April 1924. The result of his inquiries was the recommended 
return of about 77,500 acres to the islanders; this area was 
comprised of about 40,000 acres from Kolombangara, 25,000 acres 
from New Georgia Island (Kusaghe-Lupa and Hoava), and 12,000
from Vona Vona and Kohinggo. None of this land had been
70developed by Levers.
LC I. 'Lever Report', pp. 79-80, 82-92.
69 LC I. Claims Nos.30-37, 55- ’Particulars of Claims'.
70 WPHC No.2951 of 1925, Kane to H.C., 30 April 1926.
The basis of the Land Commissioner's decisions was 
his conception of customary land tenure. Phillips considered 
that land was communally owned by 'lines' or cognatic groups.
He was somewhat confused by the diversity of evidence on what 
constituted a 'line': different witnesses stated that the
descent system was matrilineal, patrilineal or bilateral. 
Phillips concluded that this multiplicity of opinion was the 
result of a continuing swing away from a strict matrilineal 
system, such as that on Vella Lavella, to a bilateral form of 
descent. However, this surmise did not affect his recommendat­
ions in any way, for he did not assert that matrilineal descent 
was the only legitimate determinant of an individual's interest 
in land, but accepted the islanders' own variable criteria. 
Phillips believed that in pre-European times a descent group 
occupied a locality - a tract of land not usually defined by 
boundaries - and that demarcation would have only occurred in 
the event of conflict, or perhaps in the definition of garden 
areas. Outside of these localities were vast residual areas 
of bush which were used for pig-hunting, nutting or as a 
source of material by the islanders of different 'lines'.
Thus the use of the bush was not exclusive, and such land 
was not regarded as belonging to any 'line' in particular until
it was definitely appropriated through settlement or cultivat- 
71ion_. It was these residual areas of bush that Levers were 
to retain on Phillips' recommendations, and which were to be 
the centre of later controversy.
71 LC I. 'Lever Report', pp. 44-61.
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The first Levers claim investigated by Phillips was 
at Kolombangara, and his approach to this case typified that 
employed on all the subsequent hearings. Kolombangara was 
the site of Levers largest single block, almost 150,000 acres.
The only land retained by the islanders was a small sector 
in the southwest of the island, between Hambere and Sambira.
This area was the only part of the island where the smooth 
slopes of the extinct volcano were broken by spurs and hills, 
and it provided the islanders with some protection in the head­
hunting era. However, they had kept canoes on the shore and 
were accustomed to use the coastal plain for coconut plantations, 
camping and fishing. By the time of the Commission all of the 
Kolombangara islanders, some two hundred to two hundred and 
fifty people, had settled on the coast. Their representatives 
now claimed the entire island.
The physical and oral evidence examined by Phillips 
indicated that the Kolombangara islanders had occupied and 
used extensive areas contained in the concession. There were 
established coconut plantations and old village, garden and 
hope sites scattered throughout all the south western quarter 
of the island. The Commissioner accordingly recommended that 
the entire southwestern quarter of the island, from Varu to 
Paparaka, be declared 'native land'. This had the effect 
of removing some 40,000 acres from the concession. The 
remaining northern and eastern parts of the island were 
retained by Levers. There were traces of former occupation 
in this area, and witnesses claimed that it had been inhabited 
before their lifetimes. However they were unable to establish 
a connection between the former occupants and themselves, as
353
they could not provide any detailed information about them.
The area had also been used occasionally for pig-hunting and 
fishing, but such activities had been infrequent during the 
head-hunting era due to the risks involved. Phillips did 
not consider this sufficient evidence of exclusive ownership of 
the land, although he did set aside six ten acre blocks scatter­
ed around the northern and eastern coasts to be returned to
72the islanders as bases for fishing and camping.
The Land Commissioner approach to the Kolombangara 
claim was repeated throughout the remaining hearings. If there 
was evidence of occupation or cultivation of an area, and the 
claimants could demonstrate a connection between the former 
inhabitants and themselves, then that entire locality would be 
declared 'native land'. To establish a connection it was 
necessary for the claimants to describe who the former occup­
ants were, what 'lines' they belonged to, and how these 'lines' 
were related to those of the claimants. Phillips accepted 
statements of relationship in good faith, and did not demand 
genealogical records or evidence of direct descent. Outside 
of the occupied localities were the bush areas that may have 
been used for fishing, hunting or nutting, but which were not 
'owned', 'occupied' or 'cultivated' exclusively by any 
particular group. Accordingly, Phillips did not classify 
these areas as 'native land', and they were retained by 
Levers.
The second claim heard was at Vona Vona Island, 
of which some 7}770 acres were included in the concession. The
72 ibid., pp. 93-1'12.
evidence indicated that this area had been used for planting 
and gardening by Munda islanders since the late nineteenth 
century. Fear of head-hunting raids had forced the islanders 
to live at Munda, but they had continued to use Vona Vona and 
after the cessation of raiding had begun settling in the 
district. Phillips recommended that the entire area be 
returned to the islanders.  ^ The next claim, at Kohinggo, was 
more complicated, for Levers had already established a 
plantation on the island. The land involved was a strip 
along the eastern and northern coast of Kohinggo, with adjacent 
islets, some 6,700 acres in all. The land had not been 
settled, but had been used for pig-hunting, camping and fishing. 
In 1911 Levers had paid Veo, a representative of the various 
mbutu mbutu with an interest in the land, £25 to settle the 
claims against the holding. While Levers claimed that this 
payment had been for the entire block, Veo maintained that it 
had been only for the land already cleared by the company. 
Phillips compromised and returned 4,100 acres to the islanders, 
while allowing the company to retain their plantation and some 
additional land, 2,600 acres in all.^
The fourth claim, the only one to be almost entirely 
rejected, involved 7?615 acres on southwest New Georgia Island, 
between Noro and Enoghae Bay. This land was claimed by Kasa, 
representative of the Munda mbutu mbutu which considered them­
selves to be of Kazakuru origin. The claim was based on
^  ibid., pp. 112-22.
74 ibid., pp. 122-28.
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tradition: the area was said to have been the home of the 
Kazakuru before they migrated to Munda and were absorbed by 
the Roviana speaking people. No-one had lived on the land with­
in living memory, although it was occasionally used for hunting 
and fishing expeditions. Even these were infrequent, as the 
area was well exposed to raiders from Kolombangara and Kusaghe. 
Even in Mahaffy's time visits to the area had been made with 
great caution and only in daytime. In 1911 Levers had paid £25 
to Gumi, the father of Kasa, to settle claims which were 
made after the company began clearing operations at Noro. 
Phillips concluded that the land had been unoccupied in 1904 
and rejected the claim, although he did set aside a small block
for the islanders at Lambete Kopi, a place which had been the
75base for fishing expeditions.
The remaining Levers land on New Georgia Island 
consisted of a coastal stretch from Enoghae Bay to the Niva 
River, some 3 8 ,4 0 0 acres in area, and the subject of two 
separate claims. The first of these was made by representatives 
of the Kusaghe and Lupa people, and covered the land from 
Enoghae to Lever Harbour. The Kusaghe and Lupa people were 
small in number (about 3 0 0 in 1923) and had become united under 
the big-man Vilingi in the late nineteenth century. Both 
Kusaghe and Lupa seem to have been in conflict with the 
neighbouring islanders of Hoava, Roviana and Kolombangara.
These pressures, combined with their numerical weakness, 
probably prompted their unification. The Kusaghe-Lupa people 
had lived in the mountainous bush, but had used the coastal
75 ibid., pp. 129-37-
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land regularly for fishing and planting. They had begun to 
settle on the coast in 1908-9 and this migration had accelerated 
when they had learned of the Levers concession and had been 
anxious to buttress their claim to the land. Phillips found 
extensive evidence of former occupation and use of the land be­
tween the Hanggaana River and the futuna Lagoon, and he 
recommended that this area be returned to the islanders. How­
ever, from Enoghae to Hanggorana and from Tutuna to Lever Harb­
our there was no such evidence and this land remained with 
Levers. None of the new settlements were in these areas, for 
the coastal villages had been established along the shores 
adjacent to the mountains that had been formerly occupied.^
The remaining Levers land on New Georgia Island, from Lever 
Harbour to the Niva River, encompassed the Hoava district.
Also included in the concession were the islands of the 
lagoon opposite the mainland. This land was the province of 
the Ndekurana (or Hoava) and Ramata people, who had lived 
together since the 1880s, when they had joined to protect 
themselves more effectively against raiders. The evidence 
clearly indicated that the land had long been occupied and 
Phillips accordingly recommended that it revert to the 
islanders.^
The final Levers claim heard by Phillips was on Ghizo, 
two-thirds of which was included in the concession. Ghizo had 
been abandoned before 1900, its inhabitants moving to Vella 
Lavella, Roviana and Kolombangara. There were only two
76 ibid. , pp. 137-54-.
77 ibid., pp. 155-63.
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surviving Ghizo islanders, and they had not lived on the 
island since their childhood. The only signs of former 
occupation or use of the island were several small stands of 
coconut trees. Phillips set aside these areas (a total of 270 
acres) for the claimants and confirmed the remainder (6,920 
acres) as Levers land.^
Although the hearings into the Levers cases concluded 
in April 1924, it was not until May of the following year that 
Phillips completed his report. A further sixteen months 
passed before the claimants were given a detailed explanation 
of the Land Commissioner's recommendations. Their reaction 
was unfavourable, and in October 1926 a petition from the 
'Chiefs' of the New Georgia Group criticising Phillips' decisions 
was forwarded to the High Commissioner. Like the previous 
petitions, the signatories were all Methodists sind predominantly 
from the Roviana Lagoon: both Phillips and Kane considered it 
to have been inspired by Goldie. The petition made four 
major points: that the recommendations were against the 
weight of the evidence; that the Land Commissioner was inexper­
ienced in 'native affairs' and had refused to accept 
assistance from the islanders to help him arrive at an under­
standing of the nature of the claims; that the 'Deputy for the 
Natives', Francis, was antagonistic to the islanders' interests 
and- that they had not been allowed to have their own represent­
ative, Goldie; and that the Land Commissioner assessed the 
claimants requirements rather than ownership.^
78 ibid., pp. 195-200.
79 WPHC No.5658 of 1926, Kane to H.C. , 23 November .1926. Enel.
Native Chiefs to Barley, 15 October 1926.
5lcemberH^ &  1° January 192?- Enel. Phillips to Kane, 4
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While Goldie may have framed the petition, and the
signatories may well have been unaware of its precise contents,
there was no doubt that it did reflect their unhappiness with
the outcome of the Commission. Barley, at the time District
Officer at Gizo, noted the ’undeniably bitter feeling' of the
claimants, and reported that objections would be lodged
80against most of the recommendations. The points contained 
in the petition were easily rebutted by Phillips: his recomm­
endations had been clearly based on the evidence he had 
collected, and had been concerned with the question of owner­
ship and not the requirements of the islanders. The personal 
criticism of Phillips and Francis was not borne out by the 
proceedings of the hearings. Kane advised the High Commissioner 
that the petition did not set forth any new grounds for not 
confirming the Land Commissioner's recommendations, and in 
June 1928 they were confirmed by the Colonial Office.^ This 
was followed by another protest signed by seventeen 'chiefs'. 
Barley reported that fourteen of these were unaware of what 
they had signed, and the Colonial Office saw no justifiable 
reason for reopening the matter. The decision remained final 
and in September 1931 a new Certificate of Occupation incorpor-
WPHC No.3658 of 1926, Kane to H.C., 9 November 1926. 
Enel. Barley to Kidson, 30 September 1926.
WPHC No.3658 of 1926, H.C. to C.O., 12 May 1927; C.O. to 
H.C., 13 June 1928.
82 WPHC N0.2JJ of 1929, Kidson to H.C., 3 January 1929; 
Barley to H.C., 22 March 1929; C.O. to H.C., 2 July 1929.
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83ating the recommendations was signed and registered.
At the centre of the claimants’ discontent with the
recommendations were the tracts of residual bush land which,
although they may have been used by the islanders generally,
had not been exclusively owned, occupied or cultivated by any
8Aparticular ’line' or group. Frequently these areas had been 
stretches of 'no man's land' between hostile districts: for 
example, the land between Roviana and Kusaghe, and that between 
Kusaghe and Hoava. Or, as in the case of Kolombangara and Ghizo, 
open and accessible country unsuitable for settlement in the 
time of the head-hunters. Phillips had rejected the claims to 
these areas because there had been no evidence that the land 
had been regarded as the territory of any particular group or 
'line' in 1904. Under the terms of his inquiry, this decision 
was a logical necessity.
Phillips' commission stipulated that he was to 
enquire and report upon 'specific cases ... of claims to land'.
He was further bound by King's Regulation No.3 of 1921, which 
stated that land 'owned', 'occupied' or 'cultivated' on 1 
January 1904 was to be withdrawn from Levers Occupation 
Certificate. The Land Commissioner was required to apply the 
latter criteria to the specific claims presented to him.
There was no room for him to consider the general, non­
exclusive use of land by the islanders: his task was to assess 
the cases presented by the Deputy on behalf of particular
83 WPHC No.2953 of 1928, Barley to H.C., 28 August 1932.
84 WPHC No.3658 of 1926, Kane to H.C., 23 November 1926.
Enel. Barley to Kidson, 7 November 1926. Sub-encl. Excerpt 
from Gizo District Quarterly Report, 17 October 1926.
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claimants. Unfortunately, the Land Commission had been 
established to resolve a number of pressing land disputes, and 
not to investigate generally the islanders' relationship with 
the land. The whole question of indigenous land tenure, and 
its application in a time of rapid social change, needed to be 
thoroughly examined and discussed. Instead, the Colonial 
Office, anxious to secure the resolution of existing disputes 
had rejected a broad inquiry in favour of the narrow commiss-
o c
ion.  ^ It was a stop gap measure which merely postponed the 
consideration of the more fundamental problems confronting 
the administration. Eventually, in the 1950s, a full invest­
igation of customary land tenure was instituted.
Despite its shortcomings, the Land Commission was 
not a failure. A number of long-standing disputes were 
settled, and the more blatant injustices of the Levers concess­
ion were redressed, although the discriminatory assumptions 
which lay behind the Waste Land Regulation and the Occupation 
Certificate remained unaffected. The administration had 
assumed that the population of the islands would decline or at 
best remain static, and that the islanders would have neither 
the need nor the desire to expand their subsistence and 
commercial activities. By its action, the administration 
had abrogated the islanders' choice and placed restrictions 
on their future courses of action. By the 1920s, the people 
of the New Georgia Group were beginning to appreciate this.
The alienation of large tracts of land without their knowledge
85 Allan, op.cit., pp. 45-6.
or consent had caused uneasiness and created doubts about
their future. Phillips had noted that they no longer wished
to part with land unless they were absolutely sure that they
would never require it again, and that they were now claiming
land that they had never before considered as their own to
86ensure that they had enough for the future.
While the Land Commission may not have totally 
reassured the islanders about their future, it did confirm 
that the days of irresponsible land alienation had passed.
Land disputes were to continue, but most did not involve 
land alienated to Europeans, being between the islanders 
themselves. The Land Commission had presaged this development: 
several of the non-Levers cases had involved the claimants 
disputing the right of other islanders to sell certain land.
In the following years, as more and more islanders sought to 
establish their rights to particular areas, disputes with 
rival claimants occurred. ^  The questions and difficulties 
created by these disputes eventually necessitated the 1950s 
inquiry into customary land tenure. The 1920-25 commission 
had marked the end of the period in which the focus of 
land problems was the acquisitions of Europeans. The disputes 
engendered by the careless alienation of land, and the Land 
Commission itself, further increased the 'land consciousness' 
of the islanders, which was to manifest itself in the increas­
ing number of disputes amongst themselves over land. Thus
LC I. 'Lever Report', pp. 4-4-61. 
^  Allan, op.cit., p. 49.
while land remained a basic issue, the tenor and direction of 
the problem changed.
The Land Commission was a turning point in other 
ways, not directly related to the land question. It marked 
an end to a period of turbulence in the relations between the 
Methodist Mission and its temporal and spiritual rivals, the 
administration and the S.D.A. Mission. Goldie’s attempt to 
stall the expansion of the Adventists had culminated in the 
attack on the latter's leaseholds before the Commission. The 
challenge had failed, and it was to be the last full-blooded 
assault against the rival evangelists. The S.D.A. were now 
firmly established in the New Georgia Group and there was 
little or nothing that the Methodists could do about it.
Goldie had not fared much better with the administration. His 
attempt to impose his conditions upon the Commission had been 
unsuccessful, and he had been forced to accept it on the terms 
of the administration. Where Woodford and Mahaffy had been 
forced to backdown in Hie aftermath of the Zito affair, and Hill 
had been removed from Gizo, Francis had withstood the campaign 
mounted against him and had remained both District Officer and 
Deputy for the Natives, and the Commission had proceeded with­
out incident. Goldie had asserted that he was the voice of 
the islanders, but his claim had not been substantiated. While 
he remained a figure of immense prestige and influence amongst 
the Methodist adherents, he was no longer a fundamental 
challenge to the authority of the administration. The success 
of the Adventists, and the government's increasing acceptance 
of its responsibilities towards the islanders, of which the
Land Commission was the first major indication, had eroded his 
position.
CHAPTER NIHE
THE STATE OF THE ISLANDS: CONCLUSION
By the mid-1920s the New Georgia Group was, in 
European eyes, one of the most 'civilised' areas in the 
Solomons. There had been no signs of resistance to the 
colonial order from the islanders for over a decade, nor were 
there any indications that there would be violence in the 
future. The Group had reached a situation of stability and 
order, after thirty years of turmoil under the Protectorate 
administration. This applied to both islanders and Europeans, 
for although the Melanesian population had been at peace since 
the conclusion of the Marovo and Zito troubles, discord had 
continued amongst the Europeans as missions, administration 
and the settler community strove to secure their prestige and 
influence. At the heart of these conflicts was the Europeans' 
obsession with status and power, not the welfare or aspirations 
of the islanders. The most persistent of these confrontations 
those between the administration and the Methodist Mission, 
and the latter and the Adventists, had their culmination in 
the Land Commission. After 1925? although there were occas­
ional outbursts of antagonism, the protracted confrontations of 
the previous years subsided. There were a number of reasons 
why this was so.
During the 1920s the missions reached the limit 
of their expansion. In the census of 1951? only six adult 
males described themselves as 'pagan': the remainder expressed
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'lan adherence to either of the missions. While it was still
possible to 'poach1 converts, it was unlikely that more than
the odd individual could be obtained in this manner, for both
missions had entrenched themselves in the communal life of
the islanders. In 193^? the population of the group was
settled in about 90 villages, with an average number of 80
2inhabitants each. There were no multi-denominational settle­
ments: every village was either Methodist or Adventist, with 
its own 'native teacher' or minister. Religious services 
would be held in the mornings and evenings, and 'school' 
conducted for two to three hours each weekday. The education 
offered by these village schools was primarily religious.
Higher education was provided by colleges at the mission 
headquarters - the Methodists at Kokenggolo, and Adventists 
at Mbatuna. In short, for either of the missions to make 
significant increases in their numbers would entail the 
conversion of entire communities - a difficult undertaking 
when a village was already committed to the rival denomination. 
In consequence, both missions seem to have concentrated on 
cementing the faith of their adherents, rather than challenging 
the hold of their rival. While there were occasional outbursts 
over 'poaching' incidents, on the whole there was less and less
WPHC No.274 of 1932, 'Census of the B.I.S.P. for 1931', 
'Return for Gizo District'. The details of the Census, 
together with a map showing the distribution of the villages 
according to the Census (Map VIII), can be found in 
Appendix IV.
2 ibid.
5 WPHC No.1103 of 1931, Ashley to H.C. , 11 March 1931. End. 
Report on Gizo District.
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L\.antagonism between the two denominations during the 1 9 3 0s.
The early 1920s saw a significant change in the 
nature of the administration of the islands. In these years 
the government began to shoulder some of its responsibilities 
towards the indigenous inhabitants of the Protectorate. Before 
1920 the administration had done little more than keep the 
peace. Practically the only contact the islanders had with 
the administration was through the District Officer, who 
was essentially a combination of policeman, magistrate and 
gaoler. There was little or no continuity or regularity in 
the impact of the administration: the tenor of government 
depended a great deal on the character and aptitude of the 
District Officer, and his contact with the various 
communities in the islands was intermittent. In these circum­
stances it was natural that many islanders should regard the 
administration as an authority secondary to the missions, 
whose influence was immediate, consistent and pervasive.^ The 
innovations of the early 1 9 2 0s gave a consistency and contin­
uity to the administration that it did not have before. The 
administration became, in fact, a system whereas previously 
it had been a person. This had obvious consequences with 
regard to relations between the missions and the government.
In the past, when Goldie had challenged the administration it 
had been in the form of a direct conflict with an individual
ibid.
WPHC No.1211- of 1932, Ashley to H.C. , 5 March 1932. Enel.
Annual Report on Gizo District, dated 14 January 1932.
WPHC No.1770 of 1926, Kane to H.C., 13 May 1926. Enel.
Quarterly Report from D.O. Gizo. Barley to‘Kane, 7 April 1926.q WPHC No.3808 of 1933, Memorandum on Mission Influences in 
the B.S.I.P., J.C. Barley, 24 November 1933-
officer in which considerations of 'face' and personal prestige 
predominated. With the establishment of a system of administ­
ration whose continued operation and existence was not depend­
ent on the individual officer at Gizo, these personal conflicts 
lost much of their meaning. In addition, the system itself 
was not disagreeable to the missions, for it recognised their 
influence and, to a certain extent, utilised it.
The first initiative of the administration was,
perhaps predictably, the introduction of taxation. King's
Regulation No.10 of 1920, the Native Tax Regulation, imposed
a poll tax on all adult males. The tax varied from 5/- to £1,
according to the individual's ability to pay and the degree
of established authority in the various districts of the 
6Protectorate. As the New Georgia Group was both stable and 
comparatively wealthy, its population was required to pay the 
full tax as soon as it was introduced. The first collection 
was in 1921-2, and £1,274 was taken from the Group. This 
figure was an understatement of the Group's eventual contrib­
ution, for a further £622/10/- had been levied on the people 
of the Marovo Lagoon, but the District Officer had been 
unable to collect this money on time due to lack of transport, 
although the people had had the money ready for payment.
The final amount paid by the Group, £1,896/10/-, was about 
20% of the total collected throughout the Protectorate, 
although the Group comprised only about 8% of its population.
6 WPHC No.2266 of 1919, Workman to H.C., 27 October 1919;
H.C. to C.O., 14 December 1919-
No. 2352 of 1925, H.C. to C.O., 26 October 1929-
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Virtually all the adult males in the Group paid the full £1
7tax.
The tax does not seem to have caused economic hard­
ship amongst the islanders, who were described by one official 
as an 'exceptionally prosperous community', due to their exten­
sive coconut groves, and the availability of trochas shell on
0
the many reefs in the district. The New Georgians certainly
appeared to have been able to accumulate the money without
compromising their traditional distaste for employment on the
plantations, for labour recruitment in the Group continued
to be negligible. However, it is possible that the tax
resulted in a decrease in mission contributions: between 1920
and 1921 donations to the Methodist Mission were halved,
although this may have been in part due to a fall in copra 
qprices. In subsequent years, the taxation contribution from
the Group varied considerably in accordance with the prevailing
economic conditions. In 1931, when copra prices were extremely
10low, the average payment per adult male was about 8 shillings.
The imposition of taxation was hardly a progressive 
step for the islanders who, at that time, were receiving 
little in return for their contribution to the revenue of the
7 WPHC No.1680 of 1922, Kane to H.C., 12 May 1922.
8 WPHC No.2352 of 1925, Kidson to H.C., 12 April 1926.
^ MCA Vol.188, Report of Solomon Islands District Synod, 8 
December 1920. Vol.189, Report of Solomon Islands District
Synod, 10 November 1921. Donations fell from £2,651- to 
£1,309.
10 WPHC No.1103 of 1931, op.cit.
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Protectorate. However, it did provide the administration with
a lever to obtain more cash from the Colonial Office. | In 1922
the Resident Commissioner pointed out to his superiors that in
return for their taxation contributions, the islanders got ’the
blessings of a settled government' and that 'Practically
11nothing else is done for them'. He accordingly requested
£150 to be spent on medicines for the islanders. This 
munificent sum comprised exactly 2% of 1921-22 tax collection; 
it was, however, a start in the right direction. In 1923 a 
doctor was stationed at Gizo and a rudimentary hospital 
constructed. While the post of District Medical Officer was 
not continually occupied in subsequent years, there were 
at least regular visits each year to the Group by a doctor, 
and a large number of islanders received treatment. In 1926,
12
for example, 76 in-patients and 1,029 out-patients were treated.
The imposition of taxation established the administ­
ration as a direct and inescapable factor in the economic 
lives of the islanders. After 1922 the administration also 
began to impinge upon the day to day existence of the 
islanders to a much greater extent. Prior to that year there 
had been no specific legal provision for the administration 
of 'native affairs'. While regulations had been enacted to 
deal with particular matters that had become pressing, there 
had been no attempt to formulate legislation that would allow 
an overall approach to the question of the domestic and
WPHC No.1690 of 1922, Kane to H.C., 22 May 1922.
WPHC No.3675 of 1926, Kane to H.C., 15 November 1926. Enel. 
Crichlow to Kane, 10 November 1926.
communal affairs of the islanders. King's Regulation No.17 
of 1922, the Native Administration Regulation, remedied this 
situation. This regulation provided for the creation of 
districts and sub-districts, the appointment of 'native 
officers' (headmen and constables), and the promulgation of
13
rules relating to the good order and well-being of the islanders.
Under the latter provision, a set of 'Native Rules' were
formulated: these involved such matters as abusive language,
the spreading of slanderous and damaging reports, disorderly-
conduct, the confinement of pigs, the non-performance of
communal services, absence from a village for more than two
months without the permission of the District Officer, and the
notification of births and deaths. Penalties for the
breaking of these 'Rules' included fines from 5/~ to 10/-
14or imprisonment for a week to a month.
There were three classes of 'native officers'. At 
the top were the district headmen, who were appointed by the 
Resident Commissioner on the recommendation of the District 
Officer, and could be dismissed in the same manner. These 
officers could receive up to £12 p.a. for their services.
Second were the village headmen, who were appointed and 
dismissed by the District Officer, and who could receive up 
to £3 p.a. Third were the village constables, whose pay was 
up to £1/10/- p.a. and who were also appointed and dismissed
15 WPHC No.266 of 1925, Minute by H. Pilling, 25 July 1925.
14 WPHC No.849 of 1924, Kidson to H.C., 22 July 1924. Enel.
Hill to H.C., 28 April 1924.
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by t h e  D i s t r i c t  O f f i c e r .  G e n e r a l l y ,  o n ly  t h o s e  o f f i c e r s  who 
had  p ro v e d  t h e m s e l v e s  r e l i a b l e  and e f f i c i e n t  were p a i d ,  and 
t h e n  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  t h e  f u l l  amount .  The New G e o rg ia  Group 
was d i v i d e d  i n t o  e i g h t  s u b - d i s t r i c t s :  Simbo, Ranongga, 
Kombangara,  V e l l a  L a v e l l a ,  R o v ian a  and t h e  Vona Vona a r e a ,
15Rendova,  t h e  Marovo Lagoon, and t h e  n o r t h w e s t e r n  New G e o r g ia .  
However,  t h i s  d i v i s i o n  d i d  n o t  have  much a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  f o r  each  s u b - d i s t r i c t  d i d  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  have 
a d i s t r i c t  headman, and s e v e r a l  o f  t h e  s u b - d i s t r i c t s  had  
more t h a n  one .  The sys tem  was a f l u i d  and a d a p t a b l e  one .  The 
c r e a t i o n  o f  a d i s t r i c t  headman was n o t  a m a t t e r  o f  f i l l i n g  a 
b u r e a u c r a t i c  n i c h e ,  b u t  o f  f i n d i n g  an i n d i v i d u a l  w i t h  
s u f f i c i e n t  i n f l u e n c e  and a b i l i t y  t o  w a r r a n t  t h e  a p p o in t m e n t .  
Thus t h e  number o f  headmen v a r i e d  o v e r  t h e  y e a r s ,  b u t  once 
a s u i t a b l e  man f o r  a p o s i t i o n  had  been  f o u n d ,  he r e m a in e d  i n  
i t  f o r  a l o n g  t i m e .  F o r  exam ple ,  o f  t h e  t h i r t y - n i n e  ' n a t i v e  
o f f i c e r s '  w o rk in g  i n  1 9 3 7 ? t h i r t y - f i v e  had  h e l d  t h e i r  j o b s  
f o r  o v e r  a d e c a d e . ^
The m i s s i o n s  s u p p o r t e d  t h e  headman sy s te m .  The o n ly  
t r o u b l e  t h a t  o c c u r r e d  was a t  Simbo, where a  M a l a i t a n ,  t h e  ex ­
w a r d e r  o f  T u l a g i  g a o l ,  was a p p o i n t e d  d i s t r i c t  headman. T h i s  
m a n 's  e f f i c i e n c y  and z e a l  a n t a g o n i s e d  some o f  t h e  S im boese ,  who 
were M e t h o d i s t s ,  and G o ld ie  o b j e c t e d ,  s t a t i n g  t h a t  headmen 
s h o u l d  be ' c h i e f s '  o f  t h e i r  own v i l l a g e s  and  d i s t r i c t s ,  r a t h e r
^  WPHC N o .266 of  1925,  Kane t o  H.C. , 26 Sep tem ber  1925« E n e l .
Memorandum on Headmen. Gizo D i s t r i c t .
16 WPHC N o .1852 o f  1937,  A s h le y  t o  H . C . , 6 May 1937. E n e l .
L i s t s  o f  N a t iv e  Headmen. Gizo D i s t r i c t .
than outsiders. The administration agreed with this principle,
and subsequent district headmen were generally big-men in their 
17own right. Moreover, they were usually strong supporters of 
the particular mission whose influence in the district was 
paramount. The system recognised the spheres of influence 
of the two missions, and may well have reinforced them. In 
the Marovo Lagoon there were two district headmen: Nipolo for 
the S.D.A. at Telina, and Ngatu at Patutiva for the Methodists. 
On Vella Lavella, the strongholds of the rival missions,
1 P)Mbilua and Ndovele, each had their respective district headmen.
The missions also benefited from the administration's policy
of encouraging the establishment of larger conglomerate
villages, so that a single village headman could be appointed
over a reasonable number of people, rather than a multiplicity
•10of officers presiding over scattered hamlets. y The missions 
themselves had long supported the same policy, in order to 
bring the islanders together in convenient, accessible
groups. By the 1930s, twenty three village headmen presided
• • 20 over communities whose average size was 107 people.
1 ^  WPIIC No.266 of 1923, Kane to II.C. , 9 January 1925- Kane to 
H.C., 20 April 1§25. Enel. Crichlow to Kane, 3^ March 
1925. Kane to H.C., 26 September 1925-
18 WPHC No. 1852 of 1937, op.cit.
 ^y WPHC No.266 of 1925, Kane to H.C. , 26 September 1925.
20 WPHC No.2?4 of 1932, op.cit.
372
The introduction of taxation, and the creation of 
an administrative system had given the government a stability 
and consistency which it had not previously possessed. It 
now intruded upon most aspects of island society. This 
transition had been accomplished without the sort of confront­
ation with the Methodist Mission which had characterised their 
relations in the past, for the expansion of the administration's 
influence had not been at the expense of the mission's author­
ity, but largely in conjunction with it. The wrangle over 
the Land Commission had been the last of the protracted, 
bitter struggles between the two bodies. Increasingly, both 
the administration and the missions were to act together, and 
to assist each other in their objectives. In 1924 after 
correspondence with the various missionary societies in the
Solomons, the government enacted legislation 'to provide for
21the punishment of adultery. In 1927 it introduced grants for
those missions which were undertaking technical education
courses for the islanders. The Methodists and Adventists,
whose courses were the most advanced in the Protectorate,
22received £50 each.
As the 1920s had seen the dilution of sectarian 
strife, and the subsidence of acrimony between mission and 
administration, it also saw the decline of agitation and 
controversy concerning the third European interest in the 
islands - the planter/settler community. As has already been
WPHC No.190 of 1923, Hill to H.C., 10 January 1924. Copy of 
King's Regulation No.7 of 1924.
22 WPHC No.2366a of 1925, Kane to H.C., 28 September 1926 and 
23 November 1926.
described, the planter/settler's compaign for political and 
economic concessions reached a peak in the early 1920s, with 
the activities of S.I.P.A., the Planters Gazette, and the 
1929 petitions for crown colony status and adjustments to the 
conditions of leaseholds. By 1925 this agitation had died down. 
The political demands had been emphatically rejected by the 
Colonial Office, but the other requests had been received 
favourably: improvement conditions and leasehold rentals had 
been relaxed, alterations had been made to the labour regulat­
ions, and an Advisory Council established. With these 
concessions, relations between the administration and the 
planting community steadily improved. In 1925 the High 
Commissioner visited the Protectorate and reported that the
25settlers' attitude to the government was loyal and respectful.
In the late 1920s and 1950s the predominant concern of the
settler community was not their political rights, but their
economic survival as copra prices crashed to catastrophic
levels. The number of operating plantations in the New
Georgia Group remained static, little development work was
24undertaken, and the quantity of labour employed declined.
The confidence and aggressive optimism of the earlier years 
was a thing of the past.
By the late 1920s the struggles for power, prestige 
and wealth which had characterised the activities of the 
various European interests in the New Georgia Group throughout
25 WPHC No.2366 of 1925, H.C. to C.O., 26 October 1925.
22 WPHC No.1103 of 1931, Ashley to H.C., 11 March 1931. Enel. 
Report on Gizo District.
the previous decades were largely dissipated. The state of 
stability and order that had been reached was also reflected in 
the lives of the islanders. About 7^900 New Georgians lived in 
90 odd villages scattered around the coasts of the islands.
The last bush-dwellers, in Kusaghe, had come down to the shore 
in the early twenties, and the fortified and concealed settle­
ments of the head-hunting days were but things of memory.
Villages had been rebuilt to conform with the white man's
25passion for symmetry and order. Most of the larger villages
were presided over by a headman appointed by the administration
whose duty was to report infringements of the 'Native Rules',
help settle minor disputes, assist in the collection of tax and
to generally act as a channel of communication to the District 
26Officer. However, in the event of lesser problems, if a
European's advice was thought necessary, it would most likely
be the local missionary who would be first approached. The
influence of the missions was pervasive, but not suffocating.
Attendances at church services and day schools could fluctuate
considerably, and the missions were not notably successful in
imposing their view of morality on the islanders. The
Methodist missionary, Metcalfe, exasperatedly wrote:
The general attitude to fornication and 
adultery has been, and still is, very 
lax, and is one of the most difficult 
problems the church has to confront.^
25 WPHC No.1770 of 1926, Kane to H.C., 1J May 1926. Enel. 
Quarterly Report for Gizo District.
26 WPHC No.81-9 of 1924, Kidson to H.C. , 22 July 1924. Enel. 
Middenway to Kane, 8 April 1924.
27 Metcalfe Papers. 'Methodism in the Marovo', p. 4.
The New Georgian Christians were not so unlike their fellows
elsewhere: they may have subscribed to the faith, but it did not
necessarily inhibit their enjoyment of life.
The education offered by the missions was improving.
Although the village schools gave little more than religious
instruction and perhaps, depending upon the ability of the
teacher, some rudimentary reading and writing, the central
schools at the mission headquarters were expanding their
activities. The Adventist school at Mbatuna had an enrolment
of about 100, and had begun to offer sometechnical courses. So
too with the Methodist school and college at Kokenggolo, which
gave instruction in engineering, boat building, carpentering,
wireless telegraphy, typewriting and agriculture. The Kokenggolo
establishment had an average attendance of about 185, although
28only about 30 boys were undertaking the technical courses.
The early educational work of the missions bore fruit in later 
years, when the New Georgia Group maintained a consistently
29higher rate of literacy than other parts of the Protectorate.
The health of the islanders was also improving.
Although the Group suffered from epidemics in 1925 and 1931,
the death rate in the islands up to 19J0 was amongst the lowest
90in the Protectorate, and the population steadily increased. 
Predictions about the decline and inevitable extinction of the
WPHC No.2366a of 1925, Kane to H.C., 28 September 1926. 
Enel. Wicks to Kane, 30 July 1926 and Goldie to Kane, 6 
September 1926.
No.1103 of 1931, op-cit.
29 Groenewegen, op.cit., pp. 87-8.
30 ibid., pp. 4-8.
population, so confidently made by Woodford and others earlier 
in the century, were revealed for what they were: convenient 
justifications for European development, massive land alienat­
ion, and indifference to the welfare and future of the 
islanders.
Economically, the islanders were comparatively well
off: they produced for sale between 800 and 900 tons of copra
per year. In 1930, when copra prices were at an unprecedented
low level, their income from this source was between £5?000
31and £6,000, of which £1,098 was taken in tax. However, they
continued to be exploited by the European retailers in the
Group, whose mark-up was generally 100%, and who insisted on
32using the shilling as the lowest unit of currency. Neverthe­
less, they were not dependent on their income for survival, 
and never felt constrained to seek employment on the 
plantations in any numbers. Their diet, while it could be 
supplemented by the purchase of sugar, bully beef and rice, 
was still comprised basically of traditional foodstuffs, 
with some introduced European vegetables. While some crops 
might fail, it was extremely rare that all should do so:
33there are no reports of food scarcity or famine in the Group. 
Ultimately, despite over a century of involvement in the
51 WPHC No.1103 of 1931, op.cit.
32 WPHC No.827 of 1930, H.C. to C.O., 13 October 1931.
33 WPHC No.990 of 1939-, Ashley to H.C. , 12 March 1939.
Enel. Reports on Native Food. Gizo District. Compiled by 
A. Middenway.
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economy of the white man, the islanders remained self-sufficient. 
To this degree, at least, they had preserved their independence; 
and that it was not a trivial independence was amply demonstrat­
ed in 1942, when the European administrative, missionary and 
economic presence in the islands scuttled as rats on a sinking 
ship in the face of the Japanese invasion and the islanders 
were once more left to fend for themselves. They did not 
collaborate with the new invaders, and displayed a courage and 
loyalty that their former colonial masters had done little to 
deserve.
By 19^0 the islanders of the New Georgia Group 
had been in contact with Europeans for 1$0 years. For the first 
century they had controlled and exploited this relationship.
The society which Europeans first encountered was neither 
static nor fragile; it had within itself the capacity for 
change and development. It was not the coming of the European 
that changed island society, but the islanders' response to 
the opportunities created by the arrival of the white man and 
his technology. These opportunities were utilised and 
exploited within an indigenous frame of reference. Big-men 
seized upon the iron technology to enhance their prestige and 
power in traditional terms: in New Georgian society religious 
belief, and warfare found much of their expression through 
the.practice of head-hunting and its associated ritual, and 
this was the chief avenue through which the new circumstances 
were to be exploited. The island of Simbo was at the centre 
of these developments. It was the focus of much of the early 
European contact with the Group, and the Simboese endeavoured 
to ensure that it would remain so. They attempted, quite
27 8
successfuly, to monopolise the economic relationship with the 
white man, acting as middlemen for the rest of the Group. In 
the same process, they expanded their power and prestige 
as head-hunters.
In the second half of die nineteenth century the 
nature of contact changed. The itinerant whalers and other 
casual visitors were replaced by traders who lived and worked 
on the islands, or who spent most of the year touring amongst 
them, and Simbo was replaced by Munda as the centre of European 
activity, although other parts of the Group also began to 
deal more regularly with the traders. The more durable 
European presence in the islands was not accompanied by a 
strengthening in the security of its participants. Periodic 
attacks on Europeans, inspired by both the desire for goods 
and the demands of island society, emphasised the weakness of 
the white man's position. The activities of the Royal Navy 
did not alter this situation, and nor did they affect the 
islanders' preoccupation with head-hunting which continued 
as before, with big-men utilising their European connections 
to enhance their strength as raiders and leaders. However, 
in the persistence of large-scale raiding lay the seed of 
future land problems, for much of the population of the 
islands dwelt deep in the bush for protection against raiders, 
giving the appearance that the land was uninhabited or, as 
Europeans described it 'waste'.
The establishment of the colonial administration 
at the turn of the century and the subsequent pacification of 
the islands, accompanied by a series of serious epidemics, 
marked the end of the islanders' capacity to determine
substantially the nature of their relationship with the white 
man. The way was now open for the development of a plantation 
economy and the exploitation of the islanders to a degree that 
was not possible in the previous century. The massive 
alienation of 'waste' land proceeded apace, along with the 
adoption of extortionate and coercive 'trading' methods. The 
colonial authority did little to improve this situation; 
in fact, it was responsible for much of the injustice concerning 
the land, and its inept behaviour towards the islanders 
worsened matters. These years also saw the establishment of 
the Methodist Mission, which made slow headway - its growth 
being mainly expressed in acres, rather than souls - until the 
outbreak of violence in the Marovo and on Vella Lavella in 
1908-10 period.
The Marovo and Vella Lavella troubles were the 
culmination of a decade of irresponsible and insensitive 
administration; they were also the last occasions in which 
the islanders would take up arms in an attempt to influence 
directly the changing course of their lives. The government's 
brutal but effective response to this challenge marked the 
final stage in the 'pacification' of the islands, and was a 
further spur to the commercial development of the Group. The 
planter-settler community became more numerous, stable and 
increasingly vocal in its demands for political and economic 
concessions and policies which envisaged the islanders as 
little more than as a cheap and quiescent source of labour, 
or as a dwindling race confined to ever-diminishing reserves.
The settlers had little need nor time for the New Georgians, 
who refused to work on their plantations and who had increasingly
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turned towards the missions as a vehicle for their hopes and 
aspirations in response to an administration which had offered 
them little more than retribution.
The decade after 1930 saw the intensification of 
ill-feeling amongst the Europeans in the Group as the Methodist 
Mission struggled for power and influence with the administrat­
ion, and competed with the Adventists for adherents. The 
arrival of the second mission had given many of the islanders 
an alternative source of the education they desired. It provided 
an opportunity to make an independent decision of fundamental 
importance - a commitment to the white man's belief and 
knowledge - without compromising traditional hostilities by 
aligning themselves with the mission of their former enemies 
and rivals, although the Methodists fought hard to subvert the 
choice. The conflict between the missions, and between the 
Methodists and the administration reached a climax in the 
Land Commission which had been instituted to deal with the 
disputes engendered by the earlier cavalier alienation of 
land. The Commission was an indication that the administration 
had at last realised that it had responsibilities towards the 
islanders beyond the punishment of 'outrages' and the 
facilitation of European commercial development, and that it 
was prepared to do something about the abuses of the past.
In the 1920s other measures were taken to improve the 
government of the inhabitants of the islands, whose needs, 
desires and welfare had previously been submerged in the 
European competition for power, prestige and wealth.
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The history of the New Georgia Group from the late 
eighteenth century to the 1920s provides an alternative view 
of the contact process between a so-called 'primitive' society 
and the culture of the European to that sometimes given.
Island society did not disintegrate as a result of European 
intrusion. For over a century the islanders largely controlled 
their relationship with the white man, and exploited it on 
their own terms. The imposition of colonial rule was not a 
remedy for disorders engendered by contact, but was responsible 
for much disorder itself.
APPENDIX I
LAND IN THE NEW GEORGIA GROUP
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The following lists detail the various land trans­
actions that occurred in the New Georgia Group up to 1925. It 
is to be noted that many of the acreages given are approximat­
ions, as in numerous cases no survey was undertaken. The 
location of the land involved is indicated on Map VII, at the 
end of this Appendix.
A. FREEHOLD LAND
The information below has been obtained from the 'Red Book'
and 'Deeds and Claims to Land' Books A and B in the Department
of Lands and Surveys in Honiara, and from the WPHC Inwards
Correspondence, the files of the Land Commission, and the
Registers of Land Claims in the Western Pacific Archives.
Each entry is in the following form:
Location. Acreage. Late of sale.
Original Buyer. Vendor. Price.
Comments.
The statement of the price in money terms did not necessarily 
mean that the vendor was paid in cash. Frequently purchasers 
paid for the land in trade goods and then supplied an 
approximate cash value for registration. Entries have been 
arranged chronologically; all transactions noted occurred 
before 1926.
1. Hombu Peka Is., Roviana Lagoon, c.10. c.1875- 
F. Wickham. ?. ?.
No deed known.
2. Nusa Zonga Is., Roviana Lagoon, c.5- 15 October 1881. 
Kelly, Williams & Woodhouse. Condo. £7«
Transferred to the Methodist Mission by Kelly in 1902.
3.
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Mbanga, southwest New Georgia. c.600. c.1882.
L. Nielsen. 'Lapa' (Lepe?). ?.
Sold to the Methodist Mission on 15 December 1902 for £2.
4. Lilihina Is., Marovo Lagoon, c.10. 14 January 1885.
T.G. Kelly. Bora, Nipolo. £8/11/6.
Later sold to T.J. Marks.
5. Ozama Is., off southeast Vella Lavella. 4.5. 13 February 
1885-
J. McDonald & J. Davis. Pulo. £17/14/4 in goods.
Sold to G.J. Waterhouse, then to Edmund Pratt, then Husen 
& Co. (1908), mortgaged to Burns, Philp & Co. (1909), sold 
to Union Plantation & Trading Co.
6. Inazaru Is., off east Ranongga. c.6. 15 September 1885-
Edmund Pratt. Mattara. trade goods.
7- Hombuhombu Is., Roviana Lagoon, c.40. 29 March 1886.
Edmund Pratt. Coorelli, Hanka, Amelie, Benny, Ojinindooroo, 
Hika, Rangi, Holy Leycolo, Gesso, trade goods.
Sold to N. Wheatley, who later made it over to Sabe Vido.
8. ’A-ra-ro’, Marovo Lagoon, c.5- 16 December 1892.
F. Wickham. Rakko. £6 in goods.
Unable to identify.
9- Tombi, Simbo. c.100. 31 December 1893«
Jean Pratt. Silanana. trade goods.
Sold to F. Green, and surveyed at 67.25 acres.
10. Logha Is., off Ghizo. c.300. 27 November 1899- 
N. Wheatley. Songer. trade goods.
Sold to Levers Pacific Plantations Ltd.
11. Rovana Is., Marovo Lagoon. 362. c.1900.
N. Wheatley. Kereso. trade goods.
Sold to T.R. MacBarron in 1922, and later sold to 
W.R. Carpenter & Co.
12. Kokenggolo, southwest New Georgia, c.250. 12 July 1902. 
Methodist Mission. Ingava, Gumi, Mia. £15-
Acreage later listed as 176.
13. Njiruundu and Inia Is., off Mbava. c.6. 7 April 1903.
J. Binskin. Morrow, Tapola, Geroe. trade goods.
14. Ughele, Rendova. 5000. 4 January 1905.
Levers Pacific Plantations Ltd. Tula, Simbisama. £50. 
Acreage given as 2,7^5 in 1926. It was before the Land 
Commission and reduced by 770 acres, and also apparently 
reduced for non-cultivation.
15« Kenelo, Rendova. c.1000. 7 April 1905.
F. Wickham. Brodie, Kia. £20.
16. Mbukimbuki Is., Marovo Lagoon. 56. 2 July 1905.
F. Wickham. Tomi Tomi. £10 in goods.
17.
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Kenelo, Rendova. c.381-0. 15 May 1906.
F. Wickham. Brodie. £30.
18. Sikuni, Vella Lavella. 328. 3 June 1907- 
Methodist Mission. Soso, Sami. £10.
19- Simbo. c.100. 19 June 1907.
Methodist Mission. Sojaviri. £10.
20. Kundu, Ranongga. 16.5- 21 June 1907- 
Methodist Mission. Sando. £5.
21. Mundi Mundi, Vella Lavella. 6197- 25 June 1907.
J.F. Goldie. Suvo, Paikalasi. £75«
Reduced to 2505 acres for non-cultivation.
22. Sikuni, Vella Lavella. 71-5- 9 July 1907.
Methodist Mission. Soso, Sami, Magara, Timbe. £10.
23. Njorio, Vella Lavella. c.160. 27 July 1907-
Methodist Mission. Moro, Qugasa, Lululu. £10 trade goods.
21-. Perasare Is., off western Vella Lavella. c.1. 27 July 1907. 
Methodist Mission. Tokai, Borui. £3-
25. Varata Is., Marovo Lagoon, c.28. 25 October 1907.
W.H. Pope. Lipu, Beno. Trade goods.
Later sold to H. Clennett.
26. Tetepare Is. c.33220. Late 1907.
Burns, Philp & Co. ?. £100.
27. Njuno, east Vella Lavella. 520. 1- May 1908.
J. Oien. Bichu, Songeto. £50 goods.
Acreage reduced to 1-15 by Land Commission. This acreage 
includes an adjacent block bought by Oien in 1910 - 
see below No.35«
28. Liapari Is. & block opposite, south Vella Lavella. 552.
31 August 1908.
Husen & Co. Soso, Sasa. £90 goods.
Mortgaged to Burns, Philp & Co (1909); conveyed to 
H. Barnett (1910); conveyed to Union Plantation & Trading 
Co. (1910).
Before Land Commission.
29. Kukurana Is. , Rendova Harbour. 92. 21- September 1908.
H. Wickham. Reri, Lani. £20 trade.
Later sold to Levers Pacific Plantations Ltd.
30. Sirikazo & Ziolo Undu Is., off west Vella Lavella. c.6.
19 November 1908.
J. Binskin. Moro, Moroo. ?.
31. Njorio, Vella Lavella. 124.5» 17 February 1909- 
J. Binskin. Morro. £30 trade goods.
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32. Lambeti, southwest New Georgia. 38. 4 April 1910.
N. Wheatley. Gamoa (Gemu?). trade goods.
33« Tambusolo Is., Rendova Harbour. 5-5« 4 April 1910.
N. Wheatley. Reni, Ega. £30.
Sold to Levers Pacific Plantations Ltd.
34. Simbilando, Vella Lavella. 700. 13 April 1910.
Ullbergs Plantation Ltd., Gorvassa, Raku. £120.
Before Land Commission. Later surveyed at 5^7 acres.
35* Njuno, Vella Lavella. -. 18 June 1910.
J. Oien. Boy, Boku. £60 goods.
See above No.27-
36. Karapata Labata and Hite Is. , off southwest New Georgia. 
C.10. 1 September 1910.
N. Wheatley. Gemu. land exchange.
Late made over to Sabe Vido.
37- Lola Is., Vona Vona Lagoon. 106.5« 1 September 1910.
H. Wickham. Gemu. £25«
38. Mbarakihi Is., off southwest New Georgia, c.20.
1 September 1910.
N. Wheatley. Rone, Veti. £24.
Sold to Gizo Solomons Plantations Ltd.
39« Himbi Is., Roviana Lagoon. 5« 1 September 1910.
N. Wheatley. Zuli. £8.
Made over to Sabe Vido.
40. Hopei Is., Roviana Lagoon, c.10. 1 September 1910.
N. Wheatley. Gemu. goods.
Made over to Sabe Vido.
41. Nggatirana Is., off southwest Vangunu. c.10. 15 October 
1910.
N. Wheatley. Wasi. £8.
Later sold to W.R. Carpenter & Co.
42. Mbarambuni Is., Rendova Harbour. 98. 8 December 1910.
N. Wheatley. Bully. £25 (part trade goods).
Later sold to Levers Pacific Plantations Ltd.
43. Tirovilu or Renard Is., off west Vella Lavella. 330.
24 February 1911.
H. Martin. Pangau, Kaola. £30.
44. Kinda, Kohinggo Is. 1629« 15 October 1911.
N. Ross. Veo. £160.
Conveyed to Kindar Ltd. (1912). Before Land Commission.
45. Iloro Is., off southeast New Georgia, c.20. 22 February 
1912.
N. Wheatley. Wasi. £14.
Later sold to W.R. Carpenter & Co.
46. Njorio, Vella Lavella. c.700. 3 April 1912.
H. Martin. Vallambulli, Londo. £100.
47- Nusa Siri Is., Vona Vona Lagoon. 68. 15 October 1912. 
H. Wickham. Vao. £30.
48. Kolo Hite Is., Vona Vona Lagoon. 40. 16 October 1912. 
H. Wickham. Gemu, Gumi. £30.
49. Ngarengare Is., Marovo Lagoon, c.80. 6 December 1912. 
A.A. Austen. Lepi. £27/2/-.
50. Njoroveto, Vella Lavella. 143. 16 October 1913- 
Levers Pacific Plantations Ltd. Harry Troiro. £20.
B. CROWN LAND (LAND ACQUIRED BY THE GOVERNMENT UP TO 1925)
The following information has been obtained from the published
B.S.I.P, List of Lands Leased to March 1917 (Suva, 1917)?
WPHC Inwards Correspondence, and the Registers of Crown
Conveyances in DLS.
The form of entries is as follows:
Location. Acreage. Date of Sale.
Vendor. Price.
Comments.
For many of the purchases the name of the vendor was not 
recorded, and the date of sale unknown. In the latter cases, 
the date of the first lease has been used to place the entry 
in chronological order.
51- Gizo, Ghizo. 300- -
Occupied by Government as waste land. This was the 
site of Gizo township, and the land was leased in 
small allotments.
52. Mbili, Minjanga Is., Marovo Lagoon. 20. 29 June 1910. 
Tasso. £20.
5 acres leased to Malayta Co. for 10 years at £3 p.a. 
(1910). Lease later cancelled.
53- Karunohu Is., Marovo Lagoon. 50. 1912.
?. £10.
Leased originally to R.F. Ericsen, then later to 
T.J. Marks for 99 years.
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54. Mahoro Is., Marovo Lagoon, c.40. February 1912.
?. £40.
Leased originally to R.C. Smithers from 1 January 1912 for 
20 years. Then to T.J. Marks for 99 years.
35» Emu Harbour, Ranongga. 640. 1918.
?. £110.
Leased to Emu Harbour Plantation Ltd. 1 July 1912 for 
99 years.
56. Emu Harbour, Ranongga. 160. 1912.
?. £25.
Leased to P. Pratt from 1 July 1912 for 99 years.
57- Sakasakuru, Vella Lavella. 1250. 3 April 1912.
Voki. £200 (paid in annual instalments of £10).
1000 acres leased to Pybus and Collinson 1 July 1915 
for 99 years.
58. Goava (Ruruvai), Vella Lavella. 640. 19 August 1912. 
Vilaila, Valu. £50 cash, plus boat (valued at £50).
Leased to A.M. Turnbull 1 January 1913« Later leased 
to Ruruvai Plantations Syndicate for 99 years.
59- Irevi (Moi), Rendova. 300. June 1913-
Zuruwumi, Wumuvulli, Hitu, Eki, Kebo. £45- 
Originally leased to F. &. E. Abercrombie, then to 
W.R. Carpenter & Co. 1 July 1913 for 99 years.
60. Kukundu, Kolombangara. 2500. 23 October 1913.
Gori, Kuki, Bombuli, Govira, Peuga. £100.
Originally set aside as 'waste land'. Government forced 
to acquire it when it was discovered to be owned.
Later leased to N. Wheatley (1850 acres) 1 January 1920 
for 99 years.
61. Seghe, southeast New Georgia, c.800. 6 December 1913- 
Ngatu, Nguru. £150.
Originally leased to A. Austen and H.A. Markham, then 
solely to Markham 1 January 1920 for 99 years.
62. Timberina, Vangunu. 300. ?.
?. £50.
Leased to R.F. Ericsen 1 January 1914. Later cancelled.
63- Mbareho Is., Kolo Lagoon. 50. ?.
?. £25.
Leased to R.F. Ericsen; then to T.J. Marks 1 January 1914 
for 99 years.
64. Njai, southeast New Georgia. 800. ?.
?. £150.
Leased to J. Clift 1 January 1914 for 99 years. Later 
cancelled.
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65- Tinge Is., Kolo Lagoon. 120. ?.
?. £40.
Leased to R.F. Ericsen; then to T.J. Marks 1 January 1914 
for 99 years.
66. Nono, southeast New Georgia. 100. 7 February 1914.
Wussi, Barutu. £20.
Leased to W. Wilmot 1 January for 99 years. Later cancelled.
67- Viru, New Georgia, c.400. 16 May 1914.
Jomoro, Mianjama. £40.
Leased to N. Wheatley; then to W.R. Carpenter & Co.
1 January 1915 For 99 years.
68. Tatama & Avavasa Is., Marovo Lagoon. 500. 2 June 1914. 
Mapuru. £80.
Leased to G.L. Tacon 1 July 1914 for 99 years. Later 
cancelled.
69- Uipi Is., Marovo Lagoon. 250. 20 June 1914.
Vangora. £40.
Leased to G.L. Tacon 1 July 1914 for 99 years. Later 
cancelled.
70. Ruruvai, Vella Lavella. 320. 21 August 1914.
Rimbi, Valu. £50.
Leased to Ruruvai Plantations Syndicate 1 January 1915 
for 99 years.
71 Kai Pt., northeast Ranongga. 640. 26 November 1914.
V at abunduru. £100.
Leased to Emu Harbour Plantations Ltd. 1 January 1915 
for 99 years.
72. Ena, Ranongga. 300. ?.
?. £50.
Leased to C.P. & H. Beck 1 January 1915 for 99 years.
73- Nianga, Vella Lavella. 500. ?.
?. £50.
Leased to McEachran Bros. & Musgrave 1 January 1915 
for 99 years.
74. Vangunu. 500. ?.
?. £60.
Leased to R.F. Ericsen; then to T„J. Marks 1 January 1915 
for 99 years.
75« Renard Cove, Rendova. c.100. 13 March 1915«
Diki. £20.
Leased to F. Abercrombie; then to N. Wheatley 1 July 1915 
for 99 years.
76. Vorambari, Vella Lavella. 640. 31 May 1920.
Nenda. £64.
Leased to Ruruvai Plantations Syndicate 1 July 1918 for 99 
years.
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77« Renard Cove, Rendova. 700. 4 April 1920.
Ngavi, Meni, Ilo. £70.
Leased to W. De C. Browne; then E. De C. Browne 1 January 
1920 for 99 years.
78. Mindi Hindi Is., Marovo Lagoon. 100. 12 April 1920.
Lepi. £50.
Leased to L. Austen 1 July 1920 for 99 years.
79« Chemoho, Vangunu. 300. 16 July 1923«
Puroku. £40.
Leased to J.C. Radley 1 July 1924.
80. Mbatumbosi Is., Nono. 20. ?.
?. £5.
Leased to A. Cant 1 January 1924 for 99 years.
81. Mbukimbuki Is., Marovo Lagoon. 30. ?.
?. £5.
Leased to R. Statham 1 January 1924 for 99 years.
C. LAND LEASED ON BEEALF OF NATIVE OWNERS (UP TO 1923)
The following information has been obtained from the List of
Lands (1917) and WPHC Inwards Correspondence.
The form of the entries is as follows:
Location. Acreage. Date of commencement of lease. 
Lessor. Period of lease. Rent.
Comments.
SR refers to the standard rent paid on cultivation leases.
This was 3b per acre for the first five years, 6d per acre for 
the second five years, 3/- per acre for the eleventh to 
twentieth years, and 6/- per acre for the twenty-first to 
thirty-third year. Rent was then reassessed.
82. Latitude Is., off Ghizo. 1. 1 April 1911. 
E. Schultz. 3 years. £4 p.a.
Expired.
83- Ndovele, Vella Lavella. 1. 1 July 1912. 
S. Mackay. 10 years. £2/4/- p.a. 
Transferred to P. Hasselgren. Expired.
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84. Paraso, Vella Lavella. c.1. 1 July 1912.
G. H. Statham. 10 years. £4 p.a.
Cancelled.
85- Ranongga. c.1. 1 July 1912.
Beck & Green. 10 years. £4 p.a.
Cancelled.
86. Viru Harbour, New Georgia. 500. 1 January 1915-
N. Wheatley & G.H. Statham. 99 years. 1915-17 12/6 p.a
Transferred to W.R. Carpenter & Co. 1918-22: £1/ 5/- p-a
1922-25: £7/10/- p.a
87- Viru Harbour, New Georgia, c.1. 1 January 1915«
R.G. Smithers. 10 years. £6 p.a.
Cancelled.
88. Samarae & Repi Is., Vona Vona Lagoon. 100. 1 January 1915- 
N. Wheatley. 99 years. 1915-22: £2/2/- p.a. 1922-25:
£5/5/- P-a.
Transferred to Kindar Ltd.
89- Tangapanga Is., 10. 1 July 1915- 
W. Anderson. 10 years. £5 p.a.
Cancelled. Location unknown.
90. Njorio, Vella Lavella. 770. 1 January 1916.
M.V. Shorter. 99 years. 1916-20: 17/5 p-.a. 1921-25: 
£1/14/6 p.a.
Cancelled.
91. Haduani, Marovo Lagoon. 160. 1 July 1916.
A.A. Austen & H.A. Markham. 99 years. 1916-20: 4/- p.a. 
1921-25: 8/- p.a.
92. Balavaini, Vangunu. 500. 1 July 1916.
H. T. Fairbrother. 99 years. 1916-20: 12/6 p.a. 1921-25: 
£1./5/- p-a.
95- Liangai, Ndovele, Vella Lavella. 200. 1 January 1917-
F. Hazelgren. 99 years. 1917-20: 5/- p-a. 1921-25:
10/- p.a.
Transferred to S. Marks.
94. Osiope, Njorio, Vella Lavella. 602. 1 January 1917-
McEachran Bros. & Musgrave. 99 years. 1917-20: 15/- p-a. 
1921-25: £1/10/- p.a.
95- Malasoga, Vella Lavella. 500. 1 July 1917- 
R. McKerlie. 99 years. SR.
96. Lambulambu Harbour, Vella Lavella. c.1. 1 January 1918.
Ruruvai Plantations Syndicate. 50 years. £2 p.a.
97- Kachi Kachi, Marovo Lagoon. 560. 1 January 1918.
G. H. Statham. 99 years. SR.
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98. Kachi Kachi, Marovo Lagoon. 266. 1 January 1918. 
G.H. Statham (for Marovo Syndicate). 99 years. SR.
99. Viru, New Georgia. 60. 1 January 1918.
Australasian Conference Association Ltd. (S.D.A.)
20 years. 10/- p.a.
100. Telina Is., Marovo Lagoon. 12. 1 January 1918. 
S.D.A. 20 years. 10/- p.a.
101. Sasaghana, Marovo Lagoon. 10. 1 January 1918.
S.D.A. 20 years. 10/- p.a.
102. Ughcle, Rendova. 11. 1 July 1918.
S.D.A. 20 years. 10/- p.a.
103- Ngaloso Harbour, Nggatokae. 24. 1 July 1919- 
S.D.A. 20 years. 10/- p.a.
104. Tomia, Vella Lavella. 230. 1 January 1922.
J. McEachran. 99 years. SR.
105. Mbatuna, Vangunu. 200. 1 July 1923- 
S.D.A. 40 years. SR.
106. Mbolu Is., Ranongga. 10. 1 July 1925- 
L.C. MacMahon. 20 years. £5/11/- p.a.
D. OCCUPATION LICENCES
107. Mbava (north). 1000 acres.
Granted to J. Binskin for 99 years from 1 May 1902.
108. Islets off Ghizo. 200 acres.
Granted to N. Wheatley for 99 years from 1 January 1903. 
Transferred to Levers Pacific Plantations Ltd. (1911).
109- Ghizo. 400 acres.
Granted to E. Wickham for 99 years from 1 January 1903- 
Transferred to British Solomons Proprietary Ltd. (1909). 
Transferred to F. Snowball (1909)-
110. Ghizo. 14 acres.
Granted to Burns, Philp & Co. for 20 years from 1 January 
1904.
111. Islets off Ghizo. 400 acres.
Granted to N. Wheatley for 99 years from 1 January 1908. 
Transferred to Levers Pacific Plantations Ltd. (1911).
112. Mbava (south). 1000 acres.
Granted to J. Binskin for 99 years from 1 April 1908.
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113. THE LEVERS CONCESSION
a. Certificate of Occupation granted to the Pacific Islands 
Co. (1902) Ltd. for 189,1-90 acres in the B.S.I.P. for
99 years from 1 June 1963.
Estimated acreages for the New Georgia Group land included 
in the concession were:
Kolombangara: 70,000 
New Georgia Is.: 22,780 
Vona Vona Lagoon: 7,000 
Ghizo: 3,000
TOTAL: 104,780
b. Certificate of Occupation dated 19 October 1914 granted 
to Levers Pacific Plantations Ltd. for 200,000 acres
in the B.S.I.P. for 999 years from 1 January 1904.
Acreages for New Georgia Group land were:
Kolombangara: 90,470 
New Georgia Is.: 48,030 
Vona Vona Lagoon: 14,910 
Ghizo: 7,1-60
TOTAL: 160,870
c. Certificate of Occupation incorporated in King's 
Regulation No.3 of 1921 (dated 4 February 1921) granted 
to Levers Pacific Plantations Ltd. for 280,000 acres in 
the B.S.I.P. for 999 years from 1 January 1904.
Acreages for New Georgia Group land were:
Kolombangara: 148,010
New Georgia Is.: 46,330 
Vona Vona Lagoon: 14,470 
Ghizo: 7,190
TOTAL: 216,000
d. Certificate of Occupation signed and registered on
8 September 1931 incorporating the recommendations of
the Land Commission, which reduced the New Georgia
Group land included in the concession to the following:
Kolombangara: 107,830
New Georgia Is.: 20,470
Vona Vona Lagoon: 2,600
Ghizo: 6,920
TOTAL: 138,090
The total size of the Levers concession after the Land 
Commission was 154,480 acres.
E. CANCELLED, REJECTED AND DOUBTFUL CLAIMS TO FREEHOLD LAND
a. Kolombangara (all unoccupied and unowned land). ?.
30 January 1886.
Deutsche, Handels & Plantagen Geselschaft der.Sudsee 
Inseln zu Hamburg claimed possession.
Pacific Islands Co. purchased these 'rights' 5 August 
1902 and surrendered them to the government.
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b. West Ghizo. ?. 2 February 1886.
Deutsche, Handels. Mengo. trade goods.
As for (a).
c. Simbo. 1. 15 May 1887*
Edmund Pratt. Mavo. trade goods.
Not known if claim was confirmed.
d. Ndume Is., Roviana Lagoon, c.250. 3d May 1893- 
Jean Pratt. Jaina, Vaho. trade goods.
Apparently not confirmed.
e. Sosolo, northwest New Georgia, c.500. 15 June 1893- 
Edmund Pratt. Pipe, Rondo, Tuita, Kooinba, Me a, Enbunbo, 
Veto, trade goods.
Disallowed.
f. Ndovele, Vella Lavella. c.375- d1 July 1893«
Jean Pratt. Aniboy, Jonji. trade goods.
Union Plantation Co. may have acquired this claim, which 
was then cancelled by the Land Commission.
g. *Bui-ha* Is. & Pelasare Ptd., Vella Lavella. c.450.
16 July 1893-
Jean Pratt. Olalava, Biki. trade goods.
Claim disallowed.
h. Saraporo, Vella Lavella. ?. 21 July 1893- 
Edmund Pratt. ?. £33/d8/- goods.
Sold (with Ozama Is.) to Husen & Co. on 23 December 1908. 
Claim rejected by Land Commission.
i. Narovo, Simbo. c.1. 27 January 1896.
Jean Pratt. Kea, Mate Sindara, Coupele. trade goods.
Not known if accepted.
j. Kiamba Is., Roviana Lagoon. ?. 23 December 1896.
Jean Pratt. Vomi. trade goods.
Not known if accepted.
k. Viru, New Georgia. 4350. 4 January 1905-
Levers Pacific Plantations Ltd. Kokotona, Dulo, Lava, 
Bara. £40 goods.
Disallowed by High Commissioner on 17 December 1910.
F. SUMMARY
The figures given below are necessarily approximations, 
as many properties were not surveyed. They represent the 
situation in 1925, but take into account the recommendations 
of the Land Commission and surveys made after that date.
The New Georgia Group
Total Freehold land: 51,500 acres.
Total Crown Land: 13,370 acres.
Total 'Native leases': 4,530 acres.
Total Occupation Certificate land: 141,100 acres.
Total land purchased, appropriated or leased: 210,300 acres. 
Percentage of land purchased, appropriated or leased to total 
land area of New Georgia Group: 16.4%
No attempt has been made to exhaustively check the figure
for the Protectorate as a whole in the same manner as was done
for the New Georgia Group. However, as a basis for the
following comparison, the figures given in the 'Memorandum:
Information desired by the High Commissioner', dated 14 May 1925
(WPHC No.1065 of 1925) have been used. These figures use the
1914 Levers Certificate, do not take the Land Commission's
recommendations into account and represent the situation as it
was in 1924. Adapting the New Georgia Group figures above
to these factors gives the following:
New Georgia B.S.I.P,
Group
Total land area (square miles) 2,000 11,458
Total Freehold land (acres) 50,500 188,025
Total Crown Land (acres) 13,370 39,218
Total 'Native leases' (acres) 4,520 12,181
Total Occupation Certificate land (acres) 
Total land purchased, appropriated or
163,870 313,097
leased (acres) 232,260 552,521
New Georgia Group land expressed as a percentage of that for 
all B.S.I.P.
Total area 17-45
Freehold 26.85
Crown 34.09
'Native leases' 37-10
Occupation Certificate 52.33
Total land purchased, 
appropriated or leased 42.03
The percentage of land purchased, appropriated or leased 
to the total land area of the New Georgia Group was 18.14; the 
corresponding figure for all of the B.S.I.P. was 7.53%.
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APPENDIX II
PLANTATIONS AND LABOURERS IN THE NEW GEORGIA GROUP
Under the Labour Amendment Regulation of 1923 a
medical officer was required to submit a monthly list of
plantation estates with the average daily number of labourers,
together with details of any illnesses and injuries. The
Medical Districts for the Protectorate-were defined and
proclaimed in September 1924. The Gizo District (Medical)
included all of the New Georgia Group, plus some islands in the
Manning Straits. The list of plantations and labourers below
has been drawn from the Quarterly Medical Returns for the
first half of 1925 (found in WPHC No.1191 of 1925)- The number
of labourers given for each estate is the monthly average
from January to June 1925, to the nearest whole number. The
list is arranged in descending order of number of labourers
employed. The form of each entry is as follows:
Name of Estate. Location. Number of labourers. 
Employer. Form of tenure. Date of commencement 
of plantation.
Comments.
It is to be noted that the exact date of commencement for most
of the plantations is not known; in these cases the year of
purchase or first year of lease has been given, for example,
'After 1916'. The abbreviations used are:
F Freehold 
C Crown Land leasehold 
N Native Land leasehold 
0 Occupation Certificate
The map at the end of the Appendix indicates the location of 
each plantation.
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1. Kenelo, Rendova. 84.
Gizo Solomons Plantations Ltd. F. After 1905.
This land was apparently purchased from F. Wickham, who 
had bought it in 1905-6. The company also owned Mbarakihi 
Is., in the Roviana Lagoon, on which it had a plantation 
and which was also worked by the labourers from Kenelo. 
(Mbarakihi. F. After 1910).
2. Stanmore. Kolombangara. 56.
Levers Pacific Plantations Ltd. 0. October 1912.
3. Karikana. Kolombangara. 55-
Levers Pacific Plantations Ltd. 0. December 1912.
4. Vila. Kolombangara. 52.
Levers Pacific Plantations Ltd. 0. March 1912.
5. Lilihina. Marovo Lagoon. 47- 
T.J. Marks. F. After 1885-
Marks also held 99 year Crown leases on Mahoro Is.
(After 1912), Karanohu Is. (After 1912), Tinge Is. (After 
1914), Mbareho Is. (After 1914), and a block on Vangunu 
(After 1915). All of these were in the Marovo Lagoon 
locality and would have been worked by the labour based 
on Lilihina.
6. Rendova Harbour. Rendova. 41.
Levers Pacific Plantations Ltd. F. After .1905- 
The company had cultivated about 450 acres by 1911. Also 
included in this estate were the neighbouring islands of 
Kukurana, Tambusolo, and Mbarambuni, all freehold. Work 
on these had begun about 1911.
7. Mundi Mundi. Vella Lavella. 40.
Associated Plantations Ltd. F. After 1907.
8. Tetipari. 40.
Solomon Islands Development Co. F. After 1908.
By 1921, 907 acres had been cultivated by the company, a 
Burns Philp concern.
9. Liapari. Vella Lavella. 39-
Union Plantation and Trading Co. Ltd. F. After 1908.
The company also had freehold title on Simbilando, Vella 
Lavella and the islet of Ozama, in the neighbourhood of 
Liapari.
10. Bagga. Mbava. 36.
J. Binskin. 0. After 1902.
Binskin also had freehold title on four islets near Mbava, 
Njuruundu and Inia (After 1902), Sirikazo and Ziolo Undu 
(After 1908), and a block at Njorio, Vella Lavella 
(After 1909).
11. Gizo. Ghizo. 35«
Burns Philp & Co. Ltd. 0. After 1903.
The company also held the lease on the government plantation 
at Gizo for some years (1917-21).
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12.  P a u r u .  so u th w e s t  New G e o r g ia .  $1.
L e v e r s  P a c i f i c  P l a n t a t i o n s  L t d .  0 .  1909-
13. Lady L e v e r .  K olom bangara .  29-
L e v e r s  P a c i f i c  P l a n t a t i o n s  L t d .  0 .  March 3935-
14. Noro. Kohinggo.  28.
L e v e r s  P a c i f i c  P l a n t a t i o n s  L t d .  0. 1908.
15. K i n d a r .  Kohinggo .  26.
K in d a r  L t d .  F .  A f t e r  1931.
The company a l s o  h e l d  Samarae and R ep i  I s .  i n  t h e  Vona 
Vona Lagoon (N. A f t e r  1933)-
16. R u r u v a i .  V e l l a  L a v e l l a .  26.
R u ru v a i  P l a n t a t i o n s  S y n d i c a t e .  C. A f t e r  1914.
The S y n d i c a t e  had  two o t h e r  crown l e a s e s  on V e l l a  L a v e l l a ,  
a t  Goava ( A f t e r  1933)  and  Voram bar i  ( a f t e r  3 9 3 8 ) .
17. Emu H a rb o u r .  Ranongga.  25-
Emu Harbour  P l a n t a t i o n  L td .  C. A f t e r  1932.
The company a l s o  h e l d  t h e  crown l e a s e  f o r  l a n d  a t  K ia  P t . ,  
Ranongga ( A f t e r  19 3 4 ) .
18. Simbo. 23-
Pybus & C o l l i n s o n .  F.  A f t e r  1893-
T h is  o l d  p l a n t a t i o n ,  was on l a n d  o r i g i n a l l y  bought  by J e a n  
P r a t t ,  and l a t e r  s o l d  t o  F. Green ,  who a p p e a r s  t o  have  
l e a s e d  i t  t o  Pybus and C o l l i n s o n .  The l a t t e r  a l s o  h e l d  
a crown l e a s e  f o r  l a n d  a t  K or iovuku  n e a r  Emu H arb o u r ,  
Ranongga ( A f t e r  1 9 1 2 ) ,  and a t  S a k a su k u ru ,  V e l l a  L a v e l l a  
( A f t e r  1 9 3 5 ) .
39- L o l a .  Vona Vona Lagoon. 23.
H. Wickham. F .  A f t e r  1930.
Wickham l i v e d  on t h e  i s l e t  o f  Hombu P e k a ,  which  had  been  
owned by h i s  f a m i l y  s i n c e  t h e  1870s ;  h e ' a l s o  had  f r e e h o l d  
t i t l e  o f  two o t h e r  i s l e t s  i n  t h e  Vona Vona Lagoon, Nusa 
S i r i  and Kolo H i t e  ( b o t h  a f t e r  1 9 1 2 ) .
20. Loga.  Logha I s .  19-
L e v e r s  P a c i f i c  P l a n t a t i o n s  L t d .  F.  A f t e r  1900.
L e v e r s  a l s o  h e l d  an O c c u p a t io n  C e r t i f i c a t e  f o r  t h e  o t h e r  
i s l e t s  s u r r o u n d i n g  Ghizo .  These  had  been  d e v e lo p e d  by 
Norman W h ea t ley  i n  t h e  e a r l y  1900s .
21. M a laso g a .  V e l l a  L a v e l l a .  18.
' R. M c K e r l i e .  N. A f t e r  1937-
22. J u r i o .  V e l l a  L a v e l l a .  38.
J u r i o  P l a n t a t i o n  L td .  ? .  ? .
23.  L i a n g a i .  V e l l a  L a v e l l a .  36.
S. Marks.  N. A f t e r  3937-
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24. Labeti. Munda. 15-
N. Wheatley. F. After 1910.
Wheatley also had freehold title for several islands in 
the Roviana Lagoon: Hombuhombu, Karapata Lapata and Hite, 
Hopei and Himbi (all 1910). He had crown leases for 
land at Kukundu, Kolombangara (After 1920) and Renard 
Cove, Rendova (After 1915;•
25. Banga. southwest New Georgia. 14.
Methodist Mission. F. After 1902.
This labour was also used on the plantations of the 
Mission's many other freehold properties.
26. Renard Is., off Vella Lavella. 14.
H. Martin. F. After 1911.
Martin also had freehold land at Njorio, Vella Lavella 
(After 1912).
27. Jorovetto. Vella Lavella. 13- 
S. Ashley. F. After 1913-
This property was owned and let by Levers.
28. Segi. southeast New Georgia. 13.
H.A. Markham. C. After 1920.
Markham also had land at Haduani, Marovo Lagoon (N. After 
1916).
29- Gizo. Ghizo. 12.
F. Green & Co.
It is not known if Green was operating a plantation at this 
time, or employing the labour at his store and depot at 
Gizo.
30. Ngari Ngari. Marovo Lagoon. 11.
A.A. Austen. F. After 1912.
Austen also had land at Haduani (N. After 1916).
31. Viru. New Georgia. 10.
H. Chaperlin. N & C. After 1913-
These leases were held by W.R. Cartpenter & Co.
32. Lokuru (Rendard Cove). Rendova. 9- 
W. De C. Browne. C. After 1920.
33- Aena. Ranongga. 9-
C.P. & H. Beck. C. After 1915-
31. Hamerai (Rovana), Marovo Lagoon. 7- 
Mrs Newall. F. early 1900s.
This property was owned by W.R. Carpenter & Co., who 
purchased it from Wheatley, who had originally begun 
cultivation.
33- Warata. Marovo Lagoon 6.
H. Clennett. F. After 1907.
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36. Nyanga. V e l l a  L a v e l l a .  3*
McEachran & Musgrave .  C. A f t e r  1913*
Also had  l a n d  a t  N j o r i o  (N. A f t e r  1917)*
37* Batu  B o sse .  Nono. 5*
H. C a n t .  C. A f t e r  1924.
38. Mindi M in d i .  Marovo Lagoon. A.
L. A u s te n .  C. A f t e r  1920.
39* Kachi  K a c h i .  Marovo Lagoon.  3*
Mrs S ta th a m .  N. A f t e r  1918.
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APPENDIX III
GOVERNMENT OFFICERS STATIONED IN THE NEW GEORGIA GROUP TO 1923 
(in alphabetical order)
BARLEY, Jack Charles
Born 4 December 1887- Attended Oxford University where he 
obtained an M.A. Came to the B.S.I.P. in December 1911 as a 
Cadet. From 1 November 1912 to 21 February 1913 was Acting 
District Magistrate at Gizo. On 22 October 1913 was appointed 
Acting District Officer in the Marovo Lagoon. In July 1914 
he was sent to Lord Howe Is. (Ontong Java), and on the 12 
February 1913 was appointed District Officer at Gizo, a position 
he held until 13 October 1919 when he was transferred to the 
Eastern Solomons. However, he was not at Gizo from 27 July 1915 
to 8 March 1917 (special duty at Lord Howe Is. and leave), from 
19 April to 9 September 1917 (Acting Resident Commissioner), 
and from 10 August to 8 September 1918 (leave). He was once 
more appointed District Officer, Gizo on 1 July 1925 and served 
there until 1928. In 1933 he became the Resident Commissioner 
of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands.
BLAKE, William Vere Jardine
Born 1 February 1892. Came to the B.S.I.P. in 1921 as Sub- 
Inspector of Constabulary. He was appointed Acting District 
Officer at Gizo from 6 October to 23 November 1922.
CRICHLOW, Nathaniel
Born 25 January 1889- Came to the B.S.I.P. as Medical Officer 
in 1914. From 23 July to 7 December 1915 he was Medical
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Officer and Acting District Officer at Gizo. From 5 January 
to 11 October 1925 be was Medical Officer, Gizo District, 
during which, from 8 January to 6 July, he was also Acting 
District Officer.
CURRY, Horatio Douglas
Born 30 April 1893- Came to the B.S.I.P. in March 1915 as a 
Cadet. He was Acting District Officer at Gizo from 25 May to 
24 June 1915? from 6 December 1915 ho 8 March 1917? and from
19 April to 9 September 1917- He was transferred to Tanganyika 
in 1922.
EDGE-PARTINGTQN, Thomas William
Born 28 August 1883« From December 1896 to March 1898 he 
attended Dartmouth naval school. From February 1899 to June 
1902 he served on HMS Orlando. He joined the Royal Naval 
College but failed to pass for Lieutenant in June 1904. He 
met Mahaffy in London and decided to come to the Solomons to 
take up planting. He stayed with Mahaffy at Gizo for several 
months and when the latter left for Fiji he was appointed 
Peace Officer in Charge at Gizo. In December 1904 he was made 
a District Magistrate, and in August 1905 a Deputy Commissioner. 
His period at Gizo was interrupted from August 1905 to January 
1906 (when he was Acting Resident Commissioner), from 13 May to
20 July 1908 (sick leave), and from 1 June to 12 August 1909 
(vacation leave). In September 1909 he was transferred to 
Malaita, and in 1915 he resigned.
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FRANCIS, Clifford. Claude
Born 10 January 1889. After service with the Government of 
Fiji he came to the Solomons in June 1912 as a Cadet. On 13 
October 1919 be replaced Barley as District Officer, Gizo.
Apart from a period as Acting Resident Commissioner (6 October 
to 23 November 1922), he remained at Gizo until 20 October 1923, 
when he took leave. In 1925 he was seconded to the New 
Hebrides.
GILLAN, Frank
Came to the Protectorate in February 1900 as provisional 
Assistant to the Resident Commissioner. From 21 September 
1900 to 31 January 1901 he was Acting Officer in Charge at 
Gizo, after which he left the Protectorate.
HAZELTON, William Henry
Arrived in the B.S.I.P. as Assistant to the Resident Commission­
er in January 1901. He was Acting Officer in Charge at Gizo 
from 10 December 1901 to 14 March 1902, and from 21 January 
to 7 June 1903? when he left the Protectorate because of ill- 
health. He returned in October 1903, and appears to have 
resumed his position as Acting Officer in Charge at Gizo.
He resigned on 8 April 1904 to go into trading.
HILL, Robert Brodhurst
Came to the B.S.I.P. in 1909 after having served with the 
Army in India. He was appointed District Magistrate at Gizo, 
began work there in December 1909, and continued in that 
position until 13 February 1915, when he was transferred to
Tulagi. Hill was absent from Gizo (on leave) on the following 
occasions: 8 February to 17 April 1911? 1 November 1912 to 21 
February 1913? 19 February to 13 April 191A.
MacDERMOT, ?
Born 1869- Spent sixteen years in Australia cattle droving 
and fruit growing before coming to the Protectorate. From 
16 March to 10 June 1903 he held a provisional and temporary 
appointment as mate ofthe Government vessel Lahloo. On 13 
June 1903 he was made Acting Officer in Charge at Gizo, and 
seems to have remained there until Hazelton's return in 
October 1903- He resigned in June 190A.
MAHAFFY, Arthur William
Born 22 October 1869- Educated at Marlborough and Oxford, 
where he obtained a B.A. in 1891- Spent four years as a 
subaltern in the Royal Munster Fusiliers, and in 1893 was 
appointed a Government Agent and Resident Officer in the Gilbert 
and Ellice Islands. In December 1897 he accepted a temporary 
appointment as Assistant to the Resident Commissioner of the 
B.S.I.P., and arrived in the islands in January 1898. In 
December 1899 he was stationed at Gizo as Resident Magistrate 
and a Deputy Commissioner of the Western Pacific. He retained 
this position until September 190A, when he was appointed 
Colonial Secretary of Fiji. Mahaffy was absent from Gizo 
on leave on the following occasions: 21 September 1900 to 
A February 1901, 10 December 1901 to 1A March 1902, 23 January 
1903 to 26 May 190A.
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MIDDENWAY, Arthur
Born 26 February 1878. Served with Government of Fiji from 
1913 to 1921 , when he was appointed a Deputy Commissioner for 
the B.S.I.P. On 10 December 1923 he was appointed District 
Officer, Gizo, and remained there until 8 January 1925 when he 
took leave. He was transferred to Isabel when he returned in 
September 1925-
PATTISQN, Charles Richard Maitland
Born 8 November 1879- After previous service in Fiji he was 
appointed a District Medical Officer in the B.S.I.P. in 
January 1923- On the 23 March 1923 he was stationed at Gizo 
as District Medical Officer. He remained there until 5 
January 1925, when he took leave. He was later removed because 
of excessive drinking.
SYKES, A. Tasman
Born 29 March 1864 . Arrived in B.S.I.P. in December 1906 as a 
Labour Inspector (probationary). He was Acting Officer in 
Charge at Gizo from 13 May to 20 July 1 9 08 , and from 18 October 
to 28 November 1909- He was suspended, and then dismissed,for 
drunkenness in 1910.
WALSH, Allen W.
Born C .1870 . On 27 April 1910 he was stationed in the Marovo 
Lagoon as a Police Officer. He took leave from 6 September 
to 12 November 19^1 , and in February 19^2 was transferred to 
Malaita. He resigned in 1913-
APPENDIX IV
THE POPULATION OF THE NEW GEORGIA GROUP
There are no reliable figures for the population of 
the islands prior to the late 1920s. After having spent some 
time in the area in 1893-4, Somerville estimated the population 
of the Roviana Lagoon to be between three and four thousand 
people. Hocart estimated the population of Simbo to be about 
400 in 1908. These appear to be the only attempts to calculate 
numbers based on observation, rather than wild guesswork. In 
the late 1920s the administration began to keep tally with 
births and deaths and made rudimentary counts of population.
Year Births Deaths Population
1926 199 205
1927 184 179 6,276
1928 182 126
1929 158 147 6,330
1930 205 130 6,475
1931 141 148 6,424
1932 153 89
1933 203 93
1934 137 111
1933 255 150 7,203
1936 198 93 7,306
1937 249 96 7,460
1938 237 91 7,688
1939 206 94
1940 212 62 7,866
The first detailed description of the population and its 
distribution was in 1930; the District Report for that year 
gave the following figures:
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No. of
Area Villages Males Females Total
North New Georgia, 
Marovo Lagoon, 
Vangunu & Nggatokae 32 964 887 1,851
Vella Lavella 22 769 623 1,392
Roviana Lagoon 10 505 415 918
Kolombangara & 
Vona Vona Lagoon 9 257 227 484
Simbo 5 241 199 440
Ranongga 5 515 471 986
Rendova 6 227 177 404
89 3,478 2,997 6,475
The 1930 total of 6,475 represented an increase of 145 over the 
1929 figure (6,330), while the natural increase for 1930 had 
been 55- The extra 90 were explained as being the result of 
the return to the Group of local islanders who had been else­
where in the Protectorate, and of emigration from Choiseul.
In 1931 the first proper census was taken, 
produced the following figures:
Males 
over 16
1,904
Females 
over 16
1 ,702
Males 
6 to 16
1,035
Females 
6 to 16
823
Males 
under 6
507
Females 
under 6
453
This
Total 
6,424
of allThe Census also enumerated the occupation and religion 
males over 16:
Occupation Religion
Government Employees 66 Methodists 1,268
Plantation Labourers 1 Adventists 630
Boats Crew 22 Pagan 6
House Servants 5Teachers 140
Carpenters 2
Farmers 1 ,420
Pagan Priest 1Convicts 2
Aged 245
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The 1931 Census  was by no means e n t i r e l y  a c c u r a t e .
Not o n ly  a r e  t h e r e  i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  i n  t h e  f i g u r e s ,  but i t  
a l s o  a p p e a r s  t h a t  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  number o f  p e o p le  were n o t  
c o u n te d .  I n  1935 t h e  D i s t r i c t  O f f i c e r  made a c a r e f u l  check  of  
t h e  p o p u l a t i o n .  The n e t  i n c r e a s e  ( b i r t h s  o v e r  d e a t h s )  from 
1932 t o  1935 had  been  303,  which  when added  t o  t h e  1931 Census  
t o t a l  o f  6 ,4 2 4 ,  gave a  r e s u l t  o f  6 ,7 2 7 -  I n  1935 t h e  D i s t r i c t  
O f f i c e r  c o u n te d  7 ,2 0 3  p e o p le  i n  t h e  Group,  and c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  
t h e  Census had  m is s e d  a b o u t  f i v e  h u n d re d  p e o p l e .  However, he 
does n o t  seem t o  have made any a t t e m p t  t o  d e te r m in e  t h e  e x t e n t  
o f  e m i g r a t i o n  t o  t h e  New G e o r g ia  Group i n  t h e  1932-5  
p e r i o d ;  t h i s  may have  a c c o u n te d  f o r  some o f  t h e  d i s c r e p a n c y .
D e s p i t e  i t s  i n a c c u r a c i e s ,  t h e  1931 Census i s  t h e  
o n ly  d e t a i l e d  p r e - w a r  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  
p o p u l a t i o n  of  t h e  Group: i t  l i s t s  e ach  v i l l a g e  i n  t h e  i s l a n d s  
and g i v e s  t h e  number o f  i t s  i n h a b i t a n t s .  The f o l l o w i n g  
t a b l e  g i v e s  t h i s  i n f o r m a t i o n .  The numbers g iv e n  t o  e ach  
v i l l a g e  have b een  d u p l i c a t e d  on Map V I I I  a s  a g u id e  t o  t h e i r  
l o c a t i o n .  The a s t e r i s k  (* )  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  e x a c t  l o c a t i o n  
o f  t h e  v i l l a g e  i s  n o t  known, a l t h o u g h  i t s  g e n e r a l  l o c a t i o n  h as  
been  g iv e n  and i t  h a s  been  p l a c e d  on Map V I I I  a c c o r d i n g l y .
The r e l i g i o u s  a d h e r e n c e  of  each  v i l l a g e  h a s  been  i n d i c a t e d  by 
t h e  l e t t e r s  M ( M e t h o d i s t ) ,  A ( A d v e n t i s t )  and P ( P a g a n ) .
No. V i l l a g e L o c a t i o n  ( I s l a n d ) Pop. R e l i g i o n
1. Pen ju k u N ggatokae 83 A
2. Sombiro Nggatokae 51 A
3- K a v o l a v a t a N ggatokae 19 A
4. Mbiche Nggatokae 33 A
5- M b i l i M in janga 38 A
6. Mbopo V angunu 43  - M
7- H i n a t a k i s i V angunu 30 M
8. S a i r a Vangunu 42 M
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No. Village Location (Island) Pop. Religion
9. Kokoana Vangunu 26 A
10. Jopulopa *Vangunu 34 A
11. Mamburana Vangunu 15 A
12. Tombulu Vangunu 27 M
13. Mbisuana V angunu 55 A
14. Cheke V angunu 39 A
15. Matagara *Vangunu 64 M
16. Patutiva V angunu 146 M
17. Telina Telina Island 72 A
18. Huleo Huleo Island 56 M
19. Mbambata Marovo Island 32 A
20. Sasaghana Marovo Island 38 A
21. Viru SE New Georgia 73 A
22. Limbo SE New Georgia 28 A
23. Govaro Makato SE New Georgia 90 M
24. Nono SE New Georgia 90 A
25. Chuchulu SE New Georgia 44 M
26. Mbambana *SE New Georgia 27 M
27. Mbuini Mbuini Tusu 33 A
28. Mburongo Mburongo Island 40 M
29. Keru Keru Island bb M
30. Mbukombuko Ramata 54 A
31. Tusumine Tusumine Island 64 A
32. Kolumbaghea N New Georgia 50 M
33. Mase N New Georgia 62 A
34. Menakasapa N New Georgia 200 M
35. Hambere Kolombangara 46 A
36. Vavanga Kolombangara 29 A
37. Ghatere Kolombangara 79 A
38. Hunda Kolombangara 80 M
39. Sambira Kolombangara 23 A
40. Nusa Simbo Nusa Simbo 90 M
41. Patusoghara Simbo 111 M
42. Ove Simbo 44 M
43. Karivara Simbo 57 A
44. Tapurai Simbo 42 M
45. Masuru Simbo 78 M
46. Kundu Ranongga 227 M
47. Lungga Ranongga 214 M
48. Mburi Mondo Ranongga 312 A
49. Sambala *Ranongga 81 M
50. Kumbokota Ranongga 129 M
51. Sosolokamu Vella Lavella (Ndovele) 85 A
52. Kaukoasi Vella Lavella (Ndovele) 26 A
53.- Roroakale Vella Lavella (Ndovele) 20 M
54. Menggonlu Vella Lavella (Ndovele) 104 A
55. Suanatali Vella Lavella (Ndovele) 39 A
56. Tambama Vella Lavella (Ndovele) 16 P
57. Paraso Vella Lavella (Ndovele) 17 M
58. Njava Vella Lavella (Njava) 150 M
59. Sirumbai Vella Lavella (Sirumbai) 96 M
60. Mbeiporo Vella Lavella (Mbilua) 17 M61. Niarovai Vella Lavella (Mbilua) 70 M
62. Eleoteve Vella Lavella (Mbilua; 92 M
63. Maravari Vella Lavella (Mbilua) 80 M
64. Pakeveto *Vella Lavella (Mbilua) 13 M
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No. Village Location (Island) Pop. Religion
69- Mbarakoma Vella Lavella (Mbilua) 81 M
66. Vonunu Vella Lavella (Mbilua) 96 M
67. Esorolando Vella Lavella (Mbilua) 12 M
68. Sambora Vella Lavella (Mbilua) 21 M
69. Supat0 Vella Lavella (Supato) 96 M
70. Mandejavanga Vella Lavella (N;jorio) 115 M
71. Bangarangara Vella Lavella (Njorio) 80 M
72. Timbala Vella Lavella (Iringgila) 20 M
73. Mbomboe Kohinggo 35 A
74. Sambana Vonavona 19 P
75. Mamburana Mamburana, Vonavona Lagoon 80 M
76. Sipisai Sipisai, Vonavona Lagoon 111 M
77. Londu Maho SE New Georgia (Munda) 112 M
78. Kekehe SE New Georgia (Munda) 69 M
79. Ndunde SE New Georgia (Munda) 216 M
80. Kakia Kakia, Roviana Lagoon 63 A
81. Nusa Roviana Nusa Roviana, Roviana Lagoon 107 M
82. Ndoki Ndoki Bethlehem, Roviana Lagoon 144 M
83. Mbaraulu Honiavasa, Roviana Lagoon 50 M
84. Nusa Hope Nusa Hope, Roviana Lagoon 76 A
85. Saikile Ndora, Roviana Lagoon 75 M
86. Mujama *E Roviana Lagoon 4 M
87. Vanga Rendova (Ughele) 30 M
88. Mburuko Rendova (Ughele) 128 A
89. Fatoani Rendova (Lokuru) 76 M
90. Rano Rendova (Lokuru) 89 M
91. Ou Rendova (Mbaniata) 24 A
92. Mbaniata Rendova (Mbaniata) 69 M
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